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ABSTRACT r 
The Labour Party and Family Income Support policy, 1940- 
79: an examination of the party's interpretation of the 
relationship between Family Income Support and the 
By: Alan Pratt 
labour market. 
The first two chapters examine the party's policy towards 
the wage-stop and the poverty trap. Until 1963 the party 
ignored the wage-stop but from then until 1975 a section 
of the party campaigned against the regulation expressing 
moral revulsion and concern about its administration but 
only rarely opposition to the principle. A Labour 
government removed the stop when its operation affected 
only a tiny minority of families. The party was quickly 
involved in the development of the poverty trap debate 
being particularly drawn to its disincentive 
characteristics, but Labour governments, like their 
Conservative counterparts, soon came to regard the idea 
as a mere statistical abstraction. 
After confirming the party's historical ambivalence about 
Family Allowances the thesis demonstrated that whenever 
it advocated allowances it did so because it believed the 
programme would alleviate family poverty rather than 
augment work incentives. However Labour governments 
consistently upheld the principle of substitutability, 
thus conferring de facto support on that less-eligibility 
dimension of Family Allowances which Macnicol has 
established informed the coalition government's decision 
to legislate for the programme in 1945. 
Despite the party's opposition to Family Income 
Supplement it became an important element in the Labour 
government's anti-poverty strategy after the Child 
Benefits debate in 1976. E. I. S. was criticised because 
of its contribution to the poverty trap and its potential 
for assisting in the pauperisation of the low paid, 
while Child Benefit was supported because it appeared to 
be a more equitable technique of delivering support to 
families with dependent children although some in the 
party were sensitive to the scheme's potential link with 
improved work incentives. 
In general. the Labour Party is seen to have failed to 
develop any coherent and sustained alternative to the 
ideas and programmes of its political opponents in this 
critical area of social policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
SCOPE, -CONTENT, METHOD AND SOURCES 
For whatever reason or combination of reasons (altruism, 
social control and economic efficiency are ones that 
immediately come to mind) all countries in the western 
industrial world have developed more or less 
sophisticated systems of social provision. An important 
element in the range of services available is the 
variety of cash benefits provided to families in respect 
of dependent children. Thus Britain is neither unique 
nor unusual in possessing the complex apparatus of a 
'welfare state'. Indeed, in the case of family income 
support payments, by comparison with other members of 
the E. E. C. this country can fairly be described as a 
late developer in terms of the generosity and scope of 
the financial aid given. 
it is also true that in democratic - welfare 
capitalist economies wage levels are determined by the 
interaction of market forces (the supply of, and demand 
for labour, the productivity of labour etc. ) with what 
can best be described as institutional forces (trade 
union organisations, minimum wage legislation etc. ). 
Equally significant is the fact that wages are also 
fixed without regard to the numbers of dependents on 
each wage, for to bring in such issues as the presence 
of dependent children would be to attack the very 
i 
essence of the labour market. As Enoch Powell said in 
the Second Reading debate on the Family Income 
Supplements Bill: 
'... it is an act of fateful consequence to pay 
relief - cash supplementation of income - to 
persons in full-time employment; ... it is 
something which is bound profoundly to distort 
the wage system and to frustrate the ambition, 
which seems to me to be almost indissociable from 
the idea of a free society - that a man should 
receive as neyl)as may be the full value of his 
work in cash'. 
At the same time, against these commonplaces of liberal 
political economy, has to be set the work of social 
investigators from Booth onwards which has consistently 
shown that a combination of low wages and dependent 
children has always carried with it a high risk of 
poverty. Consequently, as governments came to accept a 
greater responsibility for the management of economic 
and social affairs, the relationship between income from 
employment and the demands on that income occasioned by 
the presence of dependent children has been a recurring 
item on the political agenda. From the little that has 
been said so far it can be appreciated that policy 
makers have been subjected to conflicting pressures. 
There is irrefutable evidence that for many thousands of 
families, income from work is simply not enough to 
achieve what social convention or even officially 
designated poverty lines deem to be a tolerable level of 
living. Opposed to this is the belief that fear of 
physical privation is the most effective work incentive. 
I 
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The resolution of this dilemma has been a major problem 
of social policy throughout the era of industrial 
capitalism, and it has been a particular problem for the 
British Labour Party. 
It is not the purpose or intent of this thesis to 
examine the ideological differences that have 
characterised the component parts of the Labour Party 
since its creation as the Labour Representation 
Committee in 1900. A number of excellent historical 
analyses have been produced in this vein by, amongst 
others, Nairn 
(2), 
Coates 
(3), 
and Howell 
(4) 
with the 
latter being particularly valuable from a social policy 
perspective because of the use he makes of such material 
in his examination of changes over time in the party's 
political orientation. Rather, it ought to be 
sufficient for present purposes, to recall the very 
different nature of the organisations which combined in 
their historic mission in 1900, and whose traditions 
still resonate in the party. Of the three socialist 
societies involved, one, the Social Democratic 
Federation, established by Hyndemann in 1881, was 
explicitly Marxist and advocated the revolutionary path 
to social transformation, the Fabian Society was 
evolutionary and elitist and the Independent Labour 
Party 'working class in its social composition and 
utopian socialist in outlook'(5). The remaining 
participant in this endeavour, the trade union movement. 
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generally accepted the established framework of society 
and was content to work for improvements in wages and 
conditions of employment. Each of them brought its own 
distinctive view of the Labour Party and the most 
appropriate strategy for building a new society. 
Uniting these disparate and often conflicting strands is 
the image that the Labour Party has of itself as a party 
of social justice and redistribution, a party committed 
to the abolition of the poverty experienced by many of 
the party's supporters, especially in the early years of 
its existence. Figures as different in general 
political outlook as Crosland 
(6) 
and Bevan( 
) both made 
the attack on poverty a central theme of their credos. 
The conquest of poverty became a symbol which could be 
relied on to unite a party which throughout its history 
has experienced periods of internecine warfare. As 
Banting(8) has observed, within the Labour Party there 
is a pervasive assumption that whatever else it stands 
for, the Labour Party is 'about poverty'. Poverty is a 
common touchstone for Labour M. P. 's who disagree about 
almost everything else. 
'Even when due allowance is made for rhetorical 
excess. concern for the poor w(ý5 clearly part of 
Labour's self-identification'. 
From the beginning the possibilities open to the Labour 
Party in its struggle against poverty were shaped by its 
decision to operate within the parameters of 
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parliamentary democracy. Everything it did and 
considered doing was affected by this simple fact. To 
translate its aspirations and ideals into policy 
realities the party had to win power and govern as a 
majority administration in its own right or in 
partnership with any other party with which it could 
forge some agreement. Winning political power demanded 
the creation of a large and reliable base of support in 
a political culture that already possessed a range of 
deeply entrenched attitudes and predilections reflective 
of the hegemony exercised by liberal political economy. 
In the short-term it could not afford to ignore these 
attitudes, and if it was to succeed in the medium to 
long-term it would have to accommodate itself to them or 
create a countervailing set of values attractive to a 
wide range of electoral support. 
One of the prejudices of political culture alluded to 
above focused on the relationship between low wages and 
benefit income. It was based firmly in the idea of 
rational economic calculation and the psychology of 
incentives. Any worker was bound to make a comparison 
between the relative attractions of work and not 
working. If state provided income in periods of 
sickness or unemployment approached or reached the level 
of low earnings, then to be true to the tenets of 
established orthodoxies the low-paid worker especially 
was inevitably susceptible to the attractions of 
V 
voluntary unemployment. In this world, everyone, rich 
and poor alike, made rational, marginal calculations 
about positions of maximum economic advantage. 
Consequently, the major objective of state policy had to 
reside in ensuring that the gap in income between 
earnings and sickness or unemployment benefit was as 
large as possible, so that work incentives could be 
maintained and, if possible, improved. The abolition or 
even' alleviation of poverty made this objective rather 
more difficult to achieve. As Beveridge noted in the 
Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services, the only 
ways to do this were either to set benefit rates below 
subsistence level or to introduce a system of Children's 
or Family Allowances. 
(10) 
The provision of universal Family Allowances, and its 
direct successor Child Benefits, is expensive and 
obviously possesses important consequences for the level 
of taxation. Vertically redistributive taxation has 
always been a professed objective of the Labour Party 
but it has to bear in mind the possible political 
repercussions of advocating anti-poverty measures so 
demanding of public expenditure that their financing 
could only be achieved by imposing increased taxation on 
average or middle-income earners, crucial elements in 
that political base essential to the party's success. 
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Between 1940-79 the Labour Party was in power during the 
years 1945-51,1964-70 and 1974-79, and between 1940-45 
it was a partner in the coalition government led by 
Winston Churchill. Thus, it has held office in its own 
right or shared it with other parties for some twenty 
two of the forty years covered by this investigation. 
Faced with these problems of family income support 
policy in a capitalist economy and in conditions of 
parliamentary democracy with the need to establish an 
effective basis of electoral support, how has the Labour 
Party responded? Has it challenged the dominant value 
system with its stress on incentives and the superiority 
of market outcomes? Has it placed the needs of families 
above these considerations? Has it behaved in any 
significantly different way from the Conservative Party? 
This thesis is devoted to an examination of a relatively 
narrow but vitally important area of social politics. 
It seeks to lay bare the nature of the Labour Party's 
interpretation of the relationship between family income 
support policy and the labour market, particularly in 
the area of incentives and disincentives to work. 
Given the nature and substance of this thesis' focal 
concerns it is inevitable that a number of other 
interesting and important issues appear which in another 
context would themselves warrant a more comprehensive 
and rigorous analysis than can be attempted here. Four 
in particular are worth identifying which for a variety 
z 
(vii) 
of intellectual and practical reasons are not addressed 
in any significant manner. These are the possibility 
of minimum wage legislation. the whole question of the 
relationship between short-term benefits and earnings. 
the position of women and intra-family distribution of 
income. and finally the relationship between the Labour 
Party and a variety of interest groups active in the 
poverty debate. 
A national minimum wage has been periodically canvassed 
since the beginnings of industrial capitalism in 
Britain. Indeed it is significant that the other 
possibility considered by the Speenhamland 
magistrates in their meeting at the Pelican Inn in 1793. 
was a minimum wage for agricultural labourers. That 
they chose allowances in aid of wages to deal with the 
immediate crisis facing them is a matter of history; 
that they discussed a minimum wage is both interesting 
and relevant for our purposes. As a mechanism for 
coping with the needs of families with low-earning heads 
and dependent children a 
, 
minimum wage has obvious 
possibilities. Indeed it was considered but rejected by 
the Labour government in 1969 largely because of the 
boost it would allegedly give to wage costs and through 
them to the retail price index. and thus constitute a 
possible threat to the economy's international 
competitiveness. However. because a minimum wage would 
be paid to all ualifin& workers-; -with or -without 
(viii) 
children, it has to be excluded from any detailed 
consideration here. This thesis is concerned with 
family income support policy, and consequently the 
presence or otherwise of dependent children has to be 
the critical factor determining the inclusion or 
exclusion of any programme or concept. 
As with the minimum wage question so with the broader 
matter of the connection between low earnings and short- 
term benefits. The traditional concern of liberal 
political economists had always been to prevent benefit 
income in periods of sickness or unemployment from 
exceeding low earnings so that work incentives might be 
protected. For us this becomes directly relevant as it 
is manifested in the arena of family income support 
policy in, for example, the wage-stop debate, and in the 
potential of universal forms of family support for 
preserving or augmenting work incentives. Hence the 
relationship between short-term benefits and low 
earnings is only examined in a partial sense in so much 
as it is relevant to the discussion of family income 
support policy and the labour market. 
From the beginning of discussion about family income 
support policy in the twentieth century the impact of 
such programmes on the position of women has been a 
major issue. In both the Family Allowances and Child 
Benefit schemes, whether the man or the woman was to be 
(ix) 
the nominal payee provoked no little controversy while 
very early in the life of Family Income Supplements 
women lone parents formed over half of all recipients. 
The importance of this question has been reflected 
recently in the work done on the feminisation of poverty 
and its significance must not be understated. This point 
notwithstanding though it has to be remembered that this 
thesis is concerned with the relationship between Family 
Income Support policy and the labour market as a whole. 
not with parts of that labour market characterised by 
gender. Incentives are taken to be a general 
theoretical construct, thus no attempt is made to 
examine the Labour Party's sensitivity to this 
particular dimension of the wider issue. To have done 
so would have meant producing a very different piece of 
research. one that could not have been contained within 
established practical boundaries. 
The interface between pressure groups and -political 
parties in the generation of new social programmes is 
interesting and relatively under-researched. Despite 
the fact that interest groups have been very active in 
the discussion of family income support policy and the 
reality that many of such groups' most authoritative and 
influential representatives have been Labour Party 
members or supporters, this work only touches on the 
party's involvement with relevant pressure groups in 
those instances where the thesis' core concerns are 
(X) 
affected. Once again. to have done otherwise would have 
resulted in an outcome very different from that intended 
and almost impossible to contain within acceptable and 
realisable boundaries. 
For these reasons the issues identified immediately 
above are excluded from examination here. The sole 
concern of this thesis is the investigation of the 
Labour Party's understanding rhetoric and practice in a 
critical area of social politics. 
METHOD AND SOURCES 
The method used to achieve the objectives of this 
research is disarmingly simple to state. In essence it 
is an empirical investigation largely based on primary 
source materials in the archives of the Labour Party. 
It is a model of analysis that has been given an 
impressive and powerful expression in de Ste. Croix's 
recent major contribution to Marxist historiography. 
'The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World'. 
particularly when he quotes approvingly from Brunt that: 
'The most fundamental instinct that leads us to 
seek historical knowledge is surely the desire 
to find out what actually happened in the p 
... we then naturally go on to inquire why'. 
(Brunt's emphasis) 
Apart from the imagination and rigour of the analysis 
the successful consummation of this approach is to a 
large extent dependent on the quality of the sources 
available. An enormous amount of secondary source 
(xi) 
material exists on the Labour Party but relatively very 
little of it is concerned with social policy. and of 
that only a tiny proportion is relevant to the central 
concerns of this research. Much the most important part 
of --the work that follows is based on primary sources 
contained in House of Commons Hansard. Labour Party 
Annual Conference Reports* the party's published policy 
statements and. most important of all. a vast amount of 
unpublished research papers and memoranda generated by 
the party's policy making procedures and kept in the 
archives at Walworth Road. Although the party usually 
operates a fifteen year rule governing access to this 
material all the relevant documents for the period 1940- 
79 were made available for this research. a concession 
that was both generous and invaluable. 
To some extent the nature of the source material 
determines what can be written: interpretation and 
speculation can only be taken so far before credibility 
is snapped. In this context it is important. to note 
that a lot of the material examined here is culled from 
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public primary sources such as House of Commons Hansard 
and. to a much lesser extent. the Labour Party's Annual 
Conference Reports. Given the realities of political 
life these publicly reported occasions force certain 
restraints'and attitudes on to politicians. The public 
position or response does not always necessarily reflect 
the truth. 
(xii) 
If other, more private. sources exist. for example in 
the form of confidential memoranda or posiHort papers. 
then an important extra dimension is added to the 
analyst's armoury. In these circumstances it becomes 
possible to be more certain about the real concerns and 
objectives of those people involved in the development 
of party policy. While this research is not over- 
dependent on public primary sources because of the 
confidential archive materials made available. the 
thesis should be read with the knowledge that in some 
places the major source available was Hansard thus 
making relevant the caveats noted above. This is 
particularly so in the section on the wage-stop largely 
because the party's archives contain hardly any 
material on the issue. 
ORGANISATION 
The first two chapters address issues of general 
relevance to the whole of family income support policy. 
Chapter One examines the Labour Party's policy towards 
the wage-stop, that modern manifestation of less- 
eligibility which aroused a good deal of anger in the 
party and whose sole purpose was to ensure that income 
from benefit never exceeded earnings. In Chapter Two 
attention focuses on the poverty trap, an issue which 
came to prominence in the late 1960's as political 
(xiii) 
parties on both left and- right became increasingly 
interested in selectivity as the most appropriate 
technique for the allocation of scarce resources. 
Chapters Three to Five look at the three major forms of 
family income support developed in Britain since 1940, 
Family Allowances, Family Income Supplement, and Child 
Benefit. They are discussed in the chronological order 
of their appearances even though the end of Family 
Allowances merges with the beginning of Child Benefits. 
Given the overlap between all three programmes there is 
real justification for a chronological, analytical 
narrative since to some extent one thing does happen 
after another. Each individual chapter has a final 
concluding section which attempts to pull together the 
major findings relevant to the thesis' major concerns, 
and there is a separate section on general conclusions 
at the end which offers an overview of the broad pattern 
of change and development. 
(xiv) 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE WAGE-STOP: 1940-1975 
It'has been suggested that the defining characteristics 
of the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 were less 
eligibility, the workhouse test, centralisation and 
uniformity. 
(1) 
The last three of these were 
essentially administrative devices. leaving less 
eligibility as the most significant manifestation of 
that classical political economy which provided the 
inspiriting philosophy of the whole enterprise. Edwin 
Chadwick, Nassau Senior and the other authors of the 
1834 Poor Law Report made no secret of their 
ideological convictions and their use of supportive 
evidence consequently tended to the selective rather 
than objective. This is particularly evident in that 
section of the report which discusses the principles of 
administering relief to the indigent. The language 
could hardly be less ambiguous: 
t 
'The first and most essential of all conditions, 
a principle which we find universally admitted, 
even by those whose practice is at variance with 
it, is that his situation on the whole shall not 
be made really or apparently so eligible as the 
situation of (ýýe independent labourer of the 
lowest class'. 
Should this principle be breached though. 
'Such persons, therefore, are under the strongest 
inducements to quit the 
labourers and enter the 
paupers. The converse 
less eligible class of 
more eligible class of 
is the effect when the 
pauper class is placed in 
below the condition of the 
its proper position 
independent labourer. 
1 
Every penny bestowed that tends to render the 
condition of the pauper more eligible than that of 
the indepe fgnt labourer. is a bounty on indolence 
and vice'. 
As the nineteenth century progressed the Poor Law's pre- 
eminence gradually diminished as central and local 
government took on more and more responsibilities for 
social provision, but throughout this period the 
principle of less eligibility remained a dominant theme. 
J. C. Davy's evidence to the Royal Commission on the Poor 
Law in 1906 is eloquent testimony to its continuing 
hegemony. (4) and it remained to shape the nature of 
social assistance as successive governments struggled to 
come to terms with the political and social consequences 
of chronic, mass, involuntary unemployment during the 
inter-war years. In contrast to less eligibility the 
localism that had been such a feature of English poor 
relief policy since the sixteenth century received a 
major blow with the creation of the Unemployment 
Assistance Board (UAB) in 1934. It was left to this new 
organization to cope with the tensions inherent in a 
system that sought to reconcile national definitions of 
needs with the realities of local labour markets. 
The national system of unemployment assistance created 
in 1935 was extended in 1940 ii«tct I'IL-j 1o 
Oita. Ciq-Q pýttSIGNS , NAJ . 
COýFR V t1S1. QcýS' lSiýýq 
ývüW vjd. 
and the UAB was renamed the Assistance Board. The 
transformation was completed in 1948 when the Assistance 
Board became the National Assistance Board in the 1948 
National Assistance Act as Britain achieved the first 
national social assistance scheme in Western Europe. 
Throughout all these changes in provision. scope and 
title the principle of the wage-stop remained unaltered. 
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The UAB was in no doubt that the wage-stop was an 
expression of the doctrine of less eligibility. a view 
later endorsed by Victor George when he described the 
wage-stop as 
'obviously a modi(S) ed version of the principle of 
less eligibility' 
Stein was rather more circumspect in his assessment of 
the relationship between the stop and less eligibility. 
His initial judgement 
to condemn a portion 
sub-poverty in 
that at first 
similar to less 
always referred 
order 
was that the regulations appeared 
of the lowest paid to perpetual 
to maintain work incentives and 
glance the wage-stop appeared 
eligibility. 
to 
to be 
In theory less eligibility 
the lowest existing wage and thus 
provided a standing 
yielded greater 
incentive to work since work always 
income. 
Stein, the wage-stop could 
Consequently, according to 
be viewed as 'no-more-than- 
equal eligibility'. and he reiterated the Supplementary 
Benefits Commission's claim that it was not intended to 
be an incentive to work. Its basis lay in equity, the 
reasoning being that it would be 
'unfair to the man who was working but whose 
income was less than the Supplementary Benefit 
I- 0. wg Q -s-ýoP _ ýIý'oº1 ºýJeýýý claýýýAt' ýo ý RC4 Iý _Nl0º'& vx 
ÖQ &Q 1 I'^ (7 VI-1 ý Jos 
ýio 
ý G. Q l as rh 11 -- -1-, ýý ý-A Io DA Q- &N I, ý3 ff 
level if his counterpart(6)ho was unemployed 
received more in benefits. 
Having reviewed these possibilities Stein concluded that 
it was not so easy to dismiss the incentive 
characteristics of the wage-stop as the Supplementary 
Benefits Commission imagined. The wage-stop might place 
a man on the point of indifference between work and non- 
work, and leave to the control procedures the task of 
overcoming a natural preference for leisure under those 
circumstances. It also reduced the positive 
disincentive to work even though at the ethically 
uncomfortable cost of forcing claimants to live at 
levels below those laid down by Parliament as 
subsistence incomes for others. Anyway, the distinction 
between an incentive and a non-disincentive was one of 
degree rather than kind. 
(7) 
The operation of the wage-stop under the UAB aroused 
considerable public and parliamentary interest. and it 
remained an issue up to 1940 but thereafter discussion 
tailed off. An examination of House of Commons Hansard 
from 1948 onwards indicates that the first, formal 
exchange about the wage-stop took place on March 4th, 
1963, between Barbara Castle and Margaret Thatcher who 
was then the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of 
Pensions and National Insurance. 
(8) 
The initial thrust 
4 
of Castle's question was to get information about the 
numbers of families affected by the wage-stop, the 
number of dependent children in these families, and the 
number who had had their benefit reduced by more than £1 
weekly and by more than £2 weekly as a consequence of 
the operation of the rule. Thatcher's reply indicated 
that in December, 1962, there were 25,000 families so 
affected, containing 100,000 children. 10,000 had had 
their benefit reduced by between £1 and £2, and 3,000 by 
more than £2 a week. 
(9) 
At this stage, Barbara Castle's main preoccupation 
seemed to be that thousands of children were being 
penalised because they lived in large families whose 
father was an unskilled worker on a low wage. She was 
particularly concerned that this would encourage or do 
nothing to prevent the child neglect which it was the 
purpose of the Children and Young Persons Bill then 
before Parliament to address. She also asked Thatcher 
whether she would see if special children's allowances 
could be paid under the Bill in cases where the wage- 
stop was applied. 
(10) 
Mrs. Thatcher completely ignored 
these questions and requests and approached the wage- 
stop from an entirely different perspective. 
'What the answer shows is that National Assistance 
scales have risen so rapidly týfj) they have 
overtaken some minimum wage rates. ' 
5 
By implication, benefit levels were too high at the 
bottom end of the wage scale. Nowhere in this brief 
discussion did Castle question the principle or 
existence of the wage-stop. Rather, it was the results 
of its operation in terms of child neglect and poverty 
caused by deliberately keeping people below the National 
Assistance scale rates which themselves were 
'the barest minimum 
standards of decency'fU2)bringing 
up a family in 
She contented herself with asking for the regulation to 
be changed rather than making any outright demand for 
its abolition. 
It was the beginning of 1964 before Labour M. Ps renewed 
their interest in the wage-stop. This time they were 
anxious to get from the government detailed information 
about the methods used by the National Assistance Board 
to assess workers' earning capacity for purposes of 
wage-stop administration. Answering for the government. 
Joseph Godber said that employment exchanges offered the 
Board advice about an unemployed worker's probable 
earnings in the occupation for which he was registered. 
They also supplied on request information about local 
wages. 
(13) 
When a Labour M. P. asked that national 
criteria be applied in order to ensure justice. Godber 
continued to emphasise the primacy of the local labour 
market and the wage rates obtaining there. 
(14) At this 
point it is perhaps interesting to speculate about the 
6 
similarities between Godber's stress on local labour 
markets and the localism of the Poor Law finally 
abolished by the 1948 National Assistance Act. Another 
Labour M. P.. Mr. Lawson, was worried by the way in which 
wage-stopped men were being medically re-classified out 
of their registered occupations into occupations where 
they had no chance of getting a job and were then wage- 
stopped at the lower level associated with the new 
job, 
(15) 
Once again there was no critique of the 
principle of the wage-stop. It was the way in which it 
was administered that most engaged the interest of 
Labour's representatives. 
This was the theme of Labour's next foray, in April, 
1964. The substance of their questions to the 
government lay in the attempt to get more generous 
treatment for wage-stopped workers and their families, 
and also to draw attention to what they regarded as 
injustices in the operation of the rule, especially in 
the treatment of overtime earnings and production 
bonuses. 
(16) 
The most interesting part of Margaret 
Thatcher's response was her restatement of the wage 
stop's underlying philosophy. 
'... a person should not get more by way of 
assistance than he would get if he were to start 
work in 117) occupation for which he is 
registered'. 
Thatcher's articulation of the wage-stop principle 
provides an interesting lead into the next stage of 
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Parliamentary debate, because for the first time since 
1948 this saw the emergence of a clash of ideology 
between a leading figure in the hierarchy of the Labour 
Party and the Conservative government. Barbara Castle 
began her comments by citing the case of one of her 
constituents who had had his national assistance cut 
because of the wage-stop. 
(18) After explaining the 
Board's treatment of this case Thatcher raised the 
stakes by asking Castle if she was challenging the 
principle of the wage-stop or its application in this 
particular case. If she was challenging the principle 
then she was saying that 
'this man should(ýy)paid more than if 
he were in work' 
Castle replied by accepting that the rule had been 
properly applied to her constituent. She was 
challenging not the administration of the wage-stop but 
the principle on which it was based. When low wages 
were widespread the wage-stop could not be reconciled 
with the humane treatment of a family with five children 
(20) Pushing the point (the case of her constituent). 
further Mrs. Thatcher contended tht wage levels were 
fixed without regard to family dependents whereas 
National Assistance was, but 
'the principle is absolutely defensible that a man 
should not receive more when he is of work 
than he can get by returning to work'. 
Castle's attack on the principle of the wage-stop was 
supported by another Labour M. P. (Mr. Mitchinson) when 
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he questioned the continued existence of a rule which 
forced families to live below National Assistance scale 
rates. 
(22) 
Having extracted this admission from such a 
senior Labour figure as Barbara Castle. Mrs. Thatcher 
was in no mood to pass up the opportunity thus provided 
to make whatever political capital she could. 
'For the first time we appear to be getting from 
the Hon. Members opposite a fairly clear 
enunciation that the Labour Party, if it were to 
be returned to office would pay a man more when he 
is out of(2w. 5rk, than he would get if he returned 
to work'. 
Not all Labour speakers went as far as Castle and 
Mitchinson. Later on in the debate they contented 
themselves with asking for information about the numbers 
affected by the wage-stop in areas of Scotland, while 
one of them, Mr. Lawson went so far as to say that he 
was not opposed to the wage-stop in principle but its 
application in some cases. 
(24) 
Similarly. Margaret 
Herbison's contribution was directed at the 
administration of the regulation rather than its 
principle. 
(25) 
This latter point takes on added 
ar I i"I ; th'v 4 
significance given Herbison's appointment^pensions and 
National Insurance (and later as the first Minister of 
Social Security) in the government formed by Harold 
Wilson later in the year. In retrospect one can be 
grateful for this early example of Margaret Thatcher's 
commitment to liberal political economy and for her 
highly developed political instincts. She knew that 
Labour's sympathy for the poor, especially those whose 
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poverty was deliberately intensified by the application 
of the wage-stop could lead some Labour members into a 
position where they could be shown to favour giving 
people more in benefits than they formerly received in 
wages. She was also clearly aware that this conflicted 
with some long-term prejudices of British political 
culture. The response she elicited from Castle and 
Mitchinson confirmed her political judgement. 
Thirteen years of Conservative government ended on 
Friday, October 18th, 1964, when the Labour Party 
secured an overall majority of five seats, thus 
providing Harold Wilson with the opportunity to dispute 
Attlee's belief that it was impossible to maintain an 
effective government with an overall majority of less 
than ten. Wilson had no doubt that he could do this 
even though he would be operating within very difficult 
circumstances. 
(26) 
This was the political context for 
the next phase of discussion about the wage stop; a 
Labour government which in the run up to the election 
had left little doubt that it would initiate wide- 
ranging reforms in the social security system. A major 
part of Labour's strategy for reform was the institution 
of a review of the whole of social security, necessarily 
including the wage-stop as Margaret Herbison explained 
in her answer to Willie Hamilton's request for 
information about the numbers of wage-stopped 
families. 
(27) 
She stressed that the living standards of 
10 
those affected were a matter of great concern to her and 
it was a problem to which the government was giving 
urgent consideration. 
(28) The administration of the 
wage-stop continued to figure prominently in the minds 
of Labour M. P. s and Lena Jeger in particular drew 
attention to the fact that many affected by the stop 
were almost unemployable and had been out of the labour 
force for a long time. Moreover, local offices of the 
National Assistance Board were not using realistic 
figures for normal earnings as a basis for calculating 
the amount of benefit payable. 
(29) 
The Minister assured 
Lena Jeger that these and other matters were being 
discussed by the government with the Board. 
(30) 
These relatively mild exchanges were overshadowed two 
months later, on 24th May, 1964, when a Liberal, Russell 
Johnston, asked whether the Ministers of Pensions and 
National Insurance intended to abolish the wage- 
stop*(31) whilst a Conservative, Mr. Curran, asked if 
the review of the wage-stop had been concluded. 
(32) 
The 
Parliamentary Secretary, Norman Pentland, replied that 
the review was still in progress and he was unable to 
say what might happen until the review was 
completed. 
(33) 
Johnston was not happy with this answer 
and he hoped that Pentland's reply did not indicate that 
'... the views highly critical of the wage-stop 
expressed by member 1- 41of 
his party before the 
election will change 
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Pentland replied that the government was fully aware of 
all that was involved in the wage-stop, but its 
existence, and the difficulties caused by it, were only 
a small part of the general problem that the incomes of 
many low wage-earners with medium or large-sized 
families were below the appropriate National Assistance 
scale rates. The problem was currently being examined 
by an official inter-departmental committee. 
(35) 
In March 1963,19,000 unemployed men out of a total of 
121,000 unemployed men receiving National Assistance 
were wage stopped 
(36) 
and Pentland had to face a series 
of questions from Labour M. P. s representing 
constituencies in areas where the incidence of low pay 
was higher than the national average (Tyneside and 
Norfolk in this case). One of them, Mr. Rhodes, asked 
Pentland what is one of the key questions for this 
analysis. Did he have any evidence that 
'the retention of tý7)wages stop policy forces 
people to seek work? 'l 
t 
Pentland's reply was as evasive as his earlier response 
to Russell Johnston. The government was fully conscious 
of all the problems involved in the wage-stop and was 
looking at the matter very carefully* 
(38) 
Pentland's reluctance to give a straight answer to 
Rhodes was compounded when his Minister. Margaret 
Herbison. observed that while local managers of the 
12 
National Assistance Board had no discretion over the 
principles governing the wage-stop, it was the 
principles, especially in their impact on children, that 
gave the government 'very great worry'. She went on to 
say that because the government was aware of the 
'occasional' harshness of the operation of the wage-stop 
its review of policy was impelled by a determination to 
find a remedy, especially 
'... one which will make things less hard for the 
children( 315th of employed and unemployed wage- 
earners. 
Thus, in response to a number of direct questions, 
Herbison and Pentland avoided giving any commitment to 
abolish the wage-stop, using the government's review of 
social security policy as a convenient cloak to mask 
their reluctance to face openly the issues raised by 
Johnson and Rhodes. Herbison's announcement of the 
government's intention to find a solution to the poverty 
suffered by children of both employed and unemployed low 
wage earners amply demonstrated her reluctance to take 
the simple step of abolishing the wage-stop. Abolishing 
the wage-stop would only remove one small part of the 
problem and such action would almost certainly expose 
the government to the accusation that Thatcher had 
earlier levelled at Barbara Castle, of being willing to 
give more income in periods of unemployment than was 
available from employment. When faced with the same 
dilemma a generation earlier Beveridge had favoured 
I 
children's or family allowances as the perfect policy 
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prescription. Herbison also showed political skill in 
stressing that her concern was for the welfare of 
children in wage-stopped families, rather than for the 
family heads themselves. After all, no-one wished to 
punish children for their parents' poverty. 
The wage-stop figured prominently in debates on the 
Ministry of Social Security Bill in May and June of 
1966. which was designed to remodel the system of social 
assistance by replacing National Assistance with 
Supplementary Benefits; the National Assistance Board 
by the Supplementary Benefits Commission and. nearly a 
quarter of a century after Beveridge's recommendation. 
finally introducing a Ministry of Social Security* 
(40) 
In opening the Second Reading debate Margaret Herbison 
specifically acknowledged that the Bill did not address 
the problem of securing a reasonable standard of living 
for the low wage earner with a large family whether he 
was in or out of work. Because the 'exclusion from 
benefit' provisions of the Bill precluded the man in 
full-time employment from receiving benefit it followed 
that a wage-stop provision was still necessary 
'to ensure that the unemployed man is not better 
off financially when oý4tl)of work than when he is 
doing his normal job'. 
She described the 15,000 families then wage-stopped as 
representing only 'the tip of the iceberg' since 
Ministry of Labour estimates indicated that there were 
between 200,000 - 300,000 families in which the father 
14 
was in full-time work and receiving income below the 
National Assistance Board's scale rates, stressing once 
again the government's perception of the linkage between 
poverty and families with an employed or unemployed low 
paid head. However, the government had no intention of 
shelving this 'very serious problem' and as evidence of 
its concern she pointed to the impending survey to be 
conducted by her Ministry into the financial 
circumstances of 2,750 families with two or more 
children. Information from the survey would guide the 
policy to be developed for this whole group. 
(42) (This 
survey was published in July, 1967, as 'Circumstances of 
Families'). 
Herbison's explanation failed to impress the 
Conservative Opposition and Mervyn Pike was quick to 
remind the Minister of the Labour Party's scorn for the 
wage-stop before the election, and she recalled 
Herbison's observation in 1963 that thousands and 
thousands of decent families were being penalised by the 
F 
wage-stop. Miss Pike's solution would have been to add 
a supplementary family allowance to those whose income 
fell below a certain figure. 
(43) 
The ambivalence characterising Labour's approach to the 
wage-stop was best captured by Peter Archer. His speech 
was both confused and confusing. Taking up the question 
of the 200,000 - 300,000 breadwinners in full-time jobs 
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earning rates of pay less than National Assistance scale 
rates, ARcher observed that 
'I am not sure that I follow the argument that 
they must not be paid more to stay away than they 
earn at work. Surely this is precisely what we 
are doing now, and these people would(4ty better 
off if they decided not to go to work'. 
The only conclusion that one can draw from this is that 
Archer had not heard of the wage-stop, or if he had 
heard of it, that he did not understand it., He went on 
to castigate the 
'Speenhamland fallacy of providing emkWers with 
cut-rate labour on a subsidised basis' 
but at the same time rejected the whole basis of less 
eligibility 
'that these unhappy people will not work unless 
social benefits are made less attractive than the 
worst possible working conditions... The argument 
appears to be that the rich will not work unless 
you make them richer and th149? or will not work 
unless you make them poorer'. 
Having considered and rejected both allowances in aid of 
i 
wages and less eligibility Archer concluded that it was 
unfair and unwise to penalise a man who was prepared to 
work for lower rewards than he could get from 'charging 
his family to public funds. 
(47) 
Although Archer's 
speech was not a model of clarity it did raise a number 
of crucial and possibly contradictory issues that the 
government would have to face at some time. How could 
the matter be resolved without incurring the reduction 
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of work incentives allegedly consequential on giving low 
paid family heads more in benefit than they could get 
from work, without treating unfairly those currently at 
work and in receipt of wages less than National 
Assistance scale rates, and without forcing people 
deliberately into more intense poverty by the 
application of some notion of less eligibility like the 
wage-stop? 
For others on the Labour benches the solution was clear 
and the problems not at all intractable. After drawing 
attention to the estimated 60,000 children living in 
wage-stopped families, and expressing his concern about 
the effect this would have on their education, David 
Winnick made one of the clearest and most unambiguous 
statements of political principle to have emerged thus 
far. 
'I do not believe that any socialist can justify 
the continuation of the present practice of this 
kind of discrimination against people who earn a 
low income. I hope that it will be possible for 
the wagWPop to be abolished within a very short 
period. 
This socialist concern was echoed in rather more muted 
terms by Maruice Macmillan for the Opposition. He 
reminded the Labour Party of its former condemnation of 
the 
'heartlessness gf)the wage-stop as applied by the 
wicked Tories'. 
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but apparently this was to continue. The wage-stop had 
always been a harsh regulation and it was wrong that the 
government had missed an opportunity to do something 
about, it. It wasn't good enough for the government to 
say that it had not had enough time in office to do 
anything. The Ministry of Social Security Bill provided 
it with an ideal chance to take action and the 
government had missed the opportunity. 
(50) 
Winding up the debate for the government Norman Pentland 
recognised the concern of many M. P. s from both sides of 
the House that the Bill did nothing about the wage-stop. 
But, he said, it was essential that the question be kept 
in a proper perspective, particularly so in that the 
rule itself did not cause poverty. Pentland's rationale 
for this statement is interesting, and worth quoting in 
full. 
'The wage-stop ensures only that a man is not 
better off out of work than he would be when at 
work... In my view. the hardship is caused in the 
first place by(5t e low earnings which the man is 
paid at work'. 
In one sense Pentland's comment is a truism since the 
i 
wage-stop simply reflected the low earnings in the 
labour market. but at the same time it seems a 
remarkably complacent observation for a Labour minister 
to make. Clearly implied is the conclusion that the 
labour market was sacrosanct and there was nothing that 
the social security system could or should do to 
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challenge or abrogate the market's settlements. As he 
said later. 
'the fact that there has to be a wage-stop at all 
shows that some people in regular work have 
earnings (5ýýich fall below National Assistance levels'. 
The Bill's failure to deal with the problems of the 
lower paid workers' families was not because the 
government did not recognise the extent of their need 
but simply that it did not have enough facts about the 
circumstances 'of these unfortuante people'. It 
preferred its policies to be based on data rather than 
hypotheses and the data would be provided by the survey 
already announced. 
(53) 
The issues which surfaced during the Second Reading 
debate continued to dominate during the Committee stage, 
although on occasions the government was to be rather 
more forthcoming in discussing them. Margaret Herbison 
repeated her admission that the Bill did nothing to 
solve the problem of the wage-stop, adding that the 
solution to all the problems of family poverty would 
have to await the completion of the circumstances of 
families survey and the government's 'study of the whole 
question of how best to relieve child poverty' . 
(54) 
Her 
personal preference was for a child endowment scheme but 
she stressed that no solution was ruled out. 
(55) 
In 
response to an amendment to Schedule 2 of the Bill moved 
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by Maurice Macmillan calling for an extra family 
allowance for low paid families(56) she argued that this 
might produce possible disincentive effects as the 
means-tested family allowance was withdrawn following 
increased earnings. In what can be seen as a very early 
public manifestation of the possible existence of a 
poverty trap she suggested that Macmillan's proposal 
'might cause a lack of incentive in certain aEFTs 
and one would have to be careful about that'. 
Herbison's awareness of the function of the wage-stop in 
discouraging voluntary unemployment was made abundantly 
clear in her reply to the Liberal Eric Lubbock's 
warning about the evil of people on benefit getting more 
income than would be the case if they were in 
employment. 
(58) 
Lubbock was obviously ignorant about 
the nature and operation of the stop and Herbison 
reminded him that the wage-stop prevented his fears from 
coming to pass. That was what it was for. If what he 
had said had any existence in fact he would have made a 
most telling point. 
(59), Herbison's comments are a 
significant event in this analysis of Labour attitudes 
to the wage-stop. Here we have a Labour government 
openly accepting the traditional disincentive arguments 
against allowing people to get more from benefit than 
they would from work. Whatever its consequences in 
forcing people to live below even the minimal standards 
of existence laid down by the National Assistance Board, 
the wage-stop regulation performed a vital role in 
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governing the relationship between low wages and benefit 
income, and, by implication, a wider role in maintaining 
the supremacy of a particular view of what motivated 
people to work. The significance of Herbison's comments 
seems to have escaped most people during the debate, 
even Lena Jeger who was one of the most prominent Labour 
contributors to the proceedings of the Committee. 
Almost the whole of Jeger's speech on the wage-stop was 
devoted to its administration rather than its principle. 
The particular case which inspired her general concern 
about the 'adjustment to normal earnings' requirement 
involved a man who had been out of work for a very long 
time after having spent 
'... a long period in a mental hospital, who was 
rehabilitated as far as he ever will be, but who 
remaine7a very inadequate person, a poor 
worker. (my emphasis) 
She went on to ask for clarification of the treatment of 
the long-term sick suggesting that there had been a 
practice under the National Assistance Board (but no 
regulation or rule) of reviewing such wage-stopped cases 
after six months. She wanted the government to clarify 
certain administrative practices to make the situation 
clear to everyone involved in the wage-stop arena. 
(61) 
It may be stretching interpretation of Jeger's words to 
an unacceptable degree, but her identification or 
inadequate, poor workers and the long-term sick as being 
deserving of better treatment can be seen as suggesting 
indirectly the introduction of a deserving/undeserving 
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dichotomy in the wage-stop population. This view gains 
some support from what. for present purposes. is the 
most interesting and relevant part of her speech when 
she argued that a 
'strong case can be made for an adjustment to 
earnings fW s not to discourage people from going 
to work'. 
There was though no need to use the wage-stop for this 
purpose since voluntary unemployment could be 
discouraged by wider use of Clause 30 of the Bill which 
gave the minister powers to deal with people who 
wilfully refused employment. 
(63) 
She offered no 
challenge to the disincentive characteristics of the 
wage-stop. Instead. these aspects of the rule were 
deliberately endorsed. What there is. is a suggestion 
of preferential treatment for claimants with particular 
hardships. It is not totally fanciful to say that the 
major thrust of her proposals was to punish the 'work- 
shy' but be more generous to those who in former days 
had been described as the 'impotent' poor. 
She wanted all wage-stopped cases to be reviewed after 
six months because of the desperate financial 
circumstances that such families were reduced to. By 
allowing the wage-stop to continue for a long time 
people were forced into a chronic poverty from which 
they could never escape. 
(64) Despite the realisation of 
the intensity of the problems faced by wage-stopped 
families Jeger still refused to call for its abolition. 
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She was content simply to question its continued 
application over the long term. The proposed review 
after six months operation should be informed by 
detailed knowledge of the local labour market, including 
data on changes in the pattern of normal earnings and 
the structure of employment, together with an awareness 
of changes in family circumstances. It might then be 
possible for a reviewing officer to find 
'other supplementary ways of bringing the kind of 
discretion TH) assistance which should be 
possible'. 
The essence of Jeger's position was one of using the 
system, of reforming it, of giving people (or at least 
the most clearly deserving people) the most generous 
treatment possible. It reflected the dilemma facing all 
members of the Labour Party. The wage-stop prevented 
the unemployed low paid, at the bottom of the income 
distribution scale, and often in the most marginal and 
insecure jobs, from receiving the levels of assistance 
provided by the state as its de facto poverty line. It 
reinforced the poverty of the, low-paid, but no matter 
what the abhorrence genuinely felt by Jeger and others 
at the consequences of this element of social 
assistance, they knew that to remove it completely would 
raise the spectre of encouraging voluntary unemployment, 
reducing work incentives, and of ultimately threatening 
the work ethic itself. Unspoken by Jeger, but doubtless 
present in her mind, was the certainty. of the political 
capital that the Conservative Party would garner from 
such an outcome. 
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As he had during the Second Reading debate, David 
Winnick took a very different position. Apart from his 
quasi-sub-cultural observations on the number of 
children there &pp c viz.! to be in wage-stopped families.. 
('Most employees or ex-employees subject to the wge- 
stop - perhaps it is natural with poverty-ridden 
families - have a large number of children')(66), 
Winnick's speech was a forthright condemnation of the 
principle of the wage-stop. It was unacceptable, and he 
could see no good reason why it ought to continue. The 
least that could be done for wage-stopped. families would 
be to adopt Lena Jeger's suggestions, but Winnick made 
it very clear that these were second best solutions. 
Abolition was the only answer, 
'As long as there are people subjected to the 
wage-stop our conscie gy as Members of Parliament 
cannot be very clear' 
In a short but effective speech Frank Hooley displayed a 
repugnance for the wage-stop equal to Winnick's. His 
brief experience as a member of a National Assistance 
Board appeals tribunal had left him 'astounded and 
horrified' at the way the wage-stop worked. So much so 
that he was 
'so startled that I challenged the officer as to 
whether he was operating the provisi%%) correctly 
and was assured that it was the law'. 
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The whole idea of normal earnings on which the stop 
rested was in many cases arbitrary. illogical, and 
unjust, particularly when a worker through illness or 
injury was unable to return to his former occupation and 
was re-classified as a labourer with low 'normal 
earnings' and thus drawn into the wage-stop's 
operations. He was very sorry that the wage-stop had 
been incorporated into the Ministry of Social Security 
Bill and hoped that some technical means would be found 
of removing it from the social security system at the 
earliest possible opportunity. 
(69) 
Although the pre-eminent concern of this research is 
with the spread of opinion about the wage-stop within 
the Labour Party it is interesting to note the extent of 
agreement that existed between Labour's wage-stop 
critics and some leading repreentatives, even front- 
bench speakers, from the Conservative Opposition. 
Mervyn Pike's speech provides a prime example of this 
incongruity. She deliberately associated herself with 
the comments made by Lena Jeger and other Labour 
speakers, and when reminded by David Winnick that the 
previous Conservative government had done nothing to 
abolish the wage-stop she responded by saying that the 
present Bill was 'a wonderful new opportunity' to take 
action and that 
'The fact that things were not done in the past 
for reasons which we all accept is no reason why 
we should not now recognise the situation and use 
our resctJces to meet the priorities 
properly'. 
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This would appear to be a fairly unconditional 
rejection by Miss Pike of the wage-stop and all its 
works but it is not entirely clear to what extent her 
wishes were totally representative of opinion within the 
Conservative Party. Nor is it clear what she meant by 
claiming that past Conservative governments had not 
abolished tt he stop "for reasons which we all accept". 
This might refer to the presumed relationship between 
the benefit system and voluntary unemployment. but 
whatever the truth of this her speech is equally blank 
about why those reasons were no longer valid. It may 
have been, as Winnick implied. because the Conservative 
Party was now in opposition. 
Margaret Herbison herself took responsibility for 
replying to these criticisms of the wage-stop. Before 
observing and commenting on her speech it is important 
to establish at the outset that there can be no doubting 
the depth and sincerity oý her commitment to fight 
poverty. Her later career is adequate testimony to 
this. Clearly, how the wage-stop was treated would have 
some significance in this struggle even though the 
numbers affected were never large by comparison with 
other sectors of the poverty population. Hence the cost 
of abolition was never a serious problem. Her reaction 
to the speeches noted above must therefore be 
significant in the attempt to understand as clearly as 
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we may Labour's developing stance on the wage-stop 
issue. She began by considering the request for a 
review of each case after six months' operation and 
argued that the result of this amendment would be to 
limit the wage-stop's application to only those first 
six months. After that the wage-stop would cease to be 
applied. 
'... and those concerned would receive the full 
amount even if that maýyl)them better off than 
wtieii Gney were 1A WULic. 
I 
She reiterated Pentland's comment during the Second 
Reading debate that the wage-stop itself did not cause 
poverty since it simply limited benefit income to work 
income, describing it as a 'most valid point'. 
(72) 
Even though low wages rather than the wage-stop caused 
the problem she saw no reason to accept David Winnick's 
suggestion that higher wages might possibly be the 
solution. The government did not have the time to wait 
for negotiations to take place on this between unions 
and employers; it felt that it had to act much more 
quickly than that. Furthermore she gave him a 
guarantee that higher wages for the low paid was not 
the solution the government was looking for, even 
though many of the low paid deserved higher wages. For 
all these reasons, and those given by Pentland on 
Second Reading, she could not accept the end of the 
wage-stop after an initial six months application. 
(73) 
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In December 1965, some 15,000 families were affected by 
the wage-stop but Herbison regarded these as 
representing merely 'the tip of the iceberg' of the 
real problem. Her explication of the real problem and 
its significance for our major concerns is worth 
considering in some detail. 
'We are concerned not only about those 15.000 
families, but the other 200,000 or 300,000 
families where the fathers are in full-time work 
with incomes below the National Assistance Board 
level. The government are deeply concerned about 
the position of such families. particularly the 
children, (syi? ther the breadwinners are in or out 
of work'. 
She claimed that she had stressed this concern 
throughout the Bill's proceedings and the government's 
determination to find a'solution would be aided both by 
the thought that it had given to the question since it 
came to power and by the survey into family 
circumstances which would begin the following week to 
be completed in a fortnight. Although she accepted 
that the wage-stop was the biggest social security 
problem facing the country she was unable to accept the 
amendment moved by Lena Jeger. She concluded this 
section of her remarks by repeating her assertion that 
the only way of dealing with the problem was by a 
better form of family endowment regardless of whether 
the man was in employment or not. 
(75) 
Obviously this 
commitment to a family endowment scheme has fundamental 
implications for work incentives and voluntary 
unemployment because of the way it impinges on the 
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relationship between the labour market and the benefit 
system. 
Finally she turned to Jeger's second amendment which 
sought to prevent the Supplementary Benefits Commission 
from applying the wage-stop to any case other than that 
of the unemployed claimant required to register for 
employment as a condition of receiving assistance. She 
recalled that the practice of applying the wage-stop to 
the person who was temporarily sick had always been 
present under the National Assistance Board, all that 
the Bill did was to put into statutory form u. t had 
previously been administrative practice. The wage-stop 
could not be applied to anyone who was considered to be 
out of the labour market and not required to register 
for employment. Consequently it did not apply to the 
long-term sick, the chronic sick, and widows or other 
women who had care of children. She assured the 
Committee that the Supplementary Benefits Commission 
would continue to look at. the relevance of normal 
earnings and to changes in local earnings. 
(76) 
She 
ended by dragging the House back to what she had 
already identified as the central and crucial element 
of the whole issue. 
'Finally, may I say that no tampering with the 
wage-stop would get to the root of the problem. I 
am convinced tht the only solution is a form of 
family endowment. The more that this is spoken 
about in(7ýhe country, the better I shall be 
pleased'. 
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Thus assured, Lena Jeger withdrew her amendment. 
The Ministry of Social Security Bill provided the 
occasion for what, up to that time, was the most 
sustained Parliamentary and public debate about the 
wage-stop. Margaret Herbison made not a single 
concession to any of her critics' concerns about the 
government's decision to continue with the rule as an 
essential feature of the social assistance system 
envisaged by the Bill. The wage-stop was to remain. 
Why did the government do this in the face of 
opposition from its own supporters and substantial 
elements of the Conservative Party given its, and 
especially Margaret Herbison's commitment to help the 
poor? 
It is clear that the government accepted, at least in 
part, the traditional disincentive arguments against 
removing the wage-stop. As Margaret Herbison remarked 
in the process of rejecting. the amendment calling for a 
review of each wage-stop case after six months, to do 
this would in effect have meant the abolition of the 
wage-stop with the concomitant acceptance of claimants' 
income in benefit being greater than income from full- 
time employment. 
The inference was that no government could ignore this 
possibility. Apart from this fundamental point two 
other related features stand out in Herbison's 
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rationale of the government's decision to retain the 
wage-stop. The first of these is her undoubted concern 
that the 15,000 wage-stopped families were only the 
minor, visible part of some 200,000 to 300,000 families 
denied access to social assistance because the head was 
in full-time employment even though earnings were below 
assistance scale rates. On this point it is worth 
noting the vagueness of the government's knowledge 
about the size of this part of the poverty population. 
Hence its insistence on the importance of its survey 
into the financial circumstances of families with two 
or more dependent children. The second point is that 
for Margaret Herbison the only acceptable solution was 
to move towards a better system of family endowment 
regardless of whether the family head was in employment 
or not. This is exactly the justification given by 
Beveridge for his support of children's allowances in 
the 1942 report. Nothing that she said can be 
construed as meaning anything other than that she 
accepted also Beveridge's underlying analysis that the 
only way to maintain work incentives and tackle family 
poverty was to develop children's allowances for all, 
employed and non-employed alike. This would make as 
large as possible the gap between earnings and benefit 
income thus augmenting work incentives without forcing 
the non-employed below the poverty line. The element 
of continuity between Beveridge and Herbison is most 
illuminating and is indicative of the similarities 
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between his reformist liberal-capitalism and Labour's 
version of socialism. 
The Ministry of Social Security Bill would seem to have 
temporarily exhausted parliamentary appetites for 
further discussion about the wage-stop. Apart from two 
cursory responses by Norman Pentland to fairly routine 
questions(78) it was to be almost a year before Labour 
backbenchers put any further pressure on the 
government. In April 1967, David Winnick returned to 
the attack and asked Margaret Herbison if the 
government had any plans to abolish the wage-stop, at 
least for the sick and disabled* 
(79) 
Winnick was 
supported by Frank Alison who argued that if the 
purpose of the wage-stop was to discourage the 
malingerer it could hardly be applied to the disabled 
and long-term sick. 
(80) 
Doubtless Winnick's and 
Allaun's sympathies were with all the wage-stopped but 
it is interesting to see them take up a theme that had 
arisen before. They were asking for the sick and 
disabled to receive better treatment than the able- 
bodied unemployed and in so doing paid obeisance to the 
traditional classification of the poor into the 
deserving and the undeserving. Herbison's answer was 
to repeat her by now familiar refrain that the only way 
to help such families was to provide assistance when 
the father was in or our of work as the government 
proposed to do. 
(81) 
This was to be Margaret Herbison's 
last comment on the wage-stop as Minister of Social 
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Security because she resigned from the government in 
June 1967 after a long and bitter dispute with the 
Treasury and Callaghan's allies in Cabinet about the 
future shape of family income support policy. 
Obviously she took her commitments seriously. 
Herbison's successor as Minister for Social Security 
was Judith Hart, formerly Minister of State at the 
Commonwealth Office. Her first foray into the wage- 
stop controversy was in response to a question from 
Frank Allaum calling for the suspension of the stop in 
the coming autumn given the prospect of higher 
unemployment in winter. Hart reiterated the main lines 
.I 
of the argument developed by her predecessor. 
'The wage-stop rule reflects the problem of low 
earnings. It is these which account for seven- 
eights of family poverty. The Supplementary 
Benefits Commission and I are at present 
examining possible 8Wiýys of softening the 
impact 
of the wage-stop'. 
( 
This encapsulates the nature of the dilemma facing the 
Labour government. By ' its own admission the 
combination of low pay and dependent children was 
responsible for almost ninety per cent of family 
poverty, therefore the simple question facing the 
government with its often and loudly trumpeted concern 
for the poor and their children, was how to eradicate 
this demonstrable evil. A number of possible 
strategies existed which had already been alluded to 
during the debates on the Ministry of Social Security 
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Bill, amongst them a minimum wage (which it had 
rejected), a proper system of child endowment which had 
been Margaret Herbison's preference and whose non- 
consummation had led to her resignation and the 
theoretical possibility of providing direct cash 
subsidies to workers with low wages and dependent 
children. This latter, radical initiative was to 
manifest itself in 1970 in the Family Income 
Supplements Bill and together with the whole question 
of family allowances and child benefits it forms a 
subsequent major part of this research. For the moment 
though, the government was left with the wage-stop and 
what to do about it. 
The party's anxiety about the wage-stop eventually 
surfaced in a paper produced for the Home Policy Sub- 
Committee in September, 1967. 
(83) 
It is not without 
interest that this would appear to be the first time 
that any of the party's internal position papers and 
memoranda made any mention of the wage-stop in the 
post-war period. The text of the document contains the 
observation that the wage-stop regulations 
'... continue to cause acute hardship. Recent 
figures showed that one third of the unemployed 
with children who were receiving ash%: 45tance were 
subject to those cruel regulations. ' 
The government was clearly faced with a contradiction 
that lies at the heart of reformist social democracy. 
Janus like it had to face two ways at once. Its 
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decent. compassionate instincts were offended by the 
consequences of the wage-stop. but to abolish it would 
be to offend against the orthodoxies of the economic 
and social philosophy which had exercised hegemonic 
power throughout the epoch of capitalist industrial 
society. Faced with this reality the government 
promised to examine ways of softening the impact of the 
wage-stop. 
The Labour government's social security policy during 
the 1964-70 period was characterised by a predilection 
for committees of inquiry of various kinds, and the 
wage-stop itself was the subject of an internal review 
published as 'The Administration of the Wage Stop'. 
(85) 
The impending and actual publication of this report was 
to be the focus of the next stage of discussion. 
Judith Hart fended off questions from Frank Allaun and 
Willie Hamilton about plans the government might have 
for the abolition of the rule by asking them to be 
patient and wait for the review to appear. 
(86) 
It was 
eventually published on December 4th, 1967, and 
contains a clear and unequivocal statement about the 
intent of the regulation. 
'The purpose of the wage-stop is not to provide 
an incentive to a man to get work. The wage-stop 
does not require a man to get less when receiving 
Supplementary Benefit than he would get when 
working. What it does is to ensure that an 
unemployed man's income is no greater than, } 
would be if he were in full-time employment'. 
(report's emphasis) 
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Because benefit could not be paid to a man in full time 
work to bring his income up to Supplementary Benefit 
levels it would be wrong in equity to bring the income 
of a man with low earning capacity up to Supplementary 
Benefit levels just because he was unemployed or 
temporarily sick when there was nothing that could be 
done for his counterpart in full-time work* 
(88) 
Problems associated with the wage-stop would only end 
when all families, irrespective of whether the father 
was working or unemployed, could be assured of an 
adequate income. Until that position was arrived at 
there would continue to be a need for the combined 
approach of universal and means-tested benefits. The 
heart of the problem stemmed from the existence of low 
wages associated with family responsibilities. 
(89) 
Judith Hart's presentation of its findings and 
recommendations provides a comprehensive picture of the 
government's public position. In essence the proposals 
were about making the administration of the regulation 
more humane rather than with a call for its abolition. 
Hart pointed out the Commission's contention that the 
problems inherent in the wage-stop were a consequence 
of low-wages combined with family responsibilities, 
'... and that the wage-stop is nott95'erefore. in 
itself a cause of family poverty'. 
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As noted earlier, Norman Pentland and Margaret Herbison 
had already spoken this part of the script so a change 
of minister did not of itself produce any new lines. 
She welcomed the Commission's recommendation that the 
rule should be administered as sympathetically as 
possible and briefly outlined the changes that were 
intended to achieve this. The most significant 
alteration was the way in which estimations of normal 
earnings were calculated. Up to then the practice had 
been to base such assessments on local average earnings 
in the. absence of any other evidence. Henceforth the 
Commission would use the rates fixed by the National 
Joint Council for Local Authorities (Manual Workers) 
and it was anticipated that in many areas this would 
produce a higher rate of normal earnings and 
consequently a reduction in the wage-stop's scope of 
operations. Earnings rates would be kept continuously 
under review rather than considered twice yearly. The 
Commission would no longer make a deduction of 35p for 
intangible work expenses in its estimation of earnings, 
and the practice would cease of deducting the full 
amount of the earnings of the-wife of a claimant with 
wage-stopped benefit. Where the wage-stop was applied 
in cases of temporary sickness the period of six months 
used as a measure of the temporary nature of sickness 
would be reduced to three months, whilst the Commission 
was also considering removing the requirement to 
register for work, and thus become liable to the wage- 
stop, from blind people who had been continuously 
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unemployed for two years. All wage-stopped cases where 
there was an element of disability would be reviewed 
and the Commission would also examine the question of 
whether people who were 'virtually unemployable' should 
be required to register for work as a condition of 
receiving benefit* 
(91) 
These changes in the 
administration of the wage-stop provide further 
evidence of the government's implicit acceptance of the 
classification of the poor into the traditional 
deserving and undeserving categories. Certainly the 
changes made in the treatment of the unemployed wage- 
stopped claimant would increase benefit levels but they 
were demonstrably not as generous as the treatment 
given to the sick, partially disabled, and blind. Once 
again poor law values had asserted themselves. 
The Minister was also concerned that some wage-stopped 
claimants were not receiving all of the other benefits 
to which they were entitled, especially rent and rate 
rebates. The SBC would be instructing staff to make 
sure that claimants understood their entitlements and 
would also help them to apply. Hart's concern was to 
make these means-tested, selectivist elements of the 
governments social policy work better. 
(92) 
Her statement received a mixed reception from Labour 
M. P. S. All of those who spoke welcomed the relatively 
more generous and humane treatment provided by the new 
regulations, but some, like David Winnick(93) and Frank 
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Ho6ley, 
(94) 
re-asserted their previous opposition and 
regretted that the wage-stop had not been abolished. 
Responding to Hooley's request that benefits in respect 
of dependent children be excluded from wage-stop 
calculations, Hart revealed the core of her position on 
the wage-stop's principle. She said that the Commission 
justified the wage-stop in very different terms now 
than when it was originally introduced. Then it was 
intended of be a deterrent to voluntary unemployment 
and an incentive to enter the labour force. The 
justification offered now was that its continuation was 
necessary in order to be fair to men in work as against 
men not in work. 
'This new }yýyrpretation makes a great deal of 
difference'. 
It would be easy to describe this shift of position as 
specious casuistry but objectivity demands that the 
temptation be resisted. It is not inappropriate though 
to ask that if the government wished to be fair to men 
in work why did it not take other action such as the 
implementation of a minimum wage and/or more generous 
levels of family allowances? Why persist in 
victimising the sick or unemployed low wage earner, 
albeit in a more sympathetic and humane manner? 
Whatever the improvements offered by the detailed 
changes in the regulations, the logic of the wage-stop, 
the underlying policy imperative, was still to make 
work more attractive by making benefits less eligible. 
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While she was positively effusive about the more 
liberal administration of the wage-stop there was no 
expression of regret or remorse that it had not been 
removed completely. 
Although the report may have temporarily assuaged 
critics in the parliamentary party, the anti-wage-stop 
campaign continued to resonate in the wider party, and 
at the 1968 conference a resolution was presented 
calling for the abolition of the wage-stop. Resolution 
254, moved by Mrs. S. Bartlett for Eastleigh C. L. P. 
said: 
'This Conference, in view of the rising cost of 
living, as well as the increased pool of 
unemployed, urges the Government to take further 
steps to alleviate the conditions of those 
children in families who are below subsistence 
level. As a first step the wage-stop imposed by 
the Minisrriy6) of Social Security must be 
abandoned'. 
Mrs. Bartlett linked the demand for abolition with the 
two increases in Family Allowances that had taken place 
that year and with the findings of the 'Circumstances 
of Families' report showing that over half a million 
children were living in poverty, some of them kept 
there by the operations of the wage-stop. 
'In other words, we have found 197ye the poor are 
and we are making them poorer'. 
The wage-stopped were not getting any benefit from the 
Family Allowance increases since the social security 
regulations took them into account when calculating 
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benefit levels. After a short debate Conference 
refused to accept the NEC's request to remit, and 
despite the NEC's further recommendation to oppose, 
passed the resolution. 
(98) 
Apart from being the first 
time in post-war history that conference had actually 
debated the wage-stop, Resolution 254 was also 
significant because, as Minkin notes, between 1956-70 
it was one of only nineteen defeats suffered by the 
NEC, an indication perhaps of the strength of feeling 
in the party. 
(99) 
The NEC's unhappiness about Conference's desire for 
abolition is further reflected in the various drafts of 
the document on social policy that was eventually 
published in August, 1969 as 'Labour's Social 
Strategy'. 
(100) 
The first draft of this paper 
identified what it regarded as the most needy 
categories of the population as low wage earners with 
large families. the elderly. unsupported mothers, the 
disabled- and chronic sick, and  the unemployed. A 
section on the unemployed was to be included in future 
revised drafts and the first draft provisionally 
identified such issues as manpower planning training 
and the wage-stop as possible inclusions. 
(101) 
Despite 
this expression of intent, when the final version was 
published no mention was made of the wage-stop. One 
can only speculate about the reasons for this silence 
but it may be that the NEC did not wish to embarass a 
Labour government by raising such a sensitive matter 
41 
with the likelihood of a general election being held in 
the not-too-distant future. Whatever the explanation, 
nothing was said. 
The only other time that Conference discussed the wage- 
stop was in 1973 when Composite Resolution 28 included 
a call for the abolition of the wage-stop and the four 
week rule* 
(102) 
In seconding the resolution Margaret 
McCarthy said that the most important thing to do to 
remove the status and stigma of poverty was to remove 
the wage-stop. She quoted the 1834 Poor Law Report 
above the virtues of less-eligibility and argued that 
the wage-stop was its modern manifestation. In 1918 
the Labour Party Conference had passed a resolution 
calling for the end of less-eligibility but there still 
remained a basic belief in it in Britain, particularly 
in the policymaking echelons of the civil service. The 
next Labour Government would have to change that 
attitude, and in a prescient comment she noted that 
'... it is an atubyý, e which does not cost much 
money to change'. 
For seven years after Hart's statement what little 
parliamentary interest there was in the wage-stop took 
the form of attempts, usually by Labour M. Ps, to get 
information about its scope and extent. These data 
show a fall in the numbers affected from 35,600 in 
1970, with 158,600 dependents, to 10,335 in November 
1973, with 59,793 dependents. 
(104) 
In August 1974, it 
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was saving less than £1 million in a full year. 
(105) 
Particularly influential in securing this reduction was 
the introduction of Family Income Supplement in 1971. 
After the introduction of FIS, Supplementary Benefit 
rates were altered to allow for a claimant's full-time 
earnings to be supplemented by the FIS he would 
received for the purposes of operating the wage-stop. 
In February 1972, the government claimed that 25.000 
people had had their supplementary benefit increased 
because of FIS, including those whose benefits would 
have been wage-stopped but for their previous 
entitlement to FIS. 
(108) 
This was the context within which, in November 1974, 
Stan Newens asked if the government had any plans to 
abolish the wage stop* 
(1 7) 
Replying for the 
government, Alec Jones said that although there were no 
plans at the moment to abolish the regulation, the 
suggestion would be kept under consideration. 
(108) 
A 
week later he provided information about the further 
decline in the numbers affected. In November 1974, 
only 7,661 supplementary benefit claimants were wage- 
stopped. 
(109) 
Labour backbenchers kept up the pressure 
and on December 10th, 1974, Robin Cook asked if the 
government had had any consultations with the 
Supplementary Benefits Commission about the possible 
abolition of the wage-stop. 
(110) 
Jones replied that 
although the government did not have a planned 
statement in mind it was constantly in touch with the 
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SBC on the stop and other matters. 
"ll) Cook was 
grateful for what he took to be a small gleam of hope 
and asked the government to bear in mind the fact that 
the great majority of the wage-stopped unemployed had 
been out of work for more than a year. 
(112) Jones 
accepted that the wage-stop was an irritant to many 
members and observed that it ought to be considered as 
part of the general problem associated with low wages 
and family support. 
(113) Ten days later Stan Newens 
raised the wage-stop in debate, the first such occasion 
in the House of Commons since Judith Hart's statement 
in December, 1967. 
(114) 
Newen's speech was a clever political exercise in that 
it had something to appeal to most shades of opinion. 
He began by describing the wage-stop as 'an appalling 
state of affairs'. 
(115) 
Moreover it was an instrument 
which was particularly likely to be applied to the 
socially inadequate, which might mean that the full 
consequences would be borne disproportionately by 
mothers and children. Its combination of high 
administrative costs and minimal savings must call its 
continued existence into question. He 'went on to 
develop an even-handed response to his own rhetorical 
question of 'what was the case for the retention of the 
wage-stop? ' While he accepted that it was important 
from 'many different points of view' that those who 
were able to work should support themselves, the wage- 
stop often affected those who could not find jobs and 
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who might never be able to work again. The aim of the 
SBC was to avoid 'the iniquity' of a man at work 
earning less than his unemployed counterpart was 
getting in social assistance but 
starvation allowances'. 
Consequently something had to be done about low wages. 
(He did not specify what had to be done but it is not 
unreasonable to assume that he meant the introduction 
of a minimum wage). It was no use reducing levels of 
social assistance until something was done about low 
wages. The situation had to be resolved at an early 
stage. No Labour government should perpetuate poverty. 
In any case the long-term costs of poverty in creating 
'apathetic, alienated and inadequate citizens' would be 
much greater than the immediate financial cost of 
bringing up families to a reasonable minimum level of 
living. (117) 
Newens showed his awareness of the forces ranged 
against him when he referred to the problems caused by 
the latest economic crisis and the likely Treasury 
opposition to any demands for extra resources by the 
Department of Health and Social Security. He also 
referred to the popular press' propensity for 
castigating wage-stop victims as idlers but asserted 
that this approach was totally unacceptable to the 
labour movement. The Supplementary Benefits Commission 
was not the major enemy. It fell to it to enforce an 
'starvation wages (116 )no justification for 
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unacceptable rule and it had done its best to alleviate 
the operation of the wage-stop. He ended by calling 
for the immediate abolition of the wage-stop and hoped 
that the government would make an announcement that 
day. 
'I can assure him that many of us who feel deeply 
for those afflicted by it will continue our 
campaign until the rule is wiped out and these 
people get reasonable consideration from the 
State, w ý`f) at present they are not 
r eceiving. 
Alec Jones prefaced his reply by expressing the 
government's deep concern for the abolition of poverty. 
wherever it was to be found. The Secretary of State, 
Barbara Castle, was especially anxious that sensitive 
social security issues be subjected to close scrutiny 
and criticism by the House. The wage-stop was one such 
issue. Like Newens he also paid tribute to the anti- 
wage-stop campaign conducted by the Child Poverty 
Action Group which had kept the wge-stop in the 
political arena. However, despite these initial 
politenesses, he believed that there was no easy answer 
to the problem. 
'To pay a man who is not working more than he 
receives when he is working seems TI estly 
unfair to large numbers of our people'. 
It would be unwise to ignore the resentment that this 
would cause, especially amongst those on very low 
wages. The government would be foolish to pretend that 
those on low wages would not see it as unfair if it did 
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other than maintain the wage-stop. He believed that 
most people felt that the answer lay ultimately not in 
reducing the income of those on benefit through the 
wage-stop but in increasing the income of those in 
work. 
(120) This is a clear expression of a preference 
for the classic liberal solution of making the gap in 
income from earnings compared with income from benefit 
as wide as possible commensurate with the assurance of 
the availability of minimum levels of income guaranteed 
by the state. Through Jones the government was 
unequivocally accepting the need to preserve work 
incentives thus accepting a major justification for the 
wge-stop's existence. Echoing Beveridge and Herbison 
and Pentland he argued that the best solution to the 
problem lay in higher earnings for the lower paid and 
improved measures of family support. 
The final part of his speech, and in many ways the most 
significant for the future of the wage-stop, saw Jones 
pointing to the decline in the numbers affected by it. 
i 
This decline had occurred because of the introduction 
of national joint council rates for calculating normal 
earnings, general wage increases and improved benefits, 
especially rent and rate rebates, the introduction of 
FIS, and Family Allowance increases. Even when 
supplementary benefit rates were increased in April, 
1975. the numbers wage-stopped would decline to less 
than' half the current figure of less than 8.000. The 
government's plan to help the low paid and other 
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families in poverty by introducing child benefit for 
all children including the first would 
'reduce the numbetf2i5 the wage-stopped to 
vanishing point'. 
If the numbers did fall to a very low level the 
government did not rule out the possibility of 
abolishing the wage-stop in its entirety. For the 
moment though the SBC would administer it as fairly and 
sympathetically as possible. 
(122) 
Jones' comments were the closest the government had yet 
come to promising the end of the wage-stop. What had 
brought it to this position? The reasons for its 
apparent willingness to consider abolition are 
interesting, not least for the insights given into the 
government's overall political and philosophical 
orientation. In the earlier part of his reply Jones 
had defended the principle of the wage-stop. His 
defence was grounded in a concern for equity for low 
paid workers and in 'the possible political 
repurcussions should the regulation be discontinued. 
Thus the principle of the wage-stop, and all it 
represented, remained inviolate. However, changes in 
other benefits and especially the introduction of FIS 
together with the proposed introduction of Child 
Benefit had dramatically reduced the numbers of 
supplementary benefit claimants to whom the regulation 
applied. Soon these numbers would be infinitesimal. 
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The moral is quite clear. The wage-stop could be left 
to wither on the vine. So few people would be affected 
by its operations that its eventual removal could be 
accomplished without stimulating the degree of 
political opposition that would have ensued had it been 
abolished during the heyday of its existence. It would 
end with a whisper rather than a bang. 
In many ways this was an ideal solution for the Labour 
government. The contradictions at the heart of its 
stance could be resolved. By providing more generous 
family income support benefits, by looking towards an 
increase in low earnings, all of the conflicting 
pressures could be accommodated. Some of the worst 
cases of family poverty would receive more generous 
treatment; fairness and justice would be secured for 
those in employment and on low wages; the gap between 
benefit income and earnings could be made as wide as 
possible so preserving or augmenting work incentives. 
It was unlikely that the government would be attacked 
for encouraging voluntary unemployment and threatening 
the supremacy of the work ethic. Traditional 
prejudices of the political culture could be left 
unchallenged and Labour could continue to present 
itself as the party with a special concern for the 
poor. 
On the 25th March, 1975, the government estimated that 
the current cost of abolishing the wage-stop would be 
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half a million pounds a year. and its death-knell was 
finally sounded on 15th April 1975 when in answer to a 
written question Barbara Castle announced the 
government's determination to dispense with it 
completely. 
'I intend to introduce legislation to abolish the 
wage-stop at the first suitable opportunity, with 
the hope of bringing this into force when family 
income supplement is uprated later this year. 
The cost will be small, and will be accommodated 
within my departmental programme. I would, here, 
like to pay tribute to my Hon. Friend, and others 
who have been so prominent tY25)e capaign for the 
abolition of the wage-stop. 
Fittingly enough, given everything that had been said 
about the relationship between the wage-stop and a 
proper system of child endowment, the legislation that 
Castle had anticipated came in the form of the Child 
Benefit Bill which received its Second Reading on 13 
May, 1975. Clause 18 of the bill replaced paragraph 2 
of Schedule 2 to the Supplementary Benefit Act of 
1966. (124) Castle described the abolition of the wage- 
stop as a modest step in financial terms which only 
affected a small number of people, but it deprived 
families of £2 a week of their income as well as 
providing an inordinate amount of complex 
administrative work. Wage-stop cases had reached a 
peak of 35,000 in November, 1970 but had since dropped 
to around 5,000. The abolition of the rule had been 
made possible by the substantial increases the 
government had made in F. I. S. prescribed amounts and in 
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the needs allowances for rent and rate rebates, and was 
unlikely to cost more than £100.000 in a full 
year. 
(125) That it was the dramatic decline in the 
number of cases which was the major justification for 
the abolition of the wage-stop was re-affirmed by Alec 
Jones in his winding-up speech on the Second Reading 
debate. According to Jones. it seemed 
'a nonsense to keep this sort of provision on the 
Statute Book when it only caus stress to many 
families desperately in need'. 
ýý2ý} 
Over a year later on 16th November 1976. a Conservative 
M. P., Ian Sproat, who had been prominent in attempts to 
create a moral panic over alleged welfare 'scroungers' 
asked the government if it had any plans to reintroduce 
the wage-stop. Stan Orme's reply was the final word to 
be uttered about the whole controversy. 
'No. Our decision to abolish the supplementary 
benefit wage-stop last year was supported by 
Members of all three major parties. To revive 
such a restriction, which affected only a very 
small number - mostly men with larger families 
and poor employment prospects - would harm some 
of the (lst deprived families in the 
country'. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The wage-stop represented in its starkest form the 
conflict between human need and market valuations. The 
resolution of this conflict by the Labour Party probably 
says more about the strength and nature of the 
movement's political convictions than any other single 
issue. As George has said. 
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'... two values are in conflict in the case of the 
wage-stop - the value that no one should live in 
subsistence pove(rlt2y8)and the value which society 
places on work'. 
The moral outrage that many in the party felt at this 
modern example of less-eligibility was tempered by the 
knowledge that to remove it would be interpreted as a 
challenge to prevailing beliefs in the political culture 
about work incentives, equity and the work ethic itself. 
A real test of the Labour Party's commitment to welfare. 
let alone to socialism, would have resided in a 
determination to dismantle the wage-stop at the peak of 
its operations and face up to the certain political 
furore this would generate. That it never did this is 
not without significance. Almost all party members 
active in the debate about the wage-stop felt it 
necessary to make some gesture. however perfunctory. 
indicating support for prevailing ideological norms. 
Market valuation of work always won over assessments of 
family needs. 
In generalising about broad questions of political 
culture one is drawn to a recognition of elements of 
continuity and change in policy development. ` The wage- 
stop itself, as an expression of less-eligibility, 
represents an obvious example of policy continuity. 
From the beginnings of industrial capitalism the State 
has always found it essential to do everything it could 
to ensure that benefit income was never greater than 
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income from even the lowest paid employment. In public 
discussion the reasons given for this shifted 
occasionally so that one rather than another of the 
wage-stop's characteristics came to the fore. Thus. in 
the early meetings of the Unemployment Assistance Board. 
it was the stop's contribution to work incentives that 
was emphasised, although the Board's secretariat was not 
oblivious to the claims of equity. After the 
publication of the 'Administration of the Wage Stop in 
1967 Labour governments justified retention on grounds 
of equity between the low-paid and those temporarily out 
of the labour market because of sickness or 
unemployment. Labour governments could always find some 
irrevocable point of doctrine justifying a device that 
many in the party found morally reprehensible. 
From 1941 to 1963 the Labour Party showed no apparent 
interest in the wage-stop. This situation changed with 
Barbara Castle's first question to Margaret Thatcher, 
and from then until its abolition in 1975 the party 
maintained a reasonably consistent concern. Why should 
the party's interest revive in the 1960's after over two 
decades of neglect? The regulation had always been 
present and it was reaffirmed in every recasting of the 
social assistance system. Part of the answer lies in 
the growing realisation by first the academic community 
and then the political world that full employment, 
rising real incomes and the social legislation of the 
1940's had failed to abolish poverty. Initially this 
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'rediscovery of poverty' had concentrated on the elderly 
and in the 1950's the Labour Party was almost 
exclusively concerned with devising better income 
maintenance services for retired pensioners. Only 
slowly did the party extend its proposals to include 
other groups including low-paid family heads with 
dependent children. Linked with this more sophisticated 
understanding of the extent and nature of poverty was 
the rise in unemployment that began in the 1960's. As 
unemployment increased so did the number of people on 
benefit susceptible to the operations of the wage-stop. 
Just as it had in the 1930's this brought the regulation 
back into the centre of the political arena to provide 
clear challenges and opportunities for a new generation 
of Labour MP's, some with close contacts with the 
articulate and well-informed anti-poverty lobby. 
Political parties are complex organisations and however 
much they may like to present themselves to the 
electorate as examples of monolithic unanimity they are 
riven by actual or potential conflict. This is a 
particular problem for parties such as the British 
Labour Party which has an official ideology commiting it 
to a socialist reconstruction of society no matter how 
embarassing and electorally damaging the parliamentary 
leadership may find the ideology. The Labour Party is 
not a mass socialist party but it does contain many 
socialists within its ranks, especially in the 
constituencies, and it is these activists on whom the 
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party depends for the day by day donkey work of 
politics. To people like this, and their 
representatives in the parliamentary party, the wage- 
stop was a glaring example of social policy practice 
shaped by a dominant capitalist ideology. Consequently 
one ought not be too surprised that the wage-stop 
provided the NEC with one of only nineteen defeats it 
suffered at party conferences between 1956-70. 
Despite the defeat inflicted by delegates on the NEC at 
the 1968 conference the wage-stop was only considered by 
conference on one other occasion, and even then as part 
of a lengthy composite resolution. throughout the entire 
period of this analysis. The same lack of interest is 
demonstrated in the almost unbroken silence which 
characterises the product of the party's internal 
policy-making machinery. Hardly a mention is made of 
the wage stop in any of the papers produced by the 
Research Department for the various sub-committees of 
the Home Policy Committee and the other ad-hoc working 
i 
parties and study groups created during these years. 
This is a significant omission given the nature of the 
ideology enshrined in the wage-stop. Within the ranks 
of the parliamentary party the attitudes of those few 
backbench MP's who showed any sustained interest varied 
considerably. One or two favoured outright abolition 
because the wage-stop maintained the poverty earned by 
low-wages, but the majority favoured reform. Usually, 
this desire for reform manifested itself in a call for 
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the classification of wage-stop cases into what in 
effect were traditional poor law categories. Broadly 
speaking the more deserving of these categories included 
people who, because of long-term sickness or disability, 
were unlikely to be active in the labour market again 
and could be treated in a more generous and humane 
fashion. However, the able-bodied unemployed were still 
to be subjected to the full rigours of the regulation's 
operation. 
Given these divisions within backbench opinion it is not 
surprising to find Labour governments displaying the 
same reluctance to challenge directly the economic and 
social philosophy on which the wage-stop was based, not 
least because it was a philosophy which was generally 
accepted by the majority of the party's leadership, and, 
the leadership believed, by the majority of the 
electorate. It seemed unfair to this opinion to give a 
man more in income when he was unemployed than when he 
was in full-time work, regardless of the extent of 
family commitments. To do otherwise would not only 
transgress against equity but also run directly counter 
to those 'labourist' beliefs which stressed the 
centrality of work and just rewards for that work. If 
meeting family need meant providing more in benefit than 
from earnings, then need had to be relegated to a 
position of secondary importance. This was one 
characteristic of welfare capitalism that could not be 
resolved within the limits set by the party's dominant 
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intellectual and political beliefs. When the wage-stop 
was finally abolished in 1975 it was as a consequence of 
natural death rather than ideological conviction. 
r 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE POVERTY TRAP: 
THE BEGINNINGS TO 1979 
One of the most important developments in academic 
analysis of social provision in the 1960s was the 
growing appreciation of the inter-relationship between 
taxation and benefits. Traditionally benefits were about 
transferring income, taxation was about raising revenue. 
The Board of Inland Revenue had always rejected the idea 
that taxation had implications for social policy. As 
the distributional consequences of the operations Of the 
welfare state became clearer, researchers began to take 
seriously the impact of the overlap between benefits and 
taxation on people at the bottom end of the income 
scale. Work by Lees('), Piachaud 
(2) 
Field 
(3) 
(4) (Bradshaw, 
and Meachersý , quickly established that a 
rise in earnings for low-paid workers could, because of 
increased liability to higher taxation and insurance 
contributions together with loss of entitlement to 
income-related benefits, lead to an effective marginal 
tax rate of over 100%. Inevitably this raised the 
question of the relationship between those very high 
marginal tax rates and the work incentives of the low- 
paid, especially those with dependent children. This 
chapter is concerned with the Labour Party's 
understanding of the issue and its influence on the 
party's economic and social policy. 
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At its 1969 annual conference the Labour Party set up a 
'Study Group on Taxation' to work out the details of the 
party's policy. A number of papers were presented to 
the group, but in an internal memorandum(6) Andy 
Thompson. the group's Secretary, noted that since Nicky 
Kaldor. Douglas Jay, Joel Barnett and John Hughes had 
all attended the group's meetings personally and the 
T. U. C. also had representation on it, 'it is therefore 
the evidence from these five sources which has carried 
most weight in the group's deliberations' . 
>> 
Hughes had argued that amongst the areas needing urgent 
consideration was the existence of a 
'... disturbingly high incidence of taxation on low 
income households (even aftef8)allowing for all 
direct and indirect benefits)' 
He went on to make the interesting (because at the time 
it was relatively new) comment that: 
'One wonders whether the "incentive" argument heard 
so often in discussion on surtax might not have 
some relevance at those lower levels of income. 
The severe reductions on disposable household 
income produced by the system of taxes atopbenefits 
at low levels of income are disturbing'. 
Without wishing to raise the question of negative income 
tax Hughes felt that there was a case for pursuing the 
kind of changes in tax incidence and benefit provision 
that would raise the disposable income of many low income 
households. This was important for two reasons which 
were immediately relevant to current circumstances. 
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Firstly, a greater concern for the economic well-being of 
such households might provide additional pressure behind 
demands for big pay increases for low-wage earners which 
might inflate labour costs, especially if existing wage 
differentials were maintained. Secondly, the economy was 
currently under-employed and needed an injection of extra 
domestic demand to increase economic activity in 1970. 
It was thus appropriate to produce a package of tax 
remissions and benefit improvements at the lower end of 
the income scale which need not be offset or fully offset 
by heavier taxation at higher income levels. 
(10) 
Jay had 
little to say of any relevance to present purposes. He 
contended that the main problem on personal earned income 
was going to be the prevention of the tax threshold 
falling too quickly. 
'This will be more important than the alleged 
effect on inmYives. which still seems to me to be 
non-proven'. 
The main aim should be to ease pressure on small incomes. 
While it is interesting to note that such an experienced 
and senior figure as Jay. particularly one with his 
interest in economic and financial matters, was 
relatively agnostic on the alleged disincentive 
characteristics of high marginal rates of income 
taxation, the observations noted above seem to suggest 
that he was unconcerned about the hypothetical impact 
that a declining tax threshold might have on the income 
of the low paid. To be drawn into the tax network while 
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receiving low wages could cause a theoretical loss of 
incentives; it would be the taxation arm of the poverty 
trap. For Jay the major technical problem lay in 
avoiding giving too much relief to juvenile workers 
without dependants. His greatest concern was with that 
combination of low wages and large families which. had 
bedevilled governments of all parties throughout the 
modern era. On this Jay commented that: 
'Much the most effective instrument so far devised 
is the children allow a(r1921. and this should be 
extended over the years' 
Although Jay's use of the term 'children's allowance' is 
rather vague it is probable that he meant by it the 
family allowance scheme rather than child tax allowances. 
Thompson's paper alluded to above is essentially a 
summary of the proceedings of the 'Study Group on 
Taxation' and in the section on personal income tax he 
makes a number of perceptive and succinct observations 
about both the nature and political implications of the 
poverty trap. Thompson argued that the major problem 
facing the Labour Party over income tax was. 
'... that we all want to give relief to the lower 
income groups without raising personal 
allowances to such an extent that the benefits 
would ovefigill to those with above-average 
earnings'. 
Most of the proposals given in evidence to the group 
designed to achieve the above objective involved a 
contraction in the reduced rate band of taxable income. 
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This process had already been started in the 1969 Budget 
and, as Thompson observed, there was a limit to how far 
that process could continue before the reduced rate band 
disappeared entirely. There were also good reasons for 
agreeing with Kaldor's belief that the steps leading up 
to the standard rate of income tax should be reasonably 
wide, if not numerous, 
'... for a sudden transition from a marginal tax 
rate of zero to one of 6/5 in the po. tj1) would be 
highly perplexing for the tax payer'. 
Thompson went on to argue that the party's objective of 
social redistribution could be achieved by a substantial 
increase in personal allowances balanced by an increase 
in the standard rate but, he noted, 
'... at great expense in popularýt1y5)and possibly 
also with effects upon incentive'. 
In this brief comment Thompson was coolly pointing out 
the likely political and possible economic effects of 
increasing the standard rate of income tax. He might not 
have been convinced about the damage to work incentives 
but he was absolutely certain about the consequences of 
such action for the party's standing with the electorate. 
Thompson identified a possible answer to this dilemma in 
the context of what he called 
'... the grea1lglradox of the system of personal 
income tax'. 
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This paradox consisted of the vast range of income 
covered by a standard marginal rate of tax (at that time 
6/5d. in the £ on earned income and 8/3d. in the £ on 
unearned income), the low starting point of the standard 
rate, and the very high starting point for the surtax 
graduations. He illustrated his point with data showing 
that a married man with no children paid the same 
marginal rate on all his income from £816 p. a. 
(£15.13.10d per week) to £4,005 p. a. (or £77 a week). 
(17) 
Having made these important and relevant comments on the 
British system of income taxation, Thompson then 
developed a detailed exposition of what Frank Field later 
labelled the 'poverty trap'. He began by asserting that 
"It may be safely assumed that the incentive 
effects of marginal tax rates are more important 
around the level cc8, ational average earnings than 
at higher levels. 
They were more important for the average wage earner 
because a well-paid executive had many non-financial 
incentives for seeking positions with higher gross pay 
not open to the average wage earner, of which the most 
important were prestige, power and influence. Yet the 
average earner not only had to pay the same marginal tax 
rate as the £4,000 a year man, but might well be subject 
to many other deductions from his gross income as well. 
To illustrate his point he provided a detailed example of 
the poverty trap's workings. The example centred on a 
man with four children earning around £24 a week (just 
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below the national average earnings of an adult male 
manual worker) with a non-working wife, living in a 
council flat in Inner London and eligible for rent rebate 
and rate rebates. If his oldest child was at university 
or college he would be subject to parental means test on 
the maintenance grant, and if he was covered by an 
occupational pension scheme he could be expected to make 
a contribution of 4% of his pay. All these factors would 
bring marginal reductions from his gross pay and two of 
the largest items (rent rebates and rate rebates) would 
not apply at higher income levels. 
If the same man's earnings were just above £24 a week 
they would be sufficiently high to put him on the 
standard rate of income tax. Rate rebates would be 
reduced by 5/-d. in the £ of additional income above the 
level for maximum relief. The GLC rent rebate scheme 
increased the maximum rent payable by 5/-d. in the £1 for 
all families with weekly income over £24. The parental 
contribution for student grants rose by £1 for every £10 
of yearly income at that level of income (or 2/-d. in the 
£). National Insurance graduated contributions amounted 
to 34% of pay between £18 and £30 a week and, as Thompson 
noted, most of the graduated insurance contributions were 
a pure tax carrying no increased benefit entitlement, 
being designed to finance the November 1969 increase in 
National Insurance Benefits from which there was no 
contracting out. 
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If this 'specimen man' increased his earnings by £1 a 
week he would be subjected to the following deductions: 
s. d. 
Income Tax at standard rate for earned income 6-5 
Reduction of rate rebate 5-0 
Reduction of rent rebate 5-0 
Reduction of student grant 2-0 
National Insurance graduated contribution 7.8 
Superannuation contribution 9.6 
The total marginal deduction was 19/10d., leaving just 
1.6d. disposable income out of the original £1. 
(19) 
Thompson did concede that this was an extreme example 
unlikely to occur in practice since people earning £24 a 
week were unlikely to have a combination of rate poundage 
and rateable value high enough to qualify for partial 
rate rebate. But, he claimed that if one left aside rate 
rebate, a combination of all the other circumstances was 
perfectly feasible and 'very likely to be happening in a 
number of cases 
(20) 
In this case the total of 
deductions would be equivalent to around 15/-d. in the £ 
on the marginal pound. For a surtax payer to be subject 
to a marginal tax rate of 15/-d. in the pound of earned 
income he would have to be earning £12,000 a year. 
(21) 
Thompson claimed that if take-up rates for selective 
benefits were as high as might be wished the problem his 
example illustrated would be much more common. As it 
was, this aspect of direct taxation had scarcely been 
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mentioned in the evidence submitted to the group except 
for John Hughes (see above). Thompson's understanding of 
the political significance of this phenomenon for the 
Labour Party is acute and worth quoting in full: 
'This is precisely the point where we can attack 
the Tories. With their proposals for means- 
testing family allowances and extending fair rent 
schemes with rebates in the field of council house 
rents, they are advocating policies which will 
lead to still greater marginal deductions from the 
incomes of the average wage earner for the sake of 
tax cuts for the higher income groups. For all 
the Tories' talk of incentives, incentives are 
precisely wft would be most undermined by their 
proposals'. 
Thompson's paper then went on to examine the implications 
of this phenomenon for the Labour Party's taxation policy 
and recommended that the party should raise personal 
allowances against tax so, that at least the standard rate 
of tax was never paid on slices of income which were 
within the zone of partial rate rebate. The main point to 
recognise though was that there was great scope for higher 
marginal tax rates on income between £2,000 a year and the 
starting point of surtax, and if the party was to accept 
Kaldor's thesis of restoring the system of graduation, the 
ultimate objective would be to do away with a standard 
rate of tax covering the wide range of incomes and to have 
a genuinely progressive system of gradually rising rates 
of tax. A convenient point at which to raise marginal tax 
rates above the standard rate would be around one and a 
half times average earnings because that would be the 
point of income where graduation would stop for the post- 
1972 social security system. With the introduction of 
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higher marginal tax rates above that level. personal 
allowances could be increased without eliminating the 
reduced rate band and without loss of revenue. 
(23) 
While Thompson's memorandum was clearly his own work, and 
not an expression of official party thinking, it has to be 
remembered that he was an important party official 
operating at the heart of the party's policy making 
apparatus and the issues which he addressed in his paper 
remain of crucial significance in this area of social 
policy. He discusses the relationship between marginal 
rates of income tax and work incentives, the political 
dangers for the party in certain courses of action and the 
most appropriate point at which higher marginal tax rates 
might be introduced. In many ways the most interesting 
aspect of Thompson's document is that the existence of 
disincentive effects of high marginal tax rates, 
particularly on average earners, is not even questioned. 
His whole argument is predicated on this apparent 
i 
certainty. In general, Labour's traditional disposition 
had been sceptical about the relationship between high 
marginal tax rates and work incentives, this was stuff 
usually left to the Conservatives as Thompson's 
observations about the non-monetary forms of compensation 
accruing to the high paid indicate. But, the development 
of the poverty trap thesis was to change all this. When 
Thompson correctly asserted that the same marginal tax 
rate applied to a very wide range of incomes he was making 
a point of profound political significance for the future 
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of the Labour Party. Many of the party's traditional 
supporters had been drawn into paying a relatively high 
marginal tax rate for the first time and with the party 
desperately seeking politically acceptable ways of 
financing its public expenditure commitments, an obvious 
source of extra revenue (higher rates of income tax) had 
to be handled very carefully if it was not to redound to 
its electoral disadvantage. 
Thompson's analysis of the consequences of a higher level 
of take-up of selective benefits for the intensity and 
scope of the poverty trap is also profound and indicates 
the very real limits of means-tested benefits for the 
average and low-earner with dependent children. If work 
incentives had a real, objective existence in the minds of 
some or most workers then existing policy, let alone any 
future policy initiatives of this type, would be bound to 
damage work incentives even further. It is perhaps worth 
noting that Thompson's memorandum was produced soon after 
i 
the Labour Government had opted for Family Allowances with 
claw-back as the solution to the problem of low wage 
families with dependent children rather than the means- 
tested FIS type programme which Jim Callaghan had taken to 
Cabinet only to have it rejected. The Family Income 
Supplement scheme proper of course became the preferred 
solution of the Conservative Government elected in June, 
1970, and it may be significant that during the debates on 
the FIS Bill the Labour Party used the work incentive 
argument consistently in its critique of FIS (see the 
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chapter on the Family Income Supplement for a detailed 
analysis of this issue). 
The party's internal policy making machinery continued its 
interest in the poverty trap and at its meeting on the 
29th April, 1971 the Finance and Economic Affairs Sub- 
Committee resolved that the office (a synonym for the 
Research Department) should prepare a short document on 
the relationship between income tax and social security 
benefits in the level of 'marginal tax rates' borne by 
lower income groups. 
(24) 
The paper 
(25) 
produced for the 
sub-committee sets its analysis in the context of the 
Conservative Government's commitment to greater 
selectivity in social policy with the consequent risk of 
increasing the possibility of high marginal tax rates for 
the poor. Its aims were to look at the interaction of 
social policy and fiscal policy, to review recent research 
on the subject. and to draw some general conclusions. 
(26) 
It notes that the hypothetical existence of high marginal 
tax rates in a welfare state possessing a variety of means 
test had often been neglected by the Labour Party and 
surveys the work done by Prest, Piachaud, and Lynes. 
(27) 
Although the party's traditional rejection of means- 
testing had been rooted in its connotations of humiliation 
and stigmatisation, the sub-committee's terms of reference 
limited it to solely a financial analysis. and the paper 
assumed that all available means-tested benefits would be 
taken up. The Tories had always claimed that incentives 
were vitally important, hence their insistence on cuts in 
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income tax and surtax on high incomes. However research 
showed the existence of extremely high marginal tax rates 
for the poor, theoretically over 100% in some cases and 
actually well over 50% in many cases, 
'... and this for the lower-paid and average-paid 
workers, who are not likely to have any non- 
financial(28) incentives to increase their 
earnings' 
The report then makes the rather ambivalent comment that 
while there was no evidence to show that income tax by 
itself ever undermined incentives. 
'The Tory policy of reducing taxation by 
withdrawing social benefits for the average wage 
earner is posing a very real th MY to incentives for many sections of the community. 
It concluded that by concentrating help on the poorest of 
the poor the consequence of the Conservative Government's 
fiscal and social policy was to expose the average wage 
earner to the full force of reduced services and 
increased user charges. The government's measures were 
in effect bringing down the living standards of the 
average wage earner much closer to those - of the lower 
paid. In doing this they were making it practically 
impossible for the lower paid to drag themselves out of 
poverty, either through collective bargaining on wages or 
individual effort. 
(3.0) 
A revised version of this 
paper(31) did nothing to change the conclusions of the 
original, merely noting that the high marginal tax rates 
experienced by those in the poverty trap would have some 
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effect on reducing incentives to increase earnings. and 
there might well be an adverse effect on the price-wage 
spiral. It concluded by observing that 
'The Tories' 1971 Budget reduced the combined top 
rate of income tax and surtax on earned income to 
75% in the name of incentives. But with the 
extension of means tested changes to pay for these 
tax cuts, they have increased the effective rates 
of tax for the ordi ay wage earner above this 
level in many cases'. 
The Finance and Economic Affairs Sub-Committee was not 
the only part of the party's policy making system to 
express an interest in the poverty trap., a fact 
demonstrated by a meeting of the NEC members of the 
Social Policy Sub-Committee held on the 24th November 
1971 to discuss a programme of work for the full sub- 
committee. 
(33) 
Amongst the issues identified as being of 
major importance was the whole area of means tests and 
charges. Mention is made of the party's general and 
traditional opposition to the implied principles of tests 
and charges although it is suggested that the party had 
i 
been 
'rarely against all such benefits' 
(34) 
The sub-committee would need to decide what changes 
should be abolished, what retained (if any), and what 
benefits should continue and in which form. It also 
observed that it was difficult to separate the case for a 
minimum wage from the arguments surrounding means tests 
and benefits and the sub-committee might care to discuss 
the implications of a statutory minimum wage policy. 
(35) 
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Having identified the poverty trap as a major issue the 
Social Policy Sub-Committee set up the 'Working Group on 
Pensions, Means Tests and Poverty' which received a 
number of papers in February, 1972. The first of these 
was a brief document by David Piachaud, 
(36) 
one of the 
academics who had pioneered the development of the 
concept. Piachaud began by noting that income tax, 
national insurance contributions and rates now had to be 
paid by some households with net income below the 
supplementary benefit level, and the bulk of his paper 
was concerned with the identification of possible 
measures to reduce the burden of income-tax on low-income 
households. He argued that the most straightforward 
method of raising the tax threshold was to increase 
personal allowances against tax, but to maintain the same 
level of revenue any increase in personal allowances 
would have to be accompanied by a higher rate of income 
tax on some or all employees. One other way to achieve 
this objective which did not involve an increase in the 
i 
standard rate of income tax was to introduce a minimum 
level of earned income relief. This would raise the tax 
threshold and raise the marginal rate of tax over a band 
of low-middle income. 
(37) 
Another memorandum claimed that the level of the income 
tax threshold held the key to many of the problems of 
family poverty. 
(38) It drew attention to the abolition 
of the reduced rate tax bands under the last Labour 
Government and contended that over the life of that 
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government the earnings threshold of income tax for a 
married man with three children under 11 fell from 89% of 
national average earnings to 59%. mainly because of the 
introduction of claw-back into the Family Allowances 
scheme in 1968. Because of claw-back and the abolition 
of the reduced rate bands the standard rate tax threshold 
fell from 130% of average earnings to 59%. The low 
threshold at which the standard rate of income tax was 
now payable made the traditional taxable Family Allowance 
a less progressive means of income redistribution than it 
had been. An increase in Family Allowance would bring 
more people at or near the Supplementary Benefit level 
into the income tax bracket, particularly if it was 
accompanied by a 1968-type claw-back. If this problem 
was to be overcome there had to be substantial real 
increases in the income tax threshold but they ought not 
be given to all standard rate taxpayers. 
'In view of the Party's public expenditure 
commitments, and strong dislike of regressive 
indirect taxes, the last thing we could be 
committed to is a general cut in personal direct 
taxation thi9Yfh across-the-Board increases in tax 
allowances. 
This dilemma could be resolved in a variety of ways. The 
T. U. C. favoured a minimum earned income allowance which 
allowed for the 2/9ths earned income relief to include a 
cash figure so that low income/large family tax payers 
could be taken out of income tax without benefitting 
those higher up the scale. The problem with this 
solution was that if it was introduced into the existing 
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income tax system it would increase the marginal rate of 
tax on earned income at the lower end of the tax bracket. 
Those people who were enjoying the minimum earned income 
allowance would not get 2/9ths relief on small increases 
in their earnings so they would be subject to a marginal 
tax rate of 38.75%, while those higher up the scale were 
only paying 30%. Because of this the T. U. C. was now 
arguing that the minimum earned income allowance should 
be linked to a restoration of the reduced rate bands. 
But, as far as earned income was concerned, the reduced 
rate bands would be made effectively higher by the 
minimum earned income allowance. It was impossible to 
give selective benefits to low income groups by increased 
income tax allowances without producing effective 
marginal rates immediately above the threshold higher 
than the standard rate. The only way of increasing tax 
exemptions at the bottom of the scale without 
simultaneously benefiting the better off was to move away 
from the single rate system currently obtaining which 'we 
have drifted into' and to restore the system of 
graduation that used to exist. Tax rates would have to 
be higher than they formerly were; instead of a standard 
rate of around 30% for the higher income groups, with 
reduced rate bands for the average wage earner, there 
would be a standard rate of around 30% for the average 
wage earner with a higher rate for higher incomes. The 
appropriate point to introduce a surcharge above the 
standard rate would probably be at around 1.5 times 
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average earnings. This would be particularly suitable if 
this were to be the point at which graduated social 
security' contributions finished. A reform of income tax 
along these lines would. moreover. open the way for 
increases in Family Allowances without the need to make 
them tax free and therefore less redistributive. 
(40) 
The next significant contribution to the debate came in a 
paper on means tests from Michael Meacher. 
(41) 
Meacher 
argued that despite the Conservative Government's very 
determined efforts to make selectivity work, even within 
its own narrow terms of reference it had only had limited 
success. More importantly, the government's campaign had 
demonstrated in a clearer fashion than ever before that 
selectivity was faced by three dilemmas which had not 
been resolved. These were take-up versus disincentive, 
stigma versus entitlement, and cutting public expenditure 
versus increasing office staff. (This latter is not 
obviously clear but presumably Meacher was pointing out 
the higher administrative costs attached to selective 
schemes). Meacher asserted that of these three dilemmas, 
' ... the crux is the first' 
(42) 
Meacher repeated the point made earlier by John Hughes 
that the more take-up of selective benefits increased the 
worse became the disincentive problem. and said that 
there was nothing unusual about the poor being subjected 
to effective marginal tax rates of 161%. He did qualify 
his comments slightly by conceding that perhaps the 
disincentive effect of the poverty trap did not register 
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on those potentially subject to it because the total 
impact of the accumulated marginal tax rate was not fully 
appreciated by them. However, the passport system of 
five interlocking benefits associated with the Family 
Income Supplement, together with the search for a single 
application form to cover many or even more benefits at 
one time, was bound to focus the disincentive effect more 
clearly in the minds of applicants. 
(43) 
Meacher proposed that since many means-tested benefits 
were directed towards the alleviation of family poverty 
associated with low wages, there was a strong case for 
abandoning the great majority of these benefits in 
exchange for making the tax system more redistributive by 
raising the tax threshold, replacing the standard rate by 
the introduction of multiple bands, and by introducing a 
high value taxed, family cash benefit (which he called a 
'child allowance '). 
(44) 
He claimed that the arguments 
for significantly raising }the 
tax threshold were 
particularly strong since it struck far too low on the 
earnings scale. In 1938-39 the tax threshold for a 
married man with two children was 209.5% of national 
average earnings; by 1946-47 it had fallen to 102.9% and 
it fluctuated around that level till 1956-57 by which 
time it was 93.4%. after which it dropped steadily. It 
currently stood at 58.6%. Income tax was payable on an 
income below the ceiling for eligibility for most means- 
tested benefits which reinforced the disincentive effect 
by 30p. in every C. Even if means tests were retained. 
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the tax threshold ought logically be placed above the- 
band of income where most benefit cut-off points 
occurred. The elimination of the lower rates of income 
tax in the 1969-70 Budgets had virtually destroyed the 
utility of the 1967-68 type of claw-back operation. In 
conjunction with the long plateau of the standard rate 
this meant that it was now almost impossible to use the 
tax ystem selectively for limiting universal benefits 
chiefly to the lower paid. 
(45) 
Meacher went on to recommend a package of measures 
capable of dealing with this situation. The single 
person's tax allowance could be raised to £600 and the 
married allowance to £850. A 25% tax rate could be 
introduced on income below £1,000 a year. increased by 5% 
on each successive £1,000 block of earnings subject to a 
ceiling of 75% beyond £10,000 a year. Family Allowances 
and Child Tax Allowances should both be abolished and 
replaced by a £2 per week taxed, cash child allowance for 
all children, including the first. Finally, a 9% 
investment income surcharge should be imposed on all 
unearned income after an initial £500 per year. (46) The 
overall changes that Meacher proposed might require 
modification in order to become largely self-financing, 
although a more progressive income tax with a lower yield 
might balance the shift towards more regressive indirect 
taxes then taking place. One of the most interesting 
features of Meacher's paper is his awareness of the 
relationship between politics and taxation. He used data 
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from Butler and Pintoduschinsky's(47) study of the 1970 
general election to point out that the changes he 
proposed would mainly hurt the 12% of the electorate with 
the highest incomes, from whom the Labour Party only got 
10.4% support (about 335,000 votes) and would be of most 
help to the 40% of the electorate with incomes under 
£1,000 a year, from whom Labour obtained 57.3% support 
(about 6.1/3rd million votes) though it had failed to 
secure a further 33.2% (3.7 million votes) which went to 
the Tories. ) 
(48) 
The implications of this latter point 
are especially interesting. 
By the Spring of 1973 therefore the internal policymaking 
machinery of the Labour Party had already devoted 
considerable attention to the poverty trap, possible 
policy responses to it, and the likely political 
consequences of those responses. The Finance and 
Economic Affairs Sub-Committee had played a leading part 
in this programme of activity and it is perhaps proper 
that the next major development in this process came in 
the form of a lengthy paper prepared for the sub- 
committee by the Research Department on the relationship 
between the poverty trap, income tax thresholds and 
reduced rate relief. 
(49) 
The Research Department's first 
paper on the sub-committee's contribution to the party's 
1973 policy statement(50) had suggested that there should 
be no firm commitment to reintroduce reduced rate bands 
of income tax. This proposal had caused some surprise at 
the sub-committee's March meeting, but at the meeting 
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held on 18th April it was agreed that there should be no 
such commitment in the 1973 policy statement. The 
Research Department agreed to produce a paper setting out 
its views for the sub-committee's May meeting and was 
asked to relate this to the poverty trap by incorporating 
data about the increase of means-tested benefits on 
taxpayers with low incomes as their earnings rose* 
(51) 
The paper began by referring back to the report produced 
for the (defunct) Taxation Study Group in, March, 1970 
and revealed that in discussion of that document members 
of the study group had commented quite fairly, that in 
order to find an example of an effective marginal tax 
rate at the high level claimed, they had been forced to 
identify a set of circumstances which had been described 
as far fetched. The authors themselves had conceded that 
they had chosen 'an extreme example, unlikely to occur in 
practice'. This, though, was no longer the case. The 
Conservative Government had brought about a massive 
extension of the principle of means testing, principally 
through the introduction of the Family Income Supplement 
and of 'fair rents' for council housing. As a result of 
these initiatives effective marginal tax rates up to and 
beyond 100% were common. 
(52) 
To illustrate the effect of income tax and means-tested 
benefits on a £1 a week increase in earnings over a range 
of existing weekly earnings of from £17 to £34 a week the 
paper offered a model of a family with three children and 
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a non-working wife. The children were aged between 5 and 
11 years and all took school meals. The family lived in 
a modern council house or flat with an assessed fair rent 
of £6.50 a week and had unrebated local rates of £1.50 a 
week. The parents spent an average of 20p. a week on 
prescriptions and a further 20p. a week on average on 
dental and opthalmic charges if their income was above 
the exemption limit. The husband's travel to work costs, 
which affected entitlement to free school meals and 
health services, amounted to £1 a week. Finally, all 
means-tested benefits to which the family was entitled 
were being claimed. The husband's income tax threshold 
would be at earnings of £22.45 a week, making due 
allowance for Family Allowance and claw-back. 
(53) 
The paper claimed that its model family was perfectly 
, 
typical and the only assumption it had made which might 
be considered unlikely was that all the means-tested 
benefits available would be claimed. Even more severe 
examples could have been portrayed, for example by 
assuming that the wage-earner was in an occupational 
pension scheme, or by introducing an additional child in 
receipt of a means-tested student grant. 
(55) 
Apart from 
the obvious point that its model family was subject to 
very high marginal tax rates a number of other features 
were apparent. There were in fact two major 'humps' in 
the poverty trap as earnings rose over the range shown: 
firstly, between £21 and £26 a week, where the rate 
rebate tapered off, including the small range of overlap 
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between income tax and F. I. S; and secondly, between £29 
and £34 weekly, where free school meals and health 
service benefits were forfeited. The combined marginal 
rate below the first lump, where the major deduction was 
F. I. S. with its 50% marginal rate, was at around two 
thirds of the increase in earnings, whereas between the 
humps and above the second hump, where income tax at 30% 
was the major deduction, it was just over half. A further 
feature was the vast range of income covered by the 
tapering off of rent rebate. 
The two humps existed because there were basically two 
separate kinds of means test. Firstly, there was F. I. S. 
and rent and rates rebates, which were assessed on gross 
income (including family allowance and in the case of the 
non-F. I. S. benefits, F. I. S. itself) and made no allowance 
for income tax or national insurance contributions. 
Secondly, there were school meal charges and NHS charges, 
which had a fixed cut-off point assessed in terms of net 
income. Here again, Family Allowances were included as 
income, but deductions were allowed for income tax and 
national insurance contributions, rent and rates, and the 
cost of travelling to work. The net income limits 
specified were on a similar basis to the supplementary 
benefit scales (though slightly different for each 
separate means test), but because of the deductions 
allowed, the means tests operated at comparatively high 
income levels, particularly where housing costs were 
high. The Tax Credit Scheme proposed in the Government's 
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Green Paper would do nothing to alleviate the poverty 
trap and could make it worse. The only means test to be 
replaced by tax credits for those within the scheme would 
be F. I. S. Against this, the 30% income tax rate would be 
extended right down the income scale, below the tax 
threshold; the upper hump would be shifted down the 
scale as the payment of tax credits would be reckoned as 
part of net income. 
(56) 
The Research Department's paper then turned its attention 
to an analysis of the tax threshold and reduced rate 
bands of income tax. It recalled that the reduced rate 
bands of income tax had been abolished in two stages, in 
the Budgets of 1969 and 1970. For a number of years 
prior to 1969 the first £100 per year of unearned taxable 
income had been taxed at 20% and the first £100 of earned 
income at 15%. The next £200 per year of unearned income 
had been taxed at 30% and the same £200 of earned income 
at 23%. At that time the standard rate of tax was 41.25% 
on unearned income and 32.0% on earned income. In the 
1969 Budget, income tax allowances were increased by £35 
a year all round, and a single reduced rate band of £260 
at 30% was substituted for the previous two reduced rate 
bands. In the 1970 Budget there was a larger increase in 
the tax allowances, £70 for a single taxpayer and £90 for 
the married tax head of household, and the reduced rate 
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band was abolished altogether. Those with incomes only 
slightly above the previous tax threshold gained 
considerably as a result of these two budgets. On the 
other hand, all those who were already paying the 
standard rate before 1969 experienced little change in 
their position; they lost a minute amount through the 
1969 Budget and gained a small amount in 1970. 
(57) 
It went on to claim that there were two quite divergent 
attitudes within the Labour Party towards the question of 
income tax concessions for the lower paid. and it was 
important to understand how far they conflicted with each 
other since there was some confusion in the minds of 
those people who were receptive to both. One approach 
was to support the reintroduction of reduced rate bands 
on the grounds that genuine progression in the income tax 
system required that there should be rates below the 
standard rate for the poorer person as well as higher 
rates starting at a realistic level for the better off, 
although it could be argued that this was not necessarily 
a true interpretation of the concept of progressivity. 
An alternative approach was to place the emphasis on 
raising the tax threshold, increase the limit for total 
exemption from income tax, to take as many people as 
possible out of the income tax bracket without at the 
same time giving a greater benefit to those above the new 
tax thresholds through a reduced rate of tax. This 
second approach was the one followed by the last Labour 
Government when the reduced rate bands were phased out. 
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The T. U. C. had also then put the emphasis on raising 
thresholds rather than reduced rate bands of tax and had 
stuck consistently to that line until 1973. Indeed, it 
had taken the idea even further than the last Labour 
Government with its 1968 proposal for a minimum earned 
income allowance, which under the pre-1973 income tax 
would have raised the starting point of tax while 
automatically ensuring that the benefit from this was not 
extended right up the income scale. While the minimum 
earned income allowance would have raised the threshold 
quite considerably, the starting rate of tax above the 
new threshold would not have been reduced, but, in fact, 
increased. Those taxpayers benefitting from the minimum 
earned income allowance would have got no marginal two- 
ninths earned income relief until the minimum allowance 
was exhausted. 
This point had been well illustrated by a proposal in the 
T. U. C. 's 1970 Economic Review for a minimum earned income 
allowance of £300. If this proposal had been adopted in 
the 1970 Budget instead of the formal abandonment of the 
reduced rate band, the effective tax rates on earned 
income for the single taxpayer up to the standard rate 
would have been: 
Up to £555 a year Nil 
£555 - £623 30% 
£623 - £1.350 41.25% 
Standard Rate Range 32% 
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The effect of the T. U. C. 's 1970 proposal would have been 
the virtual abolition of the reduced rate band of income 
tax on earned income. What the TUC was then proposing 
was not very different in principle from what the Labour 
Government did in a less complex way when it abolished 
the reduced rate band. After 1970. with the reduced rate 
band already abolished, the introduction of a minimum 
earned income allowance would have meant a rate of tax 
above the effective standard rate on earned income at the 
bottom of the tax scale. (paper's emphasis). In 1972 
(the last year of the old income tax system) the T. U. C. 
proposed a minimum earned income allowance of £325. Had 
this been introduced in place of the all-round increase 
in tax allowances in the 1972 Budget, for a single 
taxpayer the range of tax rates on earned income up to 
the standard rate would have been: 
Up to £650 Nil 
£650 - £1,462.50 38.75% 
Standard Rate Range 
, 
30% 
Under the unified income tax system introduced in 1973. 
based on earned income with an investment income 
surcharge rather than on unearned income with earned 
income relief, a minimum earned income allowance as such 
would not be possible. The achievement of the same 
effect would require the formal introduction of higher 
tax allowances combined with starting rates of-tax above 
30%. The T. U. C. recognised this in it's 1972 Economic 
Review when it had said: 
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"An exactly equivalent effect could be achieved 
under the new system. by the introduction of a 
flat allowance subject to (98 )reduction by a 
proportion of earned income". 
However the T. U. C. 's statement "Economic Policy and 
Collective Bargaining in 1973". adopted a different 
approach with its suggestion that the government should 
consider the introduction of a reduced rate band although 
it was not included as a top priority item in its list of 
proposals in the T. U. C. 's summary Budget. The Research 
Department did not advocate the earlier T. U. C. proposal 
of the equivalent of a minimum earned income allowance as 
a positive suggestion since it would be very difficult to 
defend an income tax system which started with a rate 
higher than 30%, fell to 30% slightly higher up the 
scale, and then rose again with the higher rates of tax. 
Apart from anything else this would undermine the point 
which the party had been trying to communicate to the 
public for a long time; that the marginal rate of tax 
on earned income could not. exceed 30% until earnings 
reached a relatively high level. Such a proposal would 
also exacerbate the poverty trap at a certain point in 
the earnings range although it would relieve it lower 
down. The crucial point the Research Department was 
trying to make was that the proposal put forward by the 
T. U. C. from 1968 to 1972 (which was progressive since it 
would concentrate the benefit of tax concessions at the 
lower end of the income tax bracket) was poles apart from 
the idea that there should be reduced rate bands at the 
starting point of income tax: 
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'Each of these two conflicting approaches derives 
from the same motive: to use the income tax system 
to help the lower paid. But one seeks to do it by 
reduced marginal rates at the bottom, while(ýýg 
other would actually involve increasing them'. 
The final part of the Research Department's paper was 
concerned with a consideration of three proposals for 
delivering income tax concessions to the lower paid. The 
first was for the reintroduction of a reduced rate band 
of income tax, the second for an increase in the tax 
threshold, and the third for a relatively smaller 
increase in the threshold combined with a relatively 
shorter reduced rate band. Underlying these proposals 
was an assumption that a Labour Government would wish to 
make regular increases in the starting point of the 
standard rate (and of reduced rates should there be any) 
at least in line with the price level, and possibly in 
line with earnings. There was therefore no question of 
fiscal drag, at least not the inflationary drag which 
resulted from the tax threshold lagging behind the cost 
of living. The paper's proposals constituted once and 
for all (perhaps phased) but permanent increases in the 
starting point of the standard rate in real terms, in 
addition to regular cost-of-living reviews in each 
budget. For this reason it was felt that the concessions 
should cost only a relatively limited amount of revenue, 
around £300 million a year. The revenue loss of an 
increase in the tax threshold of £10 a year was 
calculated at £75 million a year and the substitution of 
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a reduced rate of 20% for the standard rate over the same 
£10 income band would cost £25 million. It could be 
assumed that the proportionate cost of relatively larger 
increases in the threshold or reduced rate relief could 
decline slightly as some tax payers would be removed from 
income tax (and others taken out of higher rate tax) by 
each successive marginal increase in the threshold or 
reduced rate band. £300 million a year could finance 
either an increase in the tax threshold of £44 a year all 
round, the introduction of a reduced rate band of £140 a 
year, or an increase in the threshold of £25 a year 
together with a reduced rate band of £70. The Research 
Department felt that the third possibility should be 
discarded immediately, because within the limits of an 
available £300 million it would not be possible to 
combine an increase in the threshold with the 
introduction of a reduced rate band which was long enough 
to be administratively worthwhile. Put another way, this 
meant that the reintroduction of reduced rates, if also 
r 
accompanied by a real increase in the threshold in 
addition to the necessary annual adjustments, would be 
prohibitively expensive. 
(60) 
What impact would the two remaining alternatives have on 
the relief of the poverty trap? If the proposals were 
applied to the specimen three child family described 
above the following situation would obtain; either an 
increase in the weekly earnings threshold from £22.45 to 
95 
£23.30. or a marginal rate of 20% instead of 30% on 
earnings between £22.45 and £25.15. Where earnings 
exceeded £25.15 the income tax paid would be cut by 25p 
or 26p in the first case and by 27p in the second. For 
this reason, some of the free school meals and health 
service benefits (assessed on net income) would then be 
lost at £1 a week less in gross income than shown in the 
table. Otherwise there would be little change in any of 
the other means tests and deductions. In the first 
instance, with the increase in the threshold, the 17p 
income tax on the £22 - £23 earnings range would be 
removed, with a small income tax reduction also on the 
£23 - £24 range. By comparison, the reintroduction of 
the reduced rate band would produce a smaller income tax 
reduction at the bottom of the income tax bracket, but a 
further lOp. tax cut on the £24-£25 range. In terms of 
relieving the poverty trap there was little to choose 
between the two approaches, but of the two the increased 
threshold was clearly preferable as it would neatly 
remove the overlap between income tax and FIS, thus 
providing a significant relief in the lower of the two 
humps of high effective marginal tax rates. It was 
equally evident that neither of these possible income tax 
reliefs would really go to the heart of the poverty trap 
problem. As the table on page $7 above demonstrates, 
means tests bit hard on marginal increases in earnings 
even below the then current tax threshold, and the worst 
examples of poverty surtax occurred in the upper hump (on 
earnings of £31 - £34 for the specimen 
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family shown). beyond the point where even a reduced rate 
band could be expected to provide any relief. If 
relieving the poverty trap was the main consideration of 
policy the best course of action would be to forget about 
income tax reliefs altogether (apart from the annual 
reviews to maintain the real value of the existing 
threshold) and concentrate available resources on 
removing some of the means tests by a return to a more 
universal system of benefits; in effect to overthrow the 
selectivist dogma of social policy then being pursued by 
the Conservative Government and the vaxt extension of 
means testing which had accompanied it. 
(61) 
Raising the tax threshold or reintroducing the reduced 
rate bands of tax had implications for the overall 
progressivity of the entire tax system. Those in the 
party who favoured the reinstatement of one or more 
. reduced rate bands of income tax had tended to assume 
that such a move would necessarily make the system more 
progressive; that the idea of having a starting rate 
below the standard rate was part of the same concept as 
the extension of higher rates on higher incomes. This 
was a fallacy. The only way to make income tax more 
progressive was by an increase in tax rates at some 
point. Because income tax was in principle progressive 
(in that there was a certain exemption limit, and the 
marginal rates of tax tended to increase as income rose) 
any reductions in the rates of tax, even in the form of 
97 
reduced rates at the bottom of the income tax bracket, 
tended to give a greater benefit to taxpayers higher up 
the scale than to those lower down. A truly progressive 
restructuring of income tax, under which the majority of 
taxpayers received none of the benefit which was 
concentrated on the lower paid, actually involved an 
increase in marginal rates even at the bottom of the 
scale, as with the former T. U. C. proposal for a minimum 
earned income relief. The abolition of the reduced rates 
in 1969-1970 was a highly progressive move since the 
majority of taxpayers gained very little in either of the 
two Budgets, while those who had previously been a short 
way over the threshold gained appreciably by being taken 
out of the tax bracket. 
From the point of view of progressivity of the two 
alternative income tax concessions considered by the 
Research Department, the increased threshold was 
superior. If the taxpayer in the specimen family were 
earning £23-£30 a week, he would gain the full benefit of 
the increased threshold but he would have to be earning 
£25.15 to benefit fully from the reduced rate concession 
costing the same amount. If he were earning more than 
£25.15 he would be very slightly better off (by lp or 2p. 
a week) with the reduced rate relief but if earning 
exactly £23.30 he would be 51p. better off with the 
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increased threshold; and if his earnings lay between 
£22.45 and £23.30 he would also gain more from the 
threshold increase than the reduced rate. However, the 
fact was that no income tax concession (outside of a 
possible tax credit system) could really be progressive. 
Those who were already below the tax threshold would 
gain nothing while those higher up the scale would gain 
at least as much in absolute terms as those just above 
the existing threshold, unless the concession involved 
an actual increase in marginal rates above the new 
threshold as was the case with the miminum earned income 
allowance idea. Even a straight increase in the tax 
threshold was by itself regressive. Those below the 
former threshold gained nothing and those just above it 
gained less than the full amount, while those in the 
higher tax groups tended to gain a greater amount. This 
was more true under the unified income tax system than 
it' had been before 1973. When the Conservative 
Government increased the single personal tax allowance 
by £135 a year in the 1972 Budget, no taxpayer gained by 
more than a flat £1 a week. This was automatically 
ensured because the basic tax allowances under the pre- 
1975 tax system affected earned and unearned income 
equally, and the single tax allowance was not allowed 
against surtax. Under unified tax, an increase in the 
tax allowance, unless accompanied by a simultaneous 
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restructuring higher up the scale, would give more to 
those on the higher rates and the investment income 
surcharge than to the ordinary basic rate taxpayer. 
Securing progressivity indicated the same policy 
response as did relieving the poverty trap. The best 
solution was not to cut income tax at all but rather to 
increase benefits such as Family Allowances which helped 
the most needy sections of the community who were not 
paying income tax in any case. There was no reason why 
it was wrong in principle for tax to be paid at 
relatively low levels of income. provided it was offset 
by other benefits. The last Labour Government in 1968 
had taken a deliberate decision to cut the effective tax 
threshold for families with children quite considerably 
through the combination of increased Family Allowances 
(themselves taxable) with the concept of claw-back. 
(62) 
A year previously, in May 1972, the Finance and 
Economic Affairs Sub-Committee had recommended the 
creation of a joint working party with membership from 
itself and the Social Policy Sub-Committee to consider 
how the party might respond to the government's 
announcement in its 1972 Budget that it was committed in 
principle to a variant of the Negative Income Tax and 
intended to publish a Green Paper on the subject that 
summer. 
(63) 
It was felt likely that one of the key 
political issues which the government's proposals might 
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touch on was whether the scheme would be an extension of 
selectivity, attempting to solve poverty on the cheap by 
imposing high marginal tax rates on the lower paid or a 
genuine attempt to tackle the problem of poverty. 
(64) 
The Labour Party's Tax Credit Working Party developed an 
analysis of the poverty trap entirely in keeping with 
the characteristics that have been identified above and 
contended that real disincentives to work arose low down 
the income scale where the accumulated loss of means 
tested-benefits combined with high income tax to provide 
"excessively high marginal tax rates". 
(65) 
The 
proposals contained in the government's Green Paper 
would not solve the poverty trap. Those people who 
achieved small increases in their earnings just above 
the £20 a week level could find themselves paying more 
tax, rent, National Insurance contributions, 
superannuation, school meals and health service charges 
which together could produce, in many cases, an 
effective marginal tax rate of over 100%. The only 
existing means test which the proposed Tax Credits would 
(66) 
As with replace was the Family Income Supplement. 
the Research Department's paper, it argued that the only 
way to get rid of the high marginal tax rates at low 
levels of income would be to make some of the present 
means-tested benefits universal and meet the extra cost 
of this from the imposition of higher rates of income 
tax on those earning 50% more than the national average 
figure of earnings, and on unearned income. 
(67) 
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The Research Department's detailed paper on the poverty 
trap, income tax thresholds and reduced rate relief was 
discussed by the Finance and Economic Affairs Sub- 
Committee at its meeting on the 15th May 1973. The 
minutes of this meeting say very little apart from 
noting that it was generally agreed that on the 
objective of relieving the poverty trap, the paper had 
demonstrated the superiority of increased tax thresholds 
or alternative increases in expenditure designed to 
abolish means tests as opposed to the reintroduction of 
reduced rates of income tax. Against this however, it 
was believed that wider considerations of progressivity 
demanded the restoration of reduced rate bands. 
(68) 
Fortunately, rather' more information about the internal 
debate is available in another paper produced by the 
Research Department for the Finance and Economic Affairs 
Sub-Committee in June. 
(69) 
At its May meeting the sub- 
committee had not- only, considered the Research 
Department's paper but also the memorandum of evidence 
submitted by Nicholas Kaldor to the Parliamentary Select 
Committee on Tax Credits which amongst other things had 
dealt with the question of reduced rates of income tax. 
Kaldor's paper had strongly supported the reintroduction 
of the reduced rate bands, and apparently the sub- 
committee had had 'a most useful discussion' which was 
to be continued at future meetings. 
(70) 
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The Research Department's new paper confirms the minutes 
noted above and adds that the costings contained in its 
earlier proposals were not queried either. Neither was 
its assertion that a real increase in tax thresholds (on 
top of regular reviews of tax allowances in line with 
rising earnings or prices) and the reintroduction of 
reduced rate bands of reasonable length, could together 
be prohibitively expensive, and that therefore a choice 
had to be made between the two, always assuming that 
either could be afforded. However, most of those who 
commented on the two papers agreed with Kaldor that the 
issue was much wider than the question of the poverty 
trap and that reduced rates at the starting point of 
income tax were an essential feature of a progressive 
direct taxation system. 
(71) 
The crucial point of 
divergence with Kaldor in the Research Department's 
original paper was that it had started from the point of 
view that the question of reduced rates was a separate 
issue from that of progression at higher levels of 
income. It had argued that, in view of the party's 
massive public expenditure commitments, the urgent need 
was to increase the total of revenue gained from direct 
taxation. It had therefore taken the view that the 
lynchpin of a more progressive income tax system was the 
reduction of the starting point of the higher rates of 
income tax, and that any kind of proposals for 
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reductions in income tax at lower levels would have to 
take place alongside the party's expenditure commitments 
in the debate about priorities. At the same time it had 
conceded that, as far as the timing of income tax 
changes was concerned, it might be essential for 
political reasons for some sort of income tax concession 
for the low paid to be introduced simultaneously with 
increased taxation of high incomes. 
(72) 
In his evidence to the Select Committees Kaldor had 
taken the view that reduced rate bands of income tax 
were inseparable from a. policy of tackling the tax 
hollow at higher levels of income as complementary 
features of a progressive income tax. He argued that 
whilst the income tax system had once been highly 
progressive, this progression had gradually disappeared 
since the early post-war years.. The two salient 
features of this regressive shift in the system had been 
the development of a very} large tax hollow at high 
income levels and the disappearance of the former 
reduced rate bands, the two together producing an 
excessively long range of income covered. by the standard 
rate. 
(73) 
The Appendix to Kaldor's memorandum to the Select 
Committee produced by Cripps and Tarling contained a 
table which applied the 1951-52 rates of income tax and 
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surtax to 1973 incomes. This was done by raising the 
income tax allowances, reduced rate bands, and surtax 
ranges applied in 1951-52, in line with the increase in 
earnings from that period to the beginning of 1973. The 
1951-52 rates of income tax and surtax on the 
appropriate income ranges were then expressed in terms 
of unified income tax rates. The result was a 
relatively smooth progression of marginal tax rates 
rising with income, giving a higher threshold than 
existed in 1973, a starting rate of 12%. and a rate of 
22% covering the average wage bracket, jumping to a rate 
of 38% covering the range of annual income from £2.470 
to £9,000 (for a childless married couple). 
(74) 
Kaldor favoured changes in the income tax system to 
bring it more into line with the Cripps-Tarling model 
and the re-introduction of one or more reduced rate 
bands would be an essential feature of such a switch. 
He- argued that the abolition of reduced rates in the 
Budgets of 1969 and 1970 was a highly regressive move. 
At the meeting of the Finance and Economic Affairs Sub- 
Committees on 15th May, he backed up his position by 
producing figures showing that the effective tax burden 
on specimen taxpayers earning 75% of the average wage 
rose appreciably between 1968-69 and 1970-71. To 
counter the point made in the Research Department's 
first paper that an increase in personal allowances 
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could be worth more than a reduced rate band to those 
taxpayers a short way over the existing tax threshold. 
Kaldor argued that the number of individuals so affected 
would be small. He maintained that those who were below 
or just above the tax threshold could be more 
effectively helped by minimum wage legislation than 
either income tax concessions or negative income tax/tax 
credit proposals. 
(75) 
Kaldor, also pointed out that the re-introduction of 
reduced rate bands would facilitate a claw-back type 
operation allied to an increase or extension of Family 
Allowances. Without the reduced rate bands. a claw-back 
designed to neutralise the net benefit to the standard 
rate tax payer could have the effect of clawing back the 
full increase in Family Allowances from all but those 
below the threshold, whereas with reduced rates there 
would still be a residual net benefit to those within 
the reduced rate band. Though he favoured Family 
Allowances which would be tax-free in themselves Kaldor 
did put forward a claw-back proposal in his suggestions 
for the extension of Family Allowances as an alternative 
to tax credits. 
(76) 
The Research Department's paper took great pains to 
clarify its position on the impact of the abolition of 
the reduced rate bands of income tax in 1969 and 1970 on 
the taxation of lower paid workers. It had argued in its 
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first paper that this move was, in a limited sense. 
progressive in that those at the bottom of the tax scale 
benefited while the position of the ordinary standard 
rate taxpayer was unchanged. Kaldor disputed this, and 
other members of the Finance and Economic Affairs Sub- 
Committee supported him, claiming that the reliefs in 
the two Budgets to those immediately above the former 
thresholds had in effect been paid for by those with 
incomes only slightly higher. In fact, no taxpayer was 
made substantially worse off by either of the Budgets 
themselves. Nobody was paying more in income tax 
immediately after either Budget than before solely on 
account of the tax changes. The 1969-70 Financial 
Statement demonstrated that the tax bill on all 
taxpayers above the new starting point of the standard 
rate set by the 1969 Budget was increased by about 6p. a 
year. Similarly with the 1970 Budget: the single 
taxpayer above the new threshold paid 37.5p a year more, 
while the married man gained appreciably through the 
increase in additional married allowance. 
Given this, how was it possible for the low wage earner 
to carry an increased tax burden in 1969-70 and 1970-71? 
For the authors of the Research Department's paper the 
answer was quite simple. They had explained at the sub- 
committee's meeting on the 15th May that fiscal drag was 
operating quite heavily in the period concerned, and it 
was this rather than the abolition of the reduced rate 
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bands which caused the general increase in direct 
taxation in those two years. The small notional full- 
year loss of revenue consequent on the two Budgets (£14 
million in 1969 and £175 million in 1970) was 
overwhelmed by inflation with the level of average 
earnings rising by 23.5% between April 1969 and April 
1971. The increase in the basic single person's 
allowance necessary to compensate the ordinary standard 
rate taxpayer for the loss of the reduced rates 
operating prior to 1969 was £105. This was exactly the 
combined increase that was made in the 1969 and 1970 
Budgets. But in order to avoid fiscal drag, it would 
have been necessary to anticipate the earnings increase 
of 23.5% during the period covered by the two Budgets 
with commensurate further increases in all personal 
allowances. This would have meant an increase of £75 in 
the single allowance, together with increases of £30 in 
the additional married allowance, and £25 in the basic 
child allowance. None of this occurred. except for a 
£20 increase in the married allowance in 1970. If this 
adjustment had been made in 1969 and 1970 the total real 
cost to the exchequer of eliminating fiscal drag would 
have been limited to the tax cut at the very bottom of 
the scale, and there would have been no increase in the 
burden of taxation on any other section of the community 
as a result. Thus the abolition of the reduced rate 
bands had had no adverse effect on the lower paid. The 
issue had been clouded by the heavy fiscal drag which 
took place simultaneously. 
(77) 
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It was also necessary to sound a note of caution about 
the Cripps-Tarling technique of applying 1951-52 tax 
rates to 1973 incomes. As their figures had shown, the 
yield of income tax and surtax as a proportion of GNP 
was only 8.95% in 1951 and 8.39% in 1952, compared with 
13.5% in 1971. The proportion of national income taken 
by personal direct taxation was half as much again in 
1971 
. as 
it was twenty years previously. This had been 
caused by the very considerable increase in public 
expenditure, particularly on such items as education, 
health, personal social services and roads. The 
percentage tax rates used by Kaldor in his evidence to 
the Select Committee should be increased by at least 50% 
in order to correspond to the then current yield of 
income tax, and the marginal rates at the lower end of 
the scale would have to be raised by more than this as 
those higher up the scale could hardly be increased at 
all without hitting 100%. If allowance was made for all 
this, the tax rates in Kaldor's memorandum would look 
very different. There could still be a reduced rate 
band of perhaps 20% up to £1,350 a year and a higher 
exemption limit, but there would then be a marginal tax 
rate of about 60%, starting at £2,470 a year for a 
married couple. 
(78) 
The Research Department's resume was considered by the 
Finance and Economic Affairs Sub-Committee at its next 
meeting on 20th July, 1973 together with a paper from 
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Kaldor on the "Increase in the Burden of Income Tax on 
the Working Classes During the last Labour Government". 
The minutes of the meeting provide no details of the 
discussion and content themselves with noting that it 
was agreed that the poverty trap problem of very high 
effective marginal tax rates was crucially important. 
and that the most effective means of relieving poverty 
were likely to involve increases in expenditure rather 
than any kind of income tax concession. However, the 
majority also felt that reduced rates of income tax 
should be reintroduced as part of an overall move 
towards greater progression in income tax rates. 
(79) 
This meeting of the sub-committee brought to a close 
what had been an intense period of analysis of the 
poverty trap by the party bureaucracy and it was to be 
almost two years, with a Labour Government returned to 
power, before the party machine took up the- subject 
again. 
In the Spring of 1975 the Social Policy Sub-Committee 
had agreed to prepare an anti-poverty strategy that 
would form the basis of the social policy section of 
'Labour's Programme' for 1976. The sub-committee agreed 
on a plan of work which identified means tests, and the 
interaction of taxation, benefits and earnings, as 
important areas of work; the poverty trap was included 
under both headings. 
(80) 
As a part of this programme of 
work Brian Abel-Smith produced a paper on the 
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integration of taxation and social security which 
observed inter alia, that some people entitled to or 
actually receiving Family Income Supplement paid income 
tax, and that the overlap between tax and means-tested 
benefits helped to create the poverty trap. He also 
commented that any kind of affordable negative income 
tax scheme would do little to reduce dependence on 
Family Income Supplement and hence have little effect on 
easing the poverty trap. 
(81) 
The debate was added to by a paper on means-tests from 
Ruth Lister(82) who spent some time on the poverty trap 
and recent developments in the debate. She discounted 
the claim that the poverty trap was a figment of the 
statistical imagination and had recently been 
diminishing because of the extension of eligibility 
periods. She also introduced the notion of the 'poverty 
plateau', a concept developed by Jonathan Bradshaw and 
Della Nevitt. The poverty plateau covered 
'... a range of incomes in the lower half of the 
income frequency curve wh? 55) marginal losses of 
income equal or exceed 50X' 
and had been defined by Bradshaw and Nevitt as being 
concerned with 
'the possibility of individuals moving out cý low 
income ranges to higher ones by means of the 
normal opportunities open to them in different 
occupations according to their age and social 
opportunities. The question that must be posed is 
whether or not with normal luck and effort people 
can escape poverty, or will their efforts be 
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frustrated by a 'fiscal brake" imposed by the 
income m, a , 
ntenance and tax systems of the 
country' .l 
ts4 
Their answer to their own rhetorical question was that 
with present arrangements it was difficult to know how a 
manual worker could significantly improve his economic 
position if he started life in one of the lower income 
deciles. 
Atkinson and Bosanquet were the next academics to offer a 
contribution to the Social Policy Sub-Committee's 
cerebrations with a discussion document on the 
relationship between taxation and Labour's social 
policy. 
(85) 
They identified two main reasons for 
improving the co-ordination between the taxation and 
social security systems; the overwhelming need to set up 
a proper system of universal benefits capable of 
providing a substantial level of support to people on low 
incomes without adding massively to the incomes of the 
better off which would involve reducing the size of 
personal tax allowances, and secondly, the existence of 
the poverty trap for low and even medium wage earners 
with a large family. Suggestions involving the total or 
partial integration of the tax and benefit systems were 
not acceptable, and the immediate priority was to provide 
a generous system of universal benefits which would avert 
the necessity for means testing and eliminate the poverty 
trap. This could not be achieved without reforming the 
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relationship between the taxation and benefit systems, 
but the aim should be co-ordination, not integration. 
This could be achieved by clearly stating the objectives 
of the two systems; taxation should only be concerned 
with raising revenue according to the ability to pay, 
while benefits should provide help according to 
categories of need not means* 
(86) To achieve this they 
called for the abolition of special income tax allowances 
(with the exception of the personal allowance) with the 
revenue used to raise and extend National Insurance 
benefits. It was difficult to provide a decent level of 
universal benefits so long as they were paid tax free to 
people on larger incomes, a practice that often seemed 
indefensible to a great many people, as was the fact that 
short term earnings-related benefits were also free of 
tax. To counter this they proposed that all social 
security benefits, including child endowment payments 
should be subject to tax. 
(87) 
t 
Nobody had made any serious effort to tackle the poverty 
trap and if the party was serious about changing society 
this issue could no longer be dodged. It could be 
reduced by phasing out Family Income Supplement and other 
means-tested benefits but it was also necessary to 
reintroduce reduced rate bands of income tax whose 
r 
abolition in 1969-70 had done a great deal to exacerbate 
the poverty trap. Reduced rate bands were also needed 
given their earlier recommendation that all social 
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security benefits be taxed. Their suggestion of reduced 
rate bands of 15% and 25% with a standard rate band of 
35% would mean that every pound of child endowment would 
be worth £1 for those below the tax threshold. 85p. for 
those in the first band, 75p. in the second band and 65p. 
in the standard rate. 
(88) 
Possibly the most significant contribution thus far at 
this stage of the Labour Party's examination of the 
poverty trap came in a discussion document submitted to 
the Finance and Economic Affairs Sub-Committee by Jack 
Sieve in February, 1976. 
(89) 
Sieve claimed that in 1965 
income tax, excluding surtax, on wages and salaries came 
to 9.2% of income; by 1974 it had increased to 13.9%. 
This increase of over half in the tax rate was due mainly 
to the aboltiion of reduced rate relief in 1969-70, and 
the increase in the earned standard rate of tax from 30% 
to 33%. By 1970 all progression in the income tax system 
had. ceased to exist except for the small minority of 
surtax payers. 
'At the margin. ( W ome tax had become 
proportional'. 
Until 1974 the increase in the sum of personal and child 
tax allowances for a family with two children kept pace 
with the rise in earnings. Married personal allowances 
rose proportionately with earnings but the child 
allowance did not. In 1964 the Child Tax Allowance for a 
child under 11 represented 57% of a single personal 
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allowance but by 1976 it had declined to 35%. The tax 
rate was also increased by two points to 35%. Thus in 
1964 income tax represented 7.3% of male average 
industrial earnings for a two child family but by 1975/6 
it had risen to 19.3%. It was apparent that over eleven 
years the burden of income tax, had rocketed. The 
increase was particularly marked for families with 
children and those people with low taxable incomes who 
had previously benefited from reduced rate relief. 
(91) 
In addition to income tax all employees with earnings 
above a certain floor and between that and a ceiling 
limit had to pay national insurance contributions which 
at the time of Sieve's evidence to the sub-committee 
stood at 5.5%, to be increased from April, 1977 to a rate 
of 5.75% up to a new, higher ceiling. These 
contributions were compulsory and were not actuarially 
linked to benefit and as such represented an additional 
tax on earnings; at least they were so regarded by 
workers. Consequently the marginal rate on personal tax 
for the vast majority of taxpayers was 40.5%. For a 
taxpayer with a wife and two children the tax threshold 
was crossed on an income of £1.383 per year (including 
Family Allowance), 
earnings. 
(92) 
45% of average male industrial 
Sieve claimed that this exposed the myth that U. K. 
personal taxation was progressive; for 98% of people 
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taxation was proportionate. Progression existed only for 
the 2% of taxpayers earning over £6.000 per year. For 
taxpayers earning a little over average earnings up until 
almost double that figure (£3,600 to £5,900 for a family 
man) personal tax was actually regressive, although from 
April, 1977 regression was reserved for those at the top 
of this income band. He believed that if adequate 
resources were available the threshold for all taxpayers 
should be raised substantially, but a rise of £390 per 
year, which would raise the threshold for a two child 
family to the Family Income Supplement level of earnings, 
would cost £2,500 million, 20% of, total revenue from 
income tax. 
'The raising of such enormous sums presents great 
difficulties. It is, however, imperative that 
whatever can be made available must be concentrated 
in the first instance on the group mos n need - 3ý low income wage earners with children'. 
He went on to offer what by this time was a familiar 
analysis of the poverty trap but pointed out that the 
sharpest 'poverty surtax rates' arose from the 
combination of Family Income Supplement and free school 
meals. By definition those two benefits were confined to 
families with children. Because of the structure of the 
benefit scales few wage earners without children obtained 
rent and rate rebates, therefore the poverty trap 
predominantly affected families with children. 
'Accordingly, it is not mainly on grounds of 
equity that priority must be given to earners 
with children. It is rather that unless this group 
is released from the trap into which they have 
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been put, the community will be responsible for 
removing all incentive to work and earn more. A 
significant sector of useful citizens with below 
average earnings will be pauperised. The combined 
effect of proportionate personal taxation and the 
welfare state is similar to that of the old Poor 
Laws. However hard one strives at the margin, an 
economic improvement is impossible. The 
disincentive effects of the system are such that 
their removal might well lead to a substantial 
improvement in productivity. (944nd therefore 
eventual increase in tax revenue. 
Over a wide range of low earnings the personal taxation 
system was so harsh that welfare benefits had to be 
provided if the family was to be saved from poverty. The 
problem was particularly acute at the lowest levels of 
earnings where Family Income Supplement applied. 
If the tax burden of low earners was to be reduced the 
tax threshold had to be raised significantly. Even if 
this was concentrated solely on families with children 
the cost would be great. In 1975-76 the tax threshold 
for a two child family had to be raised to two-thirds of 
average earnings. This could be achieved by increasing 
the married personal allowance, the child allowance, and 
by cancelling claw-back. If this was done the only 
remaining tax for a two child family earning up to £39 
per week would be graduated national insurance 
contributions. With very rare exceptions the principle 
would apply of no welfare benefits if income tax was 
charged. At lower levels of earnings the worst rigours 
of poverty surtax would be removed. 
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The estimated cost of this relief would be £1,430 million 
per year, any less would not solve the problem. Unless 
the tax threshold was raised to two thirds of average 
male industrial earnings and kept there, a substantial 
sector of wage earners would remain in the poverty trap. 
Even if raised to the target figure a small number of low 
income earners would continue to be subject to 
significant, though much lower. poverty surtax rates. 
Although these were costly measures they would remove the 
worst defect of the personal tax system, and should take 
priority over all other improvements and reliefs. 
Sieve's judgement was: 
'Retention of the present structure of welfare 
payments for families with children whilst the 
existing &h burden for such families persist is 
immoral'. 
It would be wishful thinking to assume that such a 
programme could be funded from sources other than 
personal taxation, and Sieve went on to claim that given 
current economic conditions; it would be dishonest to 
advocate initiatives that were not self-financing. If 
the cost of removing most poverty surtax was the 
estimated £1,400 million, and if, in addition, relatively 
poor tax payers at the lower end of the income scale were 
to be helped by the introduction of a degree of tax 
progression, the total cost of both measures would be 
enormous, above £2.900 million, equal to 20% of revenue 
from income tax. What were the most likely sources of 
funding for such a programme? 
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Sieve rejected immediately the call for additional 
taxation on higher incomes. The current levels of 
taxation on such incomes were already so high that extra 
taxes would only bring in negligible returns. Moverover 
there was a strong case on incentive grounds, as well as 
horizontal equity, for reducing the marginal rates on top 
earned incomes. There was undoubtedly substantial scope 
for increasing revenue from measures against tax 
avoidance and through closer scrutiny of the self- 
employed, but such a policy was likely to be a lengthy 
and laborious task requiring complicated legislation. 
The only effective and quick way to raise the sums 
required from personal taxation was to widen the tax 
base. He identified a variety of sources of income which 
had been given total or partial relief in the past 'for 
all sorts of good reasons' which, if brought fully into 
the tax net, could yield the £2,900 million required. 
These included life assurance, pension schemes, wives' 
earnings, owner-occupier notional rent (covered by 
Schedule A tax until 1963), and luncheon vouchers and 
canteen meals. 
(96) 
Sieve concluded his paper by pointing 
out the political dangers attached to such a course of 
action in words that merit lengthy quotation. It would 
require, 
'... great political courage on the part of the 
Government to alleviate the plight of low income 
families by utilising these erosions and reliefs. 
All are hallowed by time and most are enjoyed by 
ordinary citizens. 
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... If, and only if, we are willing to grasp the 
nettle with both hands, will the poorest section 
of the working population cease to be pauperised 
and condemned to perpetual poverty. The cost of 
righting this wrong is great and will have to be 
paid by F) vast mass of the working 
population'. 
Sieve's paper, and a critique of it by Denzil Davies, 
then a Treasury Minister, were considered by the Finance 
and Economic Affairs Sub-Committee on April 5th, 1976 
when it was agreed that the Research Department should 
prepare a short note on the major points of both 
documents. 
(98) 
The department found a great deal to 
agree with in Sieve's paper, particularly the three 
points around which his argument was based; that it was 
essential to do something to relieve the poverty trap; 
that such a course of action would be costly and could 
only be financed by getting more revenue from those 
higher up the income scale; and that the key to raising 
the revenue lay in dealing with tax avoidance and the 
erosion of the tax base rather than in altering the 
Having said this actual rates of tax at the top end. 
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though, the Research Department's note felt obliged to 
criticise Sieve on a number of grounds. It drew 
attention to his observation that the average burden of 
income tax had increased as a percentage of wages and 
salaries from 9.2% in 1965 and 13.9% in 1974, and his 
explanation that this had been caused mainly by the 
abolition of the reduced rate bands in 1969 and 1970. 
The Research Department believed that Sieve's explanation 
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was mistaken as a statement of fact. If the profile of 
personal allowances against tax had kept pace with the 
levels of earnings, the increase of one-tenth in the 
effective tax rate would only have raised the total 
proportion of income taken in tax by about 10%. from 9.2% 
to 10.1%. This amounted to only about 20% of the actual 
increase in the' tax take. Moreover, the abolition of the 
reduced rate bands of tax themselves did not give rise to 
any increase in the tax burden since the personal 
allowances were raised simultaneously, leading to a net 
reduction (on paper) in revenue. The Research Department 
believed that the increase in the tax take was to be 
explained not by changes in tax rates, nor in the 
structure of personal allowances and reduced rates, but 
in terms of the real level of personal allowances. Very 
few budgets in the previous twelve years had increased 
personal allowances to a level high enough to avoid the 
effects of fiscal drag whereby most wage earners were 
brought into the tax net throughout the succeeding year 
and those already within it made to pay a higher 
proportion of their incomes in tax as a result of 
inflation. As a result. between 1965-74 when average 
earnings rose in cash terms by over 140%, the cash value 
of the tax-free personal allowances on earned income for 
a two child family was increased by only 63%, and the 
effective earnings threshold of income tax (allowing for 
taxable Family Allowances and the claw-back) were up by 
only 74%. The real value of the tax threshold was in 
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effect cut by 28% over this nine year period and it was 
this. above all else. which accounted for the substantial 
increase in the tax take which Sieve had 
highlighted* (100) 
Although Sieve himself had mentioned the political 
dangers inherent in any programme involving the 
withdrawal of the various tax allowances he had 
identified, the Research Department took some pains to 
emphasise this dimension of the revenue raising strategy 
favoured by Sieve. Sieve had suggested that income tax 
relief on employees' contributions to pension schemes be 
withdrawn, that income tax be paid on employers' 
contributions, and also, that the investment income 
received by pension funds be taxed. 
(101) 
For the average 
wage or salary earner paying 6% of earnings into a 
superannuation scheme. and with the employer paying 
another 10% (a normal arrangement at the time), the 
levying of 35% income tax on these combined contributions 
would mean an immediate increase in his PAYE tax 
deductions amounting to 5.5% of his gross earnings. and 
perhaps up to 8% of net take-home pay. This would 
represent a major setback to the occupational pensions 
movement for which many trade unions had been striving 
over the years. Such a development would be extremely 
contentious and politically unacceptable. 
(102) 
The 
authors of the Research Department paper came to a 
similar conclusion about Sieve's suggestion that a Labour 
Government should reintroduce a tax on the notional 
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income imputed to owner-occupiers. They argued that to 
the ordinary taxpayer such a development would represent 
a completely alien principle, taxation on income which 
had not been realised and which existed only in the form 
of beneficial occupation of property, a benefit similarly 
enjoyed by local authority and private tenants with their 
homes, and on which they would not be taxed. There could 
also be cases where the imposition of such a levy would 
cause actual hardship, for example to non-working owner- 
occupier widows, and pensioners with no substantial 
benefits from occupational pension schemes or other 
private sources. 
(103) 
In his critique of Sieve's paper Denzil Davies had 
claimed that the combination of personal allowances and a 
proportional tax over the basic rate band had produced a 
pattern of effective rates of income tax that rose 
steadily as a function of increasing income. Hence the 
income tax system was more progressive than many Labour 
i 
Party critics had maintained. He also argued that 
although the burden of income tax on wage and salary 
earners had increased over the previous eleven years it 
had not been limited to families with children or to 
those with low taxable incomes 
'Average(f6kps of tax have risen at high levels as 
well... ' 
The Research Department paper conceded that although 
there was undoubtedly some truth in Davies, position it 
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took little or no account of the growing use of tax 
avoidance measures by the top income groups which had 
developed to such an extent over recent years that, 
'... the paper increase in the effective tax rates 
for the very well-to-do may not have been anything 
like fully reflecýgg5)in the actual increase in 
their tax burden'. 
There was clear evidence for this in the fact of the 
'remarkably' small increase in the revenue from surtax 
during the period of the last Labour Government. Total 
surtax revenue rose by only 30% between 1964-65 and 1970- 
71. over a period when total personal income increased by 
56% and there had been only a minimal step towards 
adjusting the surtax income limits to allow for 
inflation. Such a contrast could only be explained if 
one attributed to higher income groups a growing use of 
avoidance techniques. 
Davies was also critical of Sieve's assessment of the 
extent and intensity of the poverty trap, itself. While 
he conceded the possibility that in certain circumstances 
some family types might face marginal tax rates of 100% 
or more, he believed that. 
'In practice however. an earner in these 
circumstances is unlikely to lose as a result of a 
pay increase. This is because FIS, free welfare 
milk and free school meals are awarded for a year 
regardless of subsequent changes in income. By 
the time entitlements run out the income levels 
for benefits will normally have been increased and 
the higher income level of the beneficiary need 
not mean a reduction in benefits. The needs 
allowance for the rent and rate(1i%b)ates schemes 
are also periodically increased'. 
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Once more the Research Department paper conceded that 
Davies' analysis had some substance but it stressed that, 
it did not constitute an adequate answer to the problems 
posed by the poverty trap. Davies' comments on time lags 
were self-evidently true but if a worker within the 
poverty trap were to earn several pounds a week more (a 
married man with three children earning £48 a week would 
be worse off even after earning up to £6 a week more) 
consistently, then in time he would become worse off as a 
result after all his means tests had been 
reassessed. 
(107) 
The financial implications of the Labour Party's public 
expenditure programme continued to cause concern, notably 
in the Finance and Economic Affairs Sub-Committee and in 
the Treasury. At the sub-committee's meeting on 30th 
April, 1976, at which the Minister of State at the 
Treasury, Denzil Davies was present, the taxation section 
circulated with the first draft of 'Labour's Programme 
1976' was substantially amended, and the original 
proposal that 
'Labour will take action to bring down further the 
starting point of the higher rates of income tax' 
was deleted. 
(108) To guard against the possibility that 
this idea might be re-introduced, the Treasury felt 
obliged to submit a note containing its own assessment of 
the merits of the offending promise. 
(109) 
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The Treasury argued that much of the original section on 
income tax contained in 'Labour's Programme 1976' 
appeared to be based on the mistaken assumption that a 
large reservoir of untouched taxable capacity existed 
amongst the better off. However, 
'Ministers tfj0ýware that this is a serious 
distortion' 
Ministers were also aware, and had repeatedly said, that 
significant tax reductions for those at the bottom end of 
the income scale could only be paid for by increasing tax 
on the ordinary man and woman with average earnings. To 
emphasise the point the Treasury note quotes the 
government's most recent statement on public expenditure 
in a totally unequivocal manner. 
'Tax thresholds have fallen sharply in relation to 
average earnings, and people are being drawn into 
tax at income levels which are below social 
security benefit levels. The increase in the tax 
burden has fallen heavily on low-wage earners. 
Those earning less than the average contribute 
over a quarter of the income tax yield. This 
cannot be made good simply by increasing the 
bruden at the top: if no taxpayer were left with 
more than £5,000 per annum after to"' his would 
increase the yield by only about 6%. 
The government had already taken action to reduce the 
higher rate income tax threshold in money terms, and in 
real terms the higher rate starting point had fallen 
sharply over the previous two years to a position between 
one and a half times and twice average earnings. 
Although implicit, the political implications of the 
final part of the Treasury's brief memorandum were 
profound, 
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'Still further reductions could only have the 
result of bringing into higher rates large 
numbers of skilled tradesmen and technicians, of 
compressing still further after tax 
differentials, and of worsening the position of 
middle managers' earnin 12 
ýetween 1.5 and 2.5 
times average earnings. ' 
The offending section on the lower starting point for the 
higher rates of income tax was removed and did not appear 
in the later drafts of 'Labour's Programme for Britain' 
produced in April and May of 1976. 
(113) 
The Treasury's intervention in the affairs of the Finance 
and Economic Affairs Sub-Committee appears to have 
worked, for between then and the defeat of Callaghan's 
Government in 1979, a period of three years, there were 
very few significant attempts to continue the internal 
party debate. Of those, the most significant was a 
further contribution from Jack Sieve. 
(114) 
Sieve, a 
member of the sub-committee, was asked by the Research 
Department to prepare a paper containing his views on 
i 
what ought to be the major themes of the 1977 Budget. He 
began by reviewing all the papers produced for the sub- 
committee in 1976 arguing for a restructuring of the 
income tax system. All of these papers found the poverty 
surtax the most disquieting of the evils of the income 
tax system, 
'It saps the will of a significant number of low 
earners and leads to their permanent 
pauperisation. Over a wide band of incomes, it is 
virtually impossible, however hard o ries' to ýý15 
improve one's economic circumstances. 
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The poverty surtax not only caused much suffering but was 
also economically inefficient and might be contributing 
to the nation's poor economic performance since 
incentives at the bottom were as necessary as were those 
at the top. It was for this reason that his 
recommendations were concerned solely with raising the 
family man's income tax threshold. Other reliefs were 
justified but the resources to find them were not 
available. 
Sieve asserted that it was common knowledge that the 
problem of work incentives had become acute over recent 
years because of the erosion of the real level of the 
income tax threshold combined with the maintenance or 
improvement of the real value of social security and 
welfare benefits. The tax system on the one hand and the 
structure of welfare benefits on the other could not be 
maintained in parallel any longer. 
'without eroding the will to work. to( ress and 
improve ones economic circumstances. 
ýg 
There was no way of dealing with this situation other 
than by lowering benefit levels or else increasing the 
value of low earnings by reducing the burden of direct 
taxation. The Conservative Party had been pressing for 
the taxation of benefits, presumably because they 
favoured the first of those options, but to reduce the by 
no means excessive level of social security benefits 
would hurt the poorest and most deprived section of the 
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population and was thus incompatible with Labour's 
aspirations, 
'The logical, as well as the socialist. approach 
is to attack the problem through the taxation of 
low earnings. The taxation of low wage earning 
groups who would not be much worse off if they 
ceased tgllw7rk or worked fewer hours must be 
slashed. 
The only taxpayers to fall into this category were 
families with children. Few single people or married 
couples without children suffered from poverty; they 
were almost always 59p. better off for every additional 
pound they earned. Free school meals and Family Income 
Supplement caused the biggest rise in the graph of 
poverty surtax. Public debate had not sufficiently 
emphasised the point that the problem was almost 
exclusively confined to wage earners with childrten. 
Considerations of equity (defined by Sieve in terms of 
net income per head) also demanded that low wage earners 
with children were the people in greatest need. Not only 
were there more dependents on family income but there 
were also fewer working wives. There was abundant 
evidence to demonstrate that the increase of poverty in 
such families was greater than in other types. 
Consequently, the government ought to concentrate help on 
low wage families with dependent children to provide both 
greater work incentives and greater equity. Sieve argued 
that his recommendations would be self-financing in that 
only income tax saved would be used to finance increases 
in the family man's income tax threshold. 
(118) 
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Sieve dismissed the argument that resources to help the 
target group should come from the wealthy. and not 
ordinary taxpayers without children, since tax rates on 
high incomes were already excessive and counter- 
productive. Improvement would only come from 
restructuring the whole system of personal taxation to 
make lower rates really effective through painstaking 
laborious planning and legislation. It was vital for the 
nation's economic survival that the pauperisation of low 
income earners should not continue for another year. He 
believed that it was only through the measures he was 
proposing that the most urgent problems of equity and 
incentives for low wage earners with families could be 
solved at a stroke in the Budget of 1977. 
(119) 
Exactly a year after Sieve had executed the sub- 
committee's request, Michael Meacher submitted a paper to 
it containing his proposals for a reform of income tax. 
Meacher identified a series of deficiencies which were 
especially onerous for the low paid. At 33% the basic 
rate of income tax was very high, in fact the highest in 
Europe, and hit the low or medium paid worker very hard 
once they had crossed the tax threshold. Because of the 
absence of indexation the tax threshold had sunk too low 
and tax was payable on income below the ceiling of 
eligibility ' for most means-tested benefits, thus 
reinforcing the disincentive effect by 33p. in every 
pound. Even if means tests were retained the tax 
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threshold logically should be placed above the band of 
income where most benefit cut-off points occurred. The 
elimination of the reduced rate bands of tax in 1969-70, 
together with the long plateau of base rate tax, meant 
that it was virtually impossible to use the tax system 
selectively for targetting universal benefits mainly on 
the lower paid. Furthermore there was a need to reduce, 
what Meacher called the "workshy syndrome" by giving men 
at work a similar level of family benefit (at perhaps 
£3.50 per child per week) to that obtainable from benefit 
when unemployed. The British system of allowances 
against tax, especially those in respect of owner 
occupation, private pensions, and insurance schemes was 
over-generous and had a very regressive impact. He 
concluded his critique by claiming that the general shape 
of the U. K. income tax system was much more inequitable 
than that of other main industrial countries. 
(120) 
Meacher argued that the cornerstone of any fundamental 
reform of personal income tax had to be the separation of 
two quite distinct objectives; the setting of the 
starting point for tax liability and the fixing of the 
level of general taxation through the allowances system. 
The previous practice of using personal allowances and 
earned income relief to provide effective exemptions from 
tax had resulted in the distortion of the tax structure 
at the lower end of the scale so that the starting point 
for liability was now lower than would be reasonably 
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expected if the needs of the poor were to be borne in 
mind. 
(121) 
What was needed was a specific exemption 
limit to exclude the poor from the operations of the tax 
system rather than the continuation of allowances against 
tax. The graduation of effective tax rates could then be 
activated by the use of marginal tax rates rising in even 
and progressive steps. Incomes below the specific 
exemption limit would be excluded from tax altogether but 
those people earning more than the limit would be 
assessed for tax on each pound they earned. The problem 
with a specific exemption limit expressed as a minimum 
level of income beyond which an individual became a 
taxpayer was that it lent itself to a dramatically high 
marginal tax rate as incomes rose above the exemption 
limit. The first increment to income above the exemption 
limit would bring the recipient into liability for tax 
on the whole of his income and there would be a 
consequential danger of creating a poverty trap at the 
exemption threshold. To avoid this possibility Meacher 
proposed a reducing exemption which diminished in value 
as income rose without it being withdrawn abruptly at a 
crossover point. The principle was the same as that 
which operated in the administration of rent and rate 
rebate schemes, the exemption being reduced by a set 
proportion of the difference between income and the 
specified level of eligibility. Such a system would 
ensure a smooth withdrawal of the exemption as income 
rose without creating high levels of marginal taxation at 
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any one point. For example, income up to a maximum of 
£1,000 might qualify for a 100% exemption, while on 
incomes above this level the value of the exemption could 
be reduced by one third of the difference between gross 
income and the maximum exemption of £1,000. At £2,000 
therefore the exemption would be £666-66; at £3,000 it 
would be £333-33, and at £4,000 it would disappear 
completely. 
(122) 
With the introduction of this kind of reducing exemption 
limits the responsibility for ensuring a progressive tax 
structure would then fall on the marginal rates 
themselves. The proportional marginal rates then current 
could be replaced by a tax at a rate of perhaps 10% on 
the first £1,000 of taxable income, rising in steps of 
10% on each additional £1,000, subject to a maximum of 
around 80%. The effects of these proposals on the 
structure of effective tax rates are shown in the table 
below. 
Gross Income Exemption Under Proposed Under Current 
System System 
£££%£% 
1,000 92.75 9.3 
1,500 833.3 66.67 4.4 267.75 17.9 
2,000 666.7 166.7 8.3 442.75 22.1 
2,500 500 300 12.0 617.75 24.7 
3,000 333.3 500 16.6 742.75 26.4 
3.500 166.7 733.3 21.0 967.75 27.7 
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4,000 1,000 25.0 1,142.75 28.6 
8,000 3,550 44.4 2,782.5 34.8 
10,000 5.050 57.0 3,909 39.1 
20,000 12.550 62.8 10,948.75 54.7 
(123) 
Meacher believed that for a single person on the average 
wage these proposals would make little difference to his 
tax liability. For someone on half the average wage 
(around £2,000 per year) the change would- result in a 
substantial reduction. On income of twice annual average 
earnings (about £8,000) tax liability would increase from 
35% to 44%, while on income of £10,000 per year taxation 
would increase from 39% to 57%. Politically such a 
system would probably generally work in Labour's 
favour. 
(124) 
Meacher refused to accept the argument of 
those people who claimed that his suggestions would 
increase the tax liability of the better off to an 
unacceptably high level. The evidence suggested that the 
tax actually paid by those people earning over £3,750 per 
year in 1974 averaged only 14% - 24% depending on the 
number of children in the household, 
'It cannot seriously be maintained. therefore, 
that the taxable capacity of the highest paid, 
especially if taken in conjunction with the 
incidence of indirect taxation. has suffered more 
severely than that of 1? yý5)paid groups, let alone 
been almost exhausted'. 
Meacher's contribution 'was the last input into the 
internal party debate before the Labour Party was 
defeated in the General Election of 1979. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Given the Labour Party's traditional reluctance to commit 
itself publicly about the relationship between taxation 
and work incentives, usually the province of the 
Conservative Party when it inveighed against the economic 
consequences of the 'burden' of taxation and public 
expenditure. it is rather surprising at first sight to 
see the party involve itself so rapidly and 
wholeheartedly in the poverty trap debate. Thompson's 
work in the Research Department for example was conducted 
very early on in the development of the concept and 
covered every major characteristic. It is also important 
to recognise that many of the outside authorities most 
closely involved in the refinement of the idea were 
themselves either active supporters of the party or at 
least broadly sympathetic to its aims. Field and Meacher 
both went on to become Labour MP's, with Meacher 
achieving ministerial office in the Callaghan government. 
The avidity with which Labour seized on the poverty trap 
issue with its concomitant theoretical disincentives can 
probably be best understood in the context of the 
economic and social policy on which the Conservative 
Party fought the 1970 general election. Heath made 
economic failure the centre of his campaign, and his 
solution for Britain's economic malaise lay in the 
reduction of public expenditure as a proportion of G. N. P. 
135 
This would enable the government to cut the level of 
direct taxation borne by individuals and companies thus 
liberating incentives' and enterprise. Work effort and 
risk taking would increase and output and productivity 
both soar. Universal social provision would be a 
casualty of this drive to cut the rate of growth of 
public expenditure and the government that Heath formed 
in 1970 was bound to pursue a policy of greater 
selectivity in social policy. Such a policy naturally 
increased the scope of the poverty trap and brought with 
it, at least in theory, greater disincentives for people 
on low incomes. This provided the Labour Party with a 
golden opportunity to attack the Conservatives with their 
own weapons. If punitive marginal tax rates were wrong 
for the well-to-do, how much more so were they for the 
poor faced with even higher rates? It was a weapon that 
the Labour Party was to use particularly forcibly on the 
introduction of F. I. S. Suddenly high marginal taxes and 
work disincentives became a consuming interest of the 
Labour Party. 
Clearly, the poverty trap was not just a dry, technically 
complex issue. In one way or another it highlighted some 
issues of major importance for the Labour Party. The 
potential viability of means-tested programmes intended 
to target resources more directly and effectively on to 
specific populations, an approach that became more and 
more popular in certain sections of the party in the 
1960s. would have to be re-assessed in a new light. Even 
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if high take-up. administratively simple. non- 
stigmatising selective benefits could be designed their 
threat to the work incentives of intended beneficiaries 
could not be ignored. Labour governments as well as 
Conservative ones would have to take this on board. 
The party's agonised and unresolved search for an agreed 
policy to tackle the low tax threshold led it to an 
understanding that if the disincentive aspects of the 
poverty trap were to be overcome much the most effective 
policy response would be the development of non-means- 
tested programmes such as Child Benefit. While such 
programmes would be highly effective in combating family 
poverty and in maintaining or augmenting work incentives, 
they would also be very expensive. Financing those 
policies was to provide the Labour Party with a 
fundamental dilemma that it has never resolved. Some 
extra revenue could be obtained from a 'drive against 
avoidance and evasion but nothing like the amounts 
necessary. Nor was there much mileage in imposing even 
higher taxes on top earners given the existing. rates they 
had to face. The party's experts came to the inevitable 
conclusion that the only way to generate sufficient 
revenue to meet all its commitments was to bring down the 
starting point for the higher rates of income tax to 
about one and a half times average earnings. The 
political dangers of this were obvious. Many of the 
party's traditional supporters could find themselves with 
a higher tax bill while its chances of securing increased 
137 
support from middle income earners would be 
correspondingly reduced. 
These features were to assert themselves with startling 
clarity when the Labour government took office in 1974. 
Throughout the life of the Heath administration Labour 
had criticised F. I. S., largely because of its 
contribution to the poverty trap, and had promised to 
repeal it. In the first two years of the Wilson regime 
this determination to abolish F. I. S. was re-iterated as 
the government enacted its Child Benefit legislation. 
After Callaghan succeeded Wilson and the I. M. F. imposed 
its demands for public spending cuts in 1976, Labour 
ministers suddenly discovered unexpected virtues in 
F. I. S. while the implementation of the Child Benefit 
scheme was delayed amidst a political storm. F. I. S. was 
defended in exactly the same terms that Conservative 
ministers had used, and the poverty trap was regarded as 
a statistical abstraction. These issues are developed in 
detail in subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE LABOUR PARTY AND FAMILY ALLOWANCES 
The campaign for family allowances illustrates more 
clearly than any other social security benefit the 
tensions and ambiguities which have characterised the 
Labour Party's attitude towards income maintenance 
services throughout much of its existence as an 
organised political force. Over the years the 
advocates of family allowances had stressed the 
contribution that the programme could make to the 
alleviation of poverty in large families living on low 
wages. and in the particular context of the inter-war 
period when a declining population seemed likely. they 
also drew attention to its possibilities for 
stimulating population growth. One of family 
allowances earliest and most influential supporters was 
Sir William Beveridge. Although the humanitarian in 
Beveridge was sensitive to the help that cash 
allowances could bring to poor families. he was most 
attracted by the scheme's potential as an agent for 
increasing labour supply. So convinced of this was he 
that in writing the report of the Inter-Departmental 
Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services he 
made the reform of social security conditional on the 
introduction of allowances (along with. of course. full 
employment and a national health service). This 
analysis of the development of the Labour Party's 
policy on family allowances is mainly directed towards 
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investigating the extent to which it was conscious of, 
and engaged by. an awareness of the theoretical 
relationship held to exist between allowances and work 
incentives. 
In 1927 the party and the T. U. C. created a Joint 
Committee on the Living Wage which conducted a detailed 
investigation into the case for family allowances. The 
Joint Committee failed to agree and published both a 
Majority and Minority Report. 
(1) 
The Minority Report 
was written by two members of the T. U. C. and one party 
representative and recommended that before any decision 
was taken on family allowances a range of social 
services should be established on a non-contributory 
basis. Those suggested were a complete medical service 
up to school-leaving age, pre- and post-natal maternity 
services with a cash payment for each child during the 
first year or two years of its life, raising the 
school-leaving age from 14 to 15 with maintenance 
allowances during the additional year, nursery schools 
up to the age of entry into elementary school, the 
provision of adequate and healthy houses, the 
elimination of tuberculosis, with the supply of pure 
milk. In contrast, the Majority Report, prepared by 
four T. U. C. and five Labour Party representatives, 
wanted the introduction of family allowances of five 
shillings per week for the first child and three 
shillings for each subsequent dependent child, financed 
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from general taxation, for all children up to school- 
leaving age for whom income tax allowances were not 
obtainable. 
What were the major concerns of the authors of both 
reports? The minority believed that the cost of family 
allowances in addition to further developments in the 
social services would be unacceptably high for any 
government. Consequently a choice would have to be 
made between allowances and the other social services. 
They were not opposed to family allowances in principle 
but were very much concerned that the introduction of 
cash allowances would weaken unions' bargaining power. 
This presumed impact on wage rates was to be a 
constantly recurring theme in the attitude of a 
sizeable and influential section of the union movement 
and it is interesting to note the exact words used in 
the Minority Report: 
'Nor do we wish to argue at length the question 
of the possible effects which a system of cash 
payments might have upon wage negotiations and 
collective agreements, though we are quite 
satisfied that such a system would affect 
detrientally negotiations regarding wage fixing. 
We do feel, however, that if any comparison with 
social services is to be made on this point, the 
cash allowance system is more likely to affect 
the unions adversely. Beyond expressing this 
opinion, we do not go into the question at all'. 
Fear and suspicion of employers' likely use of family 
allowances in future wage negotiations lay at the heart 
of the trade union opposition to any scheme, and in the 
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light of their historical experience of collective 
bargaining it can be argued that such scepticism was 
entirely justified. 
The authors of the Majority Report recognised the 
potency of trade union fears about family allowances 
threat to wages and collective bargaining and gave them 
considerable weight in their deliberations, but remained 
firm in their conviction that such concern was 
groundless. Rather, they argued that the introduction 
of allowances would help rather than hinder unions in 
the struggle for better wages and conditions since their 
members' resolve would be straightened by the knowledge 
that their children 'will be removed from the "firing 
line" and a great factor of weakness would be removed. 
In May 1930 the T. U. C. General Council adopted the 
Minority Report by 16 votes to 8, a decision ratified by 
Congress in September after a reference back motion had 
been defeated by 2,154,000 votes to 1,347,000. The 
Labour Party's National Executive Committee (N. E. C. ) 
took no decision on the Joint Committee's reports 
recommending instead to the 1930 party conference that 
because of differences within the movement there should 
be further investigation by another Joint Committee. 
This was approved after a motion for reference back had 
been defeated by 1,740,000 votes to 495,000. No further 
I 
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collective and organised thought was given to Family 
Allowances by either the Labour Party or the T. U. C. for 
the next ten years. It was not 'until 1941 that the 
question was publicly reopened when the N. E. C. 's Policy 
Committee presented a paper on family allowances for 
consideration by the annual party conference. 
The internal process which culminated in the policy 
statement presented to the 1941 conference began even 
before the Labour Party joined in the formation of the 
Coalition Government in May, 1940, and can be seen as a 
part of that outburst of optimistic, radical planning 
entered into by the party very early in the war, 
engendered by the realisation that the successful 
prosecution of the war would demand major changes in the 
nation's economic and social organisation, changes that 
would place the Labour movement in a position of great 
strength. On January 11th, 1940, a meeting of the 
Standing Joint Committee of Industrial Women's 
Organisations (S. J. C. I. W. O. ) considered a memorandum on 
family allowances prepared 'by A. Susan Lawrence and 
agreed to forward it to the N. E. C. for examination by 
its policy committee. Susan Lawrence was present at the 
meeting of the N. E. C. 's Policy Committee on February 
8th, 1940, which decided that she and the committee's 
secretary should prepare a document outlining the 
differences in the level and scope of the various 
schemes of state provision whose total cost was borne by 
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the Exchequer. service allowances. war pensions, 
personal injuries schemes, unemployment assistance. 
etc. ). It was also decided that Attlee and Greenwood 
should seek a meeting with the Prime Minister and the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer to discuss these issues 
together with the general level of payments in other 
programmes of state and local assistance. 
(2) 
On 
February 16th, the S. J. C. I. W. O. was told that the Labour 
Party's Policy Committee had approved Susan Lawrence's 
memorandum in principle and had agreed to prepare a more 
detailed document confined to those allowances paid by 
the National Exchequer (i. e. out of general taxation) 
excluding assistance schemes. On March 14th, 1940. the 
Policy Committee was informed that a comprehensive 
statement on war-time allowances was being prepared, and 
that Attlee and Greenwood had got nowhere in their 
meeting with the Prime Minister and Chancellor. 
(3) 
On 
the same day a meeting of the S. J. C. I. W. O. took place 
which demonstrated the confusion about and sensitivity 
to family allowances present in the labour movement. 
Concern was expressed that 'the title of the Lawrence 
memorandum might give rise to the impression that the 
general question of family allowances was being dealt 
with, and to dispel such fears it was decided that the 
title 'Unemployment Assistance Board and War Service 
Allowances' should be used in future since this was more 
appropriate to the matters which the memorandum 
covered. 
(4) 
From this point the S. J. C. I. W. O. would 
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appear to have lost all interest in Family Allowances: 
certainly its voluminous minutes contain no further 
reference. 
The Labour Party's statement on Family Allowances(5) was 
discussed by the policy committee on July 16th, 1940(6) 
and on August 16th the policy committee finally decided 
to report to the N. E. C. that it was in favour of 
allowances and recommended that joint discussion be 
initiated with the T. U. C. 
(7) 
In essence this document 
was the same as that presented to the Party Conference 
for its consideration in February. 1941, and is in the 
direct line of descent from the 1927 Joint Committee's 
Majority Report. Its general tone is very modern, 
particularly with regard to the status of women, and it 
argues that Family Allowances were the next logical and 
administratively most simple step in the extension of 
the social services. 
(8) 
Allowances would lead to an 
improvement in both child health and the physical and 
meantal health of the mother who would be assisted in 
coping in situations where it'was difficult to meet 'the 
elastic demands of a growing family on an inelastic 
weekly wage' 
(9) 
A system of universal, cash Family 
Allowances was a more effective and preferable technique 
than stigmatising. selective benefits in kind. Great 
emphasis was placed on the economic security and 
independence that Family Allowances could confer on 
women. the achievement of which was a very desirable 
objective 'both equitably and psychologically'. A state 
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financed system of allowances would provide public 
recognition of the status of the mother. 
(10) 
The statement was sceptical of that traditional argument 
in favour of Family Allowances (advanced by 
organisations such as the Family Endowment Society) 
which claimed a direct link between a rise in the birth 
rate and the provision of allowances. It merely noted 
that if Family Allowances could reduce the risk of 
poverty or of lower living standards, fears of a 
declining population could be laid to rest. The 
improved standards of health and nutrition that might be 
expected to follow the introduction of Family Allowances 
could have some effect on maternal mortality and 
morbidity and thus produce a lower death rate, but it 
was unlikely to have a meteoric effect on the birth 
rate. 
(l1) 
Two major arguments against Family Allowances were 
identified; cost, and possible adverse effects on 
collective bargaining and wage levels. Opposition on 
the grounds of cost, first raised during the Joint 
Committee's inquiry of 1927-30, was recalled only to be 
dismissed because, 
'taxable capacity is a matter of what you can get 
at any particular time and tat it varies 
considerably from time to time'. ' 
In war time taxes could be raised to unprecdeented 
heights whilst, after the war a high level of taxes 
153 
would continue to be necessary for a variety of sound 
economic and social reasons. Family Allowances could be 
met from general taxation and would lead to a 
'beneficial effect on )just redistribution of 
the national income'. 
gqual scepticism was expressed about the suggestion that 
Family Allowances would have undesirable effects on wage 
levels fixed by collective bargaining. It was pointed 
out that not all unions shared the fears expressed by 
the Joint Committee's Minority Report, and claimed that 
between 1930-1940 there had been a great increase in 
unions' bargaining power together with a steady 
expansion in the social services. Unions were now 
sufficiently strong and prestigious to withstand any 
attempt by employers to use Family Allowances to prevent 
or reduce improvements in wage rates and conditions of 
employment. Some industries had never paid wages high 
enough to keep families and children in evem modest 
comfort, and in those industries Family Allowances would 
have an immediate beneficial impact. Moreover by 
providing at least partially for children's needs Family 
Allowances would strengthen unions in their general 
11 
struggle. For all these reasons the time was ripe for 
the introduction of a state system of allowances. while 
the fact of war provided exactly the right psychological 
context. 
'The whole weight of organised labour is being 
thrown into winning the war. Labour is more than 
ever justified in demanding this contribution by 
the nation towards the adegg maintenance of 
children in their own right'. 
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Five days after the policy committee's recommendations 
in favour of Family Allowances the N. E. C. 's Emergency 
Committee met and agreed to postpone a decision until 
the full N. E. C. could be convened. 
(15) The N. E. C. next 
met on September 25th and Hugh Dalton. Chairman of the 
policy committee, proposed that a joint meeting be 
sought with the appropriate committee of the T. U. C. to 
discuss the possibility of introducing Family 
Allowances. 
(16) 
Dalton's proposal was accepted and a 
request for a meeting was forwarded to the T. U. C. On 
October 23rd the N. E. C. 's Emergency Committee was told 
that a letter had been received from Walter Citrine (the 
T. U. C. 's General Secretary) saying that the N. E. C. 's 
request was to be considered at the next meeting of the 
T. U. C. General Council. 
(17) 
The N. E. C. continued its 
efforts to secure an early joint meeting with the 
T. U. C. 's Economic Committee but without much 
success. 
(18) 
Eventually, in February 1941 the N. E. C. 
was informed that the T. U. C. 's Economic Committee had at 
last accepted the principle of Children's Allowances and 
would present a report at the next meeting of the 
General Council. 
(19) 
Despite the recommendation of its 
Economic Committee the General Council continued in its 
posture of agonised indecision, agreeing only to adjourn 
the matter for further discussion. Regardless of the 
T. U. C. ts feelings the Policy Committee decided to 
publish its paper as part of the report to the 1941 
Conference. (20) The depth of feeling that Family 
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Allowances still inspired. even in the ranks of the 
Policy Committee, emerged on May 29th during its final 
meeting before the party conference opened on June 2nd. 
when George Ridley asked that his disagreement with the 
committee's Family Allowance proposals be placed on 
record. 
(21) 
(This development is particularly 
interesting given Ridley's reputation as an authority on 
social security, who later on in the war was to write an 
official party pamphlet on the social services. 
(22) 
The Family Allowance scheme presented to conference for 
discussion was straightforward enough. It proposed that 
the state should provide from general taxation a cash 
allowance of five shillings per week for each dependent 
child from birth till it left the school system. Without 
saying why, preference was expressed for a flat-rate 
system rather than one in which payments were graded by 
age or numbers of children. Child tax allowances in 
respect of children for whom allowances would be paid 
were to be abolished, and the allowances were to be 
substituted for the first fi4e shillings of benefit for 
children under other public schemes. The net cost of 
the whole programme was estimated to be about £85-90 
million a year. 
(23) 
It was argued that since the termination of the 1927-30 
inquiry a number of changes had taken place which 
demanded that the party give further consideration to 
Family Allowances. changes which were continually 
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alluded to by the scheme's supporters during the 
conference debate and subsequently. Briefly stated these 
were the introduction of allowances in respect of 
children in various social assistance programmes, 
research data showing the correlation between family 
size and poverty, the growth in the strength and status 
of the trade union movement, and the fundamental 
economic and social changes caused by the war. 
(24) 
The Policy Committee's report was a comprehensive and 
careful analysis of the Family Allowance idea, designed 
to overcome the deeply rooted hostility and suspicion of 
large sections of the labour movement, particularly in 
the trade unions. It recognised the reality that in a 
capitalist economy wages were fixed without regard to 
the numbers of dependents in a family, and even said 
that it was undesirable that they should be. 
(25) 
Consequently the larger the family, the greater was the 
risk of poverty. A wide range of services had been 
introduced in recognition of the demands of dependent 
children, from free school meals, free and cheap milk, 
through to health services, but their scope and effect 
was limited because they were means tested and had a 
propensity to stigmatise the recipients. Furthermore 
during the inter-war period the social security system 
had developed under the pressure of mass unemployment to 
the point where - 
'If a family contains young children, below the 
age of wage earning, child allowances are now 
paid, in one form or another, in all cases, 
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except where the family income falls below the 
income-tax level and(2tb a parent is at work in 
civilian employment. ' 
Such a situation was totally unacceptable to the Policy 
Committee on grounds of both 'fairness and commonsense' 
and could only be resolved by either abolishing all 
existing allowances or extending them to all those 
categories hitherto excluded. The first course of 
action involved the 'gravest social and political 
objections' so there was only one direction that policy 
could take. 
(27) 
Beveridge was to make exactly the same 
point in discussing what he regarded as the 
inevitability of Family Allowances. 
This defence of Family Allowances is of considerable 
significance. 'Fairness' and 'common sense' were 
deliberately chosen codewords for incentives and no 
mention is made of the work incentive characteristics 
which appealed so much to Beveridge. The report's 
authors must have been aware of Family Allowances' 
theoretical influence on labour supply if for no other 
reason than that Dalton was a gifted economist with a 
particular interest in public finance. What reasons can 
be advanced for this omission? The answer is possibly 
to be found in the need to maintain unity within the 
party, and between the party and the unions. One of the 
major points to have emerged from this discussion so far 
is the extent of the confusion and division about Family 
Allowances that existed in the whole labour movement, 
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and Dalton's speech at conference demonstrated how 
sensitive the leadership was in this regard. To have 
publicly discussed the programme's incentive 
characteristics would have risked offending against one 
of the party's most important traditions, that which 
expressed scepticism about workers' predilection for, 
and susceptibility to, monetary incentives. This would 
have served only to deepen and widen existing fissures 
within the movement. A number of factors combined at 
this time to present the party leadership with quite 
severe management problems. Dominating everything else 
was the party's membership of a coalition government 
which needed union co-operation in order to successfully 
prosecute the war. Important sections of the unions 
were opposed to the idea of Family Allowances, whilst at 
the same time there was widespread support within the 
Labour Party. In this context Dalton's attempt to 
placate everyone is perfectly understandable. 
Although it differed in no important respects from 
earlier drafts, the paper presented to the 1941 party 
conference devoted considerably more time to an 
examination of the unions' major concern, that Family 
Allowance would damage the whole collective bargaining 
process and the wage levels it produced. It conceded 
that if any scheme was to be financed by 'a direct 
charge on the cost of production' there could be some 
justification for the unions' fear. The same might also 
be true if a programme based on contributory insurance 
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were adopted. However since the party proposed to 
finance the programme from general taxation, such fears 
were groundless. There was a general view throughout 
the labour movement that higher living standards 
consisted of a combination of increased wages, cheaper 
commodities, and better social services. The party and 
the unions had consistently pressed for improvement in 
all these areas and recognised that this approach was 
the only method of securing a better quality of life 
for the working class and a more equitable distribution 
of resources. Thus there could be no objection in 
principle (the report's emphasis) to Family Allowances. 
While a few potential members might be less inclined to 
join because of the provision of allowances, the unions 
would not suffer much since such people would be few in 
number, and a union's strength was not simply a function 
of membership size, but of its quality, organisation. 
and willingness to fight when it had to. If, after 
considering all these arguments, unions were still 
opposed to a permanent scheme of allowances, they ought 
at least to support a temporary war-time programme in 
recognition of the decline in the real income of many 
low paid heads of large families because of the failure 
of their money wages to keep pace with inflation. 
(28) 
The conference debate on the Policy Committee's 
proposals was a microcosm of the party's traditional 
fears and current attitudes; all the conflicting 
currents were present and their resolution was to prove 
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difficult. Union opposition was forcibly expressed by 
Charles Dukes from the National Union of General and 
Municipal Workers who opened the debate by moving the 
reference back of the memorandum prepared for the N. E. C. 
by the Policy Committee. 
(29) Dukes felt that this was 
the only way to deal with what for him was a very ill- 
conceived scheme. While recognising the division that 
existed within the unions on Family A; llowances, he 
believed that the majority was convinced that allowances 
would be 'inimical to our methods of wage regulation', 
especially for the three million workers covered by 
sliding-scale cost of living agreements. To argue that 
cash allowances would not affect these regulations would 
be a complete evasion of the facts. Allowances were 
simply another manifestation of state paternalism and 
ought to be rejected, no matter what form they took. 
Whether they were financed by an employers' pool or out 
of general taxation, experience from other countries 
suggested that the result would be the same. Employers 
would use the benefit as an excuse for offering lower 
wages. Support for this argument was provided by a 
delegate who claimed that in negotiations in which he 
had recently been involved, the unions' claims had been 
rejected as being excessive for a single man, or a 
married man with no children. The employers preferred 
instead a lower wage settlement supported by Family 
Allowances. (30) 
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Not surprisingly this line of argument failed to elicit 
total support from conference. Opponents of allowances 
were reminded that employers'had used the existence of a 
whole series of social programmes as a tactic in wage 
bargaining. from children's allowances in unemployment 
benefit to child tax allowances. Logically therefore 
they ought to be against any further development in the 
social services. 
(31) 
It could also be argued that the 
collective bargaining beloved of the unions had not been 
attended by glittering success since there was a great 
deal of evidence to suggest that wage levels in general 
were inadequate to support families with three or more 
dependent children. In 1937 50% of men at unemployment 
exchanges had been receiving wages under £2.50 a week 
when last in full-time employment. 
(32) 
The unions 
response to the combination of low wages and large 
families was to support the introduction of a statutory 
minimum wage rather than Family Allowances. 
(33) 
Dalton's speech in defence of the Policy Committee's 
proposals was designed primarily to put to rest any 
fears that the unions might have about the scheme. 
(34) 
In everything he said he displayed the utmost 
sensitivity to the differences of opinion within the 
labour movement. Unity had to be preserved, hopefully 
based on the acceptance of the programme he was 
recommending. Even though the Policy Committee 
wholeheartedly supported the principle of allowances and 
had recommended it to the N. E. C., he felt that the 
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N. E. C. should withhold its endorsement until discussion 
had been held and agreement reached with the T. U. C. The 
N. E. C. had neither accepted nor rejected the Policy 
Committee's scheme but had approved it as a basis for 
discussion with the T. U. C. Although the T. U. C. had 
adjourned discussion about Family Allowances at its 
April meeting, Dalton hoped that negotiations might be 
reopened. He did everything he could to reassure trade 
union opponents that the report committed no-one to 
accepting Family Allowances. In asking Dukes to withdraw 
his reference back motion Dalton reiterated the point 
that the proposal was simply ä basis for discussion and 
was 
'capable of being considerabJN55hanged in the 
course of that discussion'. 
If conference accepted the reference back motion any 
further discussion with the T. U. C. would be impossible. 
Should discussions continue between the party and the 
unions and it seemed likely that Family Allowance might 
indeed damage the wage structure and union bargaining 
power. Dalton was convinced that, 
'the National Executive would think twice and 
thrice (Wore putting forward any such 
scheme'. 
He reminded conference that there were many in the 
unions who supported Family Allowances and that the 1927 
Joint Committee Majority Report had been signed by four 
members of the T. U. C. General Council. Dalton's 
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arguments must have been convincing because Dukes agreed 
to withdraw his motion. 
The 1941 conference was an important landmark in the 
evolution of the Labour Party's position on Family 
Allowances since it had discussed a detailed report on 
allowances and had not rejected' them. Although 
important sections of the party and unions remained 
hostile, the debate was still alive and conference could 
be certain that the issue would remain on the political 
agenda when Dalton remarked at the end of his speech 
that he had been asked by Arthur Greenwood to inform it 
of his decision to set up what became the Inter- 
Departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied 
Services which Dalton suspected would consider the 
principle of cash allowances. 
For the next year and more the party's thoughts and 
actions were dominated by the existence of the Beveridge 
Committee. Should it prepare its own memorandum or 
should it seek a joint submission with the T. U. C. and 
the Co-operative Union through the National Council of 
Labour? The Family Allowance issue was to figure 
prominently in these proceedings, particularly in 
connection with the party's increasingly delicate 
relationship with the T. U. C. On December 12th, 1941(37) 
the party's Social Insurance Committee was invited to a 
joint meeting with the Social Insurance Committee of the 
T. U. C. to discuss the paper approved by the General 
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Council for submission to the Beveridge Committee, a 
paper which contained no reference at all to Family 
Allowances. 
(38) 
A report of the meeting was presented 
to the Emergency National Executive Committee on 
December 17th which approved a motion so strongly 
critical of the T. U. C. 's attitude that it is worth 
quoting in full 
'That in view of the undertakings given to the 
Annual Party Conference (1941) that the question 
of Family Allowances should be the subject of 
further consideration; that the Social Services 
Committee had had no opportunity of discussing 
the evidence to be submitted to the Inter- 
Departmental Committee, which apparently makes no 
reference to this problem, it is undesirable that 
the National Executive Committee should associate 
itself with the General Council's proposed 
evidence, but the Social Services Sub-Committee 
should be asked to review the general situation 
in its widest aspects with a view to the 
preparation of independent evidence, to be 
submitted in the first instance to the National 
Executtýg) Committee at the earliest possible 
date'. 
Armed with this mandate the Labour Party Research 
Department produced a series of papers 
(40) during the 
first two months of 1942 covering the whole of social 
security, including Family Allowances, culminating in 
R. D. R. 74 which provided the basis of the resolution 
submitted by the N. E. C. to the 1942 conference. The 
N. E. C. 's resolution 
(41) 
called for the introduction of a 
comprehensive system of social security of which Family 
Allowances was to be an integral part. It was the 
Family Allowance proposals that dominated the debate. 
All the arguments that had become familiar since the 
1927-30 inquiry were deployed once more, on this 
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occasion with a clarity and sharpness informed by the 
knowledge that the time had come for the party to 
finally make up its mind. However, to the familiar 
litany of fears about Family Allowances' possible impact 
on collective bargaining, wage levels, and union power 
was added a more selfconscious, even declamatory 
socialist note. This conceded the possibility that 
there might be a case for cash allowances once the 
country's major industries had been socialised but even 
then it might be more advisable for help to be provided 
as services rather than money. 
'The Socialist answer to the problem of poverty 
in the midst of plenty is not the family 
endowment, not sharing money, it is destroying 
the barriers, of which money is one, to the full 
supply of at least the ultimate necessities to 
the needs of the community. Social is not 
sharing out, but production for use'. 
Such ideas had little appeal for Mrs. Ayrton Gould who 
replied to the debate for the N. E. C. 
(43) 
She directed 
conference's attention to the fact that the only group 
excluded from allowances of one form or another was the 
low paid civilian employee. ' In doing so she introduced 
Family Allowance's implications for labour supply in a 
subtle though not unfamiliar guise. arguing that it 
would be impossible to get 'decent' unemployment 
benefit without the introduction of allowances, 
'because you will be up against the old story 
that unemployment (ýýyefit had to be less than 
the minimum wage'. 
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The consequence of all this was that A. S. L. E. F. 's 
amendment deleting all reference to Family Allowances 
in the N. E. C. 's resolution was defeated by 1,718,000 
votes to 690,000, while. the N. E. C. 's proposal itself 
was carried on- a show of hands with only one 
dissentient. A month after the party conference voted 
in favour of allowances the House of Commons held its 
first full-scale debate on the issue. Nothing new 
emerged from the Labour benches: the same cast made 
the same comments. 
(45) 
Despite the conference's decision relations between the 
party and the T. U. C. were still difficult. A further 
joint meeting of the respective social insurance 
committees was held on June 18th. 1942 and it became 
clear that they were still divided on a number of 
important points, one of which was Family Allowances. 
The T. U. C. 's position was that no decision could be 
reached until Congress had considered the matter, 
whilst the party was now committed to a scheme 
administered by a Ministry Of Social Security providing 
weekly cash payments in respect of all children* 
(46) 
Both sides were alarmed by this continuing rift and 
were determined to use the time left before the 
publication of the Beveridge Report (expected in the 
autumn of 1942) to resolve as far as possible any 
remaining difficulties. It was agreed to hold a 
further joint meeting after a paper had been prepared 
by the Secretary of the T. U. C. 's Social Insurance 
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Committee and the Secretary of the Labour Party 
Research Department highlighting the differences that 
still existed. The paper 
(47) 
was presented to the 
Social Insurance Sub-Committee in August 1942 and 
showed that Family Allowances still remained a matter 
of contention. The T. U. C. would not commit itself 
until Congress met in September and it was only when 
the Trade Union Congress accepted allowances at its 
1942 annual conference that the question was finally 
resolved. Three years were to pass before the 
enactment of family allowances but nothing new was 
added to the debate. Parliamentary discussion included 
hardly any reference to the connection between 
allowances and labour supply; none of it came from the 
Labour benches. 
(48) 
One of the most persistent themes to emerge from the 
work of social investigators from Booth onwards was the 
likelihood that the combination of low wages and large 
families would result in poverty. defined even in basic 
subsistence terms. Once this relationship had been 
established the question of what constituted the most 
appropriate policy response became paramount. 
Beveridge had been a supporter of children's allowances 
since the 1920's and in the report on Social Insurance 
and Allied Services he advanced two 'economic' 
arguments in their favour. It was unreasonable to 
guarantee a minimum subsistence income during a period 
of interuption of earnings and not to do so during a 
normal working period. observing that 
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'a national minimum for families of every size 
cannot in practice be secured by a wage system 
which must be based on the product of amy's 
labour and not on the size of his family'. 
Given this, the only way to ensure a subsistence level 
of living for families whose head was in full-time work 
without damaging work incentives was to introduce 
Family Allowances. 
(50) 
Beveridge contended that a 
major flaw had developed in the British income 
maintenance system following the introduction of 
allowances for dependent children in the unemployment 
insurance programme in 1921. This created the 
probability that the incomes of many thousands of 
family heads would be greater during periods of 
unemployment than when they were in full-time work. 
For such people work incentives had ceased to exist. 
Beveridge's conclusion was that. 
'it is dangerous to allow benefit during 
unemployment or disability to equal or exceed 
earnings during work. But without allowances 
for children during earning and n M7arning 
alike, this danger cannot be avoided'. 
i 
The extent to which the Labour Party at this stage 
shared or was even aware of Beveridge's recognition of 
Family Allowances' labour supply characteristics is 
difficult to establish with certainty. Its public 
statements and private papers show no explicit 
understanding of the link between allowances and work 
incentives. Those who wanted the programme stressed the 
contribution it could make to the alleviation of family 
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poverty while the opposition concentrated on the alleged 
damage it could do to collective bargaining and wage 
levels. The unions in particular were more concerned 
with the programme's consequences for the operations of 
the labour market than with the behavioural responses 
that Family Allowances might elicit. Anything that 
threatened the traditional role and functions of trades 
unions. anything that might possibly strengthen 
employers was to be condemned and opposed. Mrs. Ayrton 
Gould's rather elliptic comments at the 1942 conference 
represent the closest the party came to a public 
recognition of allowances' hypothetical contribution to 
the augmentation and preservation of work incentives. 
Despite this it is very difficult to believe that there 
was no-one in the party who was aware of this aspect of 
Family Allowances, for the theoretical implications were 
clear and obvious enough. The reason for the reticence 
is possibly to be found in the party's traditions and 
mythology. In constitution at least it was committed to 
an oppositional ideology, ' to a different reward 
structure, one at odds with the primacy of the market. 
The left wing especially would have resisted any 
explicit recognition of working class responsiveness to 
market inducements, since this would be viewed by the 
world as a de facto acceptance of the supremacy and 
validity of the dominant, ruling-class ideology. As a 
result the perennial tension between left and right 
would have been exacerbated and party unity threatened. 
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Such unpleasant and inconvenient thoughts were best left 
unspoken. 
Whatever the justification offered to the public, it is 
clear that both the Coalition Government and the Civil 
Service bureaucracy regarded Family Allowances as an 
important tool for the maintenance of work incentives. 
This view is confirmed beyond doubt in much the most 
authoritative account produced thus far of the 
(52) 
Macnicol has introduction of Family Allowances. 
demonstrated that for the government the problem was one 
of dealing with the overlap between the wages of low- 
paid workers with dependent children, unemployment 
insurance and unemployment assistance without damaging 
work incentives and bringing the entire wage system into 
disrepute by showing how far low wages had fallen below 
subsistence levels. In Macnicol's phase, Family 
Allowances became a device for the preservation of less- 
eligibility. The Anderson Committee in 1923 had 
developed a hierarchy of worth between low wages, 
insurance and assistance which became de facto policy 
under the Unemployment Assistance Board and the 
Unemployment Insurance Statutory Committee after 1935. 
The maintenance of work incentives through the 
preservation of less-eligibility was at the heart of 
that position. Family Allowances gradually came to be 
seen as the only method of dealing with the demands of 
the anti-poverty lobby, the maintenance of the existing 
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wage-system and the preservation of less-eligibility. 
It could also be presented by Beveridge. and sold to the 
labour movement, as a positive and progressive response 
to the growing evidence of family poverty. It was this 
characteristic that attracted the concern of some Labour 
backbenchers once the programme had been 
operationalised. 
In October 1946 Jim Griffiths had to field a series of 
questions expressing concern that Family Allowances were 
deducted from the benefit incomes of people in receipt 
of unemployment allowances. Griffith's argued that it 
had been made clear throughout that Family Allowances 
would be in substitution for, or would be taken into 
account when calculating benefit entitlement under other 
schemes. They had to be looked at in relation to the 
system of social provision as a co-ordinated whole, and 
while he could not make any commitment at that time, the 
government was considering, 
'the whole position from this point of view' 
(53) 
Griffiths' answer failed to satisfy Barbara Castle who 
was angry about what she regarded as the indefensible 
muddle the government had got intself into over Family 
Allowances. During the Debate on the Address on 
November 15th. Castle developed a comprehensive critique 
of the whole programme(53) contending that the basis of 
the problem lay in the inadequacies of the original 
legislation. She claimed that a lot of Labour opinion 
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in the House of Commons was dissatisfied about the 
substance of the proposals, but was particularly 
concerned over two points. One was the amount of the 
cash allowance provided under the 1945 Act; five 
shillings per child was inadequate, even given the 
promise of universal free school meals and other 
benefits in kind. The second concerned the principle of 
no duplication of benefits. This proposal had been 
attacked by many Labour members and she argued that, 
'... it was only under the threat that the Bill 
would not go through at all that th resent 
unsatisfactory compromise was reached. ' 
C34Y 
The principle of no duplication had bedevilled everything 
else that they had tried to do since on children's 
benefit and Castle did not hesitate in going straight to 
the heart of the relationship between Family Allowances 
and work incentives, and by implication the ensuing 
problems for the Labour Party. Thus: 
'If one accepts that there may not be duplication 
of benefit, it means that, whereas family 
allowance is to be paid to every family regardless 
of its income level, where the family is in the 
fortunate enough position to have the wage earner 
at work, when the wage earner falls out of work, 
and therefore, is necessarily in a worse position 
to protect his children and bring them up 
according to the standard required, there is no 
family allowance. I do not see how, if we are 
genuinely fighting for a principle of family 
endowment and not merely a principle of wage 
substitution, we can posJ; ýiy justify this 
principle of no duplication'. 
The conflict had been neatly encapsulated: family 
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endowment or wage subsidisation; social need or economic 
efficiency? 
She believed that there was no chance of raising the poor 
to even subsistence levels through Family Allowances 
unless the programme was changed. There were two ways of 
achieving this. One could either raise the Family 
Allowance rate so much that it would be ample for people 
on benefit or else abandon the system of duplication 
which she believed was the only equitable answer. 
(56) 
The same concerns later motivated another Labour 
backbencher to seek assurances from the government that 
no action would be taken against any Public Assistance 
Committee which disregarded Family Allowances in 
calculating scales of relief. In response to this 
Aneurin Bevan would give no such assurance that might 
break the law. 
(57) 
While occasional Labour backbenchers were asking awkward 
but pertinent questions of government ministers, the 
party's internal policy making machinery did not ignore 
Family Allowances. Indeed for a number of years the 
scheme was allocated a reasonably high priority, 
particularly by the Social Services Sub-Committee and the 
Research Department which served it. For example, the 
Research Department produced a paper entitled 'Social 
Services' for consideration by the sub-committee at its 
meeting on the 21st September, 1948. 
(58) 
The general 
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tone of this paper was set by its introductory 
observations that it was 'axiomatic' that social 
provision had to be considered in the context of 
available resources and that the cost of social services 
as a proportion of national income could not be increased 
significantly unless produc&tcrº was likely to 
benefit. (59) With regard to Family Allowances, the paper 
argued that if any improvements in social security 
provision were possible there was a strong case for 
putting children first, a possibility that ought to be 
considered in the light of the forthcoming report of the 
Royal Commission on Population.. It then listed a number 
of possible alternatives: the amount of cash benefit 
could be raised to 7/6d (35\p) for second and subsequent 
children; benefit ought to be graded according to the 
place of the child in the family, more being given in 
respect of third and fourth children as part of a 
population policy, although the paper does note that this 
might be contstrued as a bribe; benefit might be age 
related, although this might be administratively costly; 
the scheme could be extended 'to include the first child 
as recognition of the high capital costs of first 
children; benefits in kind might be extended. 
(60) 
Having 
listed these possibilities no recommendation was made. 
In October of the same year Francois Lafitte submitted a 
personal memorandum 
(61) 
which argued that the family 
rather than old age pensions and industrial injury should 
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form the central social 'theme of the party's programme, 
saying en passant that, 
'... the stress should be on the family as 
such, fig) on the poor or working class 
family'. 
Rather than extending allowances to include the first 
child or grading them according to age, Lafitte believed 
that the rate of benefit should be doubled and also made 
tax free. Moreover, something should be done to ease the 
taxation problems of middle class families, perhaps by 
developing child tax allowances in order to secure 
greater horizontal redistribution of income within a 
group on the same gross income, from childless familites 
to those with children, all without involving the 
Treasury in any loss of tax revenue* 
(63) 
These thoughts were gathered together in a paper prepared 
for a meeting of the Social Policy Sub-Committee on 16th 
December, 1948, in what was intended as its report to the 
Policy Committee, which incorporates all the 
recommendations made by the sub-committee at its previous 
(five 
meetings. 
64ý Although children and the elderly 
were identified as the top priorities, the paper argued 
that the family should have the first claim on resources 
and notes that the Royal Commission on Population was 
likely to make similar recommendations when its report 
appeared. If social security was to be expanded in the 
next five years priority should be given to an increase 
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in Family Allowances while child tax allowances should 
also be extended. 
(65) 
After this relatively hectic, though short, burst of 
interest in Family Allowances, the available archive 
material together with the dearth of Parliamentary 
comment would seem to suggest that, for the Labour Party, 
the programme was beginning to enter that limbo which it 
generally occupied for at least the next fifteen years. 
It was not until 1952 that the party's machine began once 
more to throw out signs of interest. In April. in the 
course of a relatively lengthy paper on the principles 
that ought to govern Labour's social policy, a very few 
comments are made about Family Allowances. These 
observations contain nothing new, merely repeating the 
claims that family policy ought to be a priority, and 
that Family Allowances might be extended to include the 
first child and made age-related. 
(66) 
Similar comments 
can be found in a paper from Norman Swallow which argued, 
amongst other things, that the family ought to head any 
list of the party's prioriti6s. Swallow believed that 
since the family was the basic social unit of society it 
ought to be at the heart of the social services, which 
meant that Family Allowances should be increased and 
given in respect of the first child, and child tax 
allowances be extended. 
(67) 
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This resurrection of interest in Family Allowances was 
further reflected in a memorandum from the Research 
Department which was devoted to an analysis of the case 
for their extension to the first child. 
(68) 
it 
reiterated the view of the Social Services Sub-Committee 
that the party should press for the payment of Family 
Allowances to the first child as the top priority of its 
social programme even if this meant rejecting other 
worthy claims. After developing the case for making 
payments in respect of the first or only dependent child 
(possible reduction in family income, high initial 
capital outlay, increase in family expenditure, ) the 
Research Department's paper examined the implications for 
the family of the government's 1952 Budget proposals. It 
concluded that the combined effects of the tax changes, 
reduction in food subsidies, and increases in Family 
Allowances proposed in the Budget would mean that of the 
3.25 million families with one or more children who were 
assessed for income tax and who had an income of less 
than £500 per year, 3 million would be worse off. 
Families with four or more'children gained from the 
Budget but those with one or two children, some 2 3/4 
million families in all, lost. It went on to call for a 
future Labour Government to increase Family Allowances 
rather than restore cuts in food subsidies, since this 
would be a more equitable technique of targetting 
resources on the needy than the overall provision of food 
subsidies. To support its claim it cited the views of the 
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National Conference of Labour Women which in 1945 had 
called for the extension of Family Allowances to include 
the first child and in 1951 had debated a similar 
resolution which, although defeated, had attracted the 
support of the majority of speakers; conference had only 
rejected it because of - its desire not to embarrass a 
Labour Government during a period of economic crisis. If 
the Labour Party was the first to make these commitments 
in public it might attract votes that would otherwise go 
to the Conservative Party which it was felt might itself 
introduce similar measures in time for the next 
election. 
(69) 
In 'retrospect this paper from the Research Department 
can be seen as the high-water mark of the Labour Party's 
support for Family Allowances during the rest of the 
decade, and for a considerable time into the 1960's. By 
the end of 1952 a major change had taken place in the 
party's sense of priorities, a change that is clearly 
illustrated in the Social Services Sub-Committee's own 
programme of work. 
(70) 
At' a meeting of the Policy 
Committee held on December 15,1952 it had been decided 
that the Social Services Sub-Committee be asked to re- 
examine its 'priorities in the light of the general 
directive and plan agreed at a recent weekend conference 
of the National Executive Committee, and submit these 
fresh thoughts to the Policy Committee. The N. E. C. 's 
belief was that priority had to be given to economic 
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policy, particularly to the need for increased 
production, greater capital investment, more exports, 
and the redeployment of economic resources. During the 
first five years of this programme resources for 
additional consumption and for welfare would be limited. 
The implications of this for social policy were clear. 
'Our social services policy will hive to 
recognise that fact and should seek to 
concentrate on those measures of social policy 
that will assist our industrial redeployment. 
will secure greater value for money from existing 
services, and which will contribute towards an 
easing of those social tensions caused by the 
pressure (71of inflation in an expanding 
economy'. 1 
Within this general orientation of social policy the 
Social Services Sub-Committee was issued with a list of 
subjects which it ought to consider as important. 
Included as priorities in this list were the possibility 
of linking National Insurance and National Assistance 
Benefits to the cost of living together with a review of 
the financing of the National Insurance system, and 
transferability between voluntary pension schemes given 
that private superannuation schemes hindered labour 
mobility. Other items to be worked on, but not with the 
same urgency as those identified above which demanded 
immediate attentions included Family Allowances. 
(72) 
This catalogue of the Social Services Sub-Committee's 
future programme of work is most significant in any 
analysis of the development of the Labour Party's 
approach to Family Allowances. Hitherto, Family 
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Allowances had been regarded as an important. if not the 
most important priority in the party's programme. 
Henceforth. there was to be a major re-ordering of 
priorities deliberately located in the pre-eminent 
claims of economic reconstruction and modernisation. 
The claims of Family Allowances were thus immediately 
downgraded. Given this new context it is perhaps not 
surprising to find that the Social Services Sub- 
Committee's next utterance on Family Allowances. at its 
meeting on 25th March, 1953, was limited to a call for 
the maintenance of the real value of benefit rates. 
(73) 
As Land(74) and Walley(75) have demonstrated interest 
in and support for. Family Allowances declined rapidly 
in the 1950s as the economy expanded and real wages 
increased. The Family Allowances and National Insurance 
Bills of 1952(76) and 1956 
(77) 
made only minor changes 
in the structure and scope of the scheme. with the 
Labour Party's representatives demonstrating a lack of 
interest in the proceedings that speaks volumes for the 
i 
party's concern about the problems of family poverty. 
Clearly. by this stage, that re-ordering of priorities 
noted above had taken place and the party's income 
maintenance authorities were mainly occupied with 
addressing the problems of the elderly. Poverty had 
become a consequence of old-age, and for almost a decade 
the Labour Party eschewed any attempt to seriously 
confront the question of family poverty, with only 
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occasional bubbles of interest breaking the surface of 
complacency. The first such spasm of interest can be 
found in the draft agenda for the future work of the 
Study Group on Security and Old Age produced in July, 
1957. (78) The section of the draft agenda dealing with 
Family Allowances contains little that was new and 
nothing at all which might demonstrate any overt 
interest in or understanding of the relationship between 
Family Allowances and the labour market. After a very 
brief resume of Beveridge and the 1945 Family Allowances 
Act it goes on to make the rather dubious claim that the 
increase in benefit contained in the 1952 Act which 
compensated for the removal of food subsidies accepted 
that allowances should be adjusted in terms of their 
purchasing power, and further' argues that the 
introduction of a higher rate of benefit for the third 
and subsequent children provided for in the 1956 Act 
represented a radical change in principle. After posing 
a series of questions that might inform the party's 
future' thinking (was the Beveridge principle accepted; 
should the principle of the'1945 Act be accepted with 
its inevitable implication of extending free school 
meals to all pupils in grant-aided schools, should the 
termination date for the payment of the benefit be 
raised to 18 for all children; should allowances be 
graded according to the age of the child following 
Beveridge's argument about the relative needs of 
children at various ages; ) the document contends that 
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since the prior aim of family income support policy was 
to provide the most effective help for the low wage- 
earner with a large family, could that objective be more 
rapidly achieved by changes in the incidence of taxation 
than by the extension of Family Allowances. 
(79) 
For the next four years the party's archives 
are silent about Family Allowances and even when 
interest began to reappear it took a number of years for 
a substantial momentum to develop. Ultimately the 
party's reawakening of interest has to be located in the 
context of that 'rediscovery' of poverty which 
characterised academic social policy in the early 
1960's, but for the moment it is necessary to examine 
the substance of the party's deliberations. In March, 
1961 the Research Department produced a paper, 'New 
Needs in Welfare' 
(80) 
which described children as the 
major priority. To this end, Family Allowances and 
Child Tax Allowances should be rationalised, while 
benefit rates ought to be age-graded and increased for 
all children up to the age 
iof 
sixteen. 
(81) 
A rather 
more substantial contribution appeared in the same month 
from the Study Group on Security and Old Age. 'New 
Needs in Social Policy'(82) made the classic point that 
wages did not take family needs into account and that 
large families were a 'major source of poverty'(83) 
while the arrival of the first child was a critical 
event for family income. Under the present arrangements 
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the state provided more generous assistance through 
child tax allowances than Family Allowances which was 
clearly inequitable since it provided most benefit to 
the better off. Consequently the Study Group proposed 
to give more generous Family Allowances to all children 
up to sixteen years of age. and also to grade allowances 
by age. Moreover. 
'At the same time we shall review the child 
allowance in the Income Tax with a view to 
rationalisinf84) family and child 
allowances' . 
Much. the most significant point of those two documents 
is that the party or important elements of it. appears 
to be giving serious consideration to the distributional 
characteristics of child tax allowances and Family 
Allowances with a view to rationalising them both. This 
development can be seen in retrospect as amongst the 
first evidence of that process which led to the creation 
of the Child Benefit system some fourteen years later. 
After the Study Group's recommendations had appeared a 
suggested redraft was presented by Douglas Houghton 
which differed very little from the group's own final 
thoughts. with Houghton himself suggesting a review of 
child tax allowances and Family Allowances to produce 
what he was pleased to describe as 
'an adequate and harmonious scale (%f5ßchildren's 
benefits in sickness and in health' 
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The Study Group's suggestion of a rationalisation of 
family income support seems to have disappeared from 
later revisions of its paper. In April it contented 
itself with the observation that the greatest help the 
state could give to lower paid workers with large 
families would be to provide Family Allowances in 
respect of the first child. 
(86) 
while in May a draft of 
the 1961 policy statement, 'Labour Looks Ahead' added 
the familiar proposal for age-grading Family Allowances, 
with a particularly steep rise for teenagers. 
(87) 
Apart from the Family Allowances and National Insurance 
Bill in November. 1961. (88) which dealt with the needs 
of incapacitated children and increasing the earnings 
limit below which benefit would be paid for apprentices, 
Parliamentary interest in Family Allowances throughout 
the period was minimal, but this was to change markedly 
as a series of research papers appeared showing the 
extent of poverty in families with dependent children. 
In April, 1964, Reg Prentice used Royston 'Lambert's 
research(89) into nutritional standards to challenge the 
current relevance of Family Allowances to nutritional 
requirements and asked the government to increase 
allowance rates accordingly. 
(90) 
while in June, Willie 
Hamilton and Frank Allaun identified both the 
deprivation and levels of nutrition experienced by 
children in the large families of low-paid workers as 
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the basis of their request that the government should 
raise the Family Allowance rates. 
(911) 
Labour's victory in the General Election of October 1964 
raised expectations that something would be done about 
family poverty, awareness of which was to be massively 
increased by the publication of Abel-Smith and 
Townsend's report, 'The Poor and the Poorest', in 1965. 
Their contention that over 14% of the population was 
living in poverty (defined by them as 140% of basic NAB 
scale rates) was disturbing enough, but their evidence 
about the extent of poverty in the families of full- 
time, low-paid workers with dependent children gave a 
new dimension to the debate. 
As the academic evidence accumulated the government set 
up its own investigation into the position of families 
receiving Family Allowances, while in the political 
world the creation of the Child Poverty Action Group in 
1965 provided an articulate and well-informed voice to 
argue the case for better treatment of families with 
children. Whatever the theoretical or real contribution 
that pressure groups make to policy making there can be 
no gainsaying the fact that the presence of the CPAG 
made life more difficult for government and guaranteed 
that the poor would not be without representation. 
Although not the easiest of surveys to interpret. the 
government's own inquiry appeared in 1966 as the 
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'Circumstances of Families' 
(92) 
report and provided 
clear confirmation of Abel-Smith and Townsends earlier 
findings. Furthermore, since the government's 
investigation had been limited to those families in 
receipt of Family Allowances, by definition it had 
excluded one child families, and almost certainly 
underestimated the size of the problem. 
Despite the growing evidence about family poverty and 
the entry of the CPAG into the political arena, Wilson's 
government did not increase Family Allowances, 
contenting itself with what was bruited as a far- 
reaching analysis of the whole of social security of 
which family poverty was naturally an important part. 
With only a tiny overall majority after the 1964 
election the government's disinclination to take 
immediate action can perhaps be understood, but after 
the Labour Party's electoral triumph in March, 1966 no 
such excuse could be advanced. With an overall majority 
of nearly one hundred the government was in a strong 
enough political position to do what it wished about 
family poverty, but the policy review lingered on, 
apparently interminably. However, although the 
government's political position had been immeasurably 
strengthened by the March election, the economic context 
soon changed markedly for the worse and provided the 
government with a ready made excuse for not doing as as 
its supporters might have wished. 
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In the Autumn of 1966 and through the Spring of 1967 the 
government faced a series of questions from all sides of 
the House about Family Allowances. One such exchange 
between Kevin McNamara and Jim Callaghan. centred around 
the possibility of replacing child tax allowances by 
better Family Allowances. In reply to McNamara's 
question Callaghan said that he had received no direct 
representation on the matter but did confirm that it was 
currently under examination by the government. 
(93) In 
January, 1967, Peggy Herbison, the Minister of Social 
Security, was asked questions by Conservative M. P. 's 
about her attitude to the possibility of changing the 
Family Allowance scheme to provide better benefits for 
. 
families with incomes below the basic scale rates laid 
down by the Supplementary Benefits Commission, 
particularly those lower-paid workers, 
'... who co? yh}tute in a very real sense the 
new poor' 
Herbison offered the non-commital answer that this 
suggestion was a very complicated matter. 
The government was finding it increasingly difficult to 
shelter behind its ongoing review of policy as M. P. 's 
became disenchanted with the failure to produce any 
policy response. Michael Foot, for one, urged the 
minister to speed up the government's inquiry so that 
any increase in Family Allowances could come into effect 
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i 
at the time of the Budget. 
(95) Backbench pressure on 
the government continued and on February 6th, Herbison 
repeated that the governments review was being 
progressed as quickly as possible although she did 
accept that an immediate policy statement was highly 
desirable. (96) When she told Frank Hooley that the real 
value of Family Allowances had fallen to 74% of its 1956 
figure (the last time that benefit had been increased). 
Hooley was moved to comment that it was a scandal that 
such an important benefit had been allowed to decline 
over an eleven year period, thus articulating a depth of 
concern that appears to have become widely shared on 
both sides of the house. 
(97) 
Herbison was able to do 
nothing else but give her assurance that the government 
was treating the problem as 'a matter of great urgency' 
especially since its own investigation, 'Circumstances 
of Families' had shown that there were some 500,000 
children in families with an income lower than the 
supplementary benefit level. 
(98) 
The next significant public event in the development of 
Family Allowances. indeed one of the most important of 
all such events, took place on 20th April, 1967 when the 
Conservative Party used one of its Supply Days to 
initiate a debate on family poverty. 
(99) 
Clearly the 
Conservative leadership felt that there was enough 
evidence of public and political disquiet surrounding 
the government's handling of the poverty issue that a 
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full-blown Parliamentary debate would almost certainly 
cause a great deal of political embarrassment. In 
moving the Opposition's critical motion, Mervyn Pike 
delivered an impassioned indictment of the government's 
inaction during the two and a half years that had 
elapsed since Wilson became Prime Minister in 1964. Her 
characterisation of the government's long-running policy 
review as a convenient delaying tactic is possibly not 
unjustified. Although Pike paid tribute to Peggy 
Herbison as a Minister of Social Security with an 
undoubted personal commitment to the battle against 
family poverty, she had neither the clout nor the 
authority to push through the policies she favoured. 
Furthermore, overall responsibility for the strategic 
direction of the war on poverty ought not be 
'... one of 
dthe 
minor responsibilities of the 
governmen''flOýdd-job 
man, the Minister without 
Before looking at the details of the Labour government's 
defence or at backbench Labour opinion it is worth 
making a number of general observations, particularly 
about Peggy Herbison's speech moving the government's 
negativing amendment*(101) In retrospect Herbison's 
speech can be seen as an important landmark in the 
development of the government's family income support 
policy in a context of scarce resources and an 
atmosphere of actual or impending economic difficulty. 
In particular it is noteworthy because of the evidence 
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it provides for an unequivocal shift in the direction of 
the government's overall social philosophy towards what 
Roy Jenkins called a civilised and acceptable form of 
selectivity. She reiterated the government's commitment 
to deliberate selectivity as the most appropriate 
technique of targetting resources on a number of 
occasions during her speech, even comparing the 
government's record favourably with previous 
Conservative administrations 
(102) 
and went on to accuse 
Mervyn Pike of not saying enough about her party's 
intentions on selective Family Allowances for the low- 
paid. How was this proposal to be operationalised? How 
would it be financed? Would it affect contributory 
benefits? (103) By contrast, the Labour Government was 
'... not at all doctinaire in these matters. 
Where there are sound reasons for selectivity, we 
adopt that course. Whatever we do through the 
Supplementary Benefit Commission is selective. 
The Government have made it clear they wish local 
authorities to adopt rent rebate schemes; and, 
as I shall show, whatever scheme is adcýýb-A for 
family endowment, it will be selective'. 
Clearly, pragmatism was to, be the leitmotif of the 
Labour Government. Ideological and philosophical 
considerations were merely doctinaire. The effective 
allocation and targetting of scarce resources was now 
the key determinant of policy choice. The problem, as 
she later discussed in some detail, lay in translating 
that intent into reality, and in this regard perhaps the 
best model was that compromise (or synthesis of 
different allocative systems) advocated by Titmuss in 
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'Commitment to Welfare' and other of his writings. 
(105) 
After making her preliminary comments about the general 
nature of the government's social policy. Herbison 
turned to what she was pleased to call 'the real 
specific policyt(106). How could pragmatic selectivity 
be implemented in family income support policy? There 
existed a variety of possible policy responses and the 
government had examined them all. Families could be 
given a choice between receiving government support from 
either Family Allowances or child tax allowances, but 
the government believed that this would be 
administratively difficult and would also present many 
parents with an almost impossible choice; consequently 
it had been rejected. Failing this approach the 
government could legislate for a general increase in the 
amount of Family Allowances, but this would raise 
questions about whether it represented the best use of 
available scarce resources given the demands that came 
from the whole range of social provision. The 
government's belief was that a general increase in 
Family Allowances would not be sensible. An increase of 
50 pence would cost about £160 million a year in net 
terms, while a 25 pence increase would raise only a 
small proportion of poor families up to or above the 
supplementary benefit level at a cost of £80 million. 
Clearly, a reasonable increase in Family Allowances 
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would be too expensive. while an affordable increase 
would be relatively ineffective in tackling the problem. 
She then examined an initiative favoured by Mervyn Pike 
and important elements in the Conservative Party, the 
payment of supplementary Family Allowances to the 
poorest families. Such a programme could be 
operationalised through a means test administered by the 
Supplementary Benefits Commission and it would allow for 
the effective targetting of resources. But, Herbison 
argued, this policy instrument had several real 
disadvantages, one of which "n particular might appeal 
to the Conservative Party. Whether it appealed to the 
Conservative Party or not, the disadvantage that 
Herbison singled out initially is of great significance 
for the central concerns of this research because it 
deliberately articulated the impact such a programme 
might have on the work incentives of the poor. 
'They will be interested to learn that one of the 
disadvantages of a supplementary family allowance 
could be the disappearance of earnings incentive 
by those concerned.; There would be little 
incentive to earn10i re if it merely resulted in 
reduced benefit. 
Given this, Herbison was forced to conclude that the 
only incentives of interest to the Conservative Party 
were those of the surtax payer. If this were true then 
they were admitting that the moral fibre of the surtax 
payer was weaker than that of the low wage earner. The 
Minister's observations about the surtax paper prompted 
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an intervention by Sir Keith Joseph who argued the 
200,000 wage earners affected by family poverty either 
worked in the public sector on a flat rate pay system, 
or else in private sector jobs where there was little 
chance to earn overtime or get piece-work rates. 
Consequently most low-wage earners were not in a 
position to increase their earnings therefore. 
'... if they are assumed to be willing to stay in 
work, and one must assume that, the point about 
incentives is less important to them than it is 
to most jfD85ur fellow citizens in all levels of 
income'. 
Joseph's analysis is interesting but not of immediate 
concern except that it bears a striking similarity to 
parts of the speech he made during the Second Reading of 
the Family Income Supplements Bill in 1970 (see the 
Chapter on Family Income Ssupplement for more details), 
and that it caused Herbison to reiterate, in her 
rejection of his claims, that 
'this question of e15$jngs incentives is very 
important indeed. 
The stress placed by Peggy 
'Herbison 
on the potential 
damage to work incentives contained in any programme of 
selective assistance to the families of low wage earners 
anticipates the essence of the debate about the poverty 
trap which is examined in a separate section of this 
research. For the moment it is worth noting that her 
assessment of the Opposition's suggestion of selective 
Family Allowance increases for the low paid deserves a 
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particular recognition in any analysis of the Labour 
Party's awareness of, and concern about, the 
relationship between family income support and the 
labour market because it was amongst the earliest clear 
and sustained public examples of such an awareness from 
a senior figure in the post-1945 Labour Party. The 
other reasons she gave for rejecting the Conservatives' 
scheme were the already familiar criticisms of selective 
policies; administrative complexity and cost, low take- 
up rates, and stigmatisation. 
Her rejection of this variety of policy instruments 
served as a preamble to. her announcement of the 
government's final decision. 
(110) 
This was to be a 
scheme by which Family Allowances could be increased and 
child tax allowances reduced but not abolished. Such a 
programme would help the lower paid, would save 
resources by not giving unnecessary help to the better 
off, and would be selective. The government had no 
intention of removing child tax allowances completely 
but merely of so adjusting them that with the increase 
in Family Allowances the net family income of the 
standard rate taxpayer with children would remain 
virtually the same. Families whose head was paying 
income tax at less than the standard rate would gain, 
and those with the lowest income would gain most. This 
programme of Family Allowances with 'clawback' would use 
the non-stigmatising income test of the tax system as 
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the identifying mechanism and the universal system of 
Family Allowances as the vehicle for delivering cash 
transfers. There would be no need for any individual 
application for help, a characteristic which earned 
Herbison's approval. The net cost of a 50 pence 
increase in Family Allowances, offset by a £45 reduction 
in tax allowances for children in respect of whom Family 
Allowances were being paid, assuming a 50 pence 
reduction in National Insurance and other benefits for 
children, would be about £32 million in a full year. 
Although the proposal might disturb the tax arrangements 
of a large number of families, and might be resented by 
men who found that their net pay had been reduced whilst 
the woman's Family Allowance had increased, Herbison had 
no doubt about the advantages of her system over all 
other schemes. Her final substantive remark was to 
promise that the details of the government's proposals 
for dealing with child poverty would be announced that 
summer. In combining the selectivity of the income tax 
system with the universal structure of Family 
Allowances, the clawback proposal suggested by Herbison 
can be seen as an embodiment of that synthesis of 
allocative techniques favoured by Titmuss and alluded to 
above. 
Probably one of the best, for the quality of its 
analysis, and politically most sensitive speeches, came 
from John Cronin on the Labour backbenches. Drawing on 
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his experience as a Whip. Cronin told the government 
that there was genuine discontent amongst Labour M. P's 
at the lack of speed it was displaying in its treatment 
of family poverty. If the government did not take 
notice of the discontent it would soon find itself in 
serious difficulties. 
" ") Although he was able to 
congratulate Herbison on an excellent speech he was 
disappointed that she had made no positive proposals to 
deal with child poverty and that the government's survey 
into child poverty had not been published. He himself 
believed that poverty was mainly a problem of large 
families, particularly in large families whose head was 
in low paid full-time employment. the wage - stopped 
unemployed, and one parent families headed by a woman. 
One of the critical disadvantages experienced by such 
families was their political weakness; obviously 
children had no vote and parents only constituted a 
small part of the total electorate and consequently were 
of no significant help to either of the main political 
parties. Fathers in these families had little 
bargaining power because if 'they were in trades unions 
they were unions with limited opportunities for 
bargaining. The government was the only source of help 
for these families and their children. 
After offering his typology of the poor, Cronin 
proceeded to develop a critique of potential policy 
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initiatives. He began by rejecting selectivity because 
it involved a means test, had low take up rates and 
'would obviouf}ý)cause a loss of incentive to earn 
more money' 
This latter, of course, is exactly the point that 
Herbison made, and is further evidence of that 
developing awareness of the disincentive potential of 
what became described as the poverty trap. Cronin 
rejected the possibility of a generalised increase in 
Family Allowance rates because at a cost of £800 
million in a full year it would be massively expensive 
and would also give help to large numbers of children 
in families who did not need it. His solution to these 
problems was one that was commanding increasing support 
amongst Labour backbenchers. Essentially it involved 
abolishing child tax allowances, increasing Family 
Allowances for everyone by the amount that a standard 
rate taxpayer would lose through the abolition of child 
tax allowances, and making Family Allowances tax free. 
He had prefaced his solution by pointing to the 
'absurdity' and inequity of the then current position 
which allowed for 
'... the extraordinary situation, for example, 
that a man with four children and earning £10 a 
week receives from the country about £80 a year 
and a man with four children and earning (IS)a 
week receives back from the country £240. 
Cronin estimated that the total cost of his package 
would be about £80 million in a full year, which whilst 
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a large sum. was insubstantial in terms of overall 
government spending. 
Cronin's call for an examination of the relationship 
between child tax allowances and Family Allowances was 
re-iterated by another Labour backbencher, Hugh D. 
(Brown 114). but much the most interesting part of 
Brown's comments lies in the further evidence it 
provides about dissension within the Parliamentary 
Labour Party. Brown argued that the Conservatives had 
only initiated the debate on family poverty because of a 
motion put on the Order Paper by some Labour 
backbenchers. He wondered whether this had led the 
Opposition to assume that the Labour Party was seriously 
split because there had been no specific mention of 
(child 
poverty in the Budget. 
115) However much Brown 
may have wished to play it down, both his comments and 
the earlier ones by Cronin show quite clearly that the 
government's slowness in developing its policy on family 
poverty had become a touchstone issue for many Labour 
backbenchers, and it was one that was creating 
increasing disquiet. 
Any remaining doubts about the political significance of 
family poverty for a substantial element of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party were dispelled by Lena Jeger 
in a lengthy and interesting contribution. She urged 
the government to accept that there was no need to wait 
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for further data about family poverty before taking 
action; she for one was drowning in it. If politics 
were about anything they were about pc' Verty. and it was 
to combat poverty that the trade unions and the Labour 
Party were created. 
(116) The low-paid worker with a 
large family lay at the heart of the problem and she 
reminded the House that as far back as the premiership 
of Pitt the Younger, attempts had been made to discuss 
the position of the low paid worker with dependent 
children, often in terms of a minimum wage. Clearly 
what should be an acceptable minimum wage for a large 
family would over-provide for a worker who did not have 
a family. For Jeger the whole problem had to be located 
in the contradictory demands of wage-fixing under 
capitalism and the extent of the needs generated by 
dependent children. Her actual words are interesting, 
'... I find myself in a contradictory position, 
because the three political parties have accepted 
that when a man is out of work his income should 
be related to the number of children he has. I 
admit that this concept goes back to the old 
days - the Poor Law, Lloyd George and Beveridge - 
because if we are to pay attention to the size of 
a man's family when he is both in work and out of 
work, the family allowance is the only( lsj, 5hod 
by 
which we can take care of the problem. ' 
Jeger seems to be accepting, albeit reluctantly. the 
classical liberal (and Liberal) understanding of the 
relationship between income from employment and income 
from benefits in periods of interruption of earnings. 
Without overtly saying as much she clearly accepted 
traditional liberal thinking about the virtues of the 
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market (moderated by trade union bargaining and other 
institutional factors) as the most appropriate 
determinant of wage levels. The problem of poverty 
associated with the combination of low earnings and 
large families could only be resolved through the agency 
of Family Allowances. Once again Macnicol's 
identification of Family Allowances as a form of less 
eligibility is not without merit. 
After pointing to the TUC's recommendation of increased 
Family Allowances in its advice to the government, Jeger 
joined the growing number of Labour critics of the dual 
system of providing family income support through both 
child tax allowances and Family Allowances. Resources 
currently allocated to child tax allowances and Family 
Allowances should be pooled and shared out in such a 
manner that there would be no adverse effect on those 
people in the lower tax brackets. Such a system would 
be 
'... the only rational break-through in this 
otherwis? 118) intractable problem of family 
poverty' 
and one that was all the more relevant given the 
government's desire to develop an incomes policy that 
would be seen to be fair by the majority of the 
population. 
Given the major focal concern of this research, it is 
interesting to note that Jeger joined in the Labour 
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chorus of condemnation of the Conservatives' suggestion 
of extra Family Allowances for the lower paid. It was a 
grossly impractical idea involving administrative 
problems linked to such matters as the frequent 
variability and fluctuation of working class earnings. 
the fact that Income Tax operated on the previous year's 
earnings, and the overall difficulty of drawing an 
eligibility line. Most significant of all though is her 
observation that such an initiative would result in. 
' ... a serious disincent vleg) a disincentive to 
overtime and to promotion' 
This clear and conscious articulation of the potential 
disincentive effects on the low-paid of selective family 
income support policies by such important Labour figures 
as Peggy Herbison, Lena Jeger and John Cronin not only 
prefigures the academic development of the poverty-trap, 
but also anticipates the most persistent theme of the 
Labour Party's critique of Family Income Supplement in 
1970 (See the Chapter on Family Income Supplement). 
The debate was wound up for the government by the 
Minister without Portfolio, Patrick Gordon Walker. then 
acting as the Labour Government's social security 
supremo and as such, the person responsible for the 
policy review that was causing Labour backbenchers so 
much concern. His first major point was to repeat the 
government's view that child poverty was an extremely 
urgent problem which was the reason why the government 
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had instituted its survey of family poverty. The survey 
he described as 
'... a thorough exhaustive inquiry of a quite 
different kind and on a scale and (0)a depth different from anything done before'. 
The fieldwork had been completed in the June and July of 
1966 but the analysis of its findings had not yet been 
completed. The purpose of this very complex task was 
' ... to know the whole nature of and character of 
the problem of child pover(tly2115o find for certain 
the best way of tacking it 
It is perhaps worth commenting here on Gordon Walker's 
conceptualisation of the nature of public policy. 
Policy making is presented as an entirely rational 
process in the best tradition of the Haldane 
Report(122); the procedure was to find out everything 
one could about a problem, consider all the possible 
policy alternatives, and select what was presumably the 
self-evident answer. Discussed in these terms family 
poverty could be seen as almost apolitical. Although 
t the government hoped to publish the full. survey and its 
own analysis in June, some preliminary results were 
already available. 160,000 families containing 500.000 
children were living below the Supplemtary Benefits 
level; 70% of these families had three or four children 
but accounted for less than half of the 500.000 
children. 
(123) 
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The core of Gordon Walker's analysis of the root cause 
of poverty is easily stated. It was due to the hardship 
suffered by men who fell out of work and the presence of 
low wages. Unemployment and low wages raised, 
'... problems of a very complex kind, and it is 
understandable, and inded right, that the 
Government should have taken time to study these 
problems and work out the conse4YHfes of various 
possible ways of tackling them' 
The basic cause of family poverty was the combination of 
low earnings and the extent of family demands on these 
earnings. In his discussion of this issue he went 
straight to the heart of the problem when he commented 
that: 
'when thinking of the wages side, we are up 
against a complicated problem. Wakgý5) are 
necessarily geared to jobs, not to needs' 
The existence of wages below the poverty line was a 
defect of the wages structure that free collective 
bargaining had done nothing to solve. One of the 
objectives of the government's prices and incomes policy 
was to improve the relative position of lower paid 
workers and it was essential that unions and employers 
recognise this and not use the higher basic rates for 
the lower paid provided under the incomes policy as a 
new, higher platform for the maintenance of existing 
wage differentials. To do otherwise would have serious 
inflationary consequences and would destroy the prices 
and incomes policy. Gordon Walker believed that Family 
Endowment had to play a very critical part in the 
resolution of the problem. 
(126) 
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The Minister argued that the debate appeared to show 
that there were only three main techniques of 
implementing family endowment. One, which had attracted 
very little support, was to increase Family Allowances 
all round and pay for the increase out of general 
taxation. This would cost £160 million. Even though 
Family Allowances were taxable a general increase would 
give help to people who did not need it and would be 
very expensive. In other words, it would be costly, 
inequitable, and ineffective in targetting scarce 
resources. A variation of this approach would be to 
restrict the increase to, for example, the third and 
subsequent children. At a rate of 50 pence per child 
this would cost £64 million. 
The second main possibility was to provide a general 
increase in Family Allowances but make corresponding 
cuts in child tax allowances (the so-called clawback 
technique). Standard rate tax payers would benefit from 
Family Allowances to the extent that they lost through 
cuts in child tax allowances whilst the extra spending 
would be concentrated on poorer families. i. e. non 
standard rate taxpayers. According to Gordon Walker, 
the major problems of this technique were that it would 
require the movement of very large sums of money to send 
a fairly small sum in a particular direction, and the 
reaction of men to a reduction in their net pay(127). 
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(A potential fear that Callaghan and Healey were to 
deploy very effectively in their campaign to frustrate 
the implementation of the full Child Benefit scheme in 
the 1970s: see the section on Child Benefits for 
details). 
The third technique was to give some form of selective 
help to the most needy, identified by Gordon Walker as 
the 160,000 families in the government's survey. A 
supplementary Family Allowance for those families below 
the supplementary benefit level to bring them up to that 
level was the only method of help that he had considered 
thus far which was capable of bringing all families up 
to the poverty line. The first two developments would 
bring only about 57% up to the supplementary benefit 
level of income. Although it would target resources 
effectively this approach would have to be 
operationalised through some form of means test which 
many people viewed with repugnance, a factor which the 
government would have to consider carefully. Any form 
of means-tested scheme had formidable administrative 
problems and they would be no less formidable if applied 
to men in full-time work. Moreover, such a development 
would, in effect, get rid of the wage-stop with all the 
consequences that this would entail, especially the 
'certain disincentive to work' because of the 
relationship between income level and benefit 
entitlement. 
(128) 
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After speaking in relatively favourable terms about the 
idea of selective additional Family Allowances for the 
160.000 low paid family heads revealed in the survey, 
not least because of their cheapness. Gordon Walker 
moved without any explanatory preamble to an entirely 
different possibility which no-one had raised in the 
debate, the extension of supplementary benefit to 
everyone whose income fell below the supplementary 
figure appropriate to their circumstances (My emphasis). 
His words merit quotation in full because of the way in 
whcih they anticipate the later introduction of Family 
Income Supplement. Thus. 
'... if the existing supplementary benefits were 
amended to permit supplementary payments to all 
whose incomes fell below the prescribed 
supplementary benefit limit, the cost would be 
about £13 million a year as compared with the £60 
million, £70 mý}14cn, or £160 million cost of 
other schemes'. 
Without any warning and without any explanation he 
openly considered extending the nation's social 
assistance programme to include full-time workers on low 
incomes. Since the 1834 Poor Law Report such assistance 
in aid of wages had been anathema to British policy 
makers. After more than a hundred and thirty years a 
Labour cabinet minister was thinking aloud about such a 
possibility. This tells us a lot about the nature and 
scope of the government's review of policy options. If 
it really was prepared to examine the revolutionary step 
of providing cash supplements specifically for low-paid, 
full-time workers with dependent children, with all the 
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comment such a course of action would inevitably elicit 
about damage to work incentives, the permanent 
pauperisation of the low-paid, subsidising inefficient 
and bad employers, it really must have been concerned 
about reform on the cheap. Cost was a constantly 
recurring theme throughout the contribution of 
government speakers. In this latter regard it is worth 
noting that Gordon Walker made no attempt to answer 
those Labour critics who wanted the abolition of the 
dual system of family income support through child tax 
allowances and Family Allowances, and the redeployment 
of the resources in the form of some kind of child 
endowment. 
(130) 
After a thorough, exhaustive, indepth piece of social 
investigation (Gordon Walker's own words) and a three 
year study of possible policy initiatives the government 
was able to present its first conclusions to the House 
of Commons in a statement on 'Family Endowment' on 24th 
July, 1967. 
(131) 
Gordon Walker began by saying that 
i 
family poverty was a complex problem with no simple or 
single solution; nor could it be removed quickly. it 
demanded a combination of short- term and long-term 
measures. His statement represented the government's 
short-term response. It was an interesting collection 
of proposals. In April, 1968. existing Family Allowance 
rates would increase by 35 pence for second and 
subsequent children, but before the winter help would be 
given to large families which the government believed 
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were the ones most in need of help. Thus from the end 
of October, 1967,25 pence of the 35 pence would be paid 
in respect of fourth and subsequent children. There 
were about one million such children in 609,000 
families. The cost of the increase, net of tax and 
other adjustments, would be about £83 million in a full 
year. This extra expenditure could be raised in a 
number of ways but since the government's purpose in 
increasing Family Allowances was to increase the incomes 
of families in need it seemed logical to consider the 
possibility of 'altering income tax allowances which 
affect families' (presumably child tax allowances). 
Devising a technique for doing this had to be left to 
the Chancellor. 
(132) 
The government was concerned about the low take-up rate 
for free school meals and welfare milk so improved 
publicity and administrative arrangements would be made 
to ensure that potential claimants were aware of their 
entitlement and unashamed at the possibility of claiming 
that entitlement. In other words. the government was 
determined to make selectivity more effective by 
securing a high take-up rate. With the same intent the 
income limits below which families qualified for free 
school meals and welfare milk would be raised in line 
with recently announced increases in supplementary 
benefit rates. Large families would be helped by 
extending the provision of free school meals to fourth 
and subsequent children and by giving free welfare milk 
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to the third and subsequent children under five and also 
expectant mothers with two or more children under five. 
These latter changes would be regardless of income and 
would come into effect in April 1968. 
(133) At this 
point it is not inappropriate to note that by raising 
the income limits governing receipt of free school meals 
and welfare milk the government was widening the size of 
operation of these selective benefits and thus, in 
theory, exacerbating the effect of the poverty trap with 
the consequential loss of incentives that Gordon Walker 
had so deplored in his speech during the debate on 
family poverty in April. As will be seen, he was to 
repeat these observations during the brief debate on 
Family Endowment. The reasons for this apparent 
contradiction are not clear. 
To help defray the cost of these measures the government 
felt bound to increase charges for those who did not 
qualify for free school meals and welfare milk. Current 
prices had been fixed in 1957 and since then the costs 
had greatly increased. Continuation of the present 
charges would involve a claim on resources that could no 
longer be justified. From April, 1968 school meals 
would go up by 2.5 pence per meal and welfare milk by 2 
old pence a pint, but even these charges would contain a 
substantial subsidy; £64 million a year for school 
meals and £35 million a year for milk. The net savings 
from these increased user charges would be about £25 
million so the 
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total net cost of the government's Family Allowances 
(134) 
would be about £58 million a year. 
134) 
Speaking for the Opposition, Mervyn Pike described the 
government's proposals as 'miserably inadequate 
stopgaps' and wondered rhetorically whether the package 
was the best the government could produce after a three 
year review. 
(135) Pike's not inappropriate assessment 
of the government's policy stung Gordon Walker into a 
response that is wholly relevant for the core concerns 
of this research. In repeating his rejection of her 
programme of a means tested additional Family Allowance, 
he said. 
'There is always a balance of argument on a 
subject of this sort, but I think that the balance 
is overwhelmingly in favour of our decision. If 
one paid the increases on the basis of a- means 
test. - that would _ -have a great effect on 
incentives. And incentives are not on 
_a 
matter 
for Surtax Pavers-. They affect man other people. 
If one- Paid a_Person more for not working than for 
working_ which-would be the-effect-in some cases, 
that wou d hav_e_ 
_a 
grave effect on 
incentives-}ýý y emphasis) 
Gordon Walker's fears could not have been better or more 
clearly articulated by any Conservative minister and are 
more redolent of classical political economy than 
socialism; labourist perhaps, but not socialist. 
The government's policy choice was welcomed by some 
Labour backbenchers, but hardly received uncritical 
acclaim, and the approval it received was generated by 
the relief that Family Allowances was not to be means- 
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tested. 
(137) Although Gordon Walker accepted that 
Family Allowances would have to be increased to 87/ 
pence per child to get back to the same proportion of 
average earnings that had obtained in 1946, he believed 
that to restore that proportionality would have been too 
expensive; hence the government's compromise 
decision. (138) Under questioning the Minister admitted 
that about 51% of the children in question would 
continue to be below the supplementary benefit level but 
he did insist that all children would be greatly helped 
with many of them only just below supplementary level. 
Gordon Walker's assessment of his programme's success in 
helping the poor was rejected by Edward Heath who argued 
that the only way to help those in need was to make 
Family Allowances selective. 
(139) 
Heath's plea for 
selectivity as the only effective technique for securing 
a more effective targetting of resources provided Gordon 
Walker with a further opportunity to demonstrate his 
concern about work incentives, 
'If the line which we now understand is the 
Opposition's policy was drawn well above the 
supplementary benefiE line, the disincentive 
effect of that 1 clicy would become extremely 
marked indeed'. 
Not surprisingly Heath saw the potential embarrassment 
contained in Gordon Walker's reiterated fears, and for a 
moment traditional roles and ideologies were- exchanged 
as the Conservative leader expressed feelings more 
usually associated with the Labour Party. 
212 
'Is the Minister now seriously arguing that men 
and women will refuse to work. if they are 
poor, so as to get these family allowances 1141Y 
that the philosophy of the party opposite'. 
Heath's question was a perfectly reasonable one to ask, 
and it focuses on the essence of the dilemma facing the 
Labour Party as it attempted to address the problem of 
family poverty. How could the Labour Party respond to 
the needs of poor children? It had a clear, long- 
standing historical commitment to abolish poverty, 
especially poverty in families with dependent children 
but at- the same time it accepted the logic of liberal 
political economy with its insistence on the importance 
of keeping the gap between earnings and income from 
benefits as large as possible so as not to damange work 
incentives and distort the labour market. It knew that 
the only way to do this consistent with attacking 
family poverty, exactly as Beveridge had argued in 
1942, was to provide Family Allowances at a generous 
level. The party leadership also knew that this would 
be very expensive in public expenditure terms, and that 
to finance such a programme through tax revenue or 
extra borrowing would make it politically vulnerable at 
home and exposed to financial pressures on the foreign 
exchange market. It was not, and is not still, an easy 
dilemma to resolve. Heath's attack clearly struck home 
and Gordon Walker attempted to limit its effect by 
moderating his language somewhat, although he still 
insisted on the possible damage to work incentives at 
the bottom end of the labour market. 
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'There is also a disincentive, not that everyone 
would fall for it. if one so arranges allowances 
that people who are not working actually get 
more than if they are at work. It is a 
disincentive to take overtime, if to do so just 
brings them above the limit. I know that these 
disincentives are at rather lower levels than 
hon. and right hon. Members opposite often 
think 41t. but they are none the less 
real'. 
Clearly the model of rational economic man making 
precise judgements of marginal costs and benefits was 
alive and well in the Labour Cabinet. 
The issues thrown up by the government's review of 
anti-poverty policy and highlighted in the debate on 
Family Endowment continued to engage the attention of 
the party's policy making machine throughout the summer 
of 1967. and in September the Home Policy Sub-Committee 
produced an important paper on the immediate problems 
of socio-economic strategy. 
(143) 
It began by noting 
that it was now the mid-term point since the 1964 
election and the time was right to consider the 
economic and social policies that would set the context 
for the next election. In a section headed 'The Big 
New Issues' it argued that a major 'new' issue was 
rapidly taking shape which involved the deepest 
political emotions of the Labour movement. 
'It concerns all those complex problems of 
eliminating poverty, and dit4r45buting both 
income and wealth more fairly. ' 
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By its use of language the Home Policy Sub-Committee 
demonstrated that poverty and its removal was a matter 
of major political importance for the Labour Party at 
that time and it was an issue that was to become even 
more important during the 1970 election campaign as the 
Labour Government tried to counter the charges made by 
the Child Poverty Action Group that the poor had become 
poorer under six years of Labour Government, 
(145) 
The sub-committee was particularly concerned to deal 
urgently with the 
'... vast problem of families whose earnings from 
full-time work are not adequat? 14%q raise the family above subsistence levels'. 
The immediate wider political context in which this 
problem was located was the debate about the respective 
merits of universality and selectivity as allocative 
principles. In considering this wider debate the 
document argued that a great deal of hot air was talked 
about these matters but the central fact remained that 
especially in times of economic difficulty, the 
identification of priorities became increasingly 
important. The truth was 
'... the major argument between the parties is not 
whether we should be selective but how, i. e. are 
we to set out to select people who need extra 
help, or is the onus on identifying(lýrqups who 
need less help'. (document' emphasis) 1 
The current debate was largely about how to finance 
flat-rate increaes. Thus, in the case of child 
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allowances, should improvements in the income of 
families in need be financed from general revenue. or 
should some part of-the money be raised by reducing tax 
allowances enjoyed by the better off. In its 1966 
election manifesto the party had promised to integrate 
more closely Family Allowances and child tax allowances. 
but in the debate on the Family Endowment scheme in July 
many people felt that more help would have been possible 
for those in need had the whole question been seen in 
perspective, 
'Unfortunately in the emotional heat surrounding 
this debate, the issue of selective greater help to 
poorer families (financed by redistributing some of 
the dual-help in the form of both children cash 
allowances and child tax allowances now afforded to 
the better off) has been clouded by political 
knockabTY48)and largely irrelevant talk of means 
tests'. 
For the party to begin a debate about means testing 
would be fruitless, what it needed to do was set out 
alternative ways of financing new benefits. Given the 
lack of sufficient new rsources these must clearly be 
based on the re-allocation of. public expenditure and new 
proposals for redistributing income and wealth. If the 
party took its task seriously fiscal policy had to be 
adjusted to meet the ends it had in view. Perhaps the 
most interesting feature of the sub-committee's paper is 
the almost casual way it dismisses fears about means- 
testing. Apparently selectivity was now accepted by 
everyone in principle; political discussion ought to be 
focussed around techniques of operationalising the 
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principle rather than fruitless debate about redundant 
philosophy. 
The government's announcement in July. 1967 of a general 
increase in Family Allowances accompanied by increased 
user charges in other areas was obviously not consistent 
with the swing towards some form of selectivity within 
the Family Allowance system demonstrated in the speeches 
of both Patrick Gordon Walker and Peggy Herbison, and 
reflected in the Home Policy Sub-Committee's paper. 
The political process whereby the government's desire to 
inject an element of acceptable selectivity into the 
Family Allowance programme was transformed into a 
generalised increase in Family Allowances has been 
described from an 'insider's' position by Richard 
Crossman, 
(149) 
and supplemented by Banting's(150) 
account based on interviews with civil servants and 
ministers. Crossman notes in his diary entry for 
October 31st, 1966 that the government had decided to 
slow down the rate of economic growth which meant that 
there had to be a corresponding cut in the rate of 
growth of public expenditure. Callaghan, as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, had proposed a savage attack on the 
social services which Crossman would not accept unless 
it was accompanied by a reorganisation of Family 
Allowances and child tax allowances along the lines of 
the claw-back scheme advocated by Abel-Smith and 
Kaldor. 
(151) 
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At the Cabinet meeting held on December 20th. 1966 
Callaghan argued passionately in favour of a means- 
tested scheme to be introduced in the spring of 1967 for 
the 165.000 families in greatest need (an idea that 
eventually took shape as F. I. S. ) but the great majority 
of the Cabinet favoured a paper on claw-back from Peggy 
( Herbison 152). Callaghan would not accept this proposal 
and from then until July, 1967 claw-back became the 
subject of a bitter and protracted debate which 
eventually split the Cabinet down the middle. The basis 
of Callaghan's campaign against Family Allowances was 
his conviction that it would be unpopular with the 
voters, particularly Labour's working class supporters. 
He was regarded as being more in touch with the views of 
the average Labour voter and party member than many of 
his colleagues and as Banting observes, by 1967-8. 
'... he was increasingly convinced of one 
overriding point: as Labour's problems 
continued to grow, and thir popular support 
to decline, they could not go on antagonising 
their (? j. tical base, the manual working 
class' 
i 
The decisive Cabinet meeting, described by Crossman as 
'one of the most bitter and uulslsant 
meetings I've ever attended' 
took place on July, 19,1967. According to Crossman, 
Callaghan proposed an inadequate increase in universal 
Family Allowances and himself an adequate one financed 
through reductions in the child tax allowances of 
standard rate taxpayers. Callaghan insisted on his 
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five shillings increase, Herbison on ten shillings. 
while Wilson suggested a seven shillings compromise. 
Neither Callaghan nor Crossman would budge and a row 
broke out which ended with- Wilson calling them to 
order. Crossman claims that the majority was still with 
him and Herbison but that most of his supporters would 
not fight. He became so angry and dispirited that he 
left the meeting early, as a consequence of which there 
is no detailed account of how the final decision was 
reached. 
(156) 
The outcome though was that the 
government announced a universal increase in Family 
Allowances, e 
alternative no minister wanted, and their 
decision was 
'an 
triumpý 
---- ý 1 57. 
pf 
-----, %ar"/ 
sense- 
widely criticised as wasteful, a 
ancient ideology over common 
The day after the announcement Peggy Herbison resigned. 
What prompted her resignation is again open to 
interpretation because she herself has never commented 
publicly about it. The Child Poverty Action Group was 
in no doubt that Herbison had been asked by the Cabinet 
to find the money for a s'olution to the problem of 
family poverty at the expense of the old. the sick and 
the unemployed and that she had been quite right to 
resign in the circumstances. 
(158) 
She clearly favoured 
the clawback approach but had eventually been beaten by 
the resistance of the Inland Revenue and the 
Chancellor. (159) On the other hand, Harold Wilson 
rejected this interpretation saying that Herbison's 
resignation was prompted by the Cabinet's decision to 
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increase basic pensions by an amount smaller than she 
wanted. This decision had been taken in the Autumn of 
1966 and Herbison had immediately told Wilson that she 
must resign. Wilson had persuaded her to delay her 
resignation because she could not state her reason for 
resignation in advance of a government announcement 
about the issue on which she was resigning. Herbison 
had carried on with her job but had remained determined 
to resign once the announcement on pensions was 
, made. 
(160) 
Herbison's successor at the Ministry of Social Security 
was Judith Hart and once the Summer recess had ended she 
was soon engaged in dealing with the questions that had 
plagued her predecessor. From both sides of the House 
feelings were expressed that not enough was being done 
to help really poor families, but possibly the most 
interesting exchange was that between Hart and a leading 
Tory spokesman, Lord Balniel. Balniel asked the Minister 
for her views on the Conservative Party's suggestion of 
a special supplementary children's allowance, perhaps on 
a sliding scale, to those families below the 
supplementary benefit level. 
(161) 
Hart's response was 
exactly the same as that given by Gordon Walker before 
her, but is particularly interesting for the way she 
phrased her remarks given the debates that were to take 
place in 1970, on the Family Income Supplement Bill. 
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She said: 
'I am not quite clear whether what the noble Lord 
really has in mind is that there should be a 
permanent State subsidy to low-wage earners. If 
he has that in mind. I woY192jot agree with him 
that this is the solution'. 
Hart's first major responsibility as Minister of Social 
Security was in introducing the Second Reading of the 
Family Allowances and National Insurance Bill on 
November 8th, 1967. 
(163) 
The first part of her speech 
consisted of an uncritical affirmation of the wisdom of 
Sir William Beveridge. Family Allowances were a 
Beveridge principle, one that had continually been 
reinforced by experience. She recalled Beveridge's 
observation that Family Allowances were necessary 
because the wage system took no account of family 
commitments and responsibilities; wages were a payment 
for work done. The extent of the government's 
commitment to Beveridge's rationale for Family 
Allowances is evidenced by Hart's claim that: 
'Beveridge's premise, his analysis, his argument, 
and his conclusion, are as relevant and correct 
today as they were in 1942 and in 194(616%Yen 
family allowances were first introduced'. 
It will be remembered that the core of Beveridge's case 
for Family Allowances was that they were the only 
technique for attacking family poverty consistent with 
the preservation of work incentives at the bottom end 
of the labour market. There is nothing ambivalent 
about Hart's commitment to that philosophy. 
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The bill was very relevant to the findings of the 
'Circumstances of Families' survey which had 
demonstrated the extent of family poverty. In the 
summer of 1966 there were nearly 500,000 families 
probably containing up to 1.25 million children whose 
incomes were at or below supplementary benefit level. 
145,000 of those families were fatherless; 160,000 were 
of men who were sick or unemployed, and 140,000 were 
headed by men in full-time work. Of all those families 
the group which most concerned the government was the 
160,000 families containing about 500,000 children 
whose incomes were below supplementary benefit level 
and who could not be brought up to that standard 
because either the heads were in full-time employment 
and consequently excluded from the social assistance 
system (about 140.000 families) or they were subject to 
the wage stop (about 20.000). 
(165) 
Before considering the details of the bill's provisions 
it might be appropriate to speculate about the reasons 
that informed the government's special concern for low- 
paid full-time working family heads and the wage 
stopped. Hart offered no explanation. but perhaps the 
government was particularly affronted by the fact that 
people could be in full-time employment and still live 
below subsistence level thus providing living 
embodiment of that dilemma faced by a caring. reformist 
Labour administration. Wage levels under capitalism 
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could take no account of family dependency but had to 
reflect market conditions. That was the inescapable 
reality, and liberal political economy, even Labour's 
interventionist variant of it, explicitly forbade 
direct attempts by the State to subsidise low wages 
lest work incentives be removed and permanent 
dependency encouraged. 
The legislation proposed to increase Family Allowances 
for the first time in eleven years. Payments were to 
increase by 35 pence per qualifying child to a figure 
of 75 pence for the second child in the family, and 85 
pence for the third and subsequent children. These 
inceases would raise Family Allowances to a higher real 
value than they had ever had before. For larger 
families part of the increase had already been brought 
into effect, 25 pence a week being paid in respect of 
fourth and subsequent children, under temporary powers 
conferred by Section 5 of the National Insurance Act, 
1967. These temporary powers would lapse on April 8th, 
1968 while the new rates would come into operation on 
April. 9th. 
(166) 
Hart believed that the government's 
proposals represented a powerful attack on child 
poverty although she recognised that it did not totally 
solve the problem. 
Whether or not the benefit increases were a powerful 
attack on family poverty is contestable but there can 
be no doubt that the bill was designed to keep faith 
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with the philosophy that Hart had adumbrated in such 
unequivocal terms at the beginning of her speech. Sub 
Sections(2) and (3) of Clause 1 and Schedule 1 dealt 
with what the Minister described as 
'the necessary adjustments of National Insurance 
dependency benefits for children, providing an 
increase of 3s (15p) for the first child who does 
not qualify for family allowances, a reduction of 
4s (2op) for the second child, and a reduction of 
4s (20p) in some cases and 6s fgý3 in others for 
third and subsequent children. (my emphasis) 
These 'necessary adjustments' obviously reinforce the 
view that Family Allowances were designed to raise the 
incomes of those workers in low paid full-time jobs who 
had dependent children, with the intention of ensuring 
that the gap in income from employment compared with 
periods of non-employment be as large as possible while 
still being consistent with raising the incomes of 
those on benefit to a minimum subsistence line. Once 
more Macnicol's assessment of Family Allowances as a 
variation on the theme of less-eligibility is 
vindicated. As Hart was to observe later. 
'The object of a family allowance increase, after 
all, is to help families who cannot be helped 
through the National Insurance and supplementary 
benefits scheme, and to restore to some extent 
the balance between family (al]bgwances and the 
benefit under those schemes'. 
Whatever other people in the party may have felt about 
the inevitability of some form of selectivity in income 
support, Hart went on in her speech to develop a 
strongly expressed critique of selectivity which is 
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important as context for the direction of this 
research. Terms such as 'selectivity'. 'selective 
help'. or 'preferential help' she dismissed as 'hybrid 
and evasive' synonyms for means testing. 
(169) 
The aim 
of a Socialist Government ought to be the 
redistribution of income from the rich to the poor, and 
extending further the definition of the population to 
whom universal benefits could be paid. Anticipating 
that the Conservatives' front bench spokesman. Lord 
Balniel would attempt to make a case for extra means- 
tested Family Allowances for the low-paid. Hart offered 
a brief but comprehensive analysis of the dangers of 
such a scheme, the first two of which are significant 
for this research. She argued that means-tested Family 
Allowances 
'would be an explicit subsidy from public funds 
to lorly6yes, and an implicit endorsement of low 
wages 
Secondly, 
'they would be a disincentive to individual drive 
and ambi}gyl) and, therefore, to greater 
efficiency' 
0 
Her catalogue of objections included all those that 
opponents of selectivity had invariably used; low take- 
up, social divisiveness, the degradation and 
stigmatisation of claimants, administrative and 
bureaucratic complexity. and its failure to do anything 
for people just above the line that would form the 
operational basis for means-tested Family Allowances. 
She was not prepared to listen to any advocate of 
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means-testing who did not face up to the issues she had 
raised. 
(172) 
Neat she considered a suggestion that had been gaining 
popularity in the Labour Party, even with some 
government ministers like Herbison, and which the Child 
Poverty Action Group had been pressing for some time; 
that Family Allowances should be increased universally 
with child tax allowances adjusted so that the net 
income of the better off was no greater than before. 
This possibility had been very powerfully advanced and 
she conceded that it would be technically feasible to 
implement in a rough and ready way. Despite this she 
believed that child tax allowances had to be considered 
in the context of the whole complex of direct taxation, 
and that any help given to poorer families ought not to 
be found wholly from the better-off families with 
children. In other words there was a case for both 
vertical and horizontal redistribution of income. 
Having raised the issue Hart said nothing about' the 
government's intentions 6n child tax allowances 
although she did not preclude the Chancellor from 
saying something in his Budget statement the following 
(173) 
year. 
In retrospect Hart's speech is significant in a number 
of ways. She sought to deploy Labour's traditional 
claim to be the party that had a particular concern for 
the poor to the maximum political effect and in this 
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regard a plausible case could be made out. Increasing 
Family Allowances to their highest ever real value was 
no little achievement in a difficult economic 
situation, even though neither the policy instrument 
chosen nor the amounts involved pleased everyone. 
Furthermore, her rejection of means-testing was 
unequivocal and the reasons for that rejection. insofar 
as they touched on work incentives and the 
subsidisation of wages, demonstrate a clear 
appreciation of the theoretical relationship between 
family income support and the labour market. Once 
again a Labour Government had come up against the iron 
laws of liberal political economy rooted in. and 
predicated on, the assumptions of rational calculation 
and the psychology of incentive theory. These ideas 
exercised hegemonic power in British political culture. 
Could a Labour Government challenge them and risk the 
possible electoral consequences? 
Not surprisingly Lord Balniel tried to embarass the 
government about Peggy Herbison's resignation and her 
insistence during the April debate on family poverty 
that the government had rejected the idea of a general 
increase in Family Allowances as the best method of 
dealing with the problem. Three months after, that was 
exactly what the government had announced. 
(174) 
Not 
unreasonably, Balniel wondered what had caused the 
government's complete volte-face. Balniel's 
disappointment and surprise were shared by a number of 
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Labour members. Michael Barnes welcomed the bill for 
the help it gave to the poor but it was a let-down 
after the many references government spokesmen had made 
since the end of 1966 to the plans they were making for 
a new system of family endowment. A general increase 
in benefit could not target resources effectively and 
be quoted approvingly from Titmuss about the need for a 
universalist infrastructure utilised by the poor and 
non-poor alike. Selectivity could be developed on top 
of the universalist base provided that an acceptable 
technique could be found. For Barnes, a Negative 
Income Tax would be such an instrument. Used properly 
it could be a genuine socialist instrument to 
redistribute wealth. 
(175) 
Like Barnes before him, William Price was critical of 
the government's actions but in much more studied 
terms. The bill was based on dogma rather than the 
facts. The Minister had been faced with a straight 
choice between a means test that would give adequate 
help to the most needy or `a universal increase. Few 
Labour MPs were present to hear him say that she had 
made the wrong choice. He regarded 'the academic 
nonsense of selectivity' as meaningless jargon and was. 
'... prepared, and indeed happy, to admit that the 
issue here is whe(tlhfr) we have a means test or 
whether we do not 
Means-tested Family Allowances was the only way that 
adequate help could be given to those who needed it. 
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Price believed that society had a duty to pay wages 
sufficient in amount to allow people to live in 
prosperity without the indignity of asking help from 
any other source. He articulated the problem in terms 
that government ministers and party leaders would 
probably have shied away from. 
'My right hon Friend said that to have a means 
test on family allowances would be virtually to 
accept low wages. I agree that it would. But we 
have no alternative but to accept the fact of low 
wages, and there is no sign that the Government 
are going to move on the issue. Low wages will 
be with us for years and when my right hon Friend 
convinces the Cabinet of the need for a 
guaranteed minimum income then her arg 11991 will 
hold good. At the moment it does not'. 
Price's opinions and criticisms are more strongly 
expressed than those of any other speakers from the 
Labour benches but, as noted earlier, they do state the 
position in clear if bleak terms. The proposed general 
increase in Family Allowances would give too little 
assistance to those whose needs were greatest, and 
unnecessary help to people who did not need any. 
Selectivity within Family Allowances was an unfortuante 
imperative if the poor wereito be significantly aided. 
If he had heard of the arguments about incentives and 
state subsidisation of low wages he was evidently not 
impressed by them. 
Some pertinent comments about the political problems 
facing the government came from the Liberal, John 
Pardoe. He demolished the Labour Government's 
protestations that in three years of office it had 
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accomplished far more than its Conservative 
predecessors had in thirteen. 
'I have great expectations of the Government in 
dealing with poverty. I apply double standards 
in this matter. I expect a Labour Government to 
do a great deal better than their Conservative 
oponents in dealing with poverty. It is, 
therefore, useless for any right hon. or hon. 
member opposite to say to me, "They did not do it 
in 13 years. We have done rather better". Of 
course the Government have done bette. r They 
jolly well should have done better, and I look to 
them to(17g a great deal better in the 
future'. 
Pardoe was correct. More is expected of Labour 
Governments because concern for the poor and 
underprivileged is an essential part of the party's 
raison d'etre. And, of course, another part of that 
creed is that poverty could be tackled, society 
changed, redistribution to the less well off achieved 
within the confines of a mixed, though still largely 
capitalist economy, and through the political 
instruments of parliamentary democracy. The 
contradictions inherent in this position form the 
political backcloth to this analysis of the Labour 
Party's historical attempts to appreciate and act on 
the relationship between family income support and the 
labour market. 
Peter Archer was another Labour M. P. to express his 
disappointment at the government's proposals. Despite 
the extra help provided some 250,000 children would 
remain in poverty and he rejected any attempt to 
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provide for a general increase in Family Allowances. 
Despite this he agreed wholeheartedly with the 
government's rejection of means-tested Family 
Allowances because amongst other things, it would be 
'the greatest of all possible disincentives'. He was 
always surprised when Conservatives expressed concern 
for the incentives of higher income groups but seemed 
to be 'relatively untroubled about disincentives 
applied to the lower income groups'. 
(179) Archer 
favoured adjusting child tax allowances so that benefit 
could be concentrated more directly on to the less 
well-off. Only elected in March, 1966, David Owen made 
a quite lengthy speech which at best was only mildly 
welcoming to the government's plans. Despite ministers' 
sympathetic noises the government's policy on family 
poverty had produced a compromise which did not tackle 
the overall problem. During the course of his speech 
Owen claimed that the government, in its policy review. 
had come very close to introducing a means-tested 
Family Allowance which he would have found it 
impossible to support. 
(180) 
Like Pardoe. Owen argued 
forcibly that better things were expected from Labour 
Governments than Conservative, although his claim that 
the government was elected because people expected them 
to take revolutionary steps in the battle against 
poverty was rather overstating the case. Low wages 
were the real problem and, despite the difficulties, 
the Government had to introduce a commitment to a 
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minimum wage during the lifetime of that 
Parliament. 
(181) 
The divisions within the Labour Government about what 
constituted a proper response to family poverty were 
pointed to by a Conservative, Marcus Worsley. Worsley 
wondered what had happened to the claim made by Douglas 
Houghton in an article in 'The Times' on April 25th. 
1967 to the effect that: 
'Of the several possible ways of meeting the 
needs of the poorer families, an all-round 
increase in family allowances for everybody has 
been rightly ruled out. (18flat would be both 
expensive and unpopular'. 
Given that Houghton had been at one time in charge of 
Labour's social policy review. Worsley wondered if he 
had changed his mind. Houghton said he had not changed 
his mind and that he was disappointed that the 
government had only legislated for what he felt was 
only half of his plan of 'a scheme of interlocking 
fiscal allowances and social benefits'. However. he 
} 
did note that Judith Hart had not ruled out the 
possibility of the Chancellor taking action on child 
tax allowances. 
(183) 
For the government the debate was wound up by Charles 
Loughlin, the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Ministry of Social Security. Loughlin rejected the 
Negative Income Tax solution because he argued that it 
would take nine years to operationalise and repeated 
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the governments views about the likely consequences of 
means-tested Family Allowances. 
'Any means testing scheme must involve a reduced 
financial incentive to beneficiaries to increase 
or even maintain their earnings. There would be 
accusations of deliberate slacking, whether well- 
founded or not, and there would be considerable 
feeling between the responsible man who worked 
hard enough to be independent and the man who, for 
example, refused overtime bec&tV4) he preferred to 
rely on means test benefits'. 
The traditional case for incentives could hardly have 
been more clearly stated. In using words like 
'independence'. 'responsible', and 'slacking'. Loughlin 
spoke a language that would probably have earned the 
approval of Nassau Senior and Edwin Chadwick, the 
authors of the Poor Law Report of 1834. Means-tested 
Family Allowances would be a disincentive, and when the 
government had discussed the possibility with the TUC, 
the TUC had felt unanimously that means-tested Family 
Allowances would undoubtedly have that effect. 
(185) 
Loughlin developed his opposition to means-tested 
Family Allowances in an interesting manner by claiming 
that in work-place situations where overtime was 
normal, there might be a reluctance on the part of low- 
paid Family Allowance recipients to do overtime if the 
benefit were means-tested. Loughlin was particularly 
concerned about the damage this might do to industrial 
productivity. It is a fairly complicated line of 
argument but is worth quoting in full for the light it 
sheds on ministerial attitudes: 
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'There might be a situation where a man could not 
work hard enough and where the group earnings 
were dependent upon the individual contribution. 
If it were known that that man was subject to 
supplementation. the mere fact that he was in 
those circumstances would create great tensions 
within the group and affect productivity. As one 
who has participated in schemes for increased 
productivity in industry. my first reaction to 
selectivity of that kind would be to reject it 
because of its effect on productivity, quite 
apart from the perelol disincentive effect on 
the men concerned'. 
When the bill moved into its Committee Stage(187) a 
number of Conservatives criticised the government's 
decision to reduce National Insurance dependency 
additions to take account of the increase in Family 
Allowances. Peter Tapsell even went so far as to say 
that never before had National Insurance dependency 
additions for children been reduced after an increase 
in Family Allowances, and Conservative backbenchers 
pressed the government for an explanation. When it 
came. Loughlin's response was not entirely convincing. 
He argued that the main aim of the legislation was to 
increase Fmily Allowances, not to provide a general 
i 
updating in National Insurance Benefits which had been 
increased by 12.5 pence a week the previous month. It 
also aimed to restore to some extent the balance 
between Family Allowances and National Insurance and 
Supplementary Benefits. Benefit rates had always 
reflected the existence of Family Allowance but 
allowances had been allowed to lag behind these 
benefits in relative terms so it had been necessary for 
benefits to form an increasingly large part of total 
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provision. In Loughlin's opinion there was a 
complementary relationship between dependency additions 
in the insurance and assistance schemes and Family 
Allowances. Given this the governments action was 
reasonable. 
(188) 
Throughout this somewhat tortuous 
exchange there was no open admission that the real 
purpose of Family Allowances, particularly with regard 
to any offset in dependency additions in insurance and 
assistance provisions, was to make the gap between 
earnings and benefit income as big as possible 
commensurate with the provision of a basic minimum 
level of subsistence income. 
From the Labour side of the House, J. T. Price spoke 
very critically of the bill. He believed there was no 
justification for spending £124 million in a general 
increase in Family Allowance rates. State help should 
go to those who needed it, in accordance with the early 
Socialist creed of from each according to his ability, 
to-each according to his need. Price argued forcibly 
for selectivity and, in the process. warned the 
government of the opposition to its proposals that 
existed amongst its own supporters. In the light of 
the government's spending commitments there was an 
urgent need to be selective and the government had to 
realise that many of his colleagues shared his 
views. 
(189) 
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He wanted to dispel the belief that, 
'the Labour Party is so rooted to the old, 
traditional attitude towards the means test that 
some of its members do not realise that, if we 
are to help the worst hit members of our society 
who are below the poverty line, the argument 
cannot be sustained any longer that benefits 
should be extended right across the board to 
every fj, regardless of social provision or 
income. 
Undoubtedly. a number of Labour MP's shared Price's 
opinions but it is impossible to quantify the size of 
such opposition. With an overall majority of nearly 
one hundred seats the government had little to fear in 
voting terms but it goes without saying that party 
managers would wish to prevent the spectacle of a 
deeply divided party being presented to the electorate 
in the Conservative press. 
In contrast to Price, Hugh D Brown said that people who 
argued for selectivity were too often ignorant of its 
implications for work incentives and expressed his 
concern at the lack of awareness of 
i 
'the level at which a disincentive might 
arise if wemduced some kind of 
selectivity'. 
For the future the most interesting speech came from 
Judith Hart in closing the Committee Stage of the 
Bill's proceedings. She rejected the idea of a 
Negative Income Tax on the grounds that, although it 
might overcome some of the traditional objections to 
selectivity, it was currently administratively 
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impractical. Perhaps it was a development that lay 
some nine or ten years ahead. In the immediate short- 
term she had considered the relationship between tax 
allowances and Family Allowances and the suggestions 
that had been made of synthesising the two forms of 
income support in some 'give and take solution'. She 
described this possibility as an extremely attractive 
proposition deserving of the most serious thought since 
in her opinion it would solve many of the government's 
problems. 
(192) 
Roy Jenkins' pledge to introduce the clawback technique 
into the Family Allowance system as a 'civilised and 
acceptable' form of selectivity was given legislative 
substance in the Family Allowances and National 
Insurance Bill given a Second Reading on 2nd April, 
1968. 
(193) 
Judith Hart regarded the bill as the 
fulfilment of the government's promise during the 
debate on the bill introduced in November, 1967, to 
protect families with low incomes and dependent 
children from the consequences of the government's 
decision to devalue the pound. Accordingly, the Family 
Allowance rate was to go up by 15 pence per qualifying 
child. 
(194) 
Although there was much current discussion about what 
might constitute the proper response to the problem of 
low pay, (given substance in the previous day's 
discussion between the TUC and the CBI on the 
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possibilities of a minimum wage) Hart believed that the 
imemdiate solution to the problem of poverty could not 
be found in wages policy. As she had done during the 
debate on the 1967 bill she rejected the idea of a 
means-tested Family Allowance and reiterated her belief 
that such an initiative would have a major impact on 
the work incentives of the low-paid worker with 
dependent children. She argued that. 
'The moment that one draws a hard line and says 
that above the line there will be no assistance 
from the State, one introduces something which is 
bound to have a sharp and real impact upon the 
desire of a man supporting his family to seek to 
earn a little more each week, because if he earns 
that little more, he may earn 'himself' out of 
the schTT95) which has supported him 
hitherto'. 
The only method open to the government at the moment is 
its efforts to help poor families was Family Allowances. 
Consequently, the government, and anyone else concerned 
with family poverty, had a moral responsibility to 
explain to a hostile public that the Family Allowances 
programme was the only available answer. Family 
} 
Allowances together with the adjustments to child tax 
allowances contained in the clawback proposal was the 
most appropriate means of concentrating help on those 
families in need. 
(196) 
As Margaret Wynn has 
demonstrated (197) the government was to encounter 
considerable political unpopularity because of the 
clawback scheme. By general consensus the Family 
Allowance scheme itself was unpopular with the mass of 
the electorate and the introduction of clawback meant 
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that there would be redistribution of income within the 
family away from the man towards the woman, a 
development that was unlikely to commend itself to 
actual or potential Labour voters. Hart's plea for an 
education programme led by M. P. 's shows both her real 
concern to help poor families and to limit the damage 
that might be done to the Labour Party's political 
fortunes. 
The combined effect of the 1967 increase in Family 
Allowances and the clawback increase contained in the 
1968 Bill would depend on individual circumstances. 
Hart gave two examples as illustration. A man with 
three children earning £12 a week would receive an 8.5% 
increase in family income, while a man on £12 a week 
with four children would get 12-5% extra. The 
Minister's belief was that these increases represented 
radical and substantial improvements in the family 
income of the lowest paid in society and they deserved 
to be recognised as such. Furthermore. the government's 
i 
plans were better than similar ones the Child Poverty 
Action Group had been canvassing for two years. She 
commenced her speech by identifying what she regarded as 
the three basic causes of family poverty to which 
solutions had to be found. The first of those three 
causes, and the one most relevant to this research was 
what she described as the 'very simple but intractable 
one' of low wages, a problem which might be susceptible 
to minimum wage policy. 
(198) 
What is interesting in 
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this brief passage is Hart's characterisation of low 
wages as an intractable problem. Were low wages to be 
regarded as an inherent and permanent feature of the 
wage system under capitalism regardless of the 
operations of collective bargaining? The word 
'intractable' implies a permanence and a resistance to 
pressure that only institutional arrangements such as 
minimum wage legislation could hope to remedy. En 
passant, it is to be noted that Hart's other two basic 
causes of poverty were disability and social 
maladjustment. 
One of the most interesting contributions to the debate. 
not least because of the light it throws on the 
government's internal policy review, came from Douglas 
Houghton who, as has already been noted, had been co- 
/ 
ordinator of the government's review of social security 
policy in the recent past, and who also had a commitment 
to the idea of a Negative Income Tax. It is this latter 
point that dominated much of his speech. Taxation could 
F 
be used 'in a sophisticated manner' to recover social 
benefits paid to people who didn't need them and which 
could be better used elsewhere. The clawback proposal 
contained in the legislation then receiving their 
consideration did exactly that and his only complaint 
was that it had not been introduced a year previously 
because it had been ready then. 
(199) 
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In contrast to his support for clawback, Houghton was 
very critical of the Conservatives' proposal of means- 
tested Family Allowances, and at the heart of his 
criticism was a fear about the consequences this would 
have for the operations of the labour market. It could 
lead to a refusal to do overtime because the extra 
earnings would be cancelled out by an equivalent loss of 
income related assistance, and a refusal to take a 
better paid, more difficult job. Skilled men on higher 
wages might become disenchanted as they saw the 
differentials between themselves and the lower paid 
being reduced by means-tested assistance from the State. 
Skill at work would be regarded as no longer relevant in 
deciding take-home pay, being replaced by family size as 
the key determinant. In summary, Houghton argued there 
were bound to be serious problems of industrial 
relations and work incentives if ever such a scheme were 
to be implemented. That was why he was in favour of 
general increases in benefit selectively applied through 
ain taxation. 
(200) 
adjustments As noted earlier, 
i 
Houghton was a key figure in the conduct of the Labour 
Government's social security review and generally 
acknowledged as a leading authority on such matters. 
Consequently it is all the more interesting to see the 
dangers of selective cash assistance to the low paid 
full-time worker articulated in such a classicly liberal 
manner. There is no difference between Houghton's 
rejection of means-tested Family Allowances and the 1834 
Poor Law Report's attack on allowances in aid of wages. 
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In any epoch state funded wage subsidies were wrong and 
had to be opposed. 
The relationship between Family Allowances and wage 
levels, particularly low wages, had always excited the 
interest of important elements of the labour movement 
particularly the trade unions who had taken a long time 
to be convinced that Family Allowances would not impinge 
on free collective bargaining. These concerns had 
surfaced from time to time since the Family Allowances 
Act was passed in 1945 and did so again on this 
occasion. A number of Labour M. P. 's argued that in the 
long run the answer to family poverty lay in decent 
wages, not Family Allowances. For example. Michael 
Barnes said that he was speaking for many Labour M. P. 's 
in claiming that 
'... the prime reason for family poverty is very 
much a question of low wages. and that it is the 
wages prffiel5 that, in the long-term, must be 
tackled'. 
One way of interpreting this position is that they 
regarded Family Allowances as only a supplementary 
soruce of income, not a replacement of the struggle for 
decent wages. Implicit in this is the belief that 
Family Allowances were being used as a technique for 
maintaining the less-eligibility principle. ' Market 
conditions under capitalism demanded a low-wage sector 
of the labour force and the Family Allowances programme 
was an essential support of that sector. It also 
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possessed the 'invaluable characteristic of being an 
effective weapon in the war on poverty. Family 
Allowances were an almost perfect answer for any 
government concerned with the theoretical work 
incentives of the low paid and the poverty they might 
experience. The only drawback was the costs involved in 
increasing the benefit on a universal basis and herein 
lay the paradox. To preserve the work incentives of the 
labouring poor would demand higher levels of public 
expenditure if universal Family Allowance increases were 
the chosen policy instrument and these in turn might 
easily lead to increases in direct taxes on individuals 
and corporations with a consequential threat to the 
incentives and entrepreneurial energies of managers and 
business. The government's introduction of clawback in 
the Family Allowance scheme and the opposition's 
suggestion of selective Family Allowances can best be 
understood as attempts to resolve this paradox to the 
general advantage. 
} 
Since their introduction Family Allowances had never 
been accorded the same status in Labour mythology as, 
for example, the NHS, but one of the most significant 
features of the Second Reading debate was the number of 
Labour MP's who said that the benefit was unpopular with 
their constituents. At some point in their speeches 
Eric Heffer(203) David Michael Barnes(202) 
Winnick(204), Douglas Jay 
(205), 
Robert Howarth(206) v 
Stan Orme(207), John Ryan(208), Edwin Wainwright(209) 
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and even the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Ministry of Social Security, Charles Loughlin(210) all 
said that the benefit was unpopular. Both Heffer and 
Winnick even went so far as to say that Labour's 
setbacks in recent by-elections had been caused in part 
by its Family Allowance policy. Whatever the truth of 
this, and regardless of the accuracy or otherwise of 
backbenchers' impressionistic assessments of public 
opinion about Family Allowances, the significant 
political point is that the scheme did not command the 
wholehearted support of the Parliamentary Labour Party 
and this was bound to be a factor in the development of 
future policy to deal with family poverty. If the 
government was not to attack low wages directly through 
minimum wage legislation there were clear political 
limits to the possibilities for Family Allowances, with 
or without clawback. 
The introduction of clawback was a significant event in 
the development of family income support policy. not 
least because it publicly demonstrated the inter- 
relationship between the taxation system and social 
security. Henceforth there was to be a steadily 
developing call, from all sides of the political 
spectrum, for the introduction of some form of negative 
income tax programme, a call that the Labour Government 
was to continue to resist until its defeat in the 
General Election in June, 1970. Clawback also showed 
that there was a limit to the support which a 
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substantial proportion of backbench Labour opinion was 
prepared to give a general increase in universal Family 
Allowances, although not all of them were enamoured of 
the clawback technique. For the moment it showed that 
the Labour Party and government had moved still further 
towards selectivity and the search for more effective 
targetting of resources, and away from its traditional 
support of the moral ethos of universality. Means tests 
were now acceptable provided they were civilised. 
Support for clawback, and dissaffection with the then 
current system of family income support can be 
identified in a series of drafts of the document that 
became the basis of the party's social policy in the 
next election. The first draft of 'Labour's Social 
Strategy' contains some initial thoughts about Family 
Allowances and how they might be developed into a scheme 
of family endowment. Low wage earners and large 
families required positive proposals though both an 
incomes policy and an extension of the idea of family 
endowment. To achieve this a substantial increase in 
Family Allowances was necessary, paid for by adjustments 
in child tax allowances. 
(211) 
A later redraft developed 
these proposals by suggesting that the extension of 
Family Allowances to include the first or only child 
would be a great help, especially for unsupported 
mothers with only one child. A more equitable system 
could be achieved if Family Allowance increases were 
accompanied by reductions in child tax allowances and 
245 
also at a low net extra cost. Family. Allowances would 
be more acceptable to the general public if they were 
payable in respect of all children* 
(212) 
Further 
support for the clawback idea from internal party 
sources can be found in a paper on taxation by Andy 
Thompson for the Research Department. Thompson argues 
that there was general approval for clawback not least 
from the TUC who had implied that it might be developed 
further. In contrast, Nicky Kaldor believed that the 
present 'half-way house ... is clearly unsatisfactory' 
and that child tax allowances should be completely 
replaced by a tax-free Family Allowance with at least as 
much as their current arrangements for the great 
majority of taxpayers. 
(213) 
If it is true, as MacGregor asserts, that family poverty 
was never a major concern of the electorate's in the 
1960s. with Family Allowances being a particular vote 
loser amongst manual workers(214) it became an issue, 
albeit a marginal one. in the 1970 election. In the 
run-up to the election the Labour Government was 
embarassed by the Child Poverty Action Group's claim 
that the poor had become worse off after six years of 
Labour rule, an embarassment that was deployed to his 
party's advantage by Edward Heath who promised an 
increase in Family Allowance rates if the Conservatives 
formed the next government. 
(215) 
The extent of the 
damage this revelation did to Labour's electoral chances 
has almost certainly been overstated but before the 
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campaign began David Ennals, the Secretary of State for 
Social Services, came under pressure both inside and 
outside Parliament about the government's intentions on 
family income policy. Despite the evidence to the 
contrary, Brandon Rhys Williams maintained that the 
public was deeply concerned about child poverty and 
expected the government do do something about it, an 
assertion that prompted Ennals to an interesting reply. 
Ennals argued that between 1964-69 low wage earners with 
dependent children had done better than other sections 
of the population. After the 1970 Budget a married 
couple with two children had had a real increase in 
income of 11.5% since 1964, while a couple with three 
children were 14.5% better off. 
(216) 
Later on in May. 
Ennals revealed that the government had no plans to 
increase Family Allowances nor to extend them to the 
first child. The government was studying the extent to 
which poverty persisted in families with children 
despite the 1968 increase in benefit and the other 
selective help they got such as free school meals and 
rate rebates. Once this examination had been concluded 
the government would consider its policy. Although the 
government was concerned about the difficulties of 
families with only one child where the head was in low- 
paid full-time work he felt the numbers involved were 
almost certainly too small to justify the expenses of 
paying a Family Allowance for over seven million first 
and only children. 
(217) 
It is interesting to observe a 
Labour Government almost at the end of its 
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period of office falling back on a policy review as an 
excuse for not doing anything immediately about family 
poverty. 
In opposition again after the 1970 general election the 
party had to reconsider its own favoured policy 
instruments and also react to the initiatives launched 
by Heath's government, in particular the Family Income 
Supplement (considered elsewhere) and its proposals for 
the introduction of a Tax Credit scheme. To help shape 
this reconsideration of policy the Social Policy Sub- 
Committee set up a Working Group on Pensions, Means 
Tests and Poverty, which, in January, 1972 received a 
paper from Brian O'Malley on the tax/benefit 
structure. 
(218) (O'Malley was to become a Minister at 
the D. H. S. S. in the next Labour government until his 
early and untimely death). O'Malley argued that the 
existing mixture of taxable Family Allowances, child tax 
allowances, and clawback provided higher benefits to the 
surtax and standard rate taxpayer and was complicated, 
not well understood and administratively expensive. 
Unless future increases in taxed Family Allowances with 
clawback were accompanied by substantial increases in 
child tax allowances fewer and fewer people would 
benefit; each time an increase in taxed Family 
Allowances with clawback was introduced the tax 
threshold of those receiving it was reduced. 
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Possible variants of the existing structure included 
increasing Family Allowances in the regular periodic 
upratings of other benefits and also age-grading them as 
with child tax allowances and supplementary benefits 
child dependency additions. This would become possible 
when the payment machinery at Newcastle became fully 
computerised later in 1972. Increases in both child tax 
allowances and Family Allowances would help both poorer 
and better off families, while clawback of less than 
100% would help those people over the tax threshold. 
Family Allowances might be extended to include the first 
child and be made tax free to replace existing taxed 
Family Allowances, child tax allowances and clawback. 
If tax free Family Allowances were fixed at a level 
equal to the net value of the allowances currently 
available to the standard rate taxpayer there would be 
improvements in income for those who received no 
benefits or only partial benefit from child tax 
allowances. Subsequently the same cash help would be 
given per child whatever a family's income. These 
i 
arrangements would be less flexible than the existing 
system which enabled the degree of help to be given to 
low and higher income earners to be altered at any given 
moment. Increases in tax-free Family Allowances would 
not lower the tax threshold or produce a system where 
the more children a family had, the lower would be the 
earnings on which tax would be paid. If tax-free Family 
Allowances were not age-graded, or were initially set 
below the level of current child tax allowances. 
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vestigial child tax allowances would probably be 
required. If they were set at a high enough level many 
families would gain as much through tax-free Family 
Allowances as they would from Family Income Supplement 
although this would only apply to families with two or 
more children unless Family Allowances were extended to 
the first child. Thus, a limited Family Income 
Supplement would still be needed unless new groups were 
given entitlement to supplementary benefits, including 
those in full time work. O'Malley's final variant was 
to provide an optional scheme giving a choice between 
Family Allowances and child tax allowances* 
(219) 
The Working Group's report appeared in February. 1972 
and contained in its introduction a clear declaration 
that the ultimate aim of any socialist welfare policy 
should be the ending of inequality. 
(220) 
The 
relationship between Family Allowances and the taxation 
system was an integral part of welfare policy and in the 
group's opinion family poverty could best be tackled by 
improvements in Family Allowances and the taxation 
treatment of the lower paid. Accordingly Lt proposed 
the introduction of a new system of child endowment to 
replace the existing Family Allowance programme and 
child tax allowances. This would simplify existing 
arrangements for delivering income support in respect of 
dependent children and also provide extra help to poor 
families. especially in one parent families. The 
proposed new scheme would be worth at least as much as 
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the combined value of current levels of Family Allowance 
and child tax allowances, and be variable according to 
the number of children in the family and the child's 
age. It would include payments in respect of the first 
or only dependent child and once established should be 
reviewed annually as part of the review of National 
Insurance benefits. These changes would virtually 
remove the need for Family Income Supplement but whether 
a residual Family Income Supplement would be needed or 
developments in supplementary benefits was a matter for 
further, consideration. The elimination of family 
poverty would require all these changes together with a 
complete revision of the taxation structure along truly 
progressive lines instead of that which placed the 
greatest burden on the lower paid. 
(221) 
The publication of the Green Paper on Tax Credits in 
1972 and the setting up of a Select Committee to give 
detailed consideration to its proposals provided the 
Labour Party with both a challenge and an opportunity. 
F 
How should it react to the general principle of merging 
direct taxation and aspects of the social security 
system; how should it react to the Green Paper's 
proposal to replace taxed Family Allowance with a Child 
Credit? Organisationally the party's response was 
developed in the Tax Credits Working Party which 
opperated from June. 1972 to July 1973. 
(222) 
At its 
third meeting on October 18th. 1972 the working party 
identified what it felt were the major points of the 
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proposed Green Paper scheme. The Green Paper had raised 
some fundamental questions about the possible merger of 
direct taxation and social security which prompted the 
working party to conclude that a better alternative 
would be co-ordination rather than merger. Any tax 
credit system should not incorporate Family Allowances 
as this would lead to the disappearance of a non-means 
tested benefit. Instead Family Allowances should be 
extended to include the first child and continue to be 
payable to eliminate the existing 'tax-hollow' which 
occurred around three to five times the figure for 
national average earnings. If the tax system was to be 
made truly progressive (working party's emphasis) about 
£800 million could be raised on the basis of reasonable 
tax levels. Coupled with action to close existing tax 
loopholes this could almost pay for the Green Paper's 
ideas. In the working party's opinion the Green Paper's 
proposals would not eliminate the poverty trap. An age- 
related Family Allowance, perfectly feasible in 
administrative terms, together with universal free 
school meals would be much more effective in that 
direction. (223) The issue of age related child 
endowments was raised at the working party's sixth 
meeting on May 17th, 1973 when Peter Townsend commented 
that such an initiative might not be administratively 
feasible under a Tax Credits system. At the same 
meeting, members of the working party agreed that with 
or without a Tax Credits scheme the Labour Party should 
adopt as policy the amalgamation of Family Allowances 
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and child tax allowances, and the introduction of age- 
related child endowment payments. 
(224) 
The final 
outcome of the Tax Credits Working Party's deliberations 
in so far as they affected family income support policy 
was that increased Family Allowances, extended to 
include the first child, was a more effective answer to 
the problems of family poverty than a generalised system 
of tax credits. Nor was the party afraid of the 
implications of this in terms of the need for higher 
taxation levels or those who could afford it. 
(225) 
Nowhere in the proceedings of the working party or in 
its final report is there any mention of a relationship 
between family income policy and the labour market. 
While the party's internal machinery was considering the 
government's proposals for Tax Credits, the Labour Party 
Conference in 1973 held one of its rare debates on 
Family Allowances. 
(226) 
Family Allowances formed part 
of a complex Composite Resolution 29 moved by Joyce Pick 
from Salisbury C. L. P. Amongst other things it called 
for the maintenance of the current system of Family 
Allowances which should be increased to a minimum of 
£2.50 per child, including the first, be made tax free, 
and reviewed annually to take account of cost of living 
increases. (227) Pick's speech is particularly 
interesting because of the references she made to the 
traditional fears that party members had about Family 
Allowances. She felt obliged to assert that Family 
Allowances were no substitute for low pay, indeed 
253 
increases were necessary in both low wages and 
allowances, and argued that quite a lot of new party 
members believed that Family Allowances would depress 
wages. Many men still believed that a man's wage should 
be sufficient to keep a wife and a family. She also 
felt it necessary to reject the 'hoary' objection to 
Family Allowances that the programme would encourage 
people to have children. 
(228) 
Some evidence of possible political disagreement within 
the party on the Family Allowance issue can be found in 
a supporting speech from George Turner, a delegate from 
Norwich C. L. P. Turner stressed the importance of 
constantly upgrading Family Allowances and tax 
thresholds to take account of inflation and he further 
hoped that the party leadership would take the view that 
all social security benefits should be linked to 
movements in average industrial earnings. However, he 
made it clear that his expectations of the N. E. C. were 
not very high, particularly when it came to translating 
the redistributive rhetoric of Labour's Programme, for 
1973 into actual policy practice. What price was the 
Leadership prepared to pay to remove poverty if the 
general programme was costed at certain illustrative 
figures of benefits and 
'... we face the real discussion and the real 
issues w` "cy) the next Labour Government must tackle'. 
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Turner's expectations that the motion would not find 
favour with the NEC was accurate and Barbara Castle told 
conference that while she agreed with most of what 
Composite 29 called for she could not recommend it 
because it' included a call for a home 
responsibility payment which had not been thought 
through, and above all, because it wanted to commit the 
party to a specific figure for the tax threshold. (This 
is considered in the section on the poverty trap). 
(230) 
Conference took Castle's advice and rejected the motion. 
During the debate not a single mention was made of the 
relationship between Family Allowances and the labour 
market. 
From this point on it becomes almost impossible to focus 
on Family Allowances as a programme in itself as the 
Labour Party began to move towards developing what 
became the Child Benefits scheme. a change precisely 
captured at the very beginning of the next Labour 
Government's period of office in March, 1974. In reply 
to a question about whether the government had any 
immediate plans to increase Family Allowances in its 
campaign to abolish family poverty. Brian O'Malley, now 
a minister in the D. H. S. S., said 'no' 
'Our efforts in this field will be directed 
towards the development and introduction of a new 
system of child cash allowances; these 
allowances, payable to the mother, will 'ý lain 
respect of each child including the first'. 
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Although near death, the Family Allowance scheme was not 
to depart finally without once more drawing attention to 
both its real purpose in relation to the wages structure 
and the dilemmas this purpose presented to the C. cxbcxi 
Party. On the 25th February. 1975. Audrey Wise asked 
Barbara Castle, the Secretary of State for Social 
Services, if the government would increase supplementary 
benefit payments so that those receiving the child 
dependency additions would be able to benefit from the 
increases in Family Allowances due in April. 1978. In 
saying no to Wise's request Castle observed that the 
government's aim wherever possible was to replace means- 
tested benefits by universal benefits. and that was one 
of the purposes of increasing Family Allowances. Wise 
was not at all happy with this arguing that the poor on 
supplementary benefit would gain no advantage at all 
from the Family Allowance increase unless the government 
adjusted supplementary benefit allowances accordingly. 
Castle responded by saying that means-tested benefits 
would never disappear if they were increased every time 
(232) 
allowances went up. 
232) Both. of course. 
were right. and in expounding the government's reasoning 
Castle was maintaining to the end exactly that principle 
which Beveridge had set down in 1942. The real purpose 
of Family Allowances was to make as wide as possible. 
commensurate with the struggle against family poverty. 
the gap between income from low-paid, full-time 
employment and income in periods of unemployment or 
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sickness. It is rather ironic to see Barbara Castle 
dismiss the criticisms of a left-wing backbench Labour 
M. P. in exactly the same way that her equivalent in 
1946, Jim Griffiths had dealt with the impassioned pleas 
of another young, left-wing. backbench Labour M. P. 
Barbara Castle had come a long way in thirty years and 
her role had changed, but in essence the speeches 
remained the same. 
CONCLUSIONS 
For a political party which had always claimed a special 
concern for the poor and whose existence some of its 
members believed was born out of the working class' 
experience of poverty, Labour's position on Family 
Allowances was both ambivalent and uneasy. From the 
beginnings of the movement for Family Allowances in the 
1920's and throughout its existence as an operational 
reality from 1946, the party was split between those who 
recognised the programme's potential contribution to the 
alleviation of family poverty, and those, especially in 
P 
certain sections of the trade unions, who believed-that 
they were a major threat to collective bargaining and 
the wage system. A few socialists regarded the scheme 
as an irrelevant and confusing attempt to deal with the 
symptoms of deprivation rather than the disease itself, 
capitalism. 
During the entire period covered by this analysis the 
party's leadership had to contend with the threat to 
257 
party unity which these divisions represented. 
Sometimes the dangers were overt as, for example. during 
the party's first detailed examination of the issue in 
1927. and again in 1941-2 in the critical period before 
the TUC finally accepted Family Allowances at its 1942 
conference. For most of the time the divisions were 
muted but the knowledge that they were none the less 
present and real was a continuing problem for the 
party's managers. 
It is perhaps significant that Family Allowances were 
only accepted by the political and industrial wings of 
the labour movement in the unusual conditions provided 
by total war in 1941-2, conditions which gave organised 
labour a position of unparalleled strength. By that 
time civilian employees were the only section of the 
population with dependent children for whom the State 
did not make some provision, and on grounds of equity 
and efficiency it was a situation than could not long 
survive. Once the labour movement had come to a full 
appreciation of its bargaining power it felt confident 
enough to cast aside its traditional suspicions of 
Family Allowances, at least for the time being. 
For a few years in the post-war period a number of 
people in the Labour Party continued to stress the 
importance of Family Allowances in particular and family 
policy in general, but by 1952 this had changed and 
economic objectives rather than family needs became the 
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major focus of Labour's social policy, particularly the 
need to improve productivity and labour mobility. This 
declining interest in family needs was accompanied by 
the party's sensitivity to Family Allowances' alleged 
unpopularity with the electorate, especially amongst the 
Labour Party's working-class base, a factor that was to 
assume critical importance in the protracted debate 
about the future direction of family income support 
policy in the Labour government between 1964-7. It is 
clear that the party was a willing participant in that 
long period during the 1950's and 1960's when family 
poverty, and hence Family Allowances, was relegated to a 
very minor and peripheral position on the policy agenda. 
During this period the party's internal policy making 
machinery only rarely considered Family Allowances and 
then usually to make reference to the inequity of the 
dual system of family income support provided through 
child tax allowances and Family Allowances. As the 
academic community embarked on its 'rediscovery' of 
poverty, the Labour Party, i 
with its close connections 
with the leading members of that community, became more 
aware of the consequences of the combination of low 
wages and dependent children which research had 
demonstrated was a potent factor in the likelihood of 
experiencing poverty. It was in this context that the 
party began to press for increases and changes in the 
Family Allowance programme. Even then. as Banting has 
demonstrated, the extent of this concern in the party 
was never particularly great. Only a few MPs showed any 
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sustained interest while the party conference's 
involvement was even less. 
Amongst the most important factors shaping the review of 
anti-poverty policy which the Labour government set in 
motion on entering office in 1964 were cost and the 
intellectual debate about the respective merits of 
universality and selectivity as techniques of resource 
allocation in the social services. As the guardian of 
the public purse the Treasury was always going to be 
hostile to any innovation that was likely to be 
expensive of public expenditure and there was a 
perennial tension between the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and those ministers who were heads of major 
spending departments such as social security. To this 
was added the growing fashion within the Parliamentary 
Labour Party for some form of selectivity as the most 
appropriate policy instrument for the effective and 
efficient targetting of scarce resources. When 
Callaghan and Grossman clashed in Cabinet it was over 
the form and not the principle of selectivity. and it is 
this debate which leads us into a consideration of this 
thesis' central concern. the Labour Party's 
interpretation of the relationship between family income 
support policy and the labour market. 
There is little doubt that when the civil service 
bureaucracy and the Coalition government finally 
accepted Family Allowances they did so for economic 
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rather than social reasons. Beveridge's emphasis on 
Family Allowances' contribution to the preservation and 
augmentation of work incentives by making the gap in 
income between periods of earning and non-earning as 
wide as possible commensurate with the provision of a 
basic subsistence level of living and Macnicol's 
identification of Family Allowances as a form of less- 
eligibility, leave little room for argument. Given 
this, the appropriate question for us is to what extent 
did the Labour Party acknowledge, accept or oppose this 
justification of Family Allowances? An important point 
to establish at the outset is to recognise that there 
were differences between the party's public and private 
utterances, and between the party in periods of 
government and opposition. Over the years covered by 
this analysis on those relatively few occasions when the 
party advocated Family Allowances it did so for social 
reasons rather than economic ones. The scheme was 
regarded as an effective weapon in the battle against 
family poverty rather than a useful policy instrument 
} 
for the restoration of the work incentives of the 
labouring poor. Generally speaking, this lack of any 
comment about allowances' potential for theoretically 
improving work incentives was matched in the party's 
internal debates although on a very few occasiöns this 
feature was recognised if not actually proselytised. 
Thus the Labour Party never publicly, and only very 
rarely in private, talked about Family Allowances' 
contribution to work incentives. Labour governments 
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though behaved in a significantly different way. In 
general Labour governments since 1945 had a much better 
record of increasing Family Allowances than did their 
Conservative counterparts. Once again. whenever 
increases were provided the justification was the 
contribution they could make in improving the living 
standards of families with dependent children. 
particularly those families whose head was in low-paid, 
full-time employment. What is significant though is the 
fact that Labour governments throughout this long period 
of time never deviated from the principle of 
substitutability the practice of reducing income from 
the insurance and assistance schemes by the amount 
provided for under Family Allowances. Family Allowances 
were intended for low-paid family heads with at least 
two dependent children; substitutability meant that 
families on benefit did not receive any extra income 
from the provision of Family Allowances. It was this 
feature that had so enraged Barbara Castle in 1946 in 
her clash with Jim Griffiths. and it was the same 
feature which fuelled the argument between Audrey Wise 
and Castle some thirty years later when the latter was 
Secretary of State for Social Services and repeating 
Griffiths' arguments against her. 
The cost involved in providing generous increases in 
Family Allowances on a universal basis led the Labour 
government to consider between 1964-7 the possibility of 
providing means-tested allowances. and persuaded the 
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Conservative Party, for a while that the most effective 
answer to the problems of family poverty was a means- 
tested addition to the benefit for those on the lowest 
incomes. It was the possibility of means-testing Family 
Allowances that led the Labour Party and government in 
the late 1960's to make their most interesting comments 
about the relationship between Family Allowances and 
labour supply. While the party never openly advocated 
Family Allowances because of their theoretical capacity 
for improving work incentives, it fiercely opposed 
means-tested allowances, amongst other reasons, because 
to do so would produce a massive disincentive to work. 
In speech after speech government ministers and 
backbenchers alike ridiculed the Conservatives' 
suggestion because of its implications for work 
incentives. Although universal Family Allowances were 
not advocated for their incentive characteristics, 
selective allowances were bitterly opposed because they 
would produce work disincentives. The conceptual 
difference between incentives and disincentives is not 
easy to understand since essentially both depend on a 
belief in rational economic calculation at the margin 
and the notion of incentives and disincentives being 
part of a simulus/response mechanism. Perhaps the 
reason for this marked difference of approach was 
political rather than purely intellectual. For the 
party to have advocated universal Family Allowances 
because they would contribute to work incentives would 
have publicly placed the party in exactly the same 
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belief system as its right wing opponents, but to oppose 
means-tested Family Allowances might bring significant 
political advantages. A number of people in very senior 
positions in the party believed that if the party 
supported means-tested allowances there would be trouble 
from skilled workers who would see their income 
differentials being reduced. Skilled workers had always 
been a critical element in the Labour Party's electoral 
support and to risk alienating them would be to court 
electoral disaster. 
In retrospect the Labour government's review of policy 
alternatives between October, 1964 and the statement on 
Family Endowment in July, 1967 takes on a pivotal 
significance for the wider consideration of family 
income support policy. Every initiative and idea 
examined in this research was affected by this review; 
all have their roots in the government's struggle to 
resolve the dilemmas of a wage structure determined by 
market forces, and family needs shaped in part by the 
presence of dependent children. It is to one of the most 
radical of those initiatives, Family Income Supplement. 
that we turn next. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE LABOUR PARTY AND FAMILY INCOME SUPPLEMENT 
On October 17,1970 in the course of a statement on the 
Conservative Government's public expenditure plans, 
Anthony Barber announced the decision to introduce 
legislation for the provision of cash supplements to 
the wages of low-paid family heads in full-time 
employment with dependent children. (1) What became the 
Family Income Supplement scheme was significant in the 
immediate aftermath of the 1970 general election 
because it broke the pledge given by both Edward Heath 
and Iain Macleod to increase the level of Family 
Allowances as the best policy response to the problem 
of family poverty, but in a wider historical context 
probably of greater importance because it represented a 
clear departure from one of the enduring orthodoxies of 
British social policy; that the payment by the State 
of direct cash supplements to the wages of people in 
full-time work was an evil to be avoided at almost any 
i 
cost. Before going on to examine in detail the Labour 
Party's understanding of the relationship between 
Family Income Supplement (F. I. S. ) and the labour amrket 
it is necessary to give some consideration to the 
political and historical context in which F. I. S. has to 
be located. 
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The Conservative Party's manifesto for the 1970 general 
election contained the following comment on Family 
Allowances and family poverty, 
'We will tackle the problem of family poverty 
and ensure. that family allowances go to those 
families that need them. A scheme based upon 
negative income tax would allow benefits to be 
related to family need; other families would 
benefit by reduced taxation. The Government has 
exaggerated the administrative problems 
involved. and we will make a real effort to find 
a practical solution. If this can be done it 
will increase incentives for those at work. and 
bring much-needed help to children living in 
poverty'. (2) 
In the above extract a number of interesting features 
can be identified of which the most immediately 
relevant is the promise to target Family Allowances on 
the most needy, but it is also noteworthy that the 
party looked to some form of negative income tax as the 
most attractive solution in the long term, and that a 
concern for work incentives featured as a policy 
objective of any such scheme. The study group chaired 
by John Nott had thus far failed to devise an 
administratively feasible scheme, but it was only to 
be a relatively short time before the government 
announced its intention to introduce a Tax Credit 
Scheme as the physical embodiment of its long-standing 
commitment to some version of negative income tax. 
The reference to Family Allowances in the election 
manifesto was welcomed by the Child Poverty Action 
Group (C. P. A. G) but regarded as a little vague and in a 
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letter to Edward Heath the group's leader, Frank Field, 
asked if it reinforced the pledge given by Iain MacLeod 
that a universal increase in Family Allowances would be 
accompanied by a simultaneous adjustment to tax 
allowances. 
(3) 
Heath's reply confirmed Macleod's 
pledge and he reiterated the party's view that the only 
short-term answer to family poverty was to continue 
with the Family Allowance with clawback approach 
introduced by the Labour government in 1968. A 50p. 
increase in the value of allowances accompanied by the 
clawback technique would cost an extra £30 million in a 
full year. 
(4) 
It is worth noting at this point that the Conservative 
Party in general, and Iain Macleod in particular, had 
not always been so enamoured of clawback, even as a 
short term response. On 20th March 1968 in his reply 
to the Chancellor's Budget speech, Macleod had 
described the introduction of clawback as 
'... a new principle and a thoroughly bad one' 
(5) 
and had developed a sustained critique of Roy Jenkin's 
claim that Family Allowances with claw-back was a 
civilised and acceptable form of selectivity. 
(6) 
Macleod dismissed claw-back as a universal increase in 
benefit combined with an increase in taxation which 
brought 300,000 people into the income tax net for the 
first time, and pushed a further 250,000 into the 
standard rate band. Furthermore, some 250,000 children 
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would still be left in poverty. 
(7) 
He went on to claim 
that it was possible to have a family income support 
policy which could automatically identify and meet 
need. The Conservative Party had already worked out 
such a programme in very considerable detail. Claw- 
back was bad 'from every conceivable point of view'. 
(8) 
Macleod's optimism about the preparedness of the 
Conservatives' negative income tax scheme waned over 
the next two years. a change reflected in his speech 
during the Budget debate in April, 1970. In his 
comments on child poverty Macleod said that: 
'The long-term answer, if there be one, is 
probably a form of negative income tax, or a 
device of that nature. I am certain that the 
Government have studied this. We have given a 
great deal of study to it, but we have not yet 
found a wholly satisfactory method of antomatic 
identification, which would be it e9i great 
advantage, of those below a given line'. 
There is a significant change of tone in those remarks 
when one compares them with earlier utterances. He is 
no longer certain that there actually was a long-term 
solution to family poverty and the Conservative Party 
had not yet overcome the technical problems attached to 
an operational negative income tax programme. He 
reluctantly accepted that for the time being the most 
effective policy response was the continued use of the 
claw-back mechanism he had so strongly condemned two 
years previously. Although it was unlikely to be 
popular, the most effective approach would be the 
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provision of a 50p. increase in the existing Family 
Allowances programme costing £30 million a year net, 
but a great deal more in gross terms. 
'This is a very strong claimant indeed upon the 
amount of (ff)ney the Chancellor thought was 
available'. 
Not surprisingly Macleod was chided for his change of 
mind over claw-back by Dick Taverne, the Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury. 
"') 
but to his credit 
admitted his reluctant conversion. Failing the 
development of a technically sound negative income tax 
scheme there was no solution in the short-term other 
than an increase in Family Allowances with clawback. 
'Although I do not lit 2 t, I 
believe it to 
be the right answer' 
Thus, only two months before the 1970 general election 
returned a Conservative government to power with Iain 
Macleod as Chancellor of the Exchequer, he had 
committed his party to the further use of Family 
Allowances with claw-back as, the only short-term answer 
to family poverty. After only a few months in office 
Macleod died, to be replaced as Chancellor by Anthony 
Barber, and it was Barber who announced the decision to 
introduce an entirely new benefit, F. I. S., as the 
temporary, and therefore short-term solution to the 
needs of the working poor with families. Speculation 
about what might have been if Macleod had lived is 
useless. 
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It is generally accepted that the Labour Party fought a 
complacent and low-key election campaign in 1970, 
(13) 
one which recognised the difficulties involved in 
modernising and humanising an advanced industrial 
economy, but which also drew attention to the progress 
it claimed had already been made in achieving these 
objectives. 
(14) 
Within the context of this general 
tone of caution, what was the specific role of family 
income support policy? 
In August, 1969 the party's National Executive 
Committee issued a major statement on social policy in 
the 1970, s, 
(15) 
'Labour's Social Strategy' drew 
attention to those 'special categories' of people. or 
people who at a particular point in their life-cycle, 
experienced poverty; the head of a family in low-paid 
full-time employment with several dependent children. 
old people, fatherless families, the disabled, and the 
long-term sick and unemployed. 
(16) 
After commenting on 
i 
the findings of the Ministry of Social Security Report 
'Circumstances of Families' 
(17) 
and the New Earnings 
Survey for 1968(18) the National Executive Committee's 
document concluded that low pay was one of the major 
reasons for the continued existence of hardship and 
distress, and was clearly sensitive to the consequences 
of low pay and dependent children. 
'One group which caused particular concern was 
families with incomes below the Suplementary 
Benefit level but who could not be brought up to 
282 
that level, either because the father was in 
full-time work and so was not eligible to receive 
the National Assistance, or because they were 
already receiving Assistance, but because of the 
level of their normal earnings could not be paid 
an allowance enough to bridge the gap between the 
family's resources and its needs. There were 
about 160,000 of these families with about 
500,000 children in them. In the vast majority 
of the families the father was in full-time work; 
whionche-preievghenthteodfatnhade 
The full-time work prohibition and the wage-stop were 
singled out as the most important factors preventing 
low-paid family heads from participating fully, or at 
all. in existing income support services. Labour's 
favoured policy response was Family Allowances with 
claw-back, and 'Labour's Social Strategy' stressed its 
success and boasted about the government's achievement 
of increasing the real value of Family Allowances by 
about 70%. 
(20) 
Although appreciative of Family 
Allowances' role in combating poverty. Labour 
governments between 1964-70 had grown increasingly 
concerned about the rising level of public expenditure 
as a share of G. N. P., a 'concern sharpened by the 
recurrent foreign exchange crises that were such a 
(21) 
It is against prominent feature of these years. 
this background that the introduction of the claw-back 
technique should be viewed. Family Allowances were 
regarded by the Treasury as very expensive in terms of 
public expenditure, and a method that allowed the 
government to claim that it had met its moral 
commitment to the poor whilst also checking the rate of 
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growth of public expenditure was naturally welcomed. 
The party took some pride in describing claw-back as 
'... a part of the massive drive against the 
problem of 1oy227arnings linked with family 
responsibility. 
This was the Labour Party's position on the eve of the 
1970 general election and it was one that it had no 
apparent wish to change. In its manifesto the only 
reference to Family Allowances was a promise to 
'review the present system of J1i ly allowances 
and income tax child allowances' 
It is undeniable that neither of the major parties gave 
any inkling to the electorate that a state financed, 
wage-supplementation scheme 'like E. I. S. was even a 
remote possibility, or that any contingency plans 
existed in Whitehall for such an eventuality. Where 
then did the F. I. S. idea originate and how was it that 
a programme no-one had apparently heard of could be 
announced to Parliament on October 27th, and enacted 
into legislation by December 1970? Although one cannot 
be certain until the relevant Cabinet documents become 
available for public inspection at the end of the 
century, enough evidence is already in the public 
domain to be reasonably sure that what became known as 
F. I. S. was an idea devised by civil servants in the 
late 1960's and taken to Cabinet as a possible answer 
to the problem of family poverty by the then Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Jim Callaghan. 
(24) 
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Evidence that F. I. S. already existed in Whitehall when 
the Conservative government took office in June, 1970 
can be found in the speech made by Richard Crossman 
during the Second Reading of the F. I. S. Bill on 10 
November, 197025). Crossman was a leading figure in 
Labour politics and had been Secretary of State for 
Health and Social Services in the Labour Government. 
He was obviously in a position to know what policy 
proposals had been circulating in the highest levels, 
and his talent for indiscretion led him to share his 
knowledge with fellow M. P. 's. Thus, 
'It is no secret that this scheme is an old 
friend of ours. Many a person has put it up to 
us and said: why not do it? I always felt that, 
if it was done in a form acceptable to the 
Chancellor, it had to be well below the 
supplementary benefit level. If everyone was 
brought on to the supplementary benefit level and 
it had to taper off beyond that, the Chancellor 
would not give approval. It had to be mean 
enough to satisfy the Chancellor to work. I 
costed this both ways and said, "it is no good 
even putting this up, because the Chancellor will 
not dream of letting it go. He would not let me 
bring ev one on to the supplementary benefit 
level" '. 
ýý 
i 
Crossman is unequivocal that F. I. S. was a civil service 
scheme and had been put to him as a possible 
initiative. However, to do it in a way that Crossman 
would have approved of, and it is important to 
recognise that he was not against the idea in 
principle, would have been too costly for the Treasury 
to accept. Apparently he was presented with variations 
on the F. I. S. theme, the most expensive of which would 
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have taken people in, full-time work to the 
Supplementary Benefit level of income. This would have 
been wage-supplementation a la Speenhamland with a 
vengeance. Crossman went on to avow: 
'That is what ought to be done, no one should be 
below that level. It should be a national 
minimum. We should make the minimum there and 
say that everyone below that must have his wages 
brought up by a State payment to the level of 
Supplementary Benefit he would get if there were 
no wages stop. That would be wonderful, because 
it would mean that there would not be a person at 
work whose children would not be getting the same 
amount as they would be entitled to if he were 
unemployed127) However, this could not be 
afforded. ' 
It is not easy to be sure of Crossman' a exact meaning 
here and his reference to the wage stop is particularly 
obtuse. Was he recommending a minimum income figure, 
though the vehicle of a State subsidy to low wages, up 
to Supplementary Benefit levels? Was he recommending 
the abolition of the wage stop, something that the 
previous Labour government had steadfastly refused to 
do? Or was he assuming the theoretical abolition of 
the wage stop for the purpose of calculating the amount 
of the wage subsidy? What is beyond doubt is that 
Crossman was in favour in principle of what became 
F. I. S. There were differences in structure and amount 
between the version he favoured and the one introduced 
by the Conservative government, but in principle they 
were the same: state financed subsidies to low wage 
family heads with dependent children i. e. the 
resurrection of allowances in aid of wages, that 
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practice of the- Old Poor Law so vilified by the 
reformers who conducted the 1832-4 investigation and 
who wrote the 1834 Poor Law Report. Crossman's final 
verdict on F. I. S. was damning: 
'It is a dirtly little Bill. by itself a 
complicated little Bill. It is a typical civil 
servants' 
borrowed 
and 
iI 
a0285orry that the Secretary 
of State 
Further supporting, evidence, albeit essentially 
anecdotal in nature, can be found in correspondence 
with Frank Field, then leader of the Child Poverty 
Action Group. Field claims that. 
I... in a conversation I had with Maggie Herbison 
after she had returned to the back benches she 
mentioned the F. I. S. Bill twice came to Cabinet. 
It was brought by Jim Callaghan, then Chancellor, 
who was proposing it as an alternative to the 
1967 and (29.1968 increases in family 
allowances'. 
According to Field. Herbison defeated Callaghan's 
attempt to introduce F. I. S. by persuading a number of 
trade union leaders to sign a roundrobin letter 
objecting to the reintroduction of the Speenhamland 
i 
principle. This letter was presented to ministers and, 
one presumes, was instrumental in persuading the 
Cabinet to reject Callaghan's proposal. 
(30) 
Unfortunately, but perhaps not surprisingly given the 
political sensitivity of the issue. Herbison has not 
confirmed Field's comments. 
(31) 
Although a former Labour Minister of Social Security, 
Margaret Herbison, could not confirm the civil 
287 
service's responsibility for the creation of E. I. S., a 
former Conservative Secretary of State was more 
forthcoming. 
(32) 
Sir Keith Joseph has written that 
'The F. I. S. was presented to me and my colleagues 
when we discovered in office that increasing 
family allowances was a far, far more difficult 
method of achieving our purpose of helpi5s) the 
poor than we had assessed in opposition'. 
He further observes that the choice of F. I. S. was 
largely determined because of the unsatisfactory, and 
largely unforeseen, consequences of the clawback system 
introduced by Labour, 
'Though they were intensely discreet the 
impression I gained - and it was only an 
impression - was that i3 Wt the scheme had been 
put forward earlier... 
Further confirmation of the civil service's authorship 
of the F. I. S. scheme can be found in a letter from 
Christopher Mockler, then at the Conservative Research 
Department. He says that 
'... I have a vague recollection that the Civil 
Service had drawn it up some years before 1970. 
but were unable to get the Government of the day 
to accept t5. ý It then lay around until we came 
to power'. 
This is not the place to attempt a detailed 
investigation of the validity of Sir Keith Joseph's 
explanation of the government's decision to introduce 
F. I. S. rather than fulfill its election pledge of 
increasing Family Allowances with claw-back. Atkinson 
and Townsend. 
(36 
Barker. 
(37) 
Field. 
(38) 
Lynes. 
(39) 
and Abel-Smith 
(40ý have all offered analyses critical 
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of one or more of the elements in the Secretary of 
State's exposition' while Pratt 
(41) has written of the 
whole process encompassing the shift from Family 
Allowances with claw-back to F. I. S. It is important 
though to set down the essence of the government's 
case. The Secretary of State gave three important 
reasons for the introduction of F. I. S. 
(42) 
First. one 
third of the households with a head in full-time 
employment living below Supplementary Benefit Level had 
only one dependent child and were thus excluded from 
the Family Allowances programme. Poverty was not 
limited to families with large numbers of dependent 
children. While one-child families could be helped by 
an extension of Family Allowances to include the first 
child, such a development could not be accomplished 
quickly and would present the government with a major 
adminsitrative exercise. 
(43) 
Secondly, it was 
impossible to give the amount of financial assistance 
that working families in most urgent need required 
through any increase in Family Allowances with claw- 
back because the public expenditure requirements would 
be 'astronomical '. 
(44) 
Finally. the scope for claw- 
back was much smaller than anyone had realised. This 
had arisen as a consequence of the previous Labour 
government's decision to change the structure of income 
tax leading to a lowering of the standard rate tax 
threshold. In the Budgets of 1968 and 1969 the reduced 
rate bands of income tax had been abolished to offset 
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most of the cost of increasing the value of personal 
tax allowances contained in the same budgets. As David 
Barker observed, 
'Because this increase in the tax allowance was 
smaller than the band of income over which the 
reduced rates of tax were payable, the result of 
the exercise was. at one and the same time, to 
exempt more income from tax and to lower the 
income level at 1wboch the standard rate of tax 
became payable. 
Sir Keith Joseph stressed this point and produced the 
statistics to support his case. 
'A married couple with three children came into 
the standard rate of tax in 1967 when the 
household income was £23. By 1970 after those 
three Labour Budgets. a married couple with three 
children began to pay tax at the standard rate 
when earnings reached not £23 but £16-ls... Thus 
people who are in the category of family poverty 
are noý46)bearing tax at the standard rate 
level'. 
The implications of this dramatic fall in the standard 
rate tax threshold for the Conservative Party's 
commitment to make use of Family Allowances with claw- 
back were profound and it had to be concluded that 
because of the construction of the claw-back operation 
anyone who paid tax at the standard rate would gain 
nothing from any increase in Family Allowances. 
(47) 
a 
conclusion shared by Brian Abel-Smith, an academic 
authority who also supported the Labour Party. 
(48) 
The 
Family Allowance increases in 1968 had cost £180 
million gross, or £47 million net after taxation and 
claw-back. It had therefore been 25% effective. 
Because of the combination of falling tax thresholds 
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and inflation since 1968, if Family Allowances with 
claw-back were to be used again any increase would, only 
be 3% effective. A net increase of £6 million in the 
income of the poor would cost £180 million gross. 
(49) 
One of the most notable features of the Second Reading 
Debate on the Family Income Supplements Bill was the 
willingness of M. P. 's from all parties to make 
comparisons between F. I. S. and the Speenhamland system 
of the pre-1834 Poor Law. 
(51) 
Without exception these 
comparisons were intended to be damning of F. I. S. and 
it is appropriate at this juncture to consider briefly 
the nature of the Speenhamland system. particularly the 
consequences attributed to it by contemporaries and 
historians. 
Between the Workhouse Test Act of 1723 and Gilbert's 
Act English attitudes to poor relief changed 
considerably. The Act of 1723 had attempted to check 
applications for relief by able-bodied paupers through 
the application of the workhouse test. Gilbert's Act 
changed this policy by reserving the work houses in 
newly formed parish unions for those such as the aged, 
infirm, and sick who were unable to work, and the Act 
has been described as one of the most influential of 
all the poor law statutes enacted between the two great 
landmarks of 1601 and 1834. 
(52) In encouraging and 
regulating out-door relief Gilbert's Act anticipated 
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the practice of giving allowances in aid of wages, the 
so-called Speenhamland system, that became such a 
prominent feature of the 1790's and the early years of 
the nineteenth century. 
This change in law and practice was informed in part by 
developments in the intellectual life of eighteenth 
century England. During the second half of the century 
in particular, economists began to realise that rising 
wages together with a more humane treatment of the poor 
could result in increases in output and productivity. 
Starvation and fear were not necessarily the only or 
the best incentives to work. 
(53) 
Thus the allowance 
system can be seen as a policy response consistent with 
a more sympathetic attitude towards the poor in the 
late eighteenth century. The immediate impulse behind 
the spread of the allowance practice in the southern 
agricultural counties can be found in the nature of the 
economic and political situation of the middle 1790's. 
Food shortages caused by a Aeries of bad harvests and 
the disruption of trade stemming from the exigencies of 
war caused a rapid price inflation. With the fear of 
Jacobin inspired social unrest a constant presence the 
ruling class was faced with a critical situation 
demanding an immediate response. The allowance system 
was a part of that response. In essence it provided 
for the supplementation of wages by the parish with the 
amount being governed by the price of wheaten bread or 
flour and the numbers of dependent children. 
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The early years of the Napoleonic War saw a substantial 
increase in the Bost of poor relief, an experience 
repeated in the economic and social dislocation 
following the end of hostilities in 1815. Concern at 
the cost of relief, and its apparent failure to secure 
the acquiesence of agricultural labourers (demonstrated 
in 1830 by the 'Captain Swing' riots which were most 
severe in the so-called Speenhamland counties) helped 
to stimulate a far-reaching debate about the very 
nature of poor relief in England. The mounting 
opposition to the poor laws possessed a sharp 
intellectual cutting edge in the development and 
refinement of classicial political economy in the hands 
of Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, and Nassau Senior. Central 
to their critique was a conviction that the entire body 
of poor law practice was inimical to the creation of 
that free market in labour they believed essential to 
the development of large-scale industrialisation. 
After decades of unrest and the report of a very 
critical Parliamentary Sel, ect Committee in 1817, the 
new Whig Government led by Earl Grey appointed a Royal 
Commission in February, 1832 whose brief was to 
investigate the operation of the Poor Laws. The 
Commission's work has been criticised as biased. 
(53) 
'wildly unhistorical', 
(54) 
and wildly 
unstatistical', 
(55) 
but the report that emerged in 
1834, largely the creation of Nassau Senior and Edwin 
Chadwick, dominated the spirit of British social policy 
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for well over a century and exercises a critical 
influence in the current revival of liberal political 
economy. 
Of particular relevance for present purposes is the 
Commission's judgement of the consequences of the 
allowance system. It condemned the practice with a 
Messianic fervour and helped to forge an academic 
consensus remarkable for its unanimity, durability, and 
impact on policy. The verdict handed down by the 
Commission was entirely critical and is still 
influential in determining political and public opinion 
of the merits of state supplementation of incomes from 
full-time employment. One or two extracts from the 
1834 Poor Law Report will serve as illustrations. For 
example, 
'To suppose that the poor are the proper managers 
of their own concerns, that a man's wage ought to 
depend on his service, not on his wants, that the 
earnings of the ordinary labourer are naturally 
equal to the support of an ordinary family, that 
the welfare of that family naturally depends on 
his conduct, that he is bound to exercise any 
sort of prudence or economy, that anything is to 
be hoped from voluntary charity, are views which 
many of those who have long resided in pauperised 
rural districts see156t)o reject as too absurd for 
formal i 
The impact on work incentives was similarly beyond 
doubt. 
'Allowance-men will not work. It makes them 
idle, lazy, fraudulent and wor(tNP ss, and 
depresses the wages of free labour'. 
In recent years the academic consensus described above 
has been powerfully attacked by Blaug. who in two 
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articles has re-assessed the nature of the allowance 
system and provided the basis for a radical new 
interpretation. (58) In general terms he argues that 
the result of the allowance system was 
'to maintain the real income of workers by tying 
wages to the cost of living, it provided 
unemployment compensation together with a scheme 
to promote private employment, and it ý3pled 
both of these to a family endowment plan'. 
However, notwithstanding the merits of this thesis, the 
understanding of the allowance system that informed 
Parliamentary discussion of F. I. S. was entirely pre- 
Blaugian. Without exception every single speaker based 
his or her comments on an academic consensus whose 
credibility had been called into question some years 
before. 
If its critics were right, and F. I. S. was analagous to 
Speenhamland, then the Conservative government was 
particularly vulnerable to charges that it had 
introduced a policy which had inherent massive 
disincentives for the workipg poor. It had fought the 
1970 general election on a platform that emphasised the 
need to cut public expenditure so that marginal rates 
of income tax could be reduced and. theoretically, work 
incentives augmented. Its first exercise in budgetary 
policy on October, 27th contained a 2.5p cut in the 
standard rate of income tax, lower public expenditure 
plans, and the not unrelated announcement of the F. I. S. 
scheme. 
(60) 
Work incentives lay at the heart of its 
economic and social policy. Given this. what 
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perception did the government have of the relationship 
between F. I. S. and work incentives and how did the 
Labour Party (the focus of our concerns) respond? 
There is no evidence that the government was at all 
exercised about the incentives of the poor in full-time 
jobs, or that it even intended that F. I. S. should be 
directed at improving them. All the available primary 
sources confirm this, an opinion shared by Rein in his 
analysis of the incentive implications of what he 
describes as partial negative income tax programmes in 
Britain and the U. S. A. Rein argues that in the United 
States, Congress 
'primarily viewed the negative income tax as one 
approach to alter thC61)ork behaviour of present 
welfare recipients'. 
But, in Britain, F. I. S. (the British partial negative 
income tax), 
'appears to be more preoccupied with 
supplementing the income of the working poor. and 
its rules of eligibility are ppýyral with respect 
to augmenting work behaviour' 
The government's lack of concern about the incentive 
implications of F. I. S. was demonstrated during a 
Committee Stage discussion of what constituted the 
full-time work provision governing eligibility for the 
benefit. Sir Keith Joseph- said that it was the 
government's intention to allow people the choice of 
whether or not to work full-time; indeed, the 
government intended to advise claimants on what would 
be the best choice for them, 
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'the result may be that a woman who is now doing 
32 hours a week may be advised to do three or 
four hours a week fewer(gV so become entitled to 
supplementary benefit'. 
For Labour. Brian O'Malley remarked that this statement 
represented an unusual departure from traditional 
Conservative attitudes to work and social benefits, 
(64) 
and thus stung the Secretary of State into a rather 
more detailed explanation of the government's position. 
Although he admitted that his statement did appear to 
be a breach of principle. he attempted to qualify it by 
saying that the person he had in mind was 
'a woman who was struggitSý desperately to bring 
up children on her own'. 
He emphasised the minute size of the problem as though 
this somehow mitigated the nature of the government's 
action. Moreover, if people in this very small 
category found themselves on the borderline between 
part-time and full-time work, the D. H. S. S. would help 
them to increase their income by making the right 
choice. 
(66) 
Many potential F. I. S. recipients had 
already demonstrated their commitment to the work ethic 
by remaining in full-time employment for less money 
than they could get from contriving to appear 
unemployed or sick. 
t In most cases we do not have to worry about 
their motivation. They are proving in the 
clearest possible way their desire to work. If 
it is a question of enabling them to receive more 
from supplementary benefit by abating their work 
for two hours(6)week. who in the Committee would 
grudge them'. 
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This is an astonishing position for a Conservative 
Secretary of State for Social Services to adopt. He is 
recommending counselling to help the poor maximise 
their income rather than insist on full-time work in 
all circumstances. It represents a profound reversal 
of traditional roles, especially in a government so 
firmly wedded to work and rewards for work. 
The Labour Party used the F. I. S. debate as an ideal 
platform from which to launch a scathing attack on what 
it regarded as the government's duplicity over work 
incentives, and central to its case was F. I. S. 's 
contribution to the poverty trap. Nowhere can Labour's 
case be more clearly seen than in the Committee Stage 
discussion of an Amendment to the Bill introduced by 
Michael Meacher. 
(68) 
Meacher's amendment sought to 
limit to a maximum of 75p. in the pound any reduction 
in income consequent upon the loss of benefit 
entitlement and liability tq higher taxes and national 
insurance contributions that might follow an increase 
in earnings. In brief he wanted a maximum marginal tax 
rate of 75%. He argued that the operation of the 
poverty trap was such that. 
'... the poor are far worse off than the rich in 
the matter of incentives and that, in spite of 
the considerable emotional heat that has been 
generated on the other side of the House about 
incentives, far more attention has been given to 
incentives to highly paid executives rather than 
to what under these proposals will be a far 
greater, umber of low-paid workers on the shop 
floor'. 
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Meacher contended that there was an inescapable 
argument for a marked reduction in the 'utterly 
inadmissable burden of disincentives' at the bottom of 
the income scale contained in the F. I. S. Bill. 
(70) 
For 
the government. Paul Dean found it difficult to dispute 
the principle of Meacher's argument but he did claim 
that Meacher himself had spoiled his case by 
exaggerating the amount of marginal taxation 
experienced by the poor. an assessment that was to 
become 'a stock response form successive ministers in 
Conservative and Labour governments alike in the years 
ahead. 
(71) 
One of the most interesting aspects of 
Meacher's argument during consideration of his 
Amendment was the significance he attached to the 
consequences of a high take-up of means-tested 
benefits. The government's aim was to use E. I. S. as an 
automatic passport for eligibility to exemption from a 
variety of imposts such as prescription, opthalmic, and 
dental charges, and also boost take-up rates by an 
extensive advertising campaign. After commending the 
purpose of both those measures Meacher claimed that 
they would 
'... grossly aggravate the whole problem of 
disincentives' discussed under the Amendment, 
because the higher the uMice, th more people who 
will have more to lose'. 
Surprisingly, this is a point not often made in 
academic and political discussion of the nature of 
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means-tested benefits. with critics of selectivity 
usually pointing to low levels of take-up as a failure 
of the means-test approach. In pointing out the 
relationship between increased take-up and the poverty 
trap Meacher was identifying a causal link that was 
inescapable in theory. As he said in his closing 
remarks: 
'In trying to do the right thing in increasing 
the take-up the Government are g ng 
themselves into increasing logical toils'. 
ýý 
Labour pressed the Amendment to a division and lost by 
191 votes to 152. 
(74) 
Soon after F. I. S. reached the Statute Book the Labour 
Party initiated a Commons Debate on poverty with, a 
motion critical of the government's economic and social 
policies, especially because of the emphasis these 
policies placed on means-testing. 
(75) 
Opening the 
debate for Labour, Michael Meacher drew attention to 
the growth of poverty, since 1953, particularly in 
families where the head was in full-time work but 
earning less than the assistance scale rate plus rent. 
In 1953 some 170,000 people had been so affected, 
rising to 300,000 in 1960 and 900,000 in 1966. These 
people represented the fastest growing part of the 
poverty population because they had smaller wage 
increases than the higher paid and had a longer 
interval between pay rises, and were particularly 
susceptible to the operations of the poverty trap. 
(76) 
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Meacher identified ten reasons why the government's 
actions had increased poverty. the ninth of which was 
the introduction of F. I. S. rather than honouring its 
election pledge on Family Allowances. He appreciated 
the tax threshold arguments against the further 
utilisation of claw-back but believed that this could 
have been overcome by making all or part of the Family 
(Allowance increase tax free. 
ýýý As a method of 
delivering social services means tests were 'probably 
the most inefficient vehicle ever conceived by the wit 
of man'. 
(78) 
However, the crucial argument against the 
further development of means tests was that they would 
'completely undermine the precar ýs system of 
incentives for low-wage earners' 
To superimpose F. I. S. and means-tested housing 
allowances on top of existing means-tested benefits 
would make an already unsatisfactory situation 
ridiculous. The removal of means tests because they 
were inefficient, destructive of incentives, and above 
all, socially , divisive should be a high policy 
priority. 
(80) 
Meacher's arguments about F. I. S. 's 
disincentive characteristics received wholehearted 
support from Sir Brandon Rhys Williams who believed 
that his government's proper policy response ought to 
have been an increase in Family Allowances accompanied 
by a reduction in child tax allowances. 
(81) 
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Brian O'Malley argued that the 2.5p. cut in the 
standard rate of income tax announced by Barber in his 
public expenditure statement would not be an incentive 
to the low and average wage earner with children 
because they would lose out following the increase in 
user charges also announced by Barber in the same 
speech. The tax/benefit system as a whole provided 
more help for the better off. Under current 
arrangements the non-taxpayer got £1 a week with a 
third or subsequent child. Taking the operation of the 
tax system, claw-back, and Family Allowances together, 
the standard rate taxpayer with a third and subsequent 
children benefited by £1-5-2d. if the child was under 
11, £1-9-2d. if the child was between 11 and 15, and 
£1-13-1d. if the child was over 16. The surtax payer 
got most help of all. This situation had been under 
review by the previous labour government. The truth 
about F. I. S. was that large numbers of people would not 
receive it because, even at the bottom end of the 
income scale they would not be entitled to it; there 
would be a low take-up, and 'the system provide a 
massive disincentive to employers to put up wages'. 
(82) 
F. I. S. intensified the poverty trap and produced 
formidable disincentives for low-paid workers. Within 
the limits of public expenditure the government's 
policy should be directed towards the reduction of 
means-testing and the development of universal 
benefits. (83) Apart from Meacher and O'Malley no other 
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Labour M. P. paid any attention to the problems of the 
low-paid with dependent children with the single 
exception of Joan Lestor and she only gave a single 
sentence to it, albeit one deploring F. I. S. 's 
introduction. The disincentive arguments against 
F. I. S. were clearly understood on both sides of the 
House, but they were most clearly articulated by 
Meacher and O'Malley. 
References to F. I. S. 's contribution to the poverty trap 
and its consequent disincentive characteristics 
continued to plague the Conservative government and 
caused it some political embarrassment, most frequently 
in the brief discussions that attended the presentation 
to Parliament of the annual computation regulations 
that made provision for increases in the value of the 
benefit. In his presentation of the 1972 regulations 
on 26 January, Paul Dean, the Under-Secretary of State 
for Health and Social Security, made a determined 
attempt to pre-empt any such criticism. He maintained 
i 
that the impact of the poverty trap ought not to be 
exaggerated. It was nonsense to claim that thousands 
of families would be worse off after a pay rise. Such 
suggestions were based on hypothetical cases which, if 
they arose at all, were highly exceptional. Any 
possible disincentive effects would be mitigated 
because income was tested over different periods for 
the various benefits and there could be a considerable 
time lag before an increase in earnings affected 
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benefit entitlement or amount. Once awarded, F. I. S. 
ran for six months regardless of any subsequent rise in 
income. This was sometimes overlooked by those who 
contended that there would be serious disincentive 
effects. There was no evidence that any such effect 
arose in practice. 
(84) 
Charles Morris disputed Dean's dismissal of the poverty 
trap and cited as evidence the dilemma faced by a 
number of employees at the Post Office Corporation 
after the introduction of the corporation's new 
contributory superannuation scheme. This scheme had 
been introduced on December 1st, 1971 and one of the 
qualifications for entry was that existing employees 
would receive a salary or wage increase of 6.383% so 
that they could pay that element of their earnings as a 
contribution to the scheme. In other words, they 
received a salary and wage increase that wasn't. As a 
result, a number of low-paid employees found that their 
entitlement to F. I. S. and to rate and rent rebates was 
in jeopardy. (85) The Under-Secretary of State's 
comments on the poverty trap were interpreted by Brian 
O'Malley as evidence of the government's sensitivity 
about F. I. S. 's disincentive characteristics. Despite 
the government's conviction of the need to provide 
increased incentives for workers at all levels of 
income there had been no such help for the low paid 
F. I. S. recipients. They suffered extremely high 
marginal tax rates as a consequence of F. I. S. 
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'There are no financial incentives for them to 
increase their earn 1h)income; in fact, the 
reverse is the case'. 
He accused Dean of regarding the disincentive effects 
of F. I. S. and the poverty trap as almost incapable of 
solution, and mocked his claim that the high marginal 
tax rates of F. I. S. recipients was nonsense and 
hypothetical. Increases in F. I. S. amounts would be 
bound to lead to greater disincentives and the 
inclusion of F. I. S. payments in calculations of total 
income for purposes of determining rebates under the 
Housing Finance Bill would mean that families receiving 
F. I. S. would suffer reduced rent rebates. 
(87) 
It was not long before the first significant amendment 
to the F. I. S. regulations emerged and it was a change 
directed towards the resolution of the disincentives 
inherent in the poverty trap. Obviously its opponents' 
critiques had hit home and a politically sensitive 
government was bound to respond. On 20 November. 1972 
Sir Keith Joseph presented the Pensioners and Family 
Income Supplement Payments Bill for its Second 
Reading. 
(88) 
The Bill had two purposes, the provision 
of a special £10 Christmas payment to pensioners and 
the one relevant to this discussion. Clause 3 of the 
Bill provided for the extension of the F. I. S. award 
period from six months to twelve. Henceforth, for a 
period of twelve months after F. I. S. was awarded, the 
amount payable would remain unchanged regardless of any 
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change in the circumstances of the payee. The 
Secretary of State admitted that the extension would be 
of most benefit to those people affected by the poverty 
trap, although the numbers affected by the trap were 
much smaller than generally thought. Despite his 
attempt to minimise the extent of the problem, Sir 
Keith's acceptance that the poverty trap was a real, 
objective phenomenon rather than a statistical 
invention was a significant departure from the 
government's position in previous debates. 
The extension of the benefit period to twelve months 
would not merely postpone the poverty trap. Assuming 
that F. I. S. levels were increased each year at least in 
line with prices and a similar increase in F. I. S. 
recipients' earnings over the same period, the 
recipient would find in future that when he/she applied 
to review his/her claim the amount of the award would 
remain the same. Throughout the period of award the 
passport scheme would continue to operate in the same 
i 
way as hitherto. The change would take place from 3 
April, 1973. The government's estimate was that about 
10,000 more people a year would receive F. I. S. as a 
result of this measure at a cost of £1 million in a 
full year. 
(89) 
It can be argued that in making those 
assumptions about movements in F. I. S. amounts and 
earnings in its attempt to meet the disincentive 
criticism, the government in effect was consigning the 
low-paid, fully employed family head with a dependent 
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child or children to permanent dependency on benefits. 
a situation not dissimilar to the permanent 
pauperisation of agricultural labourers receiving 
allowances in aid of wages that haunts the pages of the 
1834 Poor Law Report. If this analysis is correct then 
the government was taking a step of great historical 
significance. 
Brian O'Malley's leading response for the Labour 
Opposition was not particularly effective. He noted 
Joseph's admission of the poverty trap's real existence 
and described Clause 3 as a temporary solution to the 
poverty trap which in reality would increase the 
numbers of people receiving means tested assistance. 
The poverty trap still existed and would continue to 
exist. 
(90) 
As with the earlier debate on poverty noted 
above. very few Labour MP. 's displayed any interest in 
the family dimension. Once again it was Michael 
Meacher who made much the most authoritative speech. 
Meacher wondered why the government had not acted to 
i 
double Family Allowances and extend them to the first 
child since this would undoubtedly bring much the most 
valuable non-means tested help at the lowest cost to 
low-paid workers. He described Joseph's explanation of 
the decision to introduce F. I. S. rather than carry out 
its 1970 general election pledge as 'artful'. The 
first part of his defence was that F. I. S. was a quicker 
method of giving help to the very poor, and unlike 
Family Allowances would provide assistance in respect 
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of the first or only dependent child. Two and a half 
years had elapsed since then and the government had 
still done nothing about Family Allowances. Therefore 
the goernment's first argument for F. I. S. had 
collapsed. Meacher accepted that the second argument 
in favour of F. I. S., that the low tax threshold had 
effectively invalidated the claw-back procedure, was 
much more valid but to its credit the government had 
since raised the tax threshold considerably. 
Consequently that argument had also collapsed. 
'Therefore. there is no reason at present why the 
Government could not introduce a doubling of 
family allowances. oý91)preferably, a child 
endowment type scheme'. 
It was the failure to answer the above questions which 
made the bill being considered a major charade for the 
low-paid worker. All it proposed was an extension of 
the F. I. S. payment period. Apart from the government's 
tardy acknowledgement that a poverty trap existed. the 
bill would achieve very little. 
'It will not mitigate family income surtax when 
eventually it falls, as its ' .l if the low-paid 
worker becomes better off'. 
At the beginning of the debate the Secretary of State 
had said that the poverty trap would not operate given 
his assumptions about movements in F. I. S. levels and 
earnings. Meacher interpreted this as meaning that in 
many cases the low paid would not increase their wages 
above the rate of inflation. In other words, they 
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would stay poor or become poorer. It was significant 
Meacher felt, that this was the only ultimate escape 
from the poverty trap that the government could 
see. 
(93) 
The significance of the extension of the F. I. S. award 
period to twelve months in relation to the argument 
about disincentives became clear during the debate on 
the computation regulations on February 5th, 1973. 
Once again, Paul Dean felt obliged to answer the charge 
that F. I. S. provided a massive boost to the 
disincentives experienced by the low-paid head of 
family enmeshed in the poverty-trap. The basis of 
these fears was that F. I. S. would rise and wages would 
rise but other things would stand still. These 
expectations and predictions were all wrong. The 
Budget had increased the tax threshold, and other 
changes made in 1972, such as raising the income levels 
for free school means and rent rebates, had reduced the 
potential impact of the poverty trap. As a result, the 
low paid who got increases 'broadly in line with price 
rises did not lose benefit over the year as a whole. 
In addition to all this the government had also 
extended the E. I. S. payment period from six months to a 
year. In adjusting other benefit rates the government 
would be concerned 
'to minimise the so-called marginal tax rates, 
just as we have been concerned to do so in 
drawing(9ýy those proposals in relation to 
F. I. S. ' 
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Brian O'Malley's reply did not dwell overmuch on the 
poverty trap' and disincentives to work. He very 
briefly alluded to a point raised in a previous debate 
by Michael Meacher, that an increased take-up would 
theoretically exacerbate the poverty trap and 
reiterated the Labour Party's belief that the scheme 
contained formidable disincentives. 
(95) 
For all its apparent distaste for the F. I. S. scheme 
there is little evidence that the Labour Party gave 
much serious consideration to the benefit's future when 
Labour next found itself in government. Perhaps this 
was due to the party's assumption that as it developed 
its plans for child endowment the need for F. I. S. would 
disappear, if not in entirety then at least in very 
large part. Only rarely does one see the party's 
internal policymaking machinery paying any attention to 
F. I. S.. and even then in a manner parenthitical to the 
major issue under discussion. This was certainly the 
case with the Social Policy Sub-Committee's report on 
i 
pensions, means tests and poverty in February, 
1972. (96) The report's opinion was that a child 
endowment scheme would virtually eliminate the need for 
F. I. S. although. 
' ... whether we will need a residual F. I. S. or 
close the gap by changes in Supplementary 
Benefits is X97.1a matter for further 
consideration'. 
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In a similar vein, Brian Abel-Smnith argued at a 
meeting of the Tax Credits Working Party on 17. May, 
1973 that the tax credits scheme being proposed by the 
Conservative government was the only way of replacing 
F. I. S. and extending the benefit of income tax 
allowances to those below the tax threshold. 
(98) 
Nor does one find much sustained interest at the 
party's annual conferences, although in 1973, during an 
unusual burst of activity, delegates discussed two 
resolutions containing F. I. S. as part of their 
substance. Composite 28, moved by Bryan Stanley from 
the Post Office Engineering Union and carried by 
conference on the National Executive Committee's 
recommendation, was a very lengthy resolution taking up 
two columns of the official conference report. The 
section relevant to our purposes said: 
'This Conference, concerned at the continuing 
failure of existing policies to provide genuine 
assistance to families on low incomes, calls on 
the next Labour Government to abolish the Family 
Income Supplement Scheme and to implement a 
system of taxation and family support which will 
give greatest assistance to families on low 
incomes. In particular Conference urges an 
immediate increase in family allowances to a 
minimum of £2 to each child, including the 
firstt9gyd grade allowances upwards according to 
age'. 
During his speech Stanley made reference to the 
existence of poverty in families whose head was in 
full-time work. The causes of this poverty were very 
low pay and the failure of F. I. S. F. I. S. together with 
311 
the many other systems of means-tested benefits had 
created the poverty trap. An increase in Family 
Allowances was a must. 
(100) 
The other revolution 
referred to above. Composite 29, included a call for 
the abolition of F. I. S. and child tax allowances, and 
the introduction of a system of taxation and family 
support designed to give the greatest assistance to 
families on low incomes. 
(101) 
A future Labour 
government's willingness to accede to conference's call 
for the abolition of F. I. S. was soon to be put to the 
test following the return of a minority Labour 
government in the election of February, 1974, and one 
with a very small overall majority after the election 
in October of the same year. 
The new government's first action with regard to F. I. S. 
was to present new computation regulations providing 
for a generous increase in F. I. S. amounts on 13. May. 
1974. Robert Brown, the Under-Secretary of State for 
Health and Social Security, recommended the regulations 
to Parliament with the resounding declaration that 
'the Prf Jt administration does not like 
F. I. S. ' 
It did not like F. I. S. because it subjected people in 
work to a means-test and had a low take-up rate. 
Consequently, 
'It is not our intention to leave F. I. S. as a 
permanent part of the social security 
structure '(l 
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The government was working towards its elimination but 
a new scheme would take a considerable amount of time 
to plan and introduce. It could not do everything at 
once, particularly in view of the difficult economic 
situation the new government had inherited. In the 
meantime it had to continue with F. I. S. 
Timothy Raison, the first Conservative speaker, made 
disincentives and the poverty trap the heart of his 
criticisms of government policy. He argued that the 
combination of Healey's budget and Barbara Castle's 
proposed increases in F. I. S. amounts would have a 
disastrous effect on the poverty trap. By raising the 
F. I. S. eligibility limits so that the average family on 
F. I. S. would get nearly £2 a week more, an increase 
very much more than the rise in personal tax 
allowances, th4 government had created a marginal tax 
rate for poor working families a good deal higher than 
the 83% marginal tax rate faced by those earning over 
£20,000 a year. He went on. 
'What is quite disastrous is that there should be 
a large group of people eligible for F. I. S. who 
are also above the tax threshold. The F. I. S. 
limits will from July be £25 for a one-child 
family, £28 for a two-child family and £31 for a 
three-child family; the tax thresholds for 
families with one, two and three children under 
11 are £21-£25, £25-86, and £30-48'. 
The effect of this is not only to create high 
marginal rates of "tax" at one or two specific 
points which is probably inevitable... but to 
allow very little net income from quite large 
jumps in pay. For example, the net income, after 
July, of a man with, say, two children, earning 
£30 a week may not be much over £1 more thatlakg 
income of a similar man earning £21 a week. ' 
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It had taken only a very short time in opposition for a 
Conservative speaker to adopt both the role and 
critique of Michael Meacher. 
Brown accepted that Raison had introduced a serious 
issue which concerned the Labour government as much as 
it had its predecessor. and he demonstrated that 
concern by giving the kind of answer that Conservative 
ministers. like Paul Dean, had prof erred when 
challenged by Labour M. P. 's in the same way that Raison 
had questioned him. Those hypothetical tables, 
'which purport to show marginal tax effect T1 
misleading unless used with extreme caution' 
They related to one particular place; they assumed 
that all benefits changed following an increase in 
earnings; they ignored annual upratings and Budget 
changes which would often occur before benefit was re- 
assessed, particularly where awards were made for 
periods of twelve months. It was exactly the same 
argument that Dean had used in the debate on the 
previous years upratings. There may have been a change 
of government but the civil service was still giving 
the same briefing. Brown also argued that it might be 
possible to phase out the withdrawal of benefits to 
avoid the disincentive effects which in any case were 
'becoming less obvious because the effects do not 
change immediately with a wage increase and the 
disincentive of high ma $6W rates is affected 
by personal motivation'. 
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The last part of the quotation given above is 
interesting because after a lengthy period when Labour 
politicans took the disincentive consequences of high 
marginal tax rates as apparently given. Brown seems to 
be introducing an element of doubt about this 
relationship. One ought not read too much into it, but 
it can be interpreted as a return to an older Labour 
scepticism about marginal tax rates and work 
incentives. Perhaps he made the comment in an attempt 
to buttress his scepticism about the actual extent and 
operation of the poverty trap. Whatever the case may 
be, it was an interesting departure from what had 
become a common stance. 
Take-up of F. I. S. increased from about 50% in 1972. to 
66% in 1973, and 75% in 1974, 
(107) 
and in a question 
possessed of some irony Tony Newton asked Michael 
Meacher, now a junior minister in the government, if he 
was aware that the higher the level of take-up of 
F. I. S. the greater would be the number of people likely 
to be affected by the poverty trap. 
(108) 
The irony was 
compounded by the striking similarity between Meacher's 
answer and those given by his Conservative 
predecessors. He argued that liability to the poverty 
trap would be reduced by the fact that benefit 
entitlement was not affected, within a year of benefit 
being granted, by an increase in earnings. It has to 
be said though that Meacher's response was 
distinguished from earlier ones by his belief that the 
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only way in which the poverty trap could be eliminated 
was through the use of universal benefits given as a 
right. 
(109) 
The Labour government's continuing problem with F. I. S. 
and disincentives manifested itself again in what was 
becoming a ritualistic series of questions and answers 
in the annual debate about new computation 
regulations. 
(110) 
On 15 May. 1975, Alec Jones, the 
Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social 
Security, prefaced his comments on the new rates by 
saying that the Labour Party bad consistently made 
clear its dislike of F. I. S. Its long-term aim was to 
reduce the role of means-testing by extending universal 
social security benefits. As a first step in this 
direction, Family Allowances had been increased in 
April, 1975 while the Child Benefits scheme remained 
the policy for the future. But for the moment. F. I. S. 
still had a part to play. 
"") 
Kenneth Clarke made the 
now familiar Conservative comments about the poverty 
(112) 
trap while from the rap government's backbenches 
Bruce George expressed the hope that the goverment 
would move 'progressively and swiftly' towards the 
elimination of F. I. S. 
(113) 
In his response Alec Jones 
claimed that he did not think that the government had 
been complacent about the problem of the so-called 
poverty trap', which as a concept had certain inherent 
problems. One of these was the eligibility period. It 
had to be remembered that entitlement was not suddenly 
.0 
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ended once earnings increased. It would be necessary 
to continue with F. I. S. until something could 
effectively replace it. He then made an interesting 
point which the Opposition was not slow to seize on. 
Jones said: 
'When child benefit starts in 1977. F. I. S. will 
have to be restructured to take efff'+)unt of the 
changed pattern of family support' 
This would reduce dependence on F. I. S. but the extent 
of this reduction could not be estimated until the 
level of Child Benefit itself became known. Thus far, 
in public at least, the Labour Party's policy had been 
that Child Benefit would remove the need for F. I. S. 
and, as mentioned above, Kenneth Clarke quickly 
realised, the change of direction implicit in Jones' 
remarks. Did the Under-Secretary mean that Child 
Benefit would not totally replace F. I. S.? It was a 
question to which Jones did not give a convincing 
answer. Apparently everything would depend on the 
Child Benefit rates. 
(115) 
f 
The opposition continued to pressure the government 
about the umbers of people in the poverty trap and in 
reply to one such question from Linda Chalker, Michael 
Meacher made it clear how much the Labour government 
was now wedded to the establishment answer. Subject to 
sampling error, the estimate was that in August, 1974 
after a pay rise of £1, about 50,000 families with 
children where the family head was in full-time work 
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could be theoretically worse off. The calculation took 
into account income tax, national insurance 
contributions, F. I. S., rent and rate rebates, the value 
of free school meals and free welfare foods. Families 
subject to a higher tax rate than the standard rate had 
been excluded. 
'The estimate is based on the assumption that tax 
and benefits change immediately the pay rise is 
given. This is unlikely to happen in practice - 
for example, family income supplements, free 
school meals and free welfare milk are awarded 
for periods of 52 weeks. The practical effect 
over time of an increase in earnings will also 
depend on other factors including any intervening 
changes in tax rates or allowances, National 
Insurance t1jgyibutions and the income limits for 
benefits'. 
One can only wonder about the difficulty Meacher must 
have had in speaking those words. Labour had begun its 
period in office in 1974 with a determination to be rid 
of F. I. S. as soon as circumstances and its development 
of an alternative permitted. As time passed the 
governments certainties about F. I. S. ' unsuitability 
began to weaken and by May, 1976 they had evaporated 
completely. 
A 
On 25 May, 1976 David Ennals announced to the Commons 
the government's withdrawal from its commitment to 
fully implement the provisions of the Child Benefit 
Act. Some five days earlier. Eric Deakins, Under- 
Secretary of State at the D. H. S. S. announced a 
substantial increase in both F. I. S. prescribed amounts 
and the size of the maximum weekly payment. The two 
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events were not unconnected, and together represent a 
critical point in the development of Labour's family 
income support policy. The increase in F. I. S. was 
intended to restore the relativity between average 
gross earnings and the prescribed amounts that existed 
in 1971 when the programme was introduced, and to bring 
into entitlement a considerable number of families 
currently excluded because their incomes were over the 
qualifying limits. It was anticipated that after the 
uprating some 85,000 families would be in receipt of 
F. I. S. at a total cost of £19 million. This compared 
with a total cost of £13 million in the year from July, 
1975 and would be an improvement in real terms. 
(117) 
During what Deakins described as 'this difficult 
economic period' the government believed it was 
essential to maintain the scope of a benefit which was 
so directly geared to working families bringing up 
children on very low incomes. 
'As long as this means-tested benefit has a role 
to play in helping working families in need. we 
are determtpfg) that 
' 
the supplement will be 
effective'. 
The Labour government had accomplished within two years 
of taking office, a volte-face that many of its 
supporters could only have found painful. Economic 
circumstances and the imbroglio over Child Benefits had 
combined to produce a deeply embarassing and 
politically damaging situation. 
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Not surprisingly the Conservative front-bench spokesman 
Kenneth Clarke, regarded Deakins' statement as manna 
from heaven. Now that the government had made a mess 
of its Child Benefit programme it had turned to F. I. S. 
and made it clear that it was committed to using F. I. S. 
as the main weapon against child poverty for the 
foreseeable future. The decision threw grave doubts on 
the government's intentions over Child Benefit. A nil- 
cost Child Benefit would produce a figure of £2-34 per 
child in April. 1977, while the government had leaked 
to the press a figure of £2-50 per child. If F. I. S. 
were to be abolished, and Family Allowances and child 
tax allowances merged into a Child Benefit payment of 
£2-50 per child. F. I. S. recipeients would be 
dramatically worse off. Consequently, especially with 
the new levels, it would be very difficult to get rid 
of F. I. S. The government had given up the idea of 
abandoning F. I. S. and had begun to use it as a 
deliberate instrument of policy. F. I. S. would be 
retained after April 1977 because otherwise Child 
} 
Benefit would have to be set at a hugely unrealistic 
level if F. I. S. recipients were not to be made suddenly 
poorer by the withdrawal of F. I. S. with the 
introduction of Child Benefit. 
(119) 
Clarke argued that the overlap between F. I. S. and the 
tax threshold was the most important cause of the 
poverty trap, 'about which there is such growing 
legitimate concern' 
(120), 
The government had made the 
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situation worse by consistently raising benefits faster 
than tax thresholds. Child tax allowances had been 
increased by £60 per annum for each child in the recent 
Budget while the proposed eligibility limits for F. I. S. 
would go up substantially more. In 1975. the gap 
between F. I. S. and the tax threshold was roughly £9; 
in 1976, after the Budget and the F. I. S. changes, it 
would be £12. The Child Poverty Action Group had 
estimated that an extra 25,000 people would have 
marginal tax rates over 100% - 75,000 rather than 
50,000. Clarke's summary is worth repeating in full. 
'This is another step towards discouraging the 
family man to get into work or to keep in work 
or to work harder. It puts more people than 
ever into a position where extra effort and 
earnings are simply not worth it. This is the 
first real flaw in the regulation. The answer 
is a proper child benefit scheme paid to all 
those in work and out of work at an adequate 
level. The Government's economic mismanagement 
has meant tpglt) they have had to abandon this as 
a target'. 
Looking at Clarke's comments in isolation it is hard to 
believe that it was actually a Conservative government 
0 
which had introduced F. I. S. less than six years before. 
Even though it had intended F. I. S. to be a short-term 
answer until an administratively feasible negative 
income tax scheme could be developed, the Conservative 
Party's outrage is difficult to take seriously. One 
would be surprised to find a more sublime irony than 
Clarke's assessment of F. I. S., or a better critique of 
it and defence of Child Benefit from a labour supply 
perspective. Labour and Conservative parties alike 
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switched on and off their belief in the objective 
existence of the poverty trap: in oppositon there was 
one. in government there was no such thing. or at worst 
it had been greatly exaggerated. What mattered above 
all else was party advantage. 
Bruce George was one of the very few Labour 
backbenchers to express any sustained interest in 
F. I. S. He had an ambivalent attitude towards the 
scheme; while welcoming the government's decision to 
introduce the largest increase thus far in prescribed 
amounts he disliked the principle on which F. I. S. was 
based. Moreover, he noted that the Under-Secretary had 
not repeated the phrases or sentiments uttered in the 
debate on the 1975 computation regulations to the 
effect that the Labour Party had always been consistent 
in its dislike of F. I. S. George hoped that the 
government would implement its theoretical approval to 
family poverty as soon as possible and eliminate F. I. S. 
with the minimum financial disadvantage to current 
recipients. A further 'absurdity' was the government's 
decision to increase E. I. S. eligibility levels more 
than the small increase in tax thresholds, the same 
point that Kenneth Clarke had made earlier. Again like 
Clarke, he noted that there would be the same 25,000 
increase in the estimated numbers theoretically subject 
to the poverty trap. At worst F. I. S. was a device to 
supplement poverty wages and he desperately hoped that 
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when Child Benefit was eventually fully operationalised 
it would be at a generous level and would be regularly 
reviewed. 
(122) 
Eric Deakins faced the criticisms of government policy 
openly and honestly. The government's anti-poverty 
strategy was to reduce reliance on means-tested 
benefits 'as soon as resources permit'. This strategy 
applied to F. I. S. which the government did not regard 
as a permanent benefit. Then came a keynote 
development of this theme. 
'On the grounds of cost and the heavy tax burden 
involved, it must be recognised that the paying 
of social benefits on a non-selective basis is 
impracticable for the forseeable future. For 
some time we shall need to rely on means-tested 
benefits, including F. I. S., to help low income 
families. So long as F. I. S. has a role to play 
in helping working families in need we are 
determined (lýiýt the supplements will be 
effective'. 
In other words, while he did not like F. I. S. the 
realities of economic and political life gave him no 
alternative. In effect he was announcing the de facto 
abandonment of the government's universal policy intent 
and signalling the permanence of means-tested selective 
benefits of which F. I. S. was a key constituent. Hence, 
the very generous uprating. 
Deakin's then considered the uprating's implications 
for the poverty trap. There had been some 
misunderstanding about action taken to eliminate the 
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poverty trap. Many people and pressure groups claimed 
that there would be an immediate reduction in the value 
of means tested benefits following a rise in pay 
because of tax and higher national insurance 
contributions. This was not the case for tax paying 
families. Every £1 of increased earnings would be 
subject to an immediate reduction of 40.75p. in income 
tax and national insurance contributions but F. I. S. was 
awarded for a twelve-month period and remained at a 
fixed level despite any interim increase in earnings. 
As it was updated every twelve months, it would have 
been increased some time during the currency of the pay 
award, sometimes before, sometimes after. The value of 
increased earnings was taken into account only at the 
end of the twelve months, and was then compared with a 
new and higher incomes level. 
'For this reason the number of pe 11 affected by 
this poverty trap is very small'. 
ýZý 
Once more the orthodox civil service view had triumphed 
and with it the connotations of permanent dependency 
that no-one saw fit to comment on. Deakins' conclusion 
was that family poverty where the head was in full-time 
work was a problem of low wages and not basically a 
problem of tax thresholds or means-tested benefits. If 
wages could be increased for the lower-paid quintile of 
the population more would be done to alleviate family 
poverty than by any other thing. 
(125) 
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The relationship, between E. I. S. and Child Benefit 
became an important theme in the Labour Government's 
family income support policy for the remainder of its 
period in office, and the government's dependence on 
F. I. S. grew increasingly evident. The extent of this 
dependence was graphically illustrated in Stan Ormes 
response to a question from a Conservative M. P. about 
what level Child Benefit would have to be fixed at if 
all working families were to be taken off F. I. S. at 
current prescribed amounts. Orme said that a Child 
Benefit of £9.50 for the first child (£10 for one 
parent families) plus £2 for each additional child 
would be needed if F. I. S. were to be removed. 
(126) 
In 
January 1977 the government made a preliminary 
announcement about the prescribed amounts and maximum 
payments which would apply to F. I. S. following the 
introduction of Child Benefit. The draft regulations 
would propose that from 5 April, 1977, the prescribed 
amount for a family with one child ought to remain at 
£39 and the maximum weekly F. I. S. payments at £8.50 for 
a family with one child plus 50p. for each additional 
child, but in order to take account of the Child 
Benefit disregard, the step in the prescribed amount 
for second and subsequent children should be reduced by 
£1 from £4-50 to £3-50. Taken together, these 
proposals would mean that all F. I. S. beneficiaries 
would gain at least the full net value of Child 
Benefits. Lone parent families with one child who had 
been receiving Child Interim Benefit would have their 
Ckild l. +-i'-21'i-Y., (3-QA-P-l t c, las "- 1 r^/avav/ PM 
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F. I. S. increased, when Child Benefit replaced Child 
Interim Benefit and was disregarded as income, as would 
all families with more than one child. This was 
because the step in the prescribed amount would be 
reduced by only £1 whereas the £1-50 benefit for each 
child which they would continue to receive would be 
wholly disregarded from 5 April. 
The government had sought to ensure as far as possible 
that the partial replacement of means-tested benefits 
by a universal benefit did not result in a loss of 
income. The disregard of Child Benefit for F. I. S. 
purposes resolved the core of the problem in that it 
protected families from losing F. I. S. or any of the 
other means-tested benefits which they received under 
the E. I. S. passport arrangements. Only two very small 
groups of families might lose as a result of the 
proposed arrangements and only then by a few pence a 
week: some in receipt of free school meals by direct 
claim and some in receipt. of either rent and rate 
rebates or a rent allowance and a rate rebate. 
(127) 
The government's proposals prompted Patrick Jenkin to 
ask why it proposed to reduce the F. I. S. income level 
for second and subsequent children by £1 instead of £1- 
50 on the introduction of Child Benefit given that this 
would increase rather than decrease dependence on 
means-tested benefits and widen the poverty trap. 
Ennals explained that a £1 reduction was the minimum 
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consistent with a rounded basic prescribed amount which 
would ensure that no family lost income. 
'As stff8)the effect on the poverty trap are 
minimal' 
These changes assumed their final form in the E. I. S. 
computation regulations for 1977 which Eric Deakins 
presented to the House of Commons on 24 March. 
1977.129) He repeated that the government's real 
objective was to secure that ideally, families on 
means-tested benefits should break even when Child 
Benefit was introduced since it did not wish to reduce 
the overall level of support that selective benefits 
gave to the poorest families. The Child Benefits 
scheme manifested the government's view that 
improvements in universal benefits should reduce 
dependency on means-testing but that objective could 
not be secured all at once. 
(130) 
For the past three 
years F. I. S. had been updated from July. while the main 
social security uprating took place in November. It 
was the government's opinion that it would be sensible 
to have a common uprating date. This would be achieved 
by making the 1977 computation regulations interim 
arrangements, pending the main uprating in November. 
In order to protect families from losing F. I. S. as a 
consequence of perhaps having received a pay rise in 
line with pay guidelines it was necessary to increase 
the prescribed amount within a year of the last 
uprating. The July uprating proposed was therefore 
designed to preserve the status quo for current F. I. S. 
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recipients. 
(131) 
The core of Linda Chalker's speech 
for the Opposition was that the Labour government had 
increased the intensity of the poverty trap and, 
because of its failure to develop a proper family 
income support policy, had been forced into an even 
greater reliance on F. I. S., a programme which the 
Conservative Party had always regarded as a temporary 
measure. 
(132) 
Despite the occasionally hyperbolic 
language that characterised her speech it is difficult 
to disagree with the main thrust of Chalker's comments; 
the government was now deliberately using F. I. S. as an 
important tool in its attempt to resolve the problems 
of family poverty. 
There was nothing new in Deakins' reply to the points 
made in the debate. his speech was largely a 
reiteration of now familiar themes. The impact of the 
poverty trap had been exagerrated because of the time 
lag between an earnings increase and the expiration of 
F. I. S. entitlement, and because of regular benefit 
upratings. The latest figures from Family Expenditure 
Survey data showed a theoretical estimate of 90,000 
families in December, 1975 subject to the poverty trap 
with a marginal tax rate of 75% or over, compared with 
60,000 in December, 1974. He accepted Chalker's 
statement that more and more families were becoming 
theoretically subject to high marginal tax rates 
because of the lack of co-ordination between tax 
thresholds and benefits. Deakin produced data showing 
328 
that 1.5% of a total of 6,500,000 working families with 
children were in theory subject to high rates of 
marginal taxes, although he maintained that in practice 
the numbers were very smal1. 
(133) 
Everyone agreed that the interaction of social security 
tax thresholds and low incomes caught people in a trap 
from which it was very difficult to escape. and there 
was not much disagreement between the two sides of the 
House on the desirability of moving towards a more 
easily understandable, simplified and unified system of 
family support. The crucial question facing any 
government was the priority it would afford to Child 
Benefits against other claims on the social security 
budget and from other areas of public expenditure. His 
conclusion was that: 
'Obviously, more resources will need to be devoted 
to child benefit if it is effectively to take 
families out of the poverty trap and enable us 
eventually to get rid of the(l rs-tested 
benefits we have been talking about 
i 
The relationship between Child Benefit and F. I. S., and 
particularly the signalling by the government of its 
intention to use F. I. S. as a continuing and important 
element in its anti-poverty programme sent shock waves 
through the Social Policy Sub-Committee and resulted in 
a protracted and lengthy correspondence between the 
sub-committee and Joel Barnett, the Chief Secretary to 
the Treasury, on the general question of the 
government's intentions on Child Benefit. 
(135) 
The 
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sub-committee first wrote to Barnett on February 4th. 
1977. and he replied on March 18th. In his letter 
Barnett noted that E. I. S. rates had been increased at 
least annually and ensured that those in need 
'do not s115%5 if child benefit is not uprated 
every year' 
There seems to be implicit in Barnett's statement an 
admission that a proper Child Benefit scheme, with all 
its theoretical advantages for the work incentives of 
the lower paid, could not be afforded. 
Barnett's letter elicited a reply from Barbara Castle 
on behalf of the Social Policy Sub-Committee on May 
12th, 1977. The sub-committee felt that 6 -tr+ý-ý? 
f `S 
letter contained a number of dangerous assumptions 
which it felt obliged to challenge. The first of these 
was his suggestion that Child Benefit upratings would 
not be relevant to those in need, a belief that the 
sub-committee disputed on the grounds that the 
proportion of people in need actually receiving F. I. S. 
was small. As evidence for this the sub-committee 
cited Ruth Lister's review of the evidence about the 
take-up of means-tested benefits to the effect that the 
proportion of the F. I. S. target population actually 
getting F. I. S. had never risen substantially above 
50%. (137) It further argued that F. I. S. did not 
adequately meet the needs of those who did actually 
take up the benefit. Research done for the D. H. S. S. 
showed that a substantial minority of F. I. S. recipients 
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had income that was still below Supplementary Benefit 
standards even after their F. I. S. award had been taken 
into account, and that the scheme was not sensitive to 
the increased needs or reduced income of F. I. S. 
beneficiaries over a period of time. 
(138) 
In his reply to Barbara Castle on June 23rd Barnett 
argued that the sub-committee had overstated its 
criticism of F. I. S. The 50% take-up rate it quoted 
related to the position in 1972. Estimates for 1975, 
based on Family Expenditure Survey data, suggested that 
about 75% of the potential target population received 
F. I. S., and that 92% of potential F. I. S. expenditure was 
received as benefit income. Barnett believed that the 
92% expenditure figure was probably the most significant 
one since the estimate of take-up by potential 
beneficiaries took no account of the fact that 
entitlements not taken up were on average considerably 
smaller than those which were. Indeed it was reasonable 
to suppose that the smallness of the entitlement was in 
itself a major reason for failure to claim. 
(139) 
Barnett also disputed the current relevance of the 
D. H. S. S. 's research into F. I. S. 's adequacy and argued 
that since the research had been conducted in 1972 
F. I. S. had been uprated several times, and the increase 
in July, 1976 was particularly significant since it 
represented a very substantial improvement by restoring 
the relationship of the prescribed amounts to earnings 
which had obtained at the scheme's inception. The 
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D. H. S. S. research confirmed the government's conviction 
that the extension of the F. I. S. award period from six 
months to a year was on the whole more beneficial to 
F. I. S. recipients than a more frequent review. 75% of 
families would have been entitled to the same or a lower 
award if they had been re-assessed for F. I. S. on their 
income at the time of the survey. Barnett then pointed 
out the implications for work incentives of the extended 
award period. Apart from greatly increasing staffing 
levels and administration costs, 
'... a shorter award period would destroy the 
protection against the poverty trap afforded by 
the combintlt4i6j of the year's run on and annual 
upratings' 
The final act in this exchange of letters came with the 
sub-committee's reply to Barnett on September 12th. It 
took issue with his claim that E. I. S. was more cost- 
effective than Child Benefit. As Barnett had said, 21% 
of Child Benefit expenditure went to the bottom quintile 
of households, that is £115 million one of a total of 
£599 million; in the same year only £18 million was 
allocated to F. I. S. In the sub-committee's view this 
meant that the bottom quintile clearly derived several 
times more value from Child Benefit than they did from 
F. I. S. 
041) 
This comment by the sub-committee was in 
one sense self-evidently true but it was not what 
Barnett had been talking about. In terms solely of 
targetting scarce resources. and disregarding all other 
considerations such as work disincentives and social 
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divisions, Barnett was technically correct. Neither did 
the sub-committee accept what it described as his 
'relatively favourable' interpretation of the operation 
of the F. I. S. scheme. The one year award period meant 
that 
ýaºN^_! ý. iýS whose income fell during that period could 
not be given additional help, while those whose income 
rose in that period inflated the proportion of families 
eligible for F. I. S. estimated to take it up. There were 
a large number of low-income families whose income, 
relative to F. I. S. prescribed amounts and Supplementary 
Benefit rates, fluctuated widely from month to month and 
year to year. Their interests would have been best 
served by the provision of a regular source of income 
from Child Benefit. 
(102) 
This exchange of letters was 
the last significant event in the Labour Party's 
consideration of F. I. S. before the Callaghan government 
was defeated in the 1979 general election, being 
succeeded by a radical right-way Conservative 
administration which would eventually remove F. I. S. from 
the social security system in April, 1988, replacing it 
with the Family Credit. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Despite the scorn with which the Labour Party regarded 
F. I. S. on its introduction, and the contempt in which it 
was held during its early period of operation, the 
record shows that in reality the party evinced little 
real interest in what was a remarkable innovation in 
modern British social policy. In the House of Commons, 
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at party conference. and in internal policy making 
circles. F. I. S. was never a major subject of concern. 
With the singular exception of Michael Meacher. and to 
a lesser extent, Brian O'Malley (a front bench 
spokesman) and Bruce George, no Labour M. P. displayed 
any sustained interest in the subject. Why should this 
be so? Perhaps the best explanation is that from the 
beginning the party's attitude was characterised by an 
assumption that it would be easy to dispense with 
F. I. S. once Labour returned to power and began to 
implement its plans for Child Endowment. A more 
speculative possibility is that a programme that never 
cost more than £27.3 million at 1978 prices during the 
period examined was unlikely to excite massive 
attention. 
A clear theme to emerge from this analysis is what can 
be described as an almost schizophrenic role reversal. 
When in Opposition. Labour, like the Conservatives, 
said the same thing; F. I. S.; had profound work 
disincentives. In government, both parties again said 
the same thing; the poverty trap and its associated 
disincentives was largely a theoretical abstraction 
whose real existence had been greatly exaggerated. The 
only consistent element in both parties' posture over 
F. I. S. was a desire to maximise party political 
advantage. 
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The Labour government's solution to F. I. S. 's 
contribution to the poverty trap was exactly as its 
Conservative predecessor's had been, to extend the 
period of award to twelve months and engage in annual 
upratings. It shared with its Conservative counterpart 
an apparent 1c'-ck the probability that its 
chosen policy instruments meant consigning the target 
population to permanent dependency on direct wage 
supplements paid by the State. F. I. S. beneficiaries 
were very unlikely ever to get wage increases 
sufficiently large to remove them from a circumstance 
that had received almost universal condemnation since 
the onset of industrial capitalism. 
The Labour Party and the Labour government knew that 
the only answer to the poverty trap and its attendant 
disincentives to work was to move towards a social 
policy based on universal benefits as of right. The 
Child Benefit scheme was a manifestation of that policy 
and until 1976 the assumption was that it would not be 
too difficult to implement. ' After the 1976 uprating, 
the Labour government in reality became wedded to the 
continuing utilisation of F. I. S. as a valuable and 
convenient programme. Valuable because it contributed 
to the drive against 'excessive' growth in public 
expenditure required by the International Monetary 
Fund, and convenient because it came to the 
government's aid after the debacle over Child Benefits. 
There is a completeness in this ending because the 
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Conservative government had inherited and used in 1970 
a scheme that had been devised by the civil service 
under a Labour government, so that it might cut the 
rate of growth of public expenditure to facilitate cuts 
in direct taxation as a means of liberating 
enterpreneurial activity in the quest for economic 
success. A Labour government had taken over a formerly 
despised programme as a means of cutting the rate of 
growth of public expenditure so that it might secure 
the approval of the international banking community for 
its struggle to achieve national solvency as a basis 
for future economic progress. Somewhere in all this 
the working poor disappeared from centre stage and 
their motivation to work became an irrelevancy. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE LABOUR PARTY AND CHILD BENEFITS 
The growing awareness that poverty affected people other 
than the elderly was reinforced in the NEC's Policy 
Statement to the 1969 party conference 'Agenda for a 
Generation'. In that section of the report dealing with 
people in need it was accepted that the low paid were a 
group increasingly associated with poverty. To help the 
low paid a minimum wage was recommended but at this 
stage in the party's evolving programme there was no 
mention of a better or different system of family income 
support. 
") 
It wasn't till 1972 that the party came out in support 
of a programme it entitled 'Child Endowment'. Labour's 
Programme for Britain argued that one of the most 
important means of tackling poverty in low income groups 
was through changes in the tax and benefit systems. 
0 
These changes should try to ensure that the tax/benefit 
system became truly progressive and not as with the then 
current position, hit the lowest paid hardest. These 
changes had to be accompanied by the raising of the tax 
threshold. 
'We propose a new system of Child Endowment which 
would give all families, as of right, an amount 
roughly equivalent to what the better off families 
now get from tax allowances and family allowances 
combined. This would not only greatly simplify 
these payments, but would also give extra help to 
poor famki5ies, particularly those with only one 
parent". 
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The administrative details of the party's proposals 
would be specified when the government published its 
Green Paper on Tax Credits. Once established the level 
of Child Endowment would be reviewed annually along with 
all National Insurance benefits. Child Endowment would 
largely eliminate the need for F. I. S. and would be of 
particular benefit to the low income family with only 
one child, since. unlike Family Allowances, it would be 
given in respect of the first or only dependent 
child. 
(3) 
The Conservative Government's decision to consider the 
introduction of a Tax Credit Scheme including, inter 
alia, a credit in respect of each dependent child, 
presented the Labour Party with a range of problems with 
the character and presentation of its own Child 
Endowment proposals. To help shape its response the 
party set up a Tax Credit Study Group (sometimes 
referred to as the Tax Credits Working Party) reporting 
to both the Finance and Economic Affairs Sub-Committee 
of the Home Policy Committee, and the Social Policy Sub- 
Committee. The Research Department's first draft 
(RD: 638) was discussed by the study group on 27th 
February, 1973, 
(4) but not by the Finance and Economic 
Affairs Sub-Committee at its 21st March meeting. The 
Social Policy Sub-Committee had not met for some time 
and had thus been in no position to consider these first 
proposals. On the 17th May the working party 
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held a special meeting to brief Labour members of the 
Commons Select Committee on Tax Credits and had agreed 
that the Research Department should re-draft RD: 638 for 
the working party's June meeting. 
(5) 
This redraft was 
presented as the Tax Credit Working Party's Interim 
Report (RD: 806). 
(6) 
It contended that the replacement of family allowances 
and child tax allowances by a child credit was the most 
important part of the government's proposals. The 
report produced a table showing the then current make-up 
of net benefits to families which were (a) above the tax 
threshold and (b) below it. This table is presented 
below. 
PRESENT CHILD BENEFITS PER WEEK (1973-4 
(a) Above tax threshold(1)First 2nd Each Additnl. 
Child Child Child 
Family AllowaUT Nil 63p. 70p. 
Tax Allowance (2) £1.1684p. _ 
84p. 
Combined Benefit £1,. 16 £1.47_ £1.54 
Paid to Wife Nil90p. £1.00 
Deducted from(2) 
Husband's Tax £1.16 57p. 54p. 
(b) Below taathreshold 
(31 
First 2nd Each additnl. 
Child Child Child 
Family AllowaUT Nil 90p. £1.00 
Tax Allowance Nil Nil Nil 
Combined Benefit Nil 90p. £1.00 
Paid to Wife Nil 90p. £1.00 
Deducted from 
Husband's tax Nil Nil Nil 
(1) Those families whose family allowance only just 
took them above the tax threshold would be in a 
position somewhere between (a) and (b). 
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(2) Plus an extra 19p. for each child over 11, or 37p. 
for each dependent child over 16; also a 
greater amount for those paying higher rates of 
tax. 
(3) Most families i73his position would be eligible 
for some F. I. S. 
The report argued that unless some special provision was 
made for continuing payment of part (my emphasis) of the 
tax credit to workers. the family allowance at preent 
payable to them would in effect be transferred to their 
husbands. While it left this question open, the 
government's Green Paper displayed a preference for 
paying it entirely to the father, ostensibly on 
administrative grounds. 
(8) 
The Labour Party had 
welcomed the publication of the Green Paper and its 
subsequent reference to the Select Committee because of 
the opportunity it provided for proper consideration of 
'an extremely far-reaching proposal for the 
restructutý5g of both taxation and social 
security' 
There were some parts of the Green Paper's proposals 
which, in as far as they went, were good in themselves. 
For example, any tax credit system involved a degree of 
progressive redistribution of income by extending the 
benefits of existing income tax allowances to families 
below the tax threshold under the current income tax 
system. 
(10) Although the party welcomed the chance to 
consider these major reform proposals it believed that 
poor families needed an immediate and substantial 
increase in family allowances along the lines of the 
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child endowment scheme advocated in "Labour's Programme 
for Britain, 1972" (see above for details) . 
(11) 
For the working party one of the most important 
questions was whether the proposed child credit should 
be paid wholly to the father through his pay packet, 
like Child Tax Allowances, or whether some direct 
payment to the mother similar to family allowances ought 
to continue. Although the issue had yet to be resolved 
the Green Paper clearly favoured ending payments to the 
mother because 
'... to pay credits other than with the main source 
of family income [i. e. thzlftther's wage] would be 
administratively costly'. 
The Labour Party reacted strongly to this possible 
threat to mothers' family allowances and in that year's 
Budget speech the Chancellor had conceded that there 
would be a payment to mothers of partial tax credits at 
least equal in value to family allowances. 
(13) 
Mothers 
r 
needed an independent source of income payable in the 
middle of the week when the budgets of low income 
families especially were particularly hard pressed. 
"We therefore feel it is vital that in any tax 
credit system. a family allowajc j type of payment 
to mothers should be retained" 
The value of such a payment ought to be considerably 
more than the current family allowance (which had not 
been increased since 1968 despite recent years' chronic 
inflation) and it ought to be extended to include the 
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first child. 
(15) 
However, given the working party's 
recommendations that the married man's additional tax 
allowance should be abolished, that married women's 
earnings be treated in the same way as their husbands, 
and that a new benefit be introduced for workers at home 
with young children, members did not think it necessary 
to pay the whole of any child benefit to the mother in 
the "normal" (presumably two parent family) since 
"such a proposal would involve a very con0ggrable 
reduction in the father's take-home pay". 
Without unduly anticipating subsequent developments in 
the history of the Child Benefit scheme it is, perhaps, 
worth noting at this point that the fear about a child 
credit payable to the mother causing "a very 
considerable reduction" in father's net pay was exactly 
the line of argument followed by the Labour government 
in its rather fraught attempts to phase in the Child 
Benefit programme after the Act was passed in 1975. 
The extent of disagreement within the Labour Party about 
the idea of tax credits is reflected in an aide-memoire 
produced for the Tax Credits Working Party's meeting 
held on July 3rd, 1973. The document is unsigned but it 
is probably the work of Andy Thompson, the Secretary to 
the working party, and it provides a fascinating insight 
into the attitudes of all the major figures on Labour's 
side of the debate. Publication of the party's 
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statement would be attended by political problems in 
that it would have to accord with the position of the 
majority of the Labour side of the Commons committee. 
This majority would possibly include Robert Sheldon, 
Joel Barnett, and Barbara Castle, but not Douglas 
Houghton. 
(17) 
The most important issue for the party to 
resolve was whether or not it was in favour of the 
principle of tax credits notwithstanding its opinion of 
the Green Paper scheme itself. Thus far there had been 
no formulation of a firm commitment against tax credits 
in principle because Thompson (the presumed author of 
the aide memoire) felt there was no need to go that far. 
The Working Party's most recent draft (RD: 835) attacked 
a number of the Green Paper's features and had concluded 
that it was not an acceptable basis for a tax credit 
scheme. 
(18) 
It felt that the most pressing need was to 
deal with poverty immediately within the present social 
security and tax systems whilst holding the door open 
for a proper tax credit programme in the future. 
(19) 
In 
the author's opinion Houghton was utterly sold on tax 
credits, while Abel-Smith and Jack Sieve were also very 
keen on the principle though more ready to be critical 
of the Green Paper. Apart from Houghton, all the other 
Labour members of the select committee, especially 
Sheldon, were very doubtful of the whole idea. Nicholas 
Kaldor would want a specific rejection of the entire 
principle of tax credits. This summary of Labour 
opinion ends with the slightly acerbic observation that 
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'... all the Titmice except Abel-Smith are 
reasontý6y happy with the stance taken in 
RD835' 
while Barbara Castle is given a separate section to the 
effect that 
'Barbara is becoming a bit of a problem in herself. 
If previous experience is anything to go by, she is 
likely to change her position completely several 
times during the course of the 'Acting, both on 
political and procedural points'. 
The major substantive issue of Thompson's paper was 
concerned with the payment of the child tax credit. In 
the current draft of the working party'sthoughts the 
party was committed to paying the entire child credit to 
the mother as well as opposing an additional married tax 
credit for the married man. This was in line with the 
position taken by the TUC General Council but Thompson 
was convinced that no-one had given much thought to its 
implications. 
'It would mean a very heavy shift in take-home pay 
from the married man to his wife, and I think it 
would pose great (, plitical difficulties if we got 
saddled with it'. 
Thompson's recommendation that the entirety of the child 
credit should not (my emphasis) be paid to the mother had 
not found much support at the last meeting of the working 
party and the relevant paragraph had been chopped. 
Despite this he believed that attitudes would change once 
the implications of the present draft of party policy had 
sunk in. 
(23) 
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The Labour Party's policy on child endowment continued to 
edge forward uncertainly in the autumn of 1973 with 
'Labour's Programme for Britain, 1973' commenting 
critically on the governments tax credit proposals. The 
party promised that the next Labour Government would 
launch a two-pronged attack on family poverty the first 
part of which would be to raise the tax threshold to help 
the low-paid and the second the introduction of a Child 
Endowment scheme. This programme would be the same as 
the one described in the 1972 proposals although the 
befit would now be reviewed annually to take account of 
inflation. (24) In line with party procedure the 
'Programme for Britain' was presented to the 1973 party 
conference and a resolution (Composite 29) was introduced 
calling on the next Labour Government to abolish F. I. S. 
and Child Tax Allowances and introduce a system of 
taxation and family support designed to give greater 
assistance to families on low incomes. Composite 29 was 
rejected. 
(25) 
Once the conference was over the party's internal policy 
making machine began to consider its work for the coming 
year. The Social Policy Sub-Committee decided to 
concentrate its attention on pensions and disablement 
income, but it did refer to the need to do extra work on 
the child benefit element of the tax credit idea. To 
this end the Finance and Economic Affairs Sub-Committee 
had said that 
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'This proposal is now in need of considerable 
refinement and needs to be in the form of a more 
precise commitment which can be coated' 
and had proposed that the Tax Credits Working Group be 
re-created. a suggestion supported by the Social Policy 
Sub-Committee. 
(26) 
Shortly afterwards of course. the political situation was 
to be transformed by Edward Heath's decision to call an 
election in February 1974 in the wake of the miners' 
strike and the subsequent return to office of a Labour 
Government operating without an overall majority after an 
election campaign in which Labour promised to 
'help the low paid and other families in poverty 
by introducing a new system of Child Cash 
Allowances for every ýý}}d, including the first, 
payable to the mother' 
The child benefit scheme emerges next in a paper on 
social security and health written by Barbara Castle. the 
new Secretary of State for Health and Social Services, 
for the Labour Party/TUC Liaison Committee on the 20th 
28, May, 1974. 
` 
In this paper Castle mentions that the 
government was working on a new child endowment scheme 
which would abolish tax allowances for children and 
replace them with tax free cash benefits for all 
children, including the first. She hoped that it would 
be possible to ensure that the new benefit would be 
regularly increased at each uprating of social security 
benefits. The scheme would be of immense help to low 
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earners with children and depending on the level at which 
the benefit was fixed it would substantially reduce the 
role of F. I. S. 
(29) 
The 1974 party conference was delayed until late November 
following Wilson's decision to hold a general election in 
October in an attempt to secure a working majority, a 
move which only just succeeded. In the social policy 
section of the Parliamentary Report the claim is made 
that 
'One broad aim of the government has been to ensure 
that any policy initiatives are taken in the 
context of an overall strategy against poverty. 
Future p? l. fies will be guided by this 
strategy'. 
Included as elements in this strategy were the removal of 
the poverty trap, and the introduction of a scheme of 
child cash allowances, including the first child, payable 
to the mother. 
(31) 
That there was a widespread concern 
about poverty is attested to by the decision to hold a 
debate on the subject. Emergency resolution No. 33 urged 
the government to take immediate steps to safeguard the 
living standards of the poor and claimed that interim 
measures such as small increases in family allowances 
would do little to eliminate poverty in the long term. 
Priority had to be given to an anti-poverty strategy 
including, 
'a cash benefit to cover the first child and the 
raising of cash benefits for all children in 
families, and the preservation of these at 
particula5 Tprcentage levels of average industrial 
earnings' 
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Audrey Cozens, the mover of the resolution, was both 
critical and suspicious of the government's actions and 
intentions. She felt that Barbara Castle had been 
somewhat complacent about what the government had done 
already for the poor and described the projected increase 
in family allowance rates from April, 1975 as 'derisory' 
given the conference's fight the previous year for rates 
of £2 per child per week. She accepted that the 
government had good intentions and, in Barbara Castle, a 
committed minister, but the same had been true between 
1964-70 and the poor had still got poorer, something that 
must not happen again. If the government did not develop 
immediate short-term policies to protect the poor against 
inflation and develop a long-term anti-poverty strategy 
by the time of the 1975 conference, the government would 
be called to account by that conference. 
(33) 
Replying to the debate for the NEC and speaking as the 
Secretary of State for Social Services, Barbara Castle 
assured conference that the aim of government policy must 
be to reduce means-testing. That was why the government 
was pledged to introduce a child allowance scheme in the 
lifetime of that Parliament. The increase in family 
allowance rates from April. 1975. which would restore the 
value of the benefit to its 1968 level was only the first 
step. She asked conference to accept composite 33 
subject to the government having freedom of action over 
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matters of timing and administrative details 
(34) 
Composite 33 was carried with only a handful of 
dissentients. 
The Child Benefit Bill received its Second Reading on 
13th May, 197535'. Introducing it Barbara Castle said 
that it represented a long overdue merger of child tax 
allowances and family allowances into 
"a new universal non-means tested, tax-free cash 
benefit for all child e6. including the first. 
payable to the mother". 
By doing this the nation's provision for family support 
was thus concentrated where it was most needed on the 
poorest families, while the payment would be received by 
the person responsible for caring for the children, the 
mother. Such a system had been needed for a long time 
and Castle recalled that in 1969 in its document 
"Labour's Social Strategy" the Labour Party had first set 
out proposals for what later became the child endowment 
scheme. The Conservative Party had taken up this theme 
in its 1972 Green Paper on Tax credits while the Commons 
Select Committee of which she had been a membr had 
unanimously recommended that the child credit be payable 
to the mother. The present bill was based on that 
formula. 
(37) 
She went out of her way to pay a tribute to the trade 
union movement, which she said, had always supported the 
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principle of payment to the mother and had. in fact, 
urged that solution on to the Select Committee even 
though the unions 
'frankly recognised that thibtýrmula would affect 
their members' take-home pay' 
Without anticipating subsequent developments too much it 
is perhaps worth noting this assertion by the Secretary 
of State given what was to happen to the implementation 
of the Child Benefit scheme after Callaghan became Prime 
Minister and Healey became Chancellor. As far as Castle 
was concerned the unions were in no doubt as to the 
implications of child benefits for their members' net 
pay. Moreover the child benefit idea was strongly 
supported by the Labour Party; it was 
'universally accepted and recognised as meeting my 
party's requirements. There is therefore no need 
for there to be any crit .g behind me. There is, 
in fact, none behind me'. 
She defended the Child Benefits scheme as being 
infinitely more acceptable 'on cost grounds than the 
previous administration's proposals for generalised tax 
credits. Under those proposals some £745 million of the 
estimated total of £1,300 million would have gone to 
people with above national average earnings. Even people 
at the top of the income scale would have benefited. 
(40) 
Commenting that the current cost of the Tax Credits 
scheme would have been some £3,000 million it was perhaps 
not surprising that the Conservative Party had not 
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committed itself to the Tax Credits Scheme in its 
manifestos for the two general elections of 1974. 
(41) 
She went on to identify the consequences of the Child 
Benefit programme. Poorer families who had been wholly 
or partially unable to take advantage of income support 
through child tax allowances because of low incomes would 
now benefit. Those people dependent on means tested 
benefits would now receive a larger proportion of their 
income as of right. Child Benefit would be paid for 
every child in a family, providing support in respect of 
the first child in the four million families currently 
receiving family allowances as well as the three million 
single child families. It would double the numbers of 
children for whom benefit would be paid. Once the scheme 
became operational there would be [for the first time] a 
single universal system of family support. 
(42) 
The 
characteristics identified by Barbara Castle 'were 
obviously very important features of the child benefit 
scheme in so far as it was concerned with the relief of 
poverty but it is interesting to note for the purposes of 
this research that nowhere does she mention the obvious, 
if theoretical implications for work incentives. By 
intensifying the impact of family allowances and widening 
the gap between income from employment and income from 
benefit, the "less-eligibility" nature of the proposal is 
self relevant. This public failure to recognise the 
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incentive possibilities of Child Benefits was to be a 
permanent theme of parliamentary debate on the Labour 
side. 
The government's plans for child benefit contained no 
estimate of anticipated costs. Castle argued that this 
was so because no costing could be given until the rate 
of benefit itself had been set which would not be done 
until 1976 and the level of benefit would in part at 
least be contingent on economic circumstances. 
'The scheme is, of course, potentially expensive, 
and the rate and thus the extent of the 
improvement - and I emphasise "improvement" - will 
have to be settled in the light of the economic 
prospect at the time. As the Chancellor said in 
his Budget Statement, we shall need to accommodate 
the cost of the new scheme within the total which, 
in the light of future reviews, we conclude that we 
can devote to public ýeenditure at large in the 
years beyond 1976-77. ' 
It is perhaps worth suggesting that Castle might have 
experienced some foreboding at the implications of this 
part of her speech. The failure to put any specific 
figure for the level of benefit in the Bill, and to leave 
the entire matter to future reviews of public expenditure 
in the light of prevailing economic circumstances, was 
to leave several hostages to fortune. She was far too 
intelligent and astute a politican not to realise the 
dangers of this for a scheme she believed in so strongly. 
Could she have been forced into this position by her 
Cabinet colleagues, especially the Prime Minister and 
Chancellor? 
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The gross cost of a hypothetical Child Benefit of £1.94 
would be £1.450 million a year. After taking account of 
consequent savings in other social security benefits the 
cost would be about £1.130 million a year which was what 
the government was then spending on family allowances and 
child tax allowances of £240 per child (the rate for 
children under 11). There would be no additional cost to 
the Exchequer but public spending would show an increase 
of £800 million a year as child tax allowances were 
converted to benefits. 
(44) 
She claimed that it was physically impossible to start 
the scheme before April, 1977 which was a great 
disappointment to her personally since it had been the 
government's original intention that the programme should 
be operationalised in April, 1976. The delay had been 
caused by the government's inability to find central 
office space in the Newcastle and Washington New Town 
area, where the administration of family allowances and 
relevant computer facilities were both located, for the 
2,200 staff needed. This was because the purpose-built 
accommodation would not be available for an April, 1976 
start and the temporary use of a large building being put 
up by the Property Services Agency in Washington was 
being frustrated by the presence of high alumina cement 
in the construction of the building. Nowhere else in the 
area was available. Consequently, and reluctantly, the 
government had been forced into an April, 1977 start for 
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the general scheme. But, while the complete programme 
had to be put back for a year, something had to be done 
for one particularly disadvantaged and readily identified 
group, one-parent families. Thus, from April 1976 there 
was to be an interim benefit of £1.50 a week for one 
parent families payable until the full child benefit 
could be put into effect. 
(45) 
Castle finished her speech by taking the House quickly 
through the Bill clause by clause. Clause 5 is 
interesting because although it was the government's 
intention to introduce the benefit in the simplest form 
possible, that is on a flat rate basis, it allowed the 
rate to be varied in relation to different cases, for 
example by reference to age. Consequently the legal 
provisions would exist in the original legislation for 
age-relating benefits as Child Tax Allowances and 
dependency allowances in the social security system 
already did. Clause 17 is important for the central 
i 
theme of this research because it continued what the 
Secretary of State described as the long-standing 
practice of reducing social security benefits to take 
account of increases in family income support through the 
child benefit scheme and what had been family 
allowances. 
(46) 
Clearly this was intended to reinforce 
the "less-eligibility" characteristics of the benefit in 
the sense that Macnicol uses the term to describe family 
allowances' contribution to widening the gap between 
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income from employment and income from benefit 
dependency. Clause 18 abolished the wage stop and this 
part of the Bill's provisions is dealt with in the 
section on the wages stop itself. Her last comments in 
introducing the Bill were to quote approvingly the Child 
Poverty Action Group's observation that child benefits 
represented, 
'... the most important (c, nge since 1946 in our 
system of family support' 1 
Not all Labour speakers during the Second Reading debate 
regarded the government's intentions as an unalloyed 
blessing. Helene Hayman described the Bill's main 
provisions as a significant departure from the hitherto 
dominant philosophy that a man's earnings would support 
himself, his wife and one child. Beveridge's 
recommendation of family allowances had been based on 
this assumption but economic circumstances had changed 
dramatically since then and the assumption was now 
consigned to the history books. 
(48) 
She was particularly 
disappointed at the date set for the scheme's 
introduction and in expressing her disappointment she 
identified something what was to become increasingly 
important as the child benefit saga unfolded. The 
introduction of the policy was not simply a matter of 
having the appropriate resources. 
'it is also a matter of political will, and it is 
the political will nationally, it is the political 
will of this House, apart from the handful of hon. 
Membes who are here tonight, that it is necessary 
to mobilise if we are to see 9benefit brought in 
earlier, as I hope we shall!. 
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Political will, the determination to see the consummation 
of policy as quickly as possible is an important element 
in policymaking generally and in Hayman's speech we can 
see the beginnings of doubt about the extent of the 
Labour government's commitment to the most important 
change in family income support policy since the war. 
Her observations on the very low attendance in the House 
for the debate are also, perhaps, not without 
significance. She went on to welcome the possibility of 
age-related payments and also the interim benefit for one 
parent families but was disappointed that this was to be 
taken off supplementary benefit payments. She recognised 
that supporters of child benefits would have a hard fight 
over the size of payment and the timing of the benefit's 
introduction. The Bill should provide for regular 
uprating for with current levels of inflation annual 
review would be insufficient. 
(50) 
Like Helene Hayman, Andrew Bennett was also distressed at 
i 
the very low attendance in the House and he wondered if 
this indicated a lack of enthusiasm for the Bill. He was 
also concerned that there was no indication of the likely 
level of the benefit since this made it difficult to 
assess the likely impact of the scheme's proposals. 
(51) 
Ted Ledbitter echoed the criticisms made by both Helene 
Hayman and Andrew Bennett. 
(52) 
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Alec Jones, the Under-Secretary of State for Health and 
Social Security, wound up the debate for the government 
and in the course of his speech made no concessions to 
any of the Bill's critics. After claiming that the 
governments proposals were in line with the Labour 
Party's manifesto commitments 
(53) he made the 
interesting, and unusual point. that he would not welcome 
with enthusiasm onto the Committee all the people who had 
spoken during the debate. This could be the usual gibe 
against the Opposition but given that such as Helene 
Hayman were excluded from the Committee Jones' remarks 
can be interpreted as a sign of the govenrment's 
determination to give short shift to critics from its own 
side. Having reiterated the government's decision to 
include the interim benefit for single parents in 
' 
(calculations 
of supplementary benefit entitlement54) 
Jones gave a more detailed explanation of the 
government's refusal to incorporate within the Bill any 
provision for a regular review of the rate of benefit. 
The explanation for this was quite simple and there was 
nothing sinister in it. Clause 5 allowed for the rate of 
payment to be fixed by regulations subject to affirmative 
resolution. This was an improvement on the current 
situation affecting family allowances and placed Child 
Benefit in the same position as Supplementary Benefit and 
F. I. S. There was no need for Child Benefit to follow the 
precedent set in the 1975 Social Security Act which 
limited provisions under that act to the movement in 
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earnings or the Retail Price Index as appropriate. Child 
Benefit was a different entity with a different purpose. 
Most people in receipt of Child Benefit would be in work 
and the benefit would simply be a tax-free addition for 
their earned income. Thus it was totally unlike benefits 
provided under the 1975 Social Security Act which were 
the main source of income of those people receiving 
them. 
(55) 
At this point it might be appropriate to make one or two 
tentative observations about the Second Reading Debate. 
Such debates are supposed to concern themselves with 
major principles and issues but with the exception of one 
or two contributions (Helene Hayman and, for the 
Conservatives, Brandon Rhys-Williams) the quality of the 
debate was dreadful. At best it glossed over the major 
areas of substance, and for the purposes of this research 
it is worth noting that there was not a single mention of 
Child Benefits' incentive characteristics. Beveridge 
made no attempt to hide such considerations in his 
formulation of the Family Allowance idea, why should a 
Labour Government be so silent on this matter on this 
occasion? Perhaps the best course of action at this 
stage is to forbear from making any suggestions and to 
deal with the question in the concluding comments. 
During the Report Stage of the Child Benefit Bill. 
Kenneth Clarke for the Opposition, made a determined 
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attempt to identify what he felt was clear and 
considerable disagreement within the government about 
Child Benefits. He argued that the reason for the 
government's decision to introduce the scheme in 1977 
rather than 1976 lay in the Treasury's refusal to provide 
additional public money. Clarke argued that the benefit 
could have been introduced in a revenue neutral fashion 
in 1976 but to please industrial workers the government 
wanted to introduce Child Benefit with additional 
funding. The Cabinet had refused to do this and the 
result of this refusal was the interim benefit for one- 
parent families which was in reality a political sop to 
Barbara Castle and the Child Benefit lobby, 
(56) 
He 
quoted with approval Helene Hayman's comments about 
political will and made some interesting observations 
about the government's handling of the Committee Stage. 
As he spoke Helene Hayman was not present in the Chamber 
and according to Clarke she had been excluded from the 
Committee because her views had upset the government. 
The government side of the Committee had included five 
payroll members and fourteen backbenchers. one of whom 
had no interest in the subject and one who had moved an 
amendment only to then vote against it himself. Clarke 
concluded that 
'The political will of the Government manifested 
itself mainly in attempting to iron out all 
opposition or dissent on their own side to the 
commencement date. 
The Government's political will is further 
illustrated by the Report stage of this important 
Bill being taken at 10.0 o'clock at night. 
suggesting that the Bill is being relegat c to 
second place in the Government's priorities'. 
ý5 
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Barbara Castle responded in characteristic vein to 
Clarke's charges, dismissing them as "political 
slapstick... designed exclusively to hide the 
Opposition's political nakedness'. 
(58) 
The government 
was not reneging on any commitment by introducing Child 
Benefit in April, 1977 rather than April, 1976. Its only 
commitment was to introduce the programme when economic 
circumstances were right. Nobody could pretend that the 
current economic position was particularly favourable. 
All that she had ever said was to express her 
disappointment that it had not proved possible to begin 
in 1976. But there had been no commitment to that date. 
Both she and the Chancellor had told the House that Child 
Benefit would start in April, 1977 and she assured 
members that this date would not be at risk because of 
building difficulties. 
(59) 
Very few Labour MPs were present during the debate to 
hear Sir George Young, for the Opposition, move an 
I 
amendment to Clause 5 to the effrect that 
'the rate shall not be lower than the combined net 
value to a standard rate taxpayer of any family 
allowance (6%5d child tax allowance that it 
replaces'. 
In replying for the government Michael Meacher did not 
appear to be unsympathetic to the purpose of Young's 
amendment but it was too soon to be certain about what 
368 
the rate would be. However. the government would not be 
satisfied with anything less than the maximum allowable 
consistent with the overall public expenditure position 
obtaining at the time. In current circumstances the 
government was unable to make predictions about either 
the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement or the level of 
public spending nearly two years ahead. As far as it was 
consistent with the overall public expenditure situation 
'we intend to achieve an improveipg3 in the 
neutral cost position' 
The government could not accept Young's amendment because 
it would lead to a substantial increase in public 
expenditure but he hoped that it would be possible to 
move in that direction in the future. 
(62) 
Young 
responded by accusing the government of going ahead with 
the Bill without taking steps to ensure that funds were 
available for it. They had not been included in 
February, 1975 when the projected five year spending 
plans had been announced and'they would not be available 
when the Chancellor had completed his current round of 
spending cuts. It was asking for a lot to believe that 
the money would be available within the next eighteen 
months. The amendment was withdrawn, presumably because 
it had served its purpose of embarassing the government. 
Young moved a further amendment to introduce age-related 
Child Benefit which produced a long wrangle of little 
relevance to present purposes except that Brian O'Malley 
asserted that there was strong support for age-related 
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benefit on all sides of the House and also for what he 
described as 'a system of earnings related child 
benefits' . 
(63 
Although the government accepted the idea 
it could not be introduced before 1979 even if resources 
were available. but O'Malley gave an assurance that the 
government did not intend to continue with flat-rate 
child benefit indefinitely. 
(64) 
After the Child Benefit Bill had completed its progress 
through the House the Labour Party's policy development 
machinery continued its consideration of the scheme. As 
a part of this process Atkinson and Bosanquet submitted a 
paper on taxation and social policy to the Social Policy 
Sub-Committee which amongst a variety of proposals 
recommending the development of taxable universal 
benefits included a suggestion that national insurance 
and child benefits be made the top priority on the 
benefit front. 
(65) 
Rather more significant in terms of 
the possibilities for Child Benefit was a paper for the 
same body by Brian Abel-Smith who was at this stage an 
adviser to Barbara Castle and thus at the centre of the 
government machine. 
(66) 
Abel-Smith's paper sparked off a 
debate between himself. Michael Meacher and David 
PiýLchaud about the future of Labour's social security 
policy into the 1980's in the context of an immediate 
economic history of low or no growth, and an economic 
position that demanded the rebuilding of Britain's 
manufacturing base and broader economic and social 
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infrastructure. The following comments note only those 
aspects of Abel-Smith's thoughts concerned with Child 
Benefits and consequently ignore the general question 
posed by him of the need to choose between a general 
Negative Income Tax approach or greater expenditure on 
particular categories of the social security population. 
Neither Meacher or Piachaud say anything of relevance to 
the purpose of this research and so their contributions 
are also ignored. 
(67) 
The essence of Abel-Smith's proposals was a consideration 
of a range of costed options that might feature in the 
future development of Child Benefit. A Child Benefit 
rate of about £2.20 for younger children and £2.70 for 
older children would be necessary to replace all existing 
child tax allowances as well as family allowances. One 
question that still remained to be resolved was whether 
or not in the long run Child Benefit should be age- 
related. Any increases in Child Benefit above the levels 
he had indicated, for all children, would be very 
expensive. An extra 50p. a week for fourteen million 
children would cost over £350 million a year, while a 
Child Benefit payment high enough to replace FIS for 80- 
90% of qualifying families would cost over £1 billion. 
The extra cost of completely replacing FIS through the 
agency of the Child Benefit scheme might be £2 billion. 
Consequently it was necessary to identify priorities in 
the possible extension of Child Benefit by considering 
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the cost of higher rates for children in one or more of 
the following categories. 
(68) 
1. National Insurance Beneficiaries 
A 50% addition to the rate where there was 
unemployment or sickness benefit payable would cost 
£70 million. 
2. First or Only Child 
Providing extra payments in respect of the first or 
only child was rooted in the assumption that a 
parent normally became a non-earner or a part-time 
earner on the birth of the child whose presence 
also created the need for larger accommodation. A 
50% addition for the first child would cost £450 
million. 
3. One or More Children Under Five 
i 
The reason for this was that a mother with a child 
under school age was least likely to be at work. 
Such an initiative would be a step towards a home 
responsibility allowance, indeed it could be 
separated out and presented as such. A 50% 
addition for all the children in such families 
would cost £400 million. 
4. Larger Families 
These were the families least able to manage on 
Child Benefit as the incidence of poverty grew the 
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larger the famil became. A 50% addition for the 
fourth or subsequent child would cost £50 million. 
5. Older Children 
Larger children cost more to rear and a 50% 
addition for children aged 11 plus would cost £300 
million. 
6. One Parent Families 
Such families had a high incidence of poverty and 
were most likely to need a minder if the parent was 
to be able to get out of the house. A 50% addition 
would cost £35 million. 
Abel-Smith's suggestions contained authoritative costings 
for a whole range of possible developments in the Child 
Benefit scheme but said nothing about any relationship 
between the programme and work incentives. In this 
regard it was entirely in keeping with all the 
observations, both public apd private, that have been 
considered thus far from the Labour Party. This silence 
was to be broken at least in terms of the private, 
internal party debate in March, 1976, in the third draft 
of the Social Policy Chapter of Labour's programme for 
1976. (69) In a section on help for the family it makes 
an unequivocal call for widening the gap in income 
between periods of employment and non-employment. The 
relevant section is worth quoting in full. 
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'In a situation where someone in work gets a 
taxed family allownce of £1.50 for two 
children and someone without work on 
supplementary benefit is judged to need at 
least £7.50 untaxed for two children aged 
between 5 and 11, there is a clear 
disincentive to return to work. This gap 
must be closed so that the worker receives by 
right the same realistic level of child 
support as the person unable to work. 
Raising the level of child support must be 
the spear36rd for our attack on family 
poverty'. 
It would be difficult to imagine even the Conservative 
Party producing a clearer more fortright avowal of the 
need to maintain work incentives than this draft of 
Labour's Programme for Britain. Consequently it is not 
difficult to understand its support for the programme of 
replacing tax allowances with cash benefits without an 
income test. It was also worth considering whether those 
benefits could be integrated with the tax system and 
whether in some cases the benefit itself should be 
subject to income tax either at the normal rate or at a 
special higher rate for the better off. 
(71) 
i 
While the Social Policy Sub-Committee was considering the 
third draft of the social policy chapter of Labour's 1976 
programme in March 1976, a month later the first 
suspicions of delay and deferment were aired in the House 
of Commons. On the 26th April, Stan Orme, in reply to a 
question from Sir Brandon Rhys-Williams, ässured the 
House that the government's policy set up under the Child 
Benefit Act would come into operation in April. 1977(72) 
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whilst David Ennals, who had replaced Barbara Castle as 
Secretary of State for Social Services when Callaghan 
succeeded Wilson as Prime Minister following the latter's 
resignation. said that he had nothing to add to the 
statement on Child Benefit policy made by the Minister of 
State on July 7th, 1975. 
(73) 
The full import of Ennals' 
restrospectively ominous silence became obvious a month 
later when Ennals made his now famous ministerial 
statement on the Child Benefit Scheme on 25 May, 
1976, 
(74) 
a statement which marked the public 
commencement of what was to become one of the most 
tortuous and embarassing events in post-war social 
politics. 
Ennals began by describing the primary objective of Child 
Benefits as the provision of a cash payment in respect of 
the first dependent child. an objective the government 
was determined to pursue, 
(75) 
However, to have 
introduced Child Benefit in its original form (the form 
promised by Orme on 26th April) would have imposed 
"an excessive strain on the pay policy which is 
vital to the Governm )'s continuing success in ffb 
overcoming inflation' 
The introduction of the full Child Benefit scheme would 
have resulted in a drastic reduction in take-home pay 
after the abolition of child tax allowances. The 
abolition of the under 11 rate of allowance alone would 
have reduced net pay by over £3 a week for a two-child 
family, by £4 for a three-child family, and by nearly £8 
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for a family with six children. In the government's 
judgement current circumstances were inappropriate for 
such an innovation. A fundamental dilemma faced the 
government over take-home pay; the pay restraints 
necessary to the success of anti-inflation policy clashed 
with the certainty that the full implementation of Child 
Benefit would have meant a net loss of income for many 
workers thus fuelling demands for potentially 
inflationary wage increases, 
(77) 
Consequently the 
government had decided that the newly increased child tax 
allowances would remain unaltered. Furthermore, given 
'the overriding need to contain public expenditure 
and the borrowing requirement as a(5%5ther plank in 
the government's economic strategy' 
it would not have been possible to combine the 
continuance of those arrangements with a big enough 
improvement in family income support to justify such 
drastic reductions in take-home pay. 
Given the unfavourable econopiic situation the government 
proposed to salvage what it could of the Child Benefit 
programme and Ennals proclaimed, in what might be 
described as a shamefully defiant manner, the 
government's determination to honour the Labour Party's 
manifesto commitment 
'to introduce a new scheme of child allowances for 
every child, including the first, payable to the 
mother'. 
Child Benefit would be introduced in April, 1977 at a 
rate of £1 for the first child and £1.50 (the then 
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current family allowance rate) for other children. The 
benefit would continue to be treated as taxable income as 
family allowance did. A premium of 50p. would be added 
to the basic rate for one-parent families to maintain the 
value of child interim benefit. The net cost of those 
proposals in 1977 would be above £95 million. The scheme 
had been anticipated in the government's White Paper on 
Public Expenditure and its cost was within the White 
Paper's plans. 
(80) 
Not surprisingly Ennals' statement produced a storm of 
protest in the House, much of it from the Labour 
backbenches, although the first critical response came 
from the official Opposition spokesman, Patrick Jenkin. 
For Jenkin, Ennals' statement represented the final 
collapse of the government's strategy for family poverty. 
By abandoning the child credit idea of the original Child 
Benefit proposals the government was both reducing help 
to the poorest families and intensifying the effect of 
the poverty trap. This latter point from Jenkin was one 
of the earliest references from a political source (if 
not the earliest) to Child Benefits' contribution to the 
augmentation of work incentives. He also quite rightly 
pointed out the TUC's long-time acceptance of all the 
implications of Child Benefits, including the inter- 
family transfer of income from man to woman, a commitment 
repeated the previous day by Len Murray. 
(81) 
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The only defence that Ennals could offer the Jenkin's 
entirely reasonable critique of government policy was 
that his announcement fully implemented the Labour 
Party's manifesto commitments for both the February and 
October elections in 1974. Although the government would 
have liked to have gone further it could still be proud 
of its overall record. and he repeated his insistence 
that the government had not abandoned the original 
scheme. It was still its intention to bring in the extra 
programme but for the moment the needs of the 
government's pay policy were paramount and that policy 
was very much dependent on take-home pay* 
(82) 
Ennals' very immediate predecessor. Barbara Castle, 
asserted that his statement represented the abandonment 
rather than the postponement of full Child Benefits. She 
refused to accept his argument about take-home pay since 
the TUC was to present a report. "The Social Contract 
1976-1977", to a Special Congress on pay policy in June. 
which included a welcome for the government's previous 
intention to go ahead with the implementation of Child 
Benefit in April or May 1977, and which also called on 
the government to make benefit levels as generous as 
possible. Full and generous Child Benefits were a part 
of the TUC's attempt to sell pay policy to its members. 
Given this would Ennals not do what she would have done 
and refuse to accept the Cabinet's decision(83) Castle's 
comments, particularly about the TUC's continued support 
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for Child Benefit and its potential importance in 
generating support for the government's pay policy put 
Ennals in a difficult position and his reply to her is 
illuminating. 
He did not think that workers generally understood the 
effect that the full Child Benefit programme would have 
on their take-home pay. If the scheme had been fully 
implemented from April, 1977 the reduction in the man's 
take-home pay following his loss of child tax allowances 
would have caused dismay. In those circumstances Ennals 
said the important thing to recognise was that the 
government had begun to implement the scheme, and, as 
economic circumstances improved, the opportunity would 
arise for it to be introduced in its entirety. 
(84) 
As 
Hall-Davis was to remark immediately after Ennals had 
replied to Castle, the Secretary of State's comments 
would be regarded by mothers as a betrayal and by fathers 
as an insult. 
(85) 
Certainly Ennals' analysis seems to 
have been rooted in the assumptions that mothers and 
fathers did not talk to each other about family income 
and that they were intellectually incapable of 
understanding that a loss in earnings was at least being 
compensated for by an increase in family income support 
payments which in the original scheme would have been 
untaxed. Is it presuming too much to consider the 
possibility that especially those people in receipt of 
low wages would not have been ignorant of the net 
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increase in total family income this would have produced? 
All that Ennals could say to his critics was that the 
necessity to control public spending was vital. as was 
the need to support the anti-inflation policy by an 
effective pay policy. The full Child Benefit proposals 
'would ý8iýve been a challenge to that pay 
policy 
A firm but temperate warning to the goverrment, 
demonstrating clear evidence of the anger and concern on 
the Labour backbenches, was given by Jack Ashley who 
claimed that the government's much publicised attack on 
family poverty was in danger of fizzling out entirely. 
Ennals' announcement was not the kind of thing its 
supporters expected from a Labour Government and although 
they understood the government's economic difficulties 
they were not prepared to accept an indefinite 
postponement of the full Child Benefit Scheme. 
(87) 
Helene Hayman's earliest fears about the direction and 
pace of the government's policy on Child Benefits have 
already been noted as has her exclusion from membership 
of the Committee stage of the Child Benefit Bill's 
progress through the House. She argued that people were 
not as ignorant as the Cabinet believed about Child 
Benefits' implications for intra-family redistribution of 
income. furthermore, what was the government's evidence 
for its contention that the introduction of Child 
Benefits would have been a threat to its pay policy, 
especially given the TUC's belief that no such threat 
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existed? Ennals' statement was 'a disappointment and an 
insult' to the 80 Labour MPs who had signed a motion the 
previous night calling for the full implementation of 
Child Benefits. 
(88) 
Hayman's reference to the 80 Labour backbenchers who had 
signed the motion initiated by her indicates the extent 
of the unrest in the parliamentary party. Quite clearly 
the government would have to be sensitive to the 
political threat to its survival as a minority government 
posed by this opposition. Ennals failed to answer any of 
Hayman's points, contenting himself with the remark that 
perhaps Hayman and the other signatories of the critical 
motion had been led by newspaper reports to expect the 
scheme to be deferred by up to three years rather than 
the limited beginning he had in fact announced. 
(89) 
As a former Minister of Social Security. Judith Hart was 
likely to add something of interest to the debate and the 
theme of her criticisms of Ennals was rather different to 
any of the earlier contributions. Given the government's 
professed concern about the impact on workers of the loss 
of child tax allowances should the Child Benefit scheme 
have been introduced in its entirety., had the Secretary 
of State not realised that the introduction of the claw- 
back principle into Family Allowances in 1968 had already 
breached that principle? If he looked at the 
correspondence from that time he would realise that there 
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were few objections to the principle or difficulties in 
understanding its operations once the idea had been 
explained. She went on to claim that: 
'There is a considerable mythology in the Treasury, 
and possibly in the Department of Health and Social 
Security about the likely impact of the scheme upon 
workers and I believe (Wt it would have been 
welcomed, not resisted'. 
Once again Ennals made no attempt to deal with the 
substance of his critics' observations. Instead he said 
that the real difference this time was that the pay 
policy rested on the notion of take-home pay rather than 
gross pay. In this context Child Benefits took on rather 
a different light. Consequently. transfer to the whole 
Child Benefits programme had to take place gradually and 
would become more acceptanle when pay limits were less 
tight. 
(91) 
The introduction of the whole Child Benefit 
programme without the one parent premium would have cost 
precisely the same as the government's announcement. £95 
million. The level of Child Benefits would have been 
£2.50 which would have been substantially paid for by a 
greater reduction in take-home pay,. that is the abolition 
of child tax allowances. Families with more than three 
children would have been worse off. As it stood, all two 
parent families would be better off under the 
government's arrangements although he admitted that he 
would have liked a much bigger scheme. In response to 
Geoff Rooker's call for a major educational/advertising 
campaign Ennals said that while he accepted the idea he 
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could not introduce the Child Benefit scheme in full when 
there was no understanding of its full implications and 
at a time when take-home pay was the crucial factor. 
(92) 
Ennals' developing explanation of the government's action 
on Child Benefits failed entirely to placate Labour 
members. Ted Leadbitter wanted to know how it was that 
before Ennals took office five weeks previously 
'... the child benefit scheme was costed, well thought 
out and accepted by the Government, the 
Parlfglyntary Labour Party, the NEC and the 
TUC" 
None of those bodies had requested a review or 
modification. What Damascene conversion had been 
experienced by the Secretary of State that in such a 
short period of time 
'... he insults the Parliamentary(9l4a)bour Party and 
rejects the TUC recommendations'. 
Leadbitter's anger was shared by Kevin McNamara who 
accused Ennals of using the economic and social 
philosophy of the nineteenth century as the basis of his 
defence of the government's action; it was in fact 
similar to the rationale deployed by Sir Keith Joseph in 
his defence of the introduction of Family Income 
Supplement. He had insulted those trade union sponsored 
MP's who had spent a lot of time explaining to their 
constituents the full implications of the transfer to 
Child Benefits. 
(95) 
Ennals' only response to these angry 
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attacks was to say that when he took up his job the level 
of Child Benefit had not been decided and thus the 
precise effects on take-home pay had not been 
calculated. 
(96) 
Three days after his statement Ennals gave a little more 
information about the government's belief that Child 
Benefits in their original form would constitute an 
unacceptable threat to its pay policy and also about 
discussions it had had with the TUC. He noted that the 
TUC's General Council's press statement on the 27th May 
had welcomed the government's decision to extend benefits 
to the first child while also stressing the need for the 
complete Child Benefit scheme to be introduced as soon as 
possible. He also understood that the General Secretary 
had gone on to say that the full implementation of the 
programme in a single step from April 1977 would have 
involved very substantial reductions in take-home pay 
which would have to be 
i 
"weighed against the very limited scope there would 
be for (§yyreases in gross pay in the coming 
period'. 
In the month following Ennal's statement on Child 
Benefits a great deal happened to heighten the political 
furore surrounding the government's decision. the most 
significant of which centred around Frank Field's article 
in 'New Society' based on leaked Cabinet documents which 
detailed the process by which the government withdrew 
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from its commitment to introduce the programme in its 
entirety in April, 1977. 
(98) 
Before looking at Field's celebrated article it is 
necessary to examine the government's policy on Child 
Benefit from the beginning of Wilson's administration in 
March, 1974. Although Barbara Castle's diaries for the 
1974-6 period are naturally partial, and thus have to be 
used with caution, they do provide some revealing 
insights into the Cabinet's treatment of family income 
support policy. 
(99) 
From the first relevant diary entry on July 9,1974, her 
story is of a bitter and continuous wrangle with the 
Treasury, represented by Healey as Chancellor and Joel 
Barnett as Chief Secretary. This first entry is typical 
of the whole from Castle's viewpoint. She had met the 
Chancellor at his request on July 9th to discuss the 
family endowment (Child Benefits) scheme. Healey claimed 
that there was no money for the programme which prompted 
Castle to remind him that it was a manifesto commitment 
which he had helped draw up. Healey's final point was 
that the Cabinet would have to decide its priorities in 
the light of the public expenditure exercise. 
(100) 
Throughout the proceedings of the Public Expenditure 
Survey Committee, Healey insisted on the lowest possible 
priority for family income support policy and attempted 
to get the implementation of Child Benefit put back to 
385 
1977, even suggesting a figure as low as £1.86 for the 
first child when Child Benefit was eventually 
introduced. (101) Castle claims that she already knew 
that it would be physically impossible to introduce Child 
Benefit until 1977 and thus traded Healey's demand for a 
1977 start for a higher interim increase in Family 
Allowances. (102) 
The same unremitting battle with the Treasury took place 
throughout Castle's time as Secretary of State for Social 
Services, arguably culminating in a meeting with Barnett 
on March 29,1976, to discuss the rate at which Child 
Benefit should be fixed. 
(103) 
Brian Abel-Smith and 
Castle's officials had prepared a paper showing that a 
figure of £2.60 per child per week would leave no family 
worse off after the abolition of child tax allowances and 
Family Allowances, while to get back to 1971 levels of 
family support would require a rate of £2.85 per child. 
Her fall-back position was £2.70. The Treasury's view 
was that £2.85 was outside its range of costings to which 
Castle responded that at a total cost of £217 million a 
year it was only just above the £200 million earmarked in 
the Contingency Fund. Barnett contended that nothing was 
earmarked in the Contingency Fund and suggested a benefit 
rate of £2.40 per child plus a premium of 22p. a week for 
one parent and large families to ensure they did not 
lose. Barnett then proceeded to attack universality and 
argued in favour of greater selectivity which prompted 
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Castle to suggest that since he was talking like Margaret 
Thatcher he ought to join the Conservative Party. Given 
their failure to agree on a figure the decision was left 
up to the full Cabinet. 
Castle's reaction to the tone and substance of her 
meeting with Barnett is eloquently captured in her diary. 
'It is at moments like this that I despair of this 
Government, dominated as it is by people who don't 
believe ýr04tpe policy on which they fought the 
election. 
Power in the Cabinet had switched to the right, and the 
result was that 
'... I am expected to accept meekly the 
reinterpretations of party doctrine which the 
Treasury (ably-aided by right wingers like Roy 
Jenkins, Fred P t. Fred Malley and Jim) just 
imposes on us'. 
(1 
The consequences for the Child Benefit scheme when 'Jim' 
Callaghan succeeded Harold Wilson as Prime Minister have 
been graphically revealed bye Frank Field in the article 
referred to above, while McCarthy has also added a number 
of other interesting observations. 
(106) 
Callaghan lost 
no time in sacking his old enemy and on April 5th, 1976 
Castle was replaced by David Ennals at the D. H. S. S. 
Ennals found himself in exactly the same position as 
Castle but this time Treasury intransigence was 
enormously strengthened by the new Prime Minister's 
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antipathy to family income support, an antipathy he had 
already demonstrated during the claw-back debate in 1966- 
7. In a series of Cabinet meetings throughout April and 
early May, Healey and Barnett demanded a Child Benefit 
rate which they felt was consistent with public 
expenditure limits. 
(107) At the Cabinet meeting on April 
29th., Ennals attempted to strengthen his case by arguing 
that a failure to increase the real level of family 
support would add to the difficulties in negotiating pay 
policy with the TUC. Significantly for future 
developments Field notes that 
'it was at this Cabinet meeting that members began 
to discuss the effects of withdrawing child tax 
allowances on t1 0ýggotiations for stage three of incomes policy'. 
The Cabinet concluded that it might be best to postpone 
the child benefit if the funds were not available to pay 
an acceptable rate. 
Field claims that it was after the Cabinet Meeting on May 
4th., at which Healey pointed out that the government had 
no commitment to maintain Child Benefits in line with 
inflation and that the use of premium payments for single 
parents and large families was a more cost effective 
method of tackling poverty, that Callaghan began working 
behind the scenes to frustrate the implementation of the 
scheme. Callaghan claimed to have received an 'excellent 
report' from the party whips that had caused him to 
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rethink the political wisdom of introducing the Child 
Benefit programme. The Chief Whip, Michael Cocks. 
reported to the Cabinet that after canvassing opinion he 
had concluded that to go ahead with a 1977 start would 
have grave political consequences which had not been 
forseen when the legislation went through the House of 
Commons. In the discussion that followed Ministers 
concluded that the distributive effects of Child Benefit 
could not be sold to the public prior to its intended 
introduction in April, 1977. Field's belief was that the 
Cabinet meetings of the 4th and 6th of May had 
effectively scuttled Child Benefits. 
It was after the May 6th meeting that the trade union 
factor in the Child Benefit dilemma became both dominant, 
and Byzantine in its complexity. Since Family Income 
Support policy had been such a prominent feature of 
Labour's 1974 election manifestos and the Child Benefit 
system was now law, preparing the public for its 
abandonment was bound to be a difficult exercise. It was 
a task made even more difficult by a series of leaks to 
the press about the government's intentions which 
produced the intervention of trade union leaders 
committed to the scheme. On 24th May at a meeting of the 
TUC - Labour Party Liaison Committee the unions forced 
the government to endorse a Liaison Committee statement 
which said: 
'It is of the utmost importance that the new child 
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benefit. to be introduced next year, provides 
benefit generous enough to represent a determined 
and conctji ated attack on the problem (of 
poverty). 
However what the trade union delegation at the Liaison 
Committee meeting did not know was that a small group of 
them, the union members on the National Economic 
Development Council, were to meet a group of senior 
Cabinet ministers, including the Chancellor, later the 
same day. At the Cabinet meeting of 25th May the 
Chancellor reported that the TUC had been asked at this 
private meeting to agree to a postponement of the scheme 
for three years because of the effect of the loss of 
child tax allowances on take-home pay. Field quotes the 
Cabinet minutes thus: 
'On being informed of the reduction in take-home 
pay which the child benefits scheme would involve, 
the TUC representatives had reacted immediately and 
violently against its implementation, irrespective 
of the level of benefits Wh]rCh ýFjould accompany the 
reduction in take-home pay. "1 
On June 21st, at a meeting of the TUC - Labour Party 
Liaison Committee the unions' position shifted again when 
they made it clear that any future Social Contract would 
be dependent on a clear commitment by the government to 
revise and implement the scheme within the next year or 
so. Barbara Castle and Ian Mikardo were instrumental in 
stimulating considerable union support for the 
introduction of the scheme by showing how Callaghan and 
Healey had duped them into abandoning an initiative which 
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was contrary to their earlier public commitment enshrined 
in the Social Contract. It later emerged that in fact 
the TUC's Social Insurance Committee had never budged 
from its commitment to Child Benefits but had become 
confused when some individual members of the TUC had 
expressed their opposition to it. 
(111) 
Although the foregoing account has concentrated on the 
political manoeuvreings surrounding the government's 
attempt to wriggle out of its commitment to Child 
Benefits and not about the substantive qualities of the 
programme, at one point in the unfolding saga Barbara 
Castle made an almost casual comment of direct relevance 
to the focal concerns of this thesis. On March 1st, 1976 
during dinner with some leading members of the TUC at 
Brian Abel-Smith's house Castle identified the need not 
to sacrifice Child Benefit to other priorities because, 
apart from anything else. 
'this was the best way to help the low paid and get 
rid of the scandal under which a family man could 
get a bigger me when unemployed than when he 
was at work'. 
Apparently Castle's comments interested and impressed 
Harry Urwin. In a footnote to her observation Castle 
spelled out the nature of this 'scandal' in a little more 
detail, 
'In February 1976. an unemployed man was entitled 
to draw £3.50 per week for his first child and £2 
for each subsequent child. When at work he 
received nothing for the first child and a family 
391 
allowance of £1.50 for his second and subsequent 
children. This discrepancy was an important factor 
in reducing the incentive to work, particularly in 
the case of a man on a low wage with a large 
family, who( 1ci)ld 
find himself better off when 
unemployed' . 
It would be difficult to imagine a clearer expression of 
the less-eligibility characteristic of Child Benefits 
than Castle's footnote and the almost dismissive way she 
treats the issue is, in itself, not without interest. 
Urwin and Terry Parry quickly grasped the importance of 
this point and became enthusiastic supporters of the need 
to have a substantial Child Benefit for every child. 
'It was their influence in the TUC which helped 
Labour MP's like myself to secure a reversal of Jim 
Callaghan's attempt, after I had left the 
Government, to postpoll &e introduction of child 
benefit indefinitely'. 
On 28th June, 1976 the Opposition used up one of its 
Supply Days to debate Child Benefits but the technical 
device it used to frame the debate was to introduce a 
motion on the adjournment. The fact that it refused to 
i 
table a substantive motion was to be a minor though 
politically interesting theme. As Patrick Jenkin said in 
his opening speech, to have put forward a substantive 
motion would have been to give the government the chance 
to amend it in such a way that Labour MP's could vote for 
the amendment. The Conservative Party's intention was to 
invite Labour M. P. 's to stand up and be counted by either 
voting for or against the adjournment. Either way they 
hoped to cause the government maximum embarassment. 
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Jenkin claimed that the 'New Society' article had shown 
the government's policy to consist of ineptitude 
compounded by panic and deceit. The Child Benefit Act 
was already on the statute book yet there was no money to 
introduce it, while the concern about the alleged impact 
on pay policy was probably contrived since the switch 
from child tax allowances to Child Benefit had always 
been an integral feature of the scheme. For Jenkin the 
reality was that 
'... we have had the cynical and disreputable 
manipulation of Cabinet colleagues, TUC Leaders and 
Back Bench Members of Parliament by the Prime 
Minister and the Chancellor of th chequer in 
their efforts to defeat the scheme'. ' 
If the government stuck to its policy and ran away from 
the vote on the adjournment it would demonstrate how 
unsure it was of its support from its own backbenchers 
and would represent 
proportions'. 
(116) 
8 moral defeat of major I 
i 
Although the Conservative Party was against any extra 
public spending in current financial circumstances it was 
possible to introduce Child Benefits within existing 
resource constraints. Child Benefit could achieve three 
important objectives in the battle against family 
poverty. For those families whose breadwinner's income 
was below the tax threshold, families who earned their 
poverty, Child Benefit would represent a real 
improvement. The government's proposals gave such 
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families an extra £1 a week. Child Benefit could provide 
£2 a week for the first child with extra benefits for 
every subsequent child. This was 
'... the first and by far the most important'fz e 
advantages of a real child benefit scheme'. 
Secondly, as a natural consequence of the first, Child 
Benefits would lead to a significant easing of the 
poverty trap. He went on to quote from a Child Poverty 
Action Group memorandum to the effect that Child Benefits 
would lift people off dependence on means tested benefits 
such as F. I. S., rent rebates and rate rebates. Those not 
claiming these benefits would get a real measure of 
income support for the first time. He quoted C. P. A. G. , 
thus: 
'Child Benefits would provide an income floor on 
which families can build by their own efforts. 
Means tested benefits provide a ceiling making it 
almost impf 4ble for them to escape by their own 
efforts'. 
Finally, Child Benefit would help to deal with that 
situation where social security recipients could be 
better off on benefit than people in work. (the position 
that the now defunct wage-stop had been specifically 
designed to prevent. My parenthitical comment, not 
Jenkin's. ) Because the Child Benefit Act provided for 
the reduction of social security income by the amount of 
Child Benefit received but its full retention by the 
worker's family the incentive to work would be increased. 
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By abandoning Child Benefits the government had foregone 
all those advantages. Given the central concerns of this 
research, about the relationship between family income 
support policy and the labour market, it is worth noting 
at this point that Jenkin's arguments for Child Benefit 
represent the first occasion that the incentive 
characteristics of the scheme had been mentioned in 
parliamentary discussion thus far. 
Jenkin went on to consider the justifications advanced by 
the government for its change in policy. He was scathing 
about the alleged threat to pay policy caused by the 
reduction in take-home pay since the TUC had always 
accepted that this was an integral part of an effective 
child benefit system. Indeed, in its evidence to the 
Select Committee on Tax Credits in 1973 the TUC had 
insisted that child credits be paid to the mother not the 
father and Jenkin quoted tellingly from this evidence: 
"an effect of the change proposed would (in the 
case of the working household) be to reduce the 
take-home pay of the father. It would be 
essential, in implementing such a change, to give 
full publicity to the soc(ilj9)objectives underlying 
the Government's policy". 
Vic Feather had specifically accepted the TUC's 
responsibility for delivering acceptance of this intra- 
family redistribution of income. In retrospect Jenkin 
was quite right to reiterate the TUC's support for this 
essential feature of the Child Benefit scheme and it 
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had never been an objection at any stage of the evolution 
of the pay policy. It was known that Child Benefit was 
going to be introduced in April, 1977. three-quarters of 
the way through Stage 2 of the pay policy. 
Reasonably enough, Jenkin asked if Barbara Castle had 
done nothing to remind her Cabinet colleagues of the 
implications of the Child Benefit scheme or to secure the 
TUC's acknowledgement of those consequences. All through 
the development of the government's pay policy detailed 
preparations were being made for the launching of Child 
Benefits in April 1977. Jenkin even quoted from an 
information leaflet that had already been produced by the 
DHSS, entitled CH1(T) dated September, 1976. He argued 
that in an article in the 'New Statesman' on 4 June, 1976 
Barbara Castle had admitted that she had not fully 
understood the consequences for Child Benefit and public 
expenditure of the Budget increases in Child Tax 
Allowances. Thus, 
'A higher tax allowance automatically jacked up the 
level of child benefit. But it also jacked up the 
cost in public expenditure. In my innocI M) I did 
not see how the argument was developing'. 
Jenkin contended that Castle's failure to appreciate the 
costing consequences of the above for Child Benefits, and 
her failure to warn of the effect on net pay in the 
context of Stage 2 of the pay policy made her a lot more 
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responsible for the failure to implement the whole scheme 
on the announced date thn she was prepared to admit. 
(121) 
However, Jenkin was convinced that considerations of pay 
policy had nothing whatsoever to do with the government's 
decision. The real reason was that it had come to the 
conclusion that it could not afford the cost of the 
measures to relieve the poor as well as provide for a 
broad general improvement in family support. The leaked 
Cabinet papers had shown that between £200 million and 
£300 million was needed to restore the level of support 
for a three child family to what it had been in 1971 
under the Conservatives.. But, the collapse of the pound 
and the need to secure a massive new foreign credit ruled 
this out. 'So the Chancellor was determined to kill the 
scheme because the cost was too great'. 
(122) 
Despite 
this. it was still possible to introduce a nil-extra cost 
scheme with child benefits of £2.34 so that two child 
families would be no worse off. Families with three or 
more children could be compensated by paying a premium of 
about an extra 30p. per child for the third and 
subsequent children. This would cost an extra £37 
million annually. Child tax allowances could also be 
adjusted for middle management to prevent them from 
having to pay for the scheme. All of this could be 
achieved at a lower cost than the programme announced by 
Ennal s. 
(123) 
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The government accepted unequivocally the principle of 
Child Benefits and it was committed to the introduction 
of the whole programme when economic circumstances 
permitted although Ennals was unable to give a specific 
date for this. He reluctantly accepted that those 
families too poor to pay'tax and not in receipt of social 
security benefits would have gained more under a Child 
Benefit scheme providing benefit of £2.50 per child. but 
'for all ordinary working families who pay tax' the 
benefit payable would have been offset by the reductions 
in take-home pay for the male head of the tax household 
through the loss of child tax allowances. 
(124) 
Families 
with more than two children would benefit less from Child 
Benefit at £2.50 than from the scheme he had announced on 
25th May, while families with more than four children. 
and all one parent families would have been worse off 
than under his proposals. Barbara Castle's suggestion in 
her 'New Statesman' article for a Child Benefit rate of 
£2.70 would have provided an extra 68p. for a one child 
i 
family and a few extra pence for larger families. This 
was more than under his scheme but only because it cost 
more, £220 million compared with £90 million. Ennals 
then articulated what was probably the main reason for 
reneging on the previous Child Benefit commitment, 
'It would have been irresponsible at this time for 
the Government to embark on an expensive new public 
expenditure commitment from 1977 to 1980. If we 
had introduced a costly child benefit M5 should 
have had to trim expenditure elsewhere'. 
') 
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It might be appropriate at this juncture to make a number 
of observations about Ennals' speech thus far. First of 
all, the quite matter of-fact way he accepted that it 
was apparently reasonable for those heads of families too 
poor to pay income tax and not on social security 
benefits to be given a worse deal than they could have 
got under a Child Benefit system with rates so low that 
no extra costs would have been incurred by the State. 
This can be interpreted as a rather surprising way for a 
Labour Secretary of State for Social Services to treat 
one of the neediest elements of the entire body of the 
poor, those families whose head was in low-paid, full- 
time employment, who in fact earned their poverty. 
Ennals said nothing about work incentives, or the poverty 
trap or much else for that matter. He was deliberately 
giving them a worse deal. What may be significant is the 
contrasting concern he showed for "all ordinary working 
families who pay tax". It could be argued that this was 
a peculiar sense of priorities for a socialist to adopt 
although it becomes more clearly understandable if placed 
in a political context which suggested the folly attached 
to offending or alienating average or above average 
earners. Even if one discounts completely the 
government's oft-professed concern for the preservation 
of its pay policy and its whole counter-inflationary 
strategy, the possible elcttoral consequences of 
initiating programmes that resulted in reduced net take- 
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home pay for a critical sector of the male electorate 
would be sufficient to give any government pause. 
Ennals proceeded to develop in greater detail than 
hitherto the relationship between the government's 
original Child Benefit legislation and pay policy. Its 
final decision was the consequence of an agonising 
reappraisal given the primacy of negotiating a pay policy 
with the T. U. C. Take-home pay became a great deal more 
important after the government and the TUC had agreed 
that the pay round beginning in August 1976 should be at 
a minimum of £2.50 per week and a maximum of no more than 
£4. 
'For the first time we had a pay policy based 
largely on take-home pay -a modest incre in 
pay linked with significant tax concessions'. 
ýýý6} 
To have superimposed the Child Benefits scheme onto this 
pay policy would have had dire consequences. After 
paying tax and National Insurance contributions on the 
i 
" pay increase combined with the reduction of child tax 
allowances of £2.02 for the first child and £1.14 for 
each subsequent child, every family man with two or more 
children and most of those with only one child would have 
been worse off after the pay rise than they were before. 
'In the context of pay policy and the fight against 
inflation, we could not risk undermining orMyy 
working people's support for the pay policy'. 
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In so far as this detailed exposition of the fears 
informing government policy is concerned it is worth 
reiterating a point made at an earlier stage of the 
controversy- by a number of Conservative critics. How 
was it that nobody thought of Child Benefits' 
implications for pay policy beforehand? It seems 
difficult to believe that such an obvious and crucial 
consideration could have been neglected, not least by 
civil servants. Possibly the answer is that the 
government had hoped to introduce a Child Benefit rate 
sufficiently generous to provide net income gains for 
all, even after the loss of child tax allowances. This 
would have made the pay policy more acceptable; at any 
rate there would have been no net losers. But the 
foreign exchange crisis and the government's desperate 
need to secure a major IMF credit led to public 
expenditure reductions and made a generous Child Benefit 
rate impossible to introduce. 
i 
Ennals further claimed that the nature of Child Benefits 
had not been understood by what he called 'the average 
man and woman', and the government was also well aware of 
the concern felt by 'leading trade union figures'. 
(109) 
He said that there was a great deal of common ground 
between the government and the TUC which, like the 
government, was committed to the full Child Benefit 
scheme. The TUC regretted that the benefit could not be 
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implemented in toto in 1977 as intended but the General 
Council welcomed the introduction of a benefit for the 
first child as promised in the Labour Party's 1974 
election manifestos. Like the government, the TUC had to 
take two factors into account, the amount of money 
available for the programme at that particular time and 
the effect of reductions in child tax allowances on take- 
home pay. Because the government, the TUC, and the 
Labour Party all wanted the full Child Benefit provision, 
at the previous week's meeting of the Labour Party - TUC 
Liaison Committee it had been agreed to set up a working 
party to report as a matter of urgency, how this agreed 
objective could be achieved. 
(128) 
Clearly the government 
had been shaken by the strength of the opposition within 
the ranks of its own supporters to Ennals' May 25 
announcement and the leaking of the Cabinet papers 
informing the 'New Society' article on June, 17. Thus in 
one sense the creation of the joint working party can be 
seen as an exercise in damage limitation. 
Ennals returned to the now familiar refrain that concern 
about both take-home pay and public expenditure was the 
dominant issue in the Child Benefit decision. To have 
gone for a benefit level that would have given only a few 
pence a week extra would have got the 'imaginative' 
initiative which was Child Benefit off to an appalling 
start. With greater freedom over public expenditure the 
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fear about take home pay could have been overcome. He 
then identified some of the problems involved in the 
"genuine" argument that had taken place in Cabinet over 
Child Benefits, 
'How could we reconcile both our commitment to the 
struggle against family poverty and the battle 
against inflation. Must one fall victim to the 
other? Were we to set aside all else in our 
determination to do nothing to endanger pay policy? 
Should we postpone the fulfilment of our manifesto 
commitment1293hese were some of the decisions we had 
to take'. 
Given the nature of the promises made in the party's 
election manifestos in 1974. the government's decision to 
introduce Child Benefit on a step by step basis could be 
interpreted as the redemption of at least the letter of 
its pledge. As for the future the government would be 
free, as economic circumstances permitted, to expand 
Child Benefit on the one hand and adjust child tax 
allowances on the other, while for the moment it would 
play a full part in the operations of the joint working 
party, 
(130) 
Ennals concluded by announcing the 
governments decision not to contest the adjournment 
motion. 
The political wisdom of the government's refusal to vote 
against the Opposition's motion was immediately verified 
(by 
Barbara Castle's response131) to Ennals' exposition 
of the government's position. Having been in Ennals' job 
until very recently she was, of course, in a better 
position than most to criticise, and she immediately went 
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straight to the heart of the dispute between the 
government and Labour backbenchers. The Government had 
clearly made a wrong decision and Labour backbenchers had 
to make them change their minds. If the government had 
pressed the Opposition motion to a division, 
'many of us could not hae supported the 
Government... because there is a vital principle 
involved and we feel that the(Mgrnment as a whole 
have not been frank with us'. 
It had not been frank about the real reasons for 
postponing the scheme, the cost of Child Benefits, and 
the consequences of the postponement of the benefit's 
introduction. In effect, postponement meant abandonment 
for the lifetime of the government. Ennals had not been 
allowed by his colleagues to give a categorical assurance 
that Child Benefits would be introduced in the 
government's lifetime and if the TUC/Labour Party working 
party came up with an agreed programme for 1977 taking 
all the public expenditure implications into 
consideration, there was no promise from Ennals that the 
i 
government would change its policy. 
'That is what we have been asking for, and we have 
not had it, and that is why (Y93 )could not support 
the Government in the lobby'. 
She refused to accept that the government could not 
afford the cost of Child Benefits, even at a figure of 
£200 million which was the amount (mistakenly) ascribed 
to a programme she had, been advocating. That year the 
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government had allocated £300 million to increases in 
child tax allowances, and was also prepared to spend 
between £75 - £100 million in 1977 on increasing Family 
Allowances both of which programmes were totally 
antithetical to the idea of Child Benefits. This was 
partly a consequence of accounting conventions since 
child tax allowances did not appear as actual public 
expenditure and were therefore not a charge on the 
contingency reserve. For this figure of almost £400 
million the government could have had a Child Benefit 
rate of over £3 a week. Increases in child tax 
allowances had never been a part of pay discussions with 
the TUC and the Chancellor had said in his Budget 
Statement that such increases were unconditional and 
they had also been in operation since the beginning of 
June, before the TUC Special Congress had voted on pay 
policy. By increasing Child tax allowances by 40p. a 
child per week 
'the Government del. berately(lp3v4tý up the trnsfer 
cost of moving to child benefit 
Because of these increases in family income support 
outside of the Child Benefit scheme the government now 
claimed that it could not afford a high enough level of 
Child Benefit to sell the idea to those whose incomes 
from work would decline, the fathers. It even claimed 
it could not afford a break -even rate of £2.64. 
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Castle rejected the government's whole approach and 
asserted that she had never accepted the government's 
figure for the cost of a break-even benefit and even 
claimed that the move to a system of Child Benefits had 
been included in the government's public expenditure 
plans 
'The introduction of the child benefit was included 
in the public expenditure White Paper. It was 
safeguarded. sacrosanct and earmarked to be 
financed out of the contingency reserve. That 
reserve has not been used up. To say that we 
cannot now afford it is to say that we have 
switched our priorities. aný13g on the Back 
Benches cannot tolerate that'. 
Ear from the figures of £200 million or £300 million 
(the amounts that Callaghan quoted in Cabinet according 
to the leaked documents) the latest figure for the cost 
sent to her in a letter from the Minister of State (at 
the D. H. S. S. ) was £180 million. This was considerably 
more than the £110 million she had been given before 
leaving office. Most of this extra cost came from the 
£45 million needed to provide child tax allowances for 
non-resident children. She remained convinced that the 
basic cost of a break-even rate of Child Benefit (£2.64 
per child) was about £110 million. If the government 
claimed that the contingency reserve was not exhausted 
but persisted in its belief that Child Benefit could not 
be afforded at a higher rate it would mean a switch in 
the government's priorities. 
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'The postponement of the child benefit scheme is 
merely the first round of the next instalment of 
public expenditure cuts. It is a kind of advance 
cut and it is done at the expense of children and 
at the e Ffis a of a vital principle of our social 
policy'. 
Castle then turned her attention to the government's 
argument that under current resource constraints the 
level of benefit could not be sufficient to make the 
switch in income support from man to woman acceptable. 
She poured scorn on the figures given by Ennals for the 
loss of take-home pay consequent upon the abolition of 
child tax allowances, especially those he gave for the 
six child family. Her advice had been that in only 20% 
of the 65,000 six child families were all children under 
elevel years of age. When Ennals spoke of an £8 a week 
deduction in take-home pay he was speaking of only 0.1% 
of all male employees. 
'... and for that we arZ13t75 be encouraged to 
abandon a major principle'. 
Notwithstanding the government's claims to the contrary 
the TUC was not hostile to Child Benefit. Castle said 
that Harry Urwin, the Deputy General Secretary of the 
Transport and General Workers Union and a member of the 
General Council, was 'blazing mad' at the treatment of 
Child Benefit. He was afraid that postponement meant 
the end. 
'He has also authorised me to say that at no time 
has the General Council of the TUC decided that 
the scheme ought to be deferred. He told me. " 
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if anyone tells you that it has would you please 
ask him to give the 6W7 No doubt we can then 
turn up the minutes". 
Irwin had also pointed out that the demand for the 
introduction of Child Benefit in April. 1977 was 
contained in the social contract document just carried 
by nine million members of the TUC at its special 
Congress. He had said: 
"Thereuit is. No o? T3§ln get away from it. It is 
trade nion policy' 
She welcomed the settling up of the TUC/Labour Party 
working party, of which she was a member, and alleged 
that the trade union movement had been severely libelled 
by the government's accusation that Child Benefit had 
had to be sacrificed to persuade the unions to accept 
the pay policy. If the working party could produce a 
solution allowing for the full scheme to be introduced 
in April 1977, without damaging public expenditure or 
causing a break in union support for pay policy she 
wanted a pledge from the government that it would accept 
these recommendations. In arguing for the introduction 
of a proper Child Benefit system she and other 
backbenchers were fighting for Ennals against the Prime 
Minister and the Chancellor. 
No Treasury Minister had been present in the House to 
hear Castle's attack, 
(140) 
nor to listen to Helen Hayman 
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develop her critique of government policy. Hayman was 
unable to support the government in its approach to 
Child Benefit since a vitally important facet of it was 
that it not only redistributed income within the family 
but also from the higher tax payer to the non-tax payer. 
She would accept a cheap benefit so long as no-one on 
the standard rate of income tax would be worse off 
because the people who mattered to her were those on the 
standard rate or below the tax threshold. The unions 
had supported Child Benefit as part of the social 
contract and nothing that the government had said had 
convinced her that it was right. In fact she now 
regretted her previous acceptance of 1977 as the 
starting date rather than the original intended one of 
1976 and was determined to adopt a hard line about 1977. 
The government's fatal error had appeared in the 
Chancellor's Budget on April 6th when it was announced 
that an extra £300 million would be spent on child tax 
allowances. If the money had been allocated to the 
first child in the Fami], y Allowance programme the 
country would have been half way to a Child Benefit 
scheme and there would have been no argument about the 
threat to pay policy contained in the transition from 
child tax allowances to Child Benefit. The government 
had made no attempt to sell the idea of Child Benefits 
to the public and had created a rod for its own back in 
its insistence that it was incompatible with pay policy. 
Its stance had become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
(141) 
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In winding up the debate for the Opposition Kenneth 
Clarke's speech was significant only because, for the 
second time in the entire history of Parliamentary 
debate of the Child Benefit scheme up to that moment, 
mention was made of the programme's incentive 
characteritsics. By pointing out Child Benefit's 
potential contribution to the reduction of the poverty 
trap by increasing the income of the low paid worker 
with dependent children vis a vis social security 
beneficiaries Clarke was adding to the earlier 
observations of Patrick Jenkinl142h. Stan Orme failed 
to develop on Clarke's point in his own closing remarks 
as Minister of State at the D. H. S. S. and contented 
himself with explaining why the government had decided 
not to vote on the motion for the Adjournment. To have 
done so would have given the Opposition. 
'the pleasure of seeing the genuine division that 
exists between many hon. Members on this side 
about the interpretation, and Agwion of this 
scheme, not about the principle'. 
I 
He rejected Castle and Hayman's claim that a level of 
benefit that did not incur extra public expenditure 
could have been sold to the public without any 
difficulty. To make the move to Child Benefit stick it 
was critical that there be a net gain in income for the 
family. £95 million of extra spending would produce a 
benefit level of £2.45 a week but to command public 
support it needed to be in excess of that. All of the 
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complaints made by Labour M. P. 'swould be considered by 
(144) 
working party. 
144) 
Parliament remained the major forum of debate and 
discussion about Child Benefits, and just over a month 
after the government had backed away from the 
Adjournment Debate, on July 30th, David Ennals 
introduced the regulations fixing the Child Benefit rate 
from April. 1977. 
(145) 
The rate was the highest the 
government could afford given net available resources 
and from April, 1977 over six million mothers would be 
£1 a week better off. All tax paying families would 
gain 50p., while working families not paying tax would 
gain up to the full value of the £1 for the first 
child. 
(146) 
The main difference between the government's 
proposals and the programme contained in the 1975 Act 
was that the government had not proceeded with its 
intention to incorporate the full value of child tax 
allowances for children aged under eleven in the rate of 
benefit. To have done this said Ennals would have 
resulted in substantial reductions in take-home pay of 
about £2 for a first child and over £1 for every other. 
He went on to repeat the familiar explanation of the 
government's decision not to go ahead with the full 
scheme in 1977. 
'In this second year of pay policy, which relates 
in an entirely new way to take-home pay, it would 
in our view have been folly to put it all at risk 
by making substantial reductions in pay packets at 
a time when we could not point to a reasonable 
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increase in family support for the family as a 
whole. Instead, we have chosen to make a more 
modest start to this transfer from father to 
moth U47) In 1977 this transfer will amount to 
70p' 
The only realistic alternative to the government's 
proposals would have been the postponement of the 
scheme. which the government refused to do. It was 
determined to introduce Child Benefit even in the modest 
way provided for in the regulations. 
He rejected the argument that the government's policy 
amounted to nothing more than the continuation of Family 
Allowances under another name. Family Allowances did 
not cover the first child and because of this had 
complicated entitlement rules. Child Benefit was 
different in both respects and the regulations provided 
for a genuine Child Benefit scheme which fulfilled the 
Labour Party's election manifesto commitment to 
introduce a cash benefit in respect of the first child 
payable to the mother. 
(148) At best, Ennal's insistence 
that the government had produced a genuine system of 
Child Benefits is questionable. No matter how much he 
asserted to the contrary the government's proposals were 
nothing like the scheme described in the 1975 Act. 
Paying benefit in respect of the first or only child was 
in essence a development of Family Allowances. How 
could it be otherwise when child tax allowances were 
left intact, indeed. had been extended in the 
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government's most recent budget? Ennals must have been 
aware of the tendentious nature of his claim and his 
reiteration that its actions constituted the honouring 
of an election promise can be interpreted as an attempt 
to rescue some political credibility from what had 
become an embarassing debacle. 
One of the most interesting parts of Ennal's speech is 
the account he gave of the operation and findings of the 
Labour Party/TUC working party. Both the Chief 
Secretary to the Treasury, Joel Barnett, and the 
Minister of State at the D. H. S. S., Stan Orme, had played 
a full part in the working party's discussions and its 
last meeting had taken place on the previous afternoon, 
July 29th. A statement had been issued after this 
meeting and a copy had been placed in the House of 
Commons Library* 
(149) 
The working party had included 
representatives from the Labour Party's National 
Executive Committee, the T. U. C., and also the two 
government ministers mentioned above. It had looked at 
ways of introducing the full Child Benefit programme 
within the life of that Parliament and had agreed in 
principle that the objective should be to phase in the 
whole programme by 1979. This should be done by making 
Child Benefit free of tax and clawback in April, 1977 
reducing Child Tax allowances by an equivalent amount 
(which would have no further effect on take-home pay) 
and by withdrawing all rerneining child tax allowances 
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over the following two years with the revenue thus 
released into increases in the rate of tax free Child 
Benefits. In this way substantial progress could be 
made towards the elimination of child tax allowances 
without any further effect on take-home pay in 1977 
while Child Benefit itself, as originally intended. 
would be taxfree. Full Child Benefit would thus be 
implemented by 1979. Since this agreement had only been 
reached on the previous evening. Ennals said that the 
government could go no further at the moment than to' 
promise that the working party's proposals would be. 
'urgently and carefully' considered. 
(150) 
Particularly relevant to the main concern of this 
research is Ennal's explanation of Regulation 2 
(paragraphs 4 and 5) and Regulation 3 which dealt with 
the relationship between Child Benefit and National 
Insurance benefits. The general principle underlying 
the relationship was that 
'Additions for children paid to people getting 
national insurance benefits have always been fixed 
on the basis that, taken with family allowances, 
they ylýv1 de the total support required for the 
child' 
Section 17 of the Child Benefit Act enabled social 
security benefits to be reduced to take account of Child 
Benefit. The general effect of those regulations was to 
make sure that the position of people with children on 
social security benefit would remain as it was. 
(152) 
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This is an important point because it emphasises yet 
again the 'less eligibility! characteristic of Family 
Allowances, and now of Child Benefit. By removing this 
form of family income support from calculations of social 
security benefit the gap in income between those workers 
in receipt of low earnings who would retain Child Benefit 
in full, and those entirely dependent on benefit income, 
was widened, thus theoretically boosting work incentives. 
Of course Ennals never spelt this out, or spoke in those 
terms, but this is the exact meaning of those particular 
regulations. It is a point that has been made before and 
one that bears repetition. 
Barbara Castle had been at the centre of the political 
stage throughout the history of the development of Child 
Benefits, and since her dismissal from the government by 
Jim Callaghan she had been a leading voice in the 
critical chorus that had continually attended the 
government's handling of policy. Once again her 
contribution is of major importance. She began by noting 
that the government had delayed the debate on the Child 
Benefit regulations until the Labour Party/TUC working 
party had completed its work, and was moved to say that 
if agreement had not been reached in the working party. 
'some of us would have felt obliged to vote against 
the Regulations today in spite of the political 
difficulties of doing so, and we would have done so 
because, whatever my right hon. Friend might say, 
the Regulations as theýy3)stand are not a genuine 
Child Benefit Scheme' 
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She was grateful for the tone of Ennals' speech but 
warned him that he had ignored the fact that his 
proposals lacked some of the essential characteristics of 
a proper Child Benefit scheme which had three essential 
features; it included a payment for the first child, it 
was tax free. and it replaced child tax allowances with a 
cash payment to the mother. 
(154) 
Since the government's decision to spend £95 million on 
extending Family Allowances to the first child three 
important changes had occurred Castle said. During 
discussion on the Finance Bill the Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury had accepted an amendment moved by George 
Cunningham (Labour M. P. for Islington South and Finsbury) 
which limited the Child tax allowance to one year, and by 
accepting this the government had signalled that it was 
prepared to reconsider its policy. Secondly, the Labour 
Party/TUC Liaison Committee had rejected the Prime 
Minister's statement that the-government could not embark 
i 
upon a proper Child Benefit scheme until 1979. This was 
a fundamental departure and the Liaison Committee had 
decided that the whole Child Benefit programme must go 
ahead and it had therefore set up the working party on 
which she and George Cunningham had served. Finally. 
this working party had been an 'important and potentially 
exciting example of open government. All the relevant 
issues had been examined frankly and thoroughly and the 
government's Labour critics had been able to look at the 
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agreed figures involved and 'face them squarely with the 
trade union movement'. As a result agreement had been 
reached and the agreed joint statement had been issued 
the previous day. The importance of this statement was 
that it made clear that what they had been discussing was 
the full introduction of Child Benefit within the 
lifetime of that Parliament. 
(155) 
Castle had no doubt that both wings of the Labour 
movement were committed to the findings of the working 
party. The unions had made it clear that they wanted 
child tax allowances abolished by the 1979 financial 
year, and during its proceedings the working party had 
looked at tables agreed by the Treasury which 
demonstrated the effect of this on take-home pay. The 
working party had also considered a variety of possible 
levels of child support, various options open to it, and 
their effect on overall family support by the end of the 
transition period. Her assessment of the TUC's position 
is interesting. 
'It is remarkable that the trade unions movement 
has said that within the next two years - even in 
advance of a firm Government commitment on 
additional resources -(ýt6)wants to see child tax 
allowances phased out'. 
As evidence of its good faith the TUC General Council had 
sent its representatives to the working party armed with 
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full plenary powers. Similarly, Barbara Castle and 
Judith Hart as representatives of the party's NEC had 
been given plenary powers by the NEC. 
The document contained the recognition that the 
government was not prepared to make more than £95 million 
available for the start of the scheme in April. 1977 but 
this did not mean that all parties to the statement 
agreed with the government's financial limit. Castle 
herself stuck to her position that the government could 
and should have made more money available for the full 
implementation of the scheme in April. 1977. Child 
Benefit was to be financed out of the Contingency Fund 
and she still maintained that there was enough money 
available in the Fund to finance its introduction in full 
in April, 1977. That this had not been done was because 
of one of two things; either the government had 
reordered its priorities with claims on the Contingency 
Fund or, her belief. that the postponement of Child 
Benefit represented the first round of the govenrment's 
future public expenditure cuts. Despite their 
reservations about the government's policy the members of 
the working party had recognised the realities facing 
them and had agreed to clear the way for a progressive 
switch to Child Benefit by making Ennals' proposals tax- 
free and by starting to phase out child tax allowances. 
The agreement meant that there would have to be an 
amendment in the next Finance Bill to impose income tax 
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and. clawback on the new benefit. Castle repeatedly 
stressed that the government's representatives on the 
working party had accepted that the abolition of child 
tax allowances should be completed over the next two 
years, an acceptance that was not subject to any caveats 
about public expenditure. 
'It means that the Chancellor will not again, in 
the coming two years, be able to bolster pay policy 
at the expense of the mother. This commitment by 
Government representatives on the working party is 
of eilme importance form that point of 
view'* 
If the Chancellor wanted TUC acquiescence for future pay 
restraint in the next two or three years a pre-condition 
of that acceptance was the availability of more money for 
Child Benefit. The TUC had made it clear in the 
statement that it would not be happy to see take-home pay 
reduced unless there was an overall gain to the family 
and in this it had the support of both the Parliamentary 
Labour Party and the NEC. To this end - it was their 
belief that the government would have to allocate extra 
resources to increase the Child Benefit rate in 1978 and 
1979. For their part, the Ministerial representatifes on 
the working party accepted that whilst there could be no 
commitment about the availability of those extra 
resources they would advise the government that the TUC 
and Labour Party representatives, 
'... expect the Government to accept that there is a 
financial commitment in the agreement reached on 
the phasing in of the scheme as it concerns the 
overal11581evel of family support in those 
years' 
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Castle concluded that the working party had been a 
valuable educational experience and repeated its 
unanimous recommendation that it be kept in existence to 
review progress on the programme's introduction. The 
opportunity should be taken to publish the detailed data 
agreed with the Treasury as part of an educational 
campaign to prepare the public for the move to Child 
Benefit over the next two years. Great gains had come 
from the movement's row with the Government. Child 
Benefit had been saved for the lifetime of the current 
Parliament, the government had been forced to admit the 
inter-relationship between tax reliefs and social 
benefits, and the government had recognised that that 
inter-relationship ought to be discussed publicly rather 
than decided unilaterally by the Chancellor. 
(159) 
Despite the real concessions it had won from the 
government the working party's report was not received 
with unanimous rejoicing by Labour critics. Having 
recalled the government's previous failure to honour the 
promises it had made during the Committee and Report 
stages of the Child Benefit Bill, Andrew Bennett went on 
to damn with faint praise the working party's 'model 
proposals' which he nonetheless hoped would receive a 
firm commitment from the government. For present 
purposes much the most intereting part of Bennett's 
speech was his identification of the contribution that 
Child Benefit could make to a reduction in the scope of 
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the poverty trap as one of its two major attractions (the 
other being that it solved the problem of take-up). 
(160) 
Although not an observation of any startling intellectual 
originality. Bennett's comment is the first public, 
parliamentary reference by a Labour MP to a 
characteristic of Child Benefit that had clear 
implications for work incentives. It should be noted 
however that Bennett himself did not proceed to 
articulate these possibilities. Along with the outraged 
Barbara Castle, Helene Hayman had been probably the most 
persistent and vocal Labour critic of the government's 
initial volte-face on the introduction of Child Benefit 
and, like Bennett, she could summon up no more than a 
lukewarm welcome for the working party's efforts. When 
implemented the recommendations would ensure that the 
party would have got more than would otherwise have been 
the case, indeed she had been afraid that after Ennals' 
statement on May 25th, the introduction of £1 a week in 
respect of the first or only dependent child would be all 
that would be seen of Child Benefit. She remained 
greatly disappointed that it would not be until 1979 that 
Child Benefit was fully operationalised, particularly 
given the original intention to begin in 1976. For her 
the most important redistributive element of the Child 
Benefit idea was not that from man to woman within the 
family, but from taxpayers in general particularly those 
at the top end of the income tax scale, to those families 
which had never enjoyed the advantages' of child tax 
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allowances because their earnings were too low. That was 
why she would have supported a scheme that entailed no 
extra cost, and why together with many other Labour 
backbenchers. she would have been prepared to defeat the 
government in the Adjournment Debate on June 28th. 
(161) 
Stan Orme's closing remarks for the government were 
generally unremarkable although one or two of his 
comments merit some consideration in this context. He 
made it abundantly clear that the working party's report 
had the unequivocal support of himself and the Chief 
Secretary to the Treasury, Joel Barnett. If they had had 
any doubts they would not have signed the document. The 
report's proposals would go ad referendum to the working 
party's constituent bodies and would receive urgent 
consideration by the government. No one could have any 
doubt that the policy would involve a phasing out of 
child tax allowances and thus a consequent reduction in 
take-home pay. Child Benefit represented a real transfer 
of resources to women, especially to working class women 
P 
and in so doing gave them an economic independence they 
had never had before. But, the real value of Child 
Benefit was that it combatted both the means test and the 
poverty-trap. Bennett's earlier comment about the 
relationship between Child Benefit and the poverty trap 
seems to have been mildly infectious. certainly in so far 
as it prompted a government minister to voice a feature 
of the scheme that had not previously been widely aired 
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in Parliament by Labour politicians. Orme's comments 
were the second such articulation. 
(162) 
Ennals' statement on 25th May, and the subsequent 
revelations in the 'New Society' article on June 17th, 
fuelled widespread anger throughout all sections of the 
Labour Party and the government's mauling over Child 
I 
Benefit was to continue at the party's annual conference 
at the end of September. A lengthy resolution (Composite 
35) was presented to delegates by St. Pancras North CL P, 
which, because it gives a comprehensive summary of the 
nature of the party's discontent is worth quoting in 
full. Thus: 
'This Conference condemns the government's failure 
to implement the Child Benefit Scheme in full in 
April, 1977. It condemns the Government's decision 
not to transfer payment of Children's tax 
allowances on to the direct child allowance and 
feels that the reasoning behind the Government's 
decision underestimates the capacity of working men 
to understand the benefit of the increase in total 
family income. Conference demands that the 
Government keeps its manifesto pledges and 
implements the scheme in full. It calls on the 
Government to set benefits at a generous level 
which will benefit all ordinary taxpayers with 
families and uprate benefits annually in line with 
average earnings, prices and other social security 
benefits to ensure that families withgý ildren keep 
ahead of the effects of inflation'. 
Wendy Mantle's speech in moving Composite 35 is 
significant amongst other things because she argued that 
the most important characteristic of Child Benefit was 
its ability to 
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'... get rid of the disincentive to work which 
obtains when an unemployed father who can get £3.80 
per child per week from the Department of Health 
and Social Security when out of work, cannot be 
sure of getting a job which pays enougl1lft5 him to 
qualify for the present tax allowance'. 
For the first time in public a member of the Labour 
Party, albeit not a particularly celebrated one, had 
squarely placed Child Benefit in the context of the 
relationship between benefit income and low earnings. In 
widening the gap between income from employment and 
income in periods of non-employment Child Benefit was 
performing that function which had so commended Family 
Allowances to William Beveridge, Keynes, and other 
apologists of liberal collectivism. That a delegate 
should so speak in public, while moving a resolution 
which the NEC wished to see remitted, is an interesting 
point. The compromise agreed by the TUC/Labour Party 
working party, while a welcome change of heart by the 
government, did not commit itself to a specific level of 
benefit with annual uprating in line with other social 
security benefits. Composite 35 sought to remedy this 
omission. The party programme itself only called for 
regular uprating while the government had not even 
accepted that more money should be made available for the 
scheme in 1978 as the working aprty had recommended. She 
believed that if Conference rejected the composite it 
would be a betrayal of the poor who had traditionally 
been the movement's first concern and whilst the poor 
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might not have the power of corporate capital or 
organised labour they did have votes and an ability to 
recognise the governments policy as an emasculated 
compromise based on expediency and not justice. If the 
government continued to behave in this way it might yet 
have to pay a political price. 
(165) 
The seconder of the 
resolution, Stuart Weir, identified two principles which 
he believed ought to inform the implementation of the 
scheme after 1978. Benefits had to be generous enough to 
take out of poverty the poorest 200,000 families in work 
who did not pay tax. They also had to be generous enough 
to improve the living standards of ordinary taxpaying 
families since declining tax thresholds over the last 
fifteen years had penalised families with children 
compared with childless households. Secondly, benefits 
had to be uprated annually to maintain their real value. 
Family Allowances and Child tax allowances had both 
declined in real terms since the war, as a result of 
which the country had treated children less generously 
than the elderly. 
(166) 
The main purpose of the party hierarchy in its attempt to 
persuade delegates not to vote for the resolution was to 
accept that there was no point in fighting battles that 
had already been won, an observation which, perhaps not 
surprisingly, elicited cries of disagreement from the 
body of the hall. Stan Orme speaking ex-officio reminded 
conference that the joint committee had come to a 
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unanimous recommendation that the full Child Benefit 
scheme be phased in over three years, a proposal which 
the Cabinet had accepted the previous week. Arguments 
about the rate of benefit were open for discussion and 
although the government could not at that stage commit 
itself to any more expenditure, its belief in Child 
Benefit was absolutely fundamental. The unique agreement 
reached by the joint committee had consequently rendered 
Composite 35 out of date. 
(167) 
In replying to the debate 
for the NEC. Fred Malley did nothing but reiterate the 
government's claim that the threat to pay policy 
contained in the immediate implementation of the 
arrangements laid down in the 1975 Child Benefit Act was 
so great that its introduction in 1977 could not be 
countenanced. He tried to present a picture of a 
government so sensitive to party anger that it had 
conceded the creation of the joint working party which 
had been so successful in reconciling the different 
positions of party and government that it might serve as 
a model for the resolution of similarly contentious 
issues in future. Despite Orme's and Malley's efforts 
the mover of Composite 35 refused the NEC's call to 
remit, and Conference carried a resolution that was very 
critical of the governments actions. 
(168) 
The fact that Composite 35 was carried against the wishes 
of the NEC demonstrated the extent of the unhappiness in 
the party as a whole, an unhappiness that the 
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Conservative Opposition was determined to exploit. 
Accordingly, on February 9th, 1977, the Opposition used 
one of its Supply Days to initiate a further debate on 
169). ( 
the Child Benefit scheme in the House of Commons 
Central to Patrick Jenkin's synopsis of Child Benefits' 
advantages was the contribution it could make to the 
reduction of the poverty trap and the improvement in work 
incentives, 
'it is the way to restore the incentive to work and 
to put paid to t e-05onsense of people being better 
off out of work' 
Despite this though, the major thrust of his criticism of 
government policy was his allegation of administrative 
delay and incompetence in the preparations for the 
beginning of the phased implementation due to start in 
April. 
(171) 
Orme was oblivious to Jenkin's identification 
of Child Benefit's relationship to the labour market and 
yet again went into a further repetition of the reasons 
why the government had firstly decided on a phased 
implementation. These arrangements provided that in the 
tax year beginning April. 1977 the mother would receive 
£1 for the first child-and £1.50 for other children, 
while in a family paying basic rate tax the father would 
lose 70p. In the following two years take-home pay would 
be reduced in two further stages through cuts in child 
tax allowances which would be made good by Child Benefit 
increases payable to the mother. On current tax rates 
and allowances the further transfer from take-home pay to 
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benefit over the two years taken together would be £1.32 
a week for the first child and £1.14 a week for every 
other child. Even given these provisions Orme still 
believed that the government had a lot of explaining to 
do, particularly to husbands. about the implications of 
the transfer from child tax allownces to benefit. 
(172) 
Orme's speech failed to allay the doubts and fears of all 
the government's Labour critics as John Ovenenden's 
speech(173) illustated, and the continuing tension 
between party and government is further evidenced in an 
exchange of letters between the Social Policy Sub- 
Committee and Joel Barnett, the Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury through the Spring and early Summer of 
1977. 
(174) 
In January 1977 the sub-committee had agreed 
that a letter should be sent to Joel Barnett concerning 
government policy on the annual uprating of Child 
Benefit. Although no copy of this letter was available 
in the party's archives it appears from Barnett's 
response to it on the 18th March 1977, that the Chairman 
of the Social Policy Sub-Committee wrote to him on 
February 4th, drawing attention to the Conference 
resolution on Child Benefit and in particular its call 
that it be uprated annually in line with earnings. 
(175) 
In his reply, Barnett accepted that the 1975 Child 
Benefit Act provided that the Secretary of State had to 
consider each year whether the child benefit rate ought 
to be increased. However, such a review must be located 
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in the context of the national economic situation, 
genuine living standards, and other relevant matters, but 
not explicitly movements in earnings or prices. Barnett 
also reminded the members of the sub-committee that there 
was no obligation to uprate benefit consequent on such a 
review. He argued that the background to this position 
lay in the fact that child benefit replaced Family 
Allowances and child tax allowances, and there had never 
been any statutory commitment to uprate either of these 
annually in line with earnings or prices. Instead, they 
had been increased from time to time by varying amounts 
when the government had judged, often in the context of 
the Budget, that this was justified by the economic 
situation and related considerations. Barnett believed 
that the government should not move from this position 
and commit itself to an annual uprating in line with 
prices and certainly not one in line with earnings, 
'To uprate in line with earnings would, in normal 
circumstances mean bigger upratings of child 
benefit than of short-term benefits such as 
sickness or unemployment benefit, on which many 
people, (ffgýnd for their main source of 
income. ' 
In saying this he was not ruling out improvements in the 
purchasing power of Child Benefit but he believed it 
would be wrong to commit the government to this on an 
automatic basis. Any commitment to protect the real 
value of child benefit by indexing them with movements in 
prices would also cause problems. In their current 
circumstances it would mean increasing Child Benefit by 
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an amount greater than the increase in earnings of those 
people who would have to be taxed to pay for it. 
Moreover it had to be remembered that Child Benefit was 
only additional to the main family income rather than a 
benefit which itself provided that income such as 
unemployment or sickness benefit, where the case for 
price index linking was stronger. The child dependency 
additions to National Insurance benefits and 
Supplementary Benefit were regularly uprated at least 
annually and at least in line with prices, and the 
prescribed amounts for EIS had also been uprated at least 
annually. These upratings in respect of dependent 
children ensured that those in need did not suffer if 
Child Benefit was not uprated every year. Barnett's 
final comment reminded the sub-committee of cost. No 
benefit was more expensive to uprate by a given cash 
amount than Child Benefit, because Child Benefit covered 
far more eligible children than any other social security 
benefit. Each lp. extra on the rate cost £7 million and 
there were bound to be yearp when the government simply 
did not have the money to pay for a price uprating. 
Given all these considerations Barnett felt that the 
correct approach was to continue with present 
arrangements and to decide each year, whether an uprating 
was appropriate in the light of circumstances then 
obtaining. To go further would be ill advised and might 
arouse expectations that the government could not 
fulfil. (177) 
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Barnett's rejection of Composite 35. and his less than 
wholehearted endorsement of Child Benefits, disturbed the 
Social Policy Sub-Committee and on May 12th, 1977 Barbara 
Castle sent a detailed reply to his letter on behalf of 
the sub-committee. 
(178) Castle's letter began with a 
detailed rebuttal of Barnett's claim that the regular 
uprating of Child Benefit would not be relevant to those 
in need and then turned to his assumption that benefits 
which did not provide many people with their main sources 
of income did not need to be up-rated annually. The sub- 
committee developed two counter arguments to Barnett's 
contention. First of all, they claimed there were 
benefits which were patently not the main source of 
income, such as maternity allowances and widows' basic 
pensions which were uprated on a yearly basis. Secondly, 
a basic component of income, even when forming a minor 
share of total income, had to be treated for up-rating 
purposes in the same way as the major source of total 
income, otherwise the principles of equity between 
different types of family and people with different forms 
of income composition would be offended. With an 
increasing number of children it was evident that Child 
Benefits would comprise an increasing proportion of total 
income. The sub-committee was accordingly moved to 
speculate whether it was a deliberate part of government 
policy during a period of inflation to discriminate 
against those wage-earners with children and particularly 
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to discriminate disproportionately severely against those 
with a larger family? It argued that 
'the essential purpose of child benefits. like 
family allowances since 1945, has been to make some 
contribution towards equitYOM tween wage earners 
with and without children'. 
The Labour Party had long believed that child tax 
allowances were never an effective policy instrument for 
achieving this principle, since the lower wage-earners 
could not benefit fully from them. If an equitable 
structure of net incomes in the community was to be 
maintained, annual upratings of Child Benefit were 
essential. 
Finally, the sub-committee attacked Barnett's claim that 
the costs of a commitment to an annual uprating of Child 
Benefit would be unduly high. Wages were not, and could 
not be, related to family size and proposals to 
redistribute income in order to reduce family poverty and 
establish equity in living standards between families of 
different size, had to provide a cash allowance in 
respect of each dependent child. The annual uprating of 
Child Benefit should be regarded as a necessary component 
of any incomes policy, and was certainly less expensive 
as well as more equitable than the indiscriminate 
adjustment of personal tax allowances for married people 
to achieve the same objective* 
(180) 
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The sub-committee's critique of Barnett's original 
response to its concerns stimulated him to a detailed 
reply to the points made in Castle's letter. With regard 
to the question of Child Benefit's relevance to the needy 
Barnett conceded that, as the Labour Party had argued for 
a long time, the transition from child tax allowances to 
Child Benefit was helpful in extending the full value of 
family support to the 'relatively small' number of 
families with incomes below the tax threshold and was an 
undoubted improvement in terms of alleviating family 
poverty. But having made this concession he went on to 
say that, 
'... it would be a serious mistake to ignore the 
fact that increases in child benefit are not a 
cost-effeýtf1ý way of relieving family 
poverty'. 
As evidence for this claim he cited a DHSS analysis which 
showed that only 21% of Child Benefit went to low income 
households (defined as households in the bottom quintile 
of the distribution of equivalent normal household 
income). The cost effectiveness of Child Benefit was 
reduced still further in terms of the net effect on 
household income. A large proportion (over a third) of 
low income Child Benefit recipients were dependent on 
other social security benefits and the dependency 
additions for children paid with those benefits were 
reduced to reflect the Child Benefit increase so that 
increases in Child Benefit did not represent additional 
support for children in those circumstances. If 
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households with children receiving National Insurnce and 
Supplementary Benefits were excluded then low income 
households received only 15% of expenditure on Child 
Benefit. 
Barnett failed to understand the sub-committee's critique 
of his distinction between those benefits which 
represented the main or only source of family income and 
those which supplemented other income. However he 
accepted its assertion that the purpose of Child Benefit 
was to secure equity between different family types. But 
it had never been government policy to compensate parents 
for the full cost of having children since parents 
voluntarily chose the personal satisfactions of having 
children. What represented equity at any particular time 
was a matter of judgement in the light of prevailing 
circumstances and other social priorities. Given this it 
was not clear that there would be any advantage in 
rigidly preserving a particular historical position from 
year to year by means of a statutory uprating commitment 
for Child Benefit. 
In a similar vein he reiterated his belief that Child 
Benefit was too costly to uprate annually in line with 
earnings or prices. There was no escaping the fact that 
a statutory uprating commitment would limit the 
government's already constrained freedom of manoeuvre to 
deploy resources to meet other social expenditure 
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priorities according to the needs of the time. The 
govenrment had already considerably reduced that freedom 
by entering into statutory uprating commitments on other 
social security benefits. 
'I am not therefore persuaded that it would be 
right to give child benefit increases automatic 
priority over other socially useful expenditure by 
means of a statutory obligation tq ate each year 
in line with prices or earnings'. llýý 
He believed this not because he was any less convinced of 
the case for universal family support than was the Social 
Policy Sub-Committee but because limiting the 
government's flexibility in this way could not help to 
achieve its broader objectives. 
Barnett's refusal to accept the substance of the sub- 
committee's case prompted it to make one final attempt to 
change his mind. 
(183) 
The major theme of this last item 
of correspondence was Barnett's previous description of 
Child Benefit not being a cost effective way of relieving 
family poverty. Taking Barnett's own definition of cost- 
effectiveness the sub-committee argued that any increase 
in the Child Benefit rate would ensure that all (the sub- 
committee's emphasis) children in the bottom quintile of 
the distribution of equivalent normal net household 
income would be helped. Given that there would be no, or 
virtually no, exceptions, Child Benefit could be 
described as extremely effective. Furthermore, costs 
would be concentrated on families with children (and, 
435 
according to the number of children), instead of being 
dispensed among single and married people. many of who 
had no dependent children which would be the case 
following an incease in the level of personal tax 
allowances or food subsidies or a reduction in tax rates. 
Compared with other measures the government had taken 
recently (such as the increase in personal tax 
allowances) increases in Child Benefit could be said to 
be very cost-effective in reducing family poverty. 
As in its previous letter the sub-committee's main 
argument was that Child Benefit necessarily served three 
major policy objectives simultaneously; reducing family 
poverty, establishing equity between adults with and 
without dependent children, and providing a basis of 
support for the family in rearing the next generation. 
Consequently, the cost-effectiveness of Child Benefit 
could only be judged in relation to those three functions 
and especially its equity function. This was why it was 
wrong for Barnett to suggest that because only 21% of 
Child Benefit expenditure reached the bottom quintile of 
families the other 79% was wasted. By serving well its 
three major objectives Child Benefit was extremely cost- 
effective. A generous level of benefit not only served 
the principle of equalising the tax burden between 
families with the same original income but different 
numbers of dependent children. It also helped to reduce 
family poverty and to that extent made unnecessary 
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separate provision to reduce poverty. Almost as an 
afterthought, because it did not figure in the list of 
three major objectives articulated earlier. the sub- 
committee finished its letter by saying that, 
'... since family incomes are increased universally, 
the scale of the poverty trap is reduced. the net 
incomes of those in work increase more than those 
not in worý18a, id earning incentives are probably 
increased'. 
The sub-committee's letter marked the end of what had 
become a protracted correspondence although there was an 
exchange of opinion between Barnett and the TUC/Labour 
Party Working Party on Child Benefit on the question of 
how much Child Benefit helped poor families. This latter 
discussion has all the characteristics of being an 
exercise in self-justification on Barnett's part and adds 
nothing of any significance to the material considered 
above. 
(185) 
What does this debate tell us about the respective 
positions of the Labour Party and the Labour Government 
on the Child Benefit issue in general and its 
relationship to the labour market in particuar? The 
Social Policy Sub-Committee's overall responsibility was 
to feed ideas into the party's policy making machinery 
without, of course, any guarantee that its ideas would be 
accepted and find a place in the party's programme. 
Nonetheless it was a key source of opinion about what 
stance the party should take on social policy issues and 
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it is interesting to note the extent of its concern about 
the government's commitment to Child Benefit. The 
outcome of the TUC/Labour Party working party had failed 
to satisfy the most persistent critics of the government 
within the party, an unease further illustrated by the 
Annual Conference's acceptance, against the wishes of the 
party's hierarchy, of the very critical Composite 35. In 
its discussion with Barnett, the Social Policy Sub- 
Committee had failed to persuade him to accept Composite 
35's call for the indexing and annualuprating of Child 
Benefit, inded he had specifically rejected such an 
innovation primarily on the grounds of - cost and Child 
Benefits ineffectiveness in directing help to the 
neediest part of the population, defined by Barnett as 
the lowest quintile of net equivalent household income. 
Faced with such intransigence the Social Policy Sub- 
Committee had attempted to demonstrate Child Benefits 
cost-effectiveness and in the process had identified what 
its members regarded as the programme's three most 
important objectives, reducing family poverty, 
establishing equity between adults with and without 
dependent children, and providing a basis of support for 
the family in rearing the next generation. Only in its 
last letter, and then for the first time, did the sub- 
committee bring into the debate Child Benefits' probable 
contribution to increasing work incentives. While paying 
lip service to the party's commitment to Child Benefit, 
Barnett could hardly have made clearer the extent of his 
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reluctance to increase the rate of benefit except in the 
most favourable of economic circumstances. As Chief 
Secretary to the Treasury he was responsible for the 
government's public expenditure programme and throughout 
the correspondence with the Social Policy Sub-Committee 
he made it apparent that Child Benefits' expense as a 
universal method of delivering family income support was 
what concerned him most. Despite his membership of 'the 
working party which produced the phasing-in compromise. 
Barnett was as determined to limit the size of public 
spending as any other occupant of his post. His 
criticism of Child Benefits inability to target 
expenditure more effectively, and his unfavourable 
comparisons of the scheme with FIS in this regard (see 
the section on the Family Income Supplement for detailed 
consideration of this), leave him only a small step away 
from calling for means-testing of Child Benefit, since 
that is what the reiterated demand for giving most help 
to those whose needs were greatest has always meant in 
the past. At no point did Barnett make any overt 
reference to Child Benefits' incentive characteristics, 
although several of his observations can be interpreted 
as having implications for this issue. Thus, when he 
rejected the suggestion that the rate of Child Benefit be 
increased in line with earnings he did so on the grounds 
that this would widen the gap between income from 
employment compared with income from periods of 
dependence on short-term benefit such as sickness and 
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unemployment which many depended on as their only source 
of income. In arguing this Barnett can be said to be 
ignoring the clear theoretical boost such an innovation 
would have given to the work incentives of especially the 
low paid. In a similar vein. his comment that Child 
Benefit did not provide extra income for those recipients 
of social security benefits is obviously true but in 
using this reality to contend that this reduced Child 
Benefit's cost effectiveness he was once again turning 
his back on the scheme's incentive characteristics. 
Given his position on the right of the parliamentary 
party and as custodian of the public purse it is perhaps 
surprising that the Chief Secretary to the Treasury left 
it to the Social Policy Sub-Committee to break the 
party's silence on this point. 
From this point on, and for the remainder of the life of 
the 1974-79 Labour Government, the discussion on Child 
Benefit within the Labour Party and the major point at 
issue between the party and the government became the 
f 
relationship between Child Benefit and the dependency 
additions in respect of children in the National 
Insurance and Supplementary Benefit systems. Perhaps 
because of this the whole question of Child Benefit and 
work incentives surfaced more openly in internal party 
debates. When Linda Chalker had asked David Ennals on 
May 10th, 1977 whether he accepted that large increases 
in dependency additions for children of the unemployed by 
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comparison with small increases in Child Benefit would 
make it more worthwhile for many family men with children 
to be unemployed rather than remain in work, the 
Secretary of State had reacted angrily. He claimed that 
the number of people who were better off unemployed was 
very small and that it was 
'... one of those canards that the Opposition have 
flogged around the country. It is abs}99gly 
untrue, and it does a great deal of damage'. ' 
Ennal's articulation of the government's faith in the 
work incentives of the low paid must have remained 
unshaken because together with his Minister of State, 
Stan Orme, he refused to commit the government to 
increase Child Benefit to the same level as the 
dependency additions in respect of children in the 
National Insurance and Supplementary Benefit programmes. 
In February, 1978 Peter Bottomley asked Orme if the 
government would accept a future target of setting a 
F 
Child Benefit rate sufficient to give a man the same 
amount for his children regardless of whether he was 
working, sick, or unemployed. The Minister's reply was 
evasive, saying that because Child Benefit was taxfree it 
benefited the man in work, particularly the low-wage 
earner with a family. Before considering the substance 
of Bottomley's question the government wanted to get the 
level of benefit right first. After Child Benefit had 
been phased in the matter could be considered. 
(187) 
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Given Orme's response to Bottomley's question, Barbara 
Castle was moved to comment that two of the parties to 
the joint working party which had produced the phasing-in 
solution. the TUC and the Labour Party's NEC, believed 
that by April, 1979. 
' ... child benefits should reach the target of the 
equivalent (gi8) the 
dependent's allowance for the 
unemployed' 
Did Orme's reply indicate that the government was not as 
enthusiastic about this as the TUC and the Labour Party? 
Orme remained as non-commital as ever, contenting himself 
with the reply that the joint working party's views had 
been placed before the government. In the meantime, 
benefit levels would be reviewed in the light of 
circumstances. 
(189) 
On this point it is worth noting 
that on the same day that Orme was being evasive with 
questioners from both the Labour and Conservative 
Parties, his superior was much more forthcoming. When 
asked in a Written Question from Sir Brandon Rays 
Williams if it was the government's policy to raise the 
i 
benefits paid in respect of the children of men in full- 
time work to the same level as those paid under the 
insurance and assistance systems for children of men who 
were unemployed. David Ennals replied with an unequivocal 
'no'. Exactly why the Secretary of State and his 
Minister should give such different answers is unclear 
but it can be taken that Ennals represented the 
government's real position. 
(190) 
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Developments within the party's internal committee system 
reflect the same concerns as Parliamentary proceedings 
but provide much more detail and overt awareness of the 
issues involved. In March, 1978 the Social Policy Sub- 
Committee produced a paper on the case for and against 
raising Child Benefit rates to the same level as the 
National Insurance short-term child dependency 
rates. 
(191) 
The objective of the TUC and the party's NEC 
was a Child Benefit rate large enough to subsume the 
National Insurance short-term child dependency rate. 
currently at £4.50. A figure of £8.40 was needed to 
subsume the long-term rate and age related benefits from 
£4.10 to £8.90 to subsume the scale rates for children 
under the Supplementary Benefits system. To support this 
development the sub-committee's paper argued that it 
would clearly help with work incentives if an unemployed 
man did not receive more family income support when out 
of work by way of unemployment benefit. 
(192) 
This part 
of the sub-committee's paper is little different from the 
heart of the argument for the wage stop which, perhaps 
ironically, had been finally abolished by the 1975 Child 
Benefit Act. A very similar argument was put forward in 
June by the NEC/Cabinet Working Group on Social Policy 
and Education. 
(193) 
which, in fact repeats a great deal 
of the Social Policy Sub-Committee's earlier paper noted 
immediately above. 
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Regardless of these earlier thoughts much the most 
important document produced by the party appeared in 
December 1978 in the form of the 'Report of the 
TUC/Labour Party Working Group on Short Term 
Benefits'. 
(194) 
As its title suggests, family income 
support policy was not the working group's main concern, 
but the relationship between short-term benefits and 
income from employment, particularly low-paid employment 
was bound to be affected by the existence of Child 
Benefit and it is this which makes the report's 
observations relevant to the concerns of this research. 
Before considering the report in detail, it is perhaps 
worth noting that of the six representatives from the 
Labour Party on the working group, four (Brian Abel- 
Smith, Peter Townsend, Ruth Lister. and Tony Lynes) were 
major figures in both the academic world and the anti- 
poverty lobby, whilst one other (Stan Orme) was a 
Minister of State at the D. H. S. S. The other 
representative was Ms. T. O'Connell. It goes without 
saying that, at the least. tt}e party's representation was 
authoritative. 
It had become apparent at the group's first meeting in 
May. 1977 that any significant improvement in the general 
level of short-term benefits would result in a minority 
of claimants with several dependent children and low 
earning capacity being as well or better off out of work 
than in work. What the report described as the 
'dramatic' improvement in the value of Child Benefit 
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since May, 1977, including the increase to £4 per child 
due in April, 1979, had greatly reduced the significance 
of this problem. It would be further reduced when Child 
Benefit was raised to a level at which the addition to 
short-term National Insurance benefits for dependent 
children could be phased out altogether. The group was 
satisfied that, given these improvements in Child 
Benefit, its proposals on short-term benefits would not 
cause any serious disincentive problems. It emphasised 
though that this conclusion would only remain valid if 
Child Benefit, once raised to the level of the short-term 
dependency additions for children, was then increased 
regularly at least in line with average earnings. 
Failure to do this would either lead to the re- 
introduction of dependency additions or undermine the 
adequacy of the short-term benefit rates for dependent 
children. 
(195) 
The essence of this part of the working 
group's report is exactly that which Beveridge deployed 
in his laudatory comments about Family Allowances' 
contribution to the work incentives of the low paid. 
Child Benefit, like Family Allowances, was paid to and 
retained by all workers (in the case of Family 
Allowances, all workers with two or more dependent 
children) with the additional advantage that, unlike 
Family Allowances, Child Benefit was not taxable. By 
reducing, and ultimately phasing out completely, the 
value of the child dependency addition to short-term 
benefits, Beveridge's central objective of making as 
large as possible (given the aim of attacking family 
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poverty) the gap between income from employment and 
income from benefit could be achieved and work incentives 
maintained or augmented. Nowhere else can one find in 
any of the primary sources on the Labour Party such a 
clear exposition of Child Benefit's theoretical 
consequences for work incentives at the bottom end of the 
distribution of earnings. It is also not without 
significance that this recognition comes from people who 
at the time formed a substantial proportion of the 
leadership of the anti-poverty lobby, and that it is 
expressed in terms that are entirely consistent with 
liberal political economy, fixated as it was with the 
labour market and incentives to work. Anyone looking for 
ideological symbols could do worse than select the 
party's pledge in its 1979 manifesto that as a step 
towards meeting its objective that families got as much 
help for their children when working as they did on 
short-term benefits, it would increase Child Benefit to 
£4.50 per child in November. There is an air of 
plaintive surrender in the Social Policy Sub-Committee's 
complaint that the incoming Conservative Government had 
scrapped Labour's plans and in so, doing had failed to 
engage in its claim to be concerned about reducing 
disincentives to work. The increase to £4 per child in 
the Child Benefit rate in April. 1979, had reduced the 
gap in child support between those in and out of work to 
85p. per child. Following the Conservative Government's 
increase in short-term benefit rates from November, 1979, 
this gap would be doubled to £1.70. 
(196) 
446 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although Child Benefit is paid in respect of every 
dependent child and is not subject to taxation, in 
essence and principle it has exactly the same 
relationship to income from social security benefits as 
Family Allowances, and perhaps it is not too surprising 
therefore that the Labour Party's thinking on both 
programmes should bear a number of similarities, not 
least in terms of the party's interpretation of their 
implications for labour supply. Before looking at this 
most important issue however it might be instructive to 
make a number of more general observations about the 
context within which the party's understanding developed. 
Politically the mechanics of the introduction of Child 
Benefits were a self-inflicted disaster for the Labour 
Government. Rarely can a government have acted with such 
public ineptitude. To some extent Callaghan's attempt to 
abdicate from his responsibilities on Child Benefits 
echoes the agonised debate about the introduction of 
claw-back into the Family Allowance system between 1966- 
7, although even that episode was handled with a touch 
that seems masterly by comparison with the shambles that 
attended the eventual introduction of Child Benefits. 
Callaghan was the leading figure on both occasions and it 
is clear that his hostility towards family income support 
policy was a critical factor in the shaping of the final 
outcome. Whether his hostility was a consequence of his 
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fears of 
skilled, 
chauvinism 
purposes* 
frustrated 
appeared 
movement. 
Benefits 
offending Labour's political base in the 
male working class or of traditional male 
is not particularly important for present 
What is, significant is that his opposition 
the implementation of a programme that 
to command general support within the Labour 
It would appear that in the case of Child 
the government, especially after Callaghan 
became Prime Minister in 1976, lacked the political will 
to proceed with a programme that had been an important 
feature of the Labour Party's election manifestos in 1974 
and which was on the statute book by the end of 1975. 
From the moment of its enactment Child Benefit was a 
major source of conflict within the government, 
particularly between Barbara Castle, as Secretary of 
State for Social Services. and the Treasury. After 
Callaghan had replaced Castle with David Ennals, the 
battle still continued but the new Prime Minister found 
it easier to handle Ennals than the Treasury had Castle. 
Callaghan's appointment as Prime Minister gave the 
Treasury enormous extra support, and his skillful 
exploitation of divisions within the Cabinet and the TUC 
delayed the implementation of the full Child Benefit 
programme until 1979. His success was not without a 
major political price however. Not only did he provide 
the Conservative Party with a perfect opportunity to 
attack the government but he also provoked a major 
conflict between the government and the Labour Party, and 
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in a parliamentary position where the government's tiny 
overall majority was soon to disappear entirely this was 
a dangerous dispute to provoke. The Labour Party has 
always been a volatile organisation and Michael Cocks' 
assurance as Chief Whip that backbench opinion was 
solidly behind Callaghan on the Child Benefit issue was 
never true. Party Conference, never a body to get overly 
concerned about family income support, was made critical 
and suspicious of government attitudes, and only added to 
the difficulties that Callaghan's actions themselves had 
provoked. Although Callaghan fully deserved the 
opprobrium heaped on him after Field's article made 
public the extent of his deception, from the beginning of 
Child Benefits' progress through the House of Commons a 
few backbenchers had always harboured doubts about the 
strength of the government's commitment to the policy, 
and even under Wilson's premiership the government's 
business managers had dealt ruthlessly with opposition 
from their own supporters. Helene Hayman's exclusion 
from the Committee Stage of the bill's proceedings is 
evidence of this, as is the government's packing of its 
side of the Committee's membership with an unusually 
large payroll vote. 
Although the TUC supported Child Benefits and had made 
its implementation a condition of Council's acceptance of 
the Social Contract, there were still important sections 
of the trade union movement, and some individual union 
leaders, who exhibited that traditional union hostility 
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to family income support that had characterised union 
attitudes to Family Allowances for such a long time. 
Callaghan was able to exploit these , 
divisions, 
particularly by playing on the threat to notions of 
masculine dominance represented by the redistribution of 
income within the family from 'the wallet to the purse' 
as current phraseology had it, necessarily occasioned by 
the phasing out of child tax allowances and their 
replacement, along with Family Allowances, by Child 
Benefits. 
It is impossible' to look at Child Benefit without being 
aware of its implications for public expenditure and 
public expenditure constraints' implications for it. 
Child Benefits are universal, tax free,, paid in respect 
of every dependent child and costly. In any government 
the Treasury would be bound to keep a vigilant eye on 
proposals to develop Child Benefits in ways that would 
make even greater demands on the public purse, as for 
example, would be the case with the Labour Party's 
periodic demands that Benefit be reviewed each year to 
take account of inflation and age-related to reflect more 
accurately the real costs of bringing up children. 
Throughout the period covered by this examination of 
Child Benefits the Treasury did everything it could to 
minimise its cost, regardless of political commitment and 
legislative obligation. The Treasury view was that Child 
Benefit was an ineffective mechanism for delivering 
income to the poorest families with dependent children. 
450 
It preferred a programme that in its opinion would target 
resources more effectively (and cheaply), a preference 
that is clearly illustrated in the exchanges between 
Castle and Barnett about the rate that should be adopted, 
and the liking that Barnett expressed for F. I. S. in his 
correspondence with the Labour Party's Social Policy Sub- 
Committee. 
Fears about public expenditure and Child Benefits' 
alleged threat to Stage Three of the government's pay 
policy, based as it was on net income, were apparently 
the most important reasons behind the Callaghan 
government's efforts to delay the operationalisation of 
the full programme. From the start of its interest in 
the idea of a family endowment scheme to replace child 
tax allowances and Family Allowances, the Labour Party's 
policy makers had always expressed support for paying the 
benefit to the mother rather than the father. It always 
accepted that this would lead to a reduction in male net 
earnings; that was the whole point of Child Benefits. 
Andy Thompson had warned the party of the likely 
consequences of this decision at a very early stage in 
the formulation of the party's Child Benefit proposals 
but his warning had been rejected. The government's 
assertion that Stage Three of its pay policy was 
dependent on net income (lower pay awards in return for 
income tax concessions) is self-evidently true but to 
claim that this vital part of anti-inflationary policy 
was developed without anyone being conscious of Child 
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Benefits' possible impact on it is literally incredible. 
It is to say that neither Callaghan. nor Healey. nor 
Barnett nor any relevant civil servant in the Treasury 
and the D. H. S. S. were aware of the nature of the Child 
Benefits programme. It is at least as likely that the 
government used this argument to hide the fact that its 
most important and influential members were opposed to 
the centrepiece of its policy to combat family poverty. 
Having made these general observations about the 
political and economic context within which the Child 
Benefits drama unfolded, the final, and most important 
task, is to make a judgement about the Labour Party's 
interpretation of the connections between Child Benefits 
and the labour market. By its continuation of the 
practice of substitutability which had been a vital 
feature of Family Allowances, the government 
demonstrated its real belief in Child Benefits as a force 
for the preservation and augmentation of work incentives. 
Since they were free of tax and also paid in respect of 
the first or only dependent child, Child Benefits 
intensified the impact of Family Allowances by making the 
gap in income between periods of earning and non-earning 
as large as possible. If Macnicol is correct in 
ascribing a less-eligibility function to Family 
Allowances, then the same is even more true of Child 
Benefits. It would be difficult for any reasonably well 
informed minister, MP, or party member to be unaware of 
this fact. 
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That the incentive dimension of Child Benefits was hardly 
ever mentioned by the Labour Party in any of its 
publications, or by any of its representatives, at least 
in public, is not without significance. The TUC/Labour 
Party Working Group on Short-Term Benefits was clearly 
aware of the theoretical links between labour supply and 
Child Benefits as its report in December, 1978 indicates. 
Likewise Barbara Castle, as her diary entry for March 
1st, 1976 makes clear. Important though those examples 
are, they are rare exceptions rather than a general rule. 
Otherwise, why should Barbara Castle avoid any mention of 
incentives in her speech introducing the Second Reading 
of the Child Benefits Bill on May 13th, 1975? Perhaps the 
silence can be explained by a genuine belief that the 
real purpose of Child Benefits was to combat family 
poverty and give a modicum of independence to women 
rather than with altering the behaviour of the working 
poor. Conversely, it could be that the party was acutely 
sensitive to the possibility that if it drew attention to 
Child Benefits' less-eligibility characteristics it would 
be 'vulnerable to the charge that in essence the Labour 
Party believed in the same system of political economy 
as the parties of the right. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In the introduction to this thesis a number of general 
questions were posed about the significance of dominant 
and deeply rooted beliefs concerning the relationship 
between earnings and income from benefit, the prevalence 
of workers' susceptibility to the work incentives 
offered by the existence of a gap between earnings and 
benefits, the Labour Party's acceptance of parliamentary 
democracy as the best way of securing economic and 
social change in the interests of workers and their 
families, and the party's image of itself as an 
organisation irrevocably and indubitably committed to 
the alleviation and ultimate abolition of poverty. The 
five previous chapters examined in detail the party's 
response to the policy problems attendant upon attempts 
to reconcile the needs of families with the logic of 
wage determination in a largely free market economy. 
Each of these chapters offered conclusions specific to 
the issue examined. In this final section an attempt is 
made to identify a number of overarching themes relevant 
to the thesis' focal concerns. 
In general it can fairly be said that the Labour Party 
failed to develop any sustained and intellectually 
convincing alternative to established economic and 
social orthodoxy, and as a consequence was continuously 
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on the defensive whenever it suggested alternatives to 
existing practices and procedures. By failing to 
establish a widespread base of political support in 
favour of challenging market outcomes the party was 
forced.. sometimes reluctantly, to accede in those 
criticisms of its ideas that were born out of a genuine 
commitment to the economic and psychological basis of 
incentive theory. 
Having said this however it is important to recognise 
that there was a major difference between the party in 
opposition and the party in government. In all of the 
substantial areas covered by this analysis, but 
especially with regard to the wage-stop, Family Income 
Supplements and Child Benefits, Labour govenrments 
behaved in a very different way from what might have 
been expected from the stance they adopted in 
opposition. Then the wage-stop was an unacceptable 
manifestation of a doctrine that should have been buried 
with the Poor Law in 1948; Family Income Supplements 
were a modern form of allowances in aid of wages and 
meant the permanent pauperisation of the working poor, 
whilst the Child Benefit scheme represented an equitable 
and Socialist response to the problems of family 
poverty. In practice the wage-stop was only abolished 
when it cost more to administer than it saved in 
expenditure, F. I. S. became a valued weapon in the Labour 
Government's range of policy options between 1974-9, and 
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the Child Benefit scheme a costly threat to the 
government's anti-inflation strategy. Although there 
were many individuals and some groups in the party who 
did have a genuine and intellectually coherent vision of 
family income support policy it was, on the whole, not 
shared by the party as a collectivity. For a party 
whose unity and sense of political identity depended in 
large part on its belief that it was 'about poverty' it 
is not an inpiring record. 
In retrospect it can be seen that the review of policy 
conducted by the Labour government between 1964-7 was 
critical. Everything that occurred after this review 
until the end of our period was shaped by this long, 
bitter and painful examination of the possibilities. 
Out of it came the programme that was eventually 
introduced as the Family Income Supplement by the 
Conservative government in 1970, while the Child 
Benefits scheme was prefigured by the emergence of 
claw-back as a conscious embodiment of a degree of 
fusion between taxation and benefits. The choice 
between universality and selectivity, the problem of 
funding family income support policy and the 
distribution of income within the family were all 
significant issues in this review process and they were 
to continue to dominate policy developments. 
One issue that appears not to have been at the forefront 
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of this review was the relationship between family 
income support policy and the labour market. and it was 
only gradually that the theoretical consequences for 
labour supply of some of the possibilities considered 
began to dawn. By the late 1960's opinion in the Labour 
Party, particularly in the parliamentary party, moved 
decisively in favour of some form of selectivity as the 
most appropriate principle and technique of resource 
allocation, with the theoretical model developed by 
Titmuss being particularly influential in this shift. 
The alleged unpopularity of universal Family Allowances. 
their cost, and their apparent wastefulness in giving 
help to families who apparently did not need it also 
helped to prepare the ground. As the Labour and 
Conservative parties vied with each other over which of 
them could be the most effectively selective. and as a 
Labour Cabinet only just defeated Callaghan's attempt to 
bring in F. I. S. 3there was an almost exactly 
contemporary realisation that means-tested programmes of 
assistance had the theoretical potential to distort 
labour supply. It could be said that the relationship 
between the labour market and family income support 
policy crept in by the back door rather than announced 
itself as a major question in its own right. Apart from 
one or two exceptions. the connection between work 
incentives and family benefits has been neglected by 
modern academics, politicans in general and the Labour 
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Party in particular. Amongst academics only Macnicol 
has made the issue a major feature of his analysis. 
This neglect is somewhat surprising given the importance 
of the matter for liberal political economists 
throughout the modern era. From Smith, Malthus and 
Nassan Senior through to Beveridge and Keynes there is a 
clear continuity of interest, a clear appreciation of 
the links between the two. Similarly, civil servants 
were always alive to the dangers of giving the low paid 
especially more in benefit than they could get from 
employment, and we have seen that it was this 
consideration that finally persuaded the bureaucracy to 
recommend the introduction of Family Allowances in the 
early 1940's. Incentives and reward for risk-taking 
were, and are, essential features of the economic 
philosophy of right wing parties, and the alleged 
insensitivity of the Labour Party to these phenomena 
was, and remains, an essential part of the right's 
critique of the Labour Party's economic and social 
policy. One of the things that this analysis of family 
income support policy has established is that the 
right's concern for work incentives never extended to 
the low-paid worker with dependent children, at least 
not when the right was in power. This is amply 
demonstrated by successive Conservative government's 
neglect of Family Allowances and the decision to 
implement F. I. S. as the best method of delivering help 
to those who earned their poverty. regardless of its 
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possible contribution to ensuring the permanent 
dependency of the low-paid with dependent children. 
What was Labour's response to an issue so central to the 
concerns of liberal political economy? Throughout the 
party's long and uneasy association with Family 
Allowances it never advocated them because of their 
contribution to work incentives as Beveridge and the 
civil service did. although it has to be said that by 
its use in government of the doctrine of 
substitutability it gave de facto support to the 
objective of making the gap in income between periods of 
earning and benefit dependency as large as possible. 
When the party advocated improvements in Family 
Allowances it did so because it regarded the programme 
as an effective measure against family poverty, and any 
doubts about the scheme generally revolved around its 
expense, its possible impact on collective bargaining, 
and its apparent unpopularity with the electorate. 
particularly Labour's working class base. While 
incentives played little or no part in the party's 
support for Family Allowances the same cannot be said 
about its opposition to the Conservative Party's 
proposals for extra, means-tested allowances for the 
low-paid, and the Heath government's introduction of 
F. I. S. In both those instances it was their 
disincentive characteristics that most excited Labour's 
opposition. Why should the party be silent about the 
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universal Family Allowances' theoretical contribution to 
work incentives and so vocal about the disincentive 
dimension of means-tested alternatives? 
Part of the answer to this question lies in the 
adjectives qualifying the respective initiatives. By 
definition, Family Allowances were paid to everyone with 
two or more dependent children, whilst selective Family 
Allowances and F. I. S. would only be paid if people 
satisfied an income test as well. Despite the party's 
conversion to a 'civilised' form of selectivity in the 
late 1960's, the very phrase 'means test' struck a deep 
and powerful emotion in the wider Labour movement. To 
the familiar litany of objections to selective social 
services such as low take-up, high administrative costs 
and stigmatisation could be added a new one: income 
related benefits carried with them high marginal tax 
rates and thus, potential disincentive consequences. 
The development of the poverty trap concept provided the 
Labour Party with an economic as well as moral arguments 
i 
against means testing, and it was one that could be used 
effectively against a Conservative Party which from the 
end of the 1960's under Heath's Leadership was becoming 
increasingly liberal in its economic philosophy. If 
high marginal tax rates were a barrier to 
entrepreneurial and executive talents, then the even 
higher marginal tax rates borne by the working poor, 
particularly after the implementation of F. I. S., must 
have threatened their attachment to the labour force. 
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Moreover the poverty trap issue was one which offered 
the Labour Party with considerable political mileage 
given the right's obsession with taxation and 
incentives, an opportunity that the party was not slow 
to exploit. 
In opposition the Labour Paty was certain of the 
objective existence of the poverty trap and scorned the 
government's claim that the problem was more apparent 
than real. However, after Harold Wilson formed his 
government in 1974 the poverty trap became another of 
those instances of role reversal which have 
characterised the Labour Party's periods of government 
and opposition since 1940. What the party's 
representatives regarded as an objective reality in 
opposition became much less certain and substantial 
between 1974-9. Ironic is possibly too mild a word to 
use to describe Labour ministers' almost verbatim 
repetition of the arguments advanced by their 
Conservative predecessors in their attempt to play down 
F 
the significance of something which they had formerly 
been so certain of. The poverty trap had become a 
statistical abstraction. 
Given that the introduction of F. I. S. in 1970 provided 
the Labour Party with its most powerful weapon in its 
articulation of the poverty trap, it is appropriate that 
the same programme should also give the party some of 
its most difficult moments between 1974-9. We have seen 
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how the Labour Party assumed that it would be able 
easily to dispense with F. I. S. as it brought the Child 
Benefit scheme into operation, but as the government 
became embroiled in the political debate surrounding 
Child Benefits it found F. I. S. to be a most useful 
policy instrument. The government's newly discovered 
attachment to F. I. S. and its scepticism about the 
poverty trap is well illustrated in the exchange of 
letters between Joel Barnett and the party's Social 
Services Sub-Committee. 
In many ways the events surrounding the introduction of 
Child Benefits were similar to the policy review carried 
out between 1964-7. The same issues were involved, the 
same or similar initiatives were suggested, and some of 
the same protagonists were present. Callaghan 
especially can be easily characterised as a continuing 
embodiment of that conservatism and male chauvinism that 
so enraged Crossman and later, Barbara Castle, while his 
and Really' s exploitation of the fears of a small but 
i 
important group of trade union leaders about the impact 
of Child Benefits on their members' net pay is a 
reminder of the suspicion that has constantly attended 
some union understanding of children's allowances. 
Perhaps a more potent factor circumscribing Labour 
government's development of family income support policy 
has been the dominance of Treasury orthodoxy in the 
policy making process. In the last twenty years or so 
Callaghan, Healey and Barnett have all been formidable 
opponents of generous universal forms of assistance. 
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In a sense this analysis of Labour's interpretation of 
the relationship between family income support policy 
and the labour market has been about the purposes and 
possibilities of political action within the British 
version of liberal democracy. Labour's record in 
opposition and government can be regarded as a bitter 
disappointment to anyone believing in the chances of 
economic and social change directed by the general 
philosophy of democratic socialism. Comparisons are 
often invidious, but compared with the advances in 
welfare capitalism secured by social democrats in 
Sweden, the record of the Labour Party over the years 
covered by this research is poor. Its commitment to 
state funded income support for the family has been 
ambivalent and inconsistent, and only in the preparation 
of the Child Benefit scheme was its policy reasonably 
well prepared. Even then important elements in the 
government were opposed to it. The Party has lacked a 
coherent and clearly articulated social policy of its 
own to set against the prevailing orthodoxies of liberal 
political economy. Faced with the starkest of choices 
between market values and family needs present in the 
wage-stop provision it talked a good fight in opposition 
and consistently refused the challenge when in power. 
The party's cowardice and prevarications about the wage- 
stop are appropriate symbols of its general failure to 
come to terms with the tensions and contradictions of 
welfare capitalism. 
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